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[Xmca-l] Re: Noumenal and Phenomenal



James, perhaps you are thinking of transcendental phenomenology?  Hermeneutic phenomenology has a logic that is interpretive - not surprisingly, given the reference to Hermes, messenger of the gods, and interpreter of their messages.  In hermeneutic phenomenology, explication is “the articulation of the possibilities projected in understanding," and understanding always has the character of interpretation.

You are assuming, then, that there exist both ‘mind’ and ‘environment’?  ;)

Martin


> On Jun 21, 2016, at 9:42 AM, Ma, James (james.ma@canterbury.ac.uk) <james.ma@canterbury.ac.uk> wrote:
> 
> Martin, by "a priori property" I meant the deductive character of phenomenological inquires.
> 
> 
> By the way, I'm inclined to think that existentialism is quite in tune with Vygotsky since it takes the position that human action implies both mind and environment - e.g. according to Sartre, an individual is one who makes oneself of whatever is made of one.
> 
> 
> I'd very interested to hear your take on this.
> 
> 
> James
> 
> 
> ________________________________
> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> on behalf of Martin John Packer <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co>
> Sent: 21 June 2016 14:32
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Noumenal and Phenomenal
> 
> Well as I see it, hermeneutic phenomenology set out precisely to escape from the Kantian (and Husserlian) distinction between the 'world of experience' and 'the real world.' It insisted that we live *in* the world, and are *of* the world. In my view, Vygotsky was attempting something similar.
> 
> What "a prior property" are you referring to, James?
> 
> Martin
> 
>> On Jun 21, 2016, at 6:27 AM, Ma, James (james.ma@canterbury.ac.uk) <james.ma@canterbury.ac.uk> wrote:
>> 
>> The reason I brought up the Kantian distinction was somehow connected to existentialism which has a direct bearing on hermeneutic phenomenology (the a priori property of which has long been my interest). I've often had something phenomenological at the back of my mind whenever my thoughts are on Vygotsky's "non-classical" psychology - I wondered what your thoughts on the relevance of phenomenology for CHAT might be, if any?
> 
>