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[Xmca-l] Re: Noumenal and Phenomenal



Martin:

Actually, it's the icon that is "first" for Peirce, but it's sometimes
pretty hard to tell what "firstness" means, because it's not really
equivalent to mediacy, which is the way most Vygotskyans are trained to
think. Instead, Peirce uses a set of thought experiments to distinguish
what comes first: "An icon is a represntamen whose representative quality
is a firstness of it as a first. That is a quality that it has qua thing
renders it fit to be a representament.". (Philosophical writings of Peirce,
J. Buchler ed., New York: Dover, p. 104).

Here's the passage of Peirce I find most useful:

"A sign is either an icon, an index or a symbol. An icon is a sign that
would possess the character which renders it significant even though its
object had no existence: such as a lead pencil streak representing a
geometrical line. An index is a sign which would,at once,lose the character
which makes it a sign if its object where removed, but would not lose that
character if there were no interpretant. Such,for instance, is a piece of
mould (i.e. particle board--DK) with a bullet hole in it as a sign of a
shot; for without the shot there would have been no hole,but there is a
hole there, whether anybody has the sense to attribute it to a shot or not.
A symbol is a sign which would lose the character which renders it a sign
if there were no interpretant. Such is any utterance of speech which
signifies what it does only by virtue of its being understood to have that
signification." (104).

So icons are "first" because they don't need an object to mean; indexes are
"second" because although they need an object, they don't need an
interpretant, and symbols are "third" because in order to mean they need an
object, and an interpretant. What is confusing to people is that this
doesn't create three distinct categories: a symbol has to also be some kind
of index and some kind of icon, and an index has to be an icon. So a foot
is a foot and it doesn't need any aim or goal or object to mean a foot. In
the same way, a foot print is a footprint, but it it's not just a
footprint: it also means that there was a foot there at one time,and that's
what makes it an index as well as an icon. Finally, the word "foot" or
"pied" or "jiao" is a sound, but it's not just a sound; it also means that
there was a speaking mouth, tongue, vocal cords, lungs and brain there at
one time, and these are what makes each spoken word an icon and an index as
well as a symbol.

David Kellogg
Macquarie University

On Mon, Jun 27, 2016 at 4:18 AM, Martin John Packer <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co
> wrote:

> Hi Larry,
>
> I though that Greg was asking whether it was not the case that the Ur-sign
> for LSV was the index, rather than the icon or symbol. I took this to be a
> reference to LSV’s frequent mention of the infant’s pointing - an indexical
> sign if ever that was one, since the gesture is literally done  with the
> index finger.
>
> As I understand it, for Peirce the index was basic, the icon more complex,
> and the symbol the most complex kind of sign.
>
> And for what it’s worth, I read Hegel (and many other phenomenologists) as
> aiming to describe the movement in consciousness from appearance to
> reality. Or perhaps better put, the movement from what seems real to what
> turns out to be the mere appearance of a deeper reality. For Hegel (for
> Marx, for LSV?), this movement never ends. (Well, there’s some debate over
> that claim, but let it stand for now!)
>
> > On Jun 26, 2016, at 2:08 PM, Lplarry <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > I hope this topic (noumenal and phenomenal) can continue.
> > Greg’s question if objects (and objectives) is the *ur* phenomenon for
> Vygotsky, and this model contrasting with Peirce’s triadic model where the
> objects ( *ur* phenomenon)  is one element of semiosis.
> >
> > I am going to introduce a quote from Hegel that  may add to this topic:
> >
> > “Philosophy is not meant to be a narration of happenings but a cognition
> of what is *true* in them, and further, on the basis of this cognition, to
> *comprehend* that which, in the narrative, appears as a mere happening.”
> >
> > Is this process of truth as the basis for *comprehending* noumenal or
> phenomenal?
> >
> > Sent from my Windows 10 phone
> >
> > From: Lplarry
>
>
>