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[Xmca-l] Re: Noumenal and Phenomenal


My short answer would be that Heidegger’s favorite example was the act of hammering. And his favorite bete noire was technology. So although ‘mediation’ is not a term that is used in Being & Time, at least in a conceptual sense, I would say that Heidegger was very aware of the phenomena that others use the term mediation to conceptualize.

I do have a longer answer too. But I need to see whether or not I have the time to write it.  :)


> On Jun 21, 2016, at 7:43 PM, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> wrote:
> Martin,
> This doesn't answer the question that Andy and I were raising, namely the
> issue of mediation and whether or not the phenomenological position that
> you embrace also embraces "mediation" as a concept. I will attempt to
> answer my question on your behalf (based on my reading of your book, The
> Science of Qualitative Research). I intend this as a provocation as much as
> an attempt to articulate some common ground so feel free to say "No, you've
> got it all wrong!"
> In your book you draw a distinction between epistemological and ontological
> construction. You note that Kant (as the villain) is interested in
> epistemological construction - i.e. the construction of representations.
> This leads to the noumenal/phenomenal distinction. Thus, although
> things-in-themselves are noumenal, the constructed representations of the
> world are phenomenal (and thus not of this world - or perhaps more
> playfully, "out of this world"?). The problem here is that in this
> conception of things, the world of things is made up of one type of thing
> and the world of ideas is made up of an altogether different thing.
> So I wonder then if there might be a similar distinction with regard to
> mediation - i.e., there is epistemological mediation and this is different
> from ontological mediation.
> The trouble is that as my hermeneutic phenomenologist friend Stephen
> Yanchar (he was one of Brent Slife's students) points out, mediation
> presupposes something that stands between two different kinds of thing -
> (e.g., the noumenal and the phenomenal?). Yanchar points to Heidegger's
> notion of disclosure or unconcealment as a more productive concept than
> mediation because it places the phenomenal back into the noumenal world.
> So I guess I've failed to answer my question, so I'll simply re-pose it:
> does "mediation" have a role in a non-dualistic hermeneutic phenomenology?
> Martin?
> -greg
> On Tue, Jun 21, 2016 at 10:32 PM, Martin John Packer <
> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote:
>> Well as I see it, hermeneutic phenomenology set out precisely to escape
>> from the Kantian (and Husserlian) distinction between the ‘world of
>> experience’ and ‘the real world.’ It insisted that we live *in* the world,
>> and are *of* the world. In my view, Vygotsky was attempting something
>> similar.
>> What “a prior property” are you referring to, James?
>> Martin
>>> On Jun 21, 2016, at 6:27 AM, Ma, James (james.ma@canterbury.ac.uk) <
>> james.ma@canterbury.ac.uk> wrote:
>>> The reason I brought up the Kantian distinction was somehow connected to
>> existentialism which has a direct bearing on hermeneutic phenomenology (the
>> a priori property of which has long been my interest). I've often had
>> something phenomenological at the back of my mind whenever my thoughts are
>> on Vygotsky's "non-classical" psychology - I wondered what your thoughts on
>> the relevance of phenomenology for CHAT might be, if any?
> -- 
> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> Assistant Professor
> Department of Anthropology
> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> Brigham Young University
> Provo, UT 84602
> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson