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[Xmca-l] Re: Noumenal and Phenomenal

Hi Larry,

I though that Greg was asking whether it was not the case that the Ur-sign for LSV was the index, rather than the icon or symbol. I took this to be a reference to LSV’s frequent mention of the infant’s pointing - an indexical sign if ever that was one, since the gesture is literally done  with the index finger.

As I understand it, for Peirce the index was basic, the icon more complex, and the symbol the most complex kind of sign. 

And for what it’s worth, I read Hegel (and many other phenomenologists) as aiming to describe the movement in consciousness from appearance to reality. Or perhaps better put, the movement from what seems real to what turns out to be the mere appearance of a deeper reality. For Hegel (for Marx, for LSV?), this movement never ends. (Well, there’s some debate over that claim, but let it stand for now!)

> On Jun 26, 2016, at 2:08 PM, Lplarry <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
> I hope this topic (noumenal and phenomenal) can continue.
> Greg’s question if objects (and objectives) is the *ur* phenomenon for Vygotsky, and this model contrasting with Peirce’s triadic model where the objects ( *ur* phenomenon)  is one element of semiosis.
> I am going to introduce a quote from Hegel that  may add to this topic:
> “Philosophy is not meant to be a narration of happenings but a cognition of what is *true* in them, and further, on the basis of this cognition, to *comprehend* that which, in the narrative, appears as a mere happening.”
> Is this process of truth as the basis for *comprehending* noumenal or phenomenal?
> Sent from my Windows 10 phone
> From: Lplarry