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> Today's Topics:
> 
>   1. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Andy Blunden)
>   2. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (?Haydi Zulfei? ?)
>   3. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (?Haydi Zulfei? ?)
>   4. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Huw Lloyd)
>   5. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Huw Lloyd)
>   6. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Andy Blunden)
>   7. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Huw Lloyd)
>   8. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Andy Blunden)
>   9. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Martin John Packer)
>  10. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Huw Lloyd)
>  11. Re: Digital game-based learning (Hugh O'Donnell)
>  12. Re: Digital game-based learning (Huw Lloyd)
>  13. Fwd: Request for Articles: Anti-Poverty Policy Innovations
>      (mike cole)
>  14. Re: Digital game-based learning (Hugh O'Donnell)
>  15.  missionaries and cannibals (Huw Lloyd)
>  16. Re: missionaries and cannibals (Huw Lloyd)
>  17.   What is the word (Annalisa Aguilar)
>  18. Re: What is the word (Huw Lloyd)
>  19. Re: What is the word (Annalisa Aguilar)
>  20. Re: What is the word (Huw Lloyd)
>  21. Re: What is the word (Huw Lloyd)
>  22. Re: What is the word (Annalisa Aguilar)
>  23. Re: missionaries and cannibals (mike cole)
>  24. Re: What is the word (Huw Lloyd)
>  25. Re: missionaries and cannibals (Huw Lloyd)
>  26. Re: What is the word (Annalisa Aguilar)
>  27. Re: What is the word (Huw Lloyd)
>  28. Re: What is the word (Annalisa Aguilar)
>  29.  Fwd:  Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (David Kellogg)
>  30. Re: What is the word (Huw Lloyd)
>  31.  help ! (?Haydi Zulfei? ?)
>  32. Re: help ! (Andy Blunden)
>  33. Re: help ! (Huw Lloyd)
>  34. Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Huw Lloyd)
>  35. Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Andy Blunden)
>  36. Re: help ! (?Haydi Zulfei? ?)
>  37.  Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (?Haydi Zulfei? ?)
>  38.  NYTimes.com: When Philosophy Lost Its Way (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe)
>  39. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Andy Blunden)
>  40. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (?Haydi Zulfei? ?)
>  41. Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
>      (?Haydi Zulfei? ?)
>  42. Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
>      (?Haydi Zulfei? ?)
>  43. Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
>      (?Haydi Zulfei? ?)
>  44. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (?Haydi Zulfei? ?)
>  45. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (?Haydi Zulfei? ?)
>  46. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (David Kellogg)
>  47. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Huw Lloyd)
>  48. [Lchc-l] A remarkable act of courage in American civil
>      discourse (Annalisa Aguilar)
>  49.   Beware Hysterical Librarians! (Annalisa Aguilar)
>  50. Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie phenomenon
>      (Susan Davis)
>  51.  Fwd: The Day Without Adjuncts at Northeastern
>      (Ana Marjanovic-Shane)
>  52. Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie
>      phenomenon (Andy Blunden)
>  53. Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie
>      phenomenon (Andy Blunden)
>  54. Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie
>      phenomenon (Glassman, Michael)
>  55. Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie
>      phenomenon (Annalisa Aguilar)
>  56. Re: Fwd: The Day Without Adjuncts at Northeastern (mike cole)
>  57. Re: Fwd: The Day Without Adjuncts at Northeastern (mike cole)
>  58. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (David Kellogg)
>  59. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Huw Lloyd)
>  60. Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie
>      phenomenon (Beth Ferholt)
>  61. Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie
>      phenomenon (Bruce Robinson)
>  62. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Greg Thompson)
>  63.  Society for Psychological Anthropology Vimeo page (Greg Thompson)
>  64. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Lplarry)
>  65.  Fwd: BSA Work, Employment and Society Conference 2016 - Call
>      for Papers (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe)
>  66. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (David Kellogg)
>  67. Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie
>      phenomenon (Susan Davis)
>  68. Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie
>      phenomenon (Annalisa Aguilar)
>  69. Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie
>      phenomenon (Annalisa Aguilar)
>  70. Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie
>      phenomenon (HENRY SHONERD)
>  71. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Huw Lloyd)
>  72. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Huw Lloyd)
>  73. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Lplarry)
>  74. Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4) (Martin John Packer)
>  75.  Fwd: Article (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe)
> 
> 
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> Message: 1
> Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 15:56:24 +1100
> From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> To: David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>,	"eXtended Mind, Culture,
> 	Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID: <569335F8.60907@mira.net>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed
> 
> My German is not good enough to decipher the usage in all 
> these instances, David.
> Of course, Hegel uses the word "moment" in all its modes, 
> and that includes "at that moment in the story." The 
> paradigmatic usage is with Individual, Particular and 
> Universal moments, which are not stages, etc., but as in the 
> page Martin found for us, inseparable aspects.  It is this 
> meaning which I find is generally the most troubling for people.
> 
> I should not have said "Hegel does not use ..." Culpa mea. 
> Hegel uses the word "moment" in all sorts of ways, yes.
> 
> Andy
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> On 11/01/2016 3:46 PM, David Kellogg wrote:
>> Actually, Andy, he does. Take a look at the attached file. 
>> Search it for "Momente". There are nearly three hundred 
>> instances, and the word "momente" is being used pretty 
>> much just the way Vygotsky uses it the Russian word "Moment".
>> 
>> Or save yourself some time, and just think. A lot of what 
>> Hegel is doing here is criticizing Kant. The idea of 
>> "Momente" and "Instanz" is central to Kant. How could 
>> Hegel not use it?
>> 
>> David Kellogg
>> Macquarie University
>> 
>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 9:10 AM, Andy Blunden 
>> <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
>> 
>>    Actually, Hegel does not use "moment" as meaning a
>>    stage, phase or step, David. He tends to use phase,
>>    category, stage or division for those concepts.
>> 
>>    Individual, Particular and Universal are typical
>>    examples of "moments" but these are not steps, phases
>>    or stages of the concepts, even though they are also
>>    exhibited in this way. Every concrete concept has all
>>    three moments. In a trade union, the members, the
>>    branches/divisions and the general secretary are
>>    individual, universal and particular moments. We
>>    cannot conceive of a union developing from an
>>    individual to a branch to a general secretary, can we?
>> 
>>    I will look into the origins of this expression. I
>>    have always just presumed it came from mathematics, as
>>    in the first, second, third, ... moments of a
>>    function, and I know Hegel did study this branch of
>>    mathematics, because he gives a lot of space to it in
>>    the Science of Logic in his critique of calculus. But
>>    I am probably quite wrong. I'll check.
>> 
>>    Andy
>>    ------------------------------------------------------------
>>    *Andy Blunden*
>>    http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>    <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>    On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote:
>> 
>>        Huw:
>> 
>>        Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even more often
>>        "moments", and the word
>>        "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a phase, or a
>>        step (as in the three
>>        "moments" of the formation of the concept in
>>        Hegel, as in "in itself", "for
>>        others", "for myself".
>> 
>>        One of the most difficult problems we had to solve
>>        in translating the
>>        Lectures on Pedology was that Vygotsky very
>>        clearly distinguishes three
>>        moments of speech development: indicative,
>>        nominative, and signifying.
>>        "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a pointing
>>        gesture. "Nominating" is
>>        ipso facto verbal, because it is the naming
>>        function: "every thing has a
>>        name". But "signifying" is much harder to pin
>>        down, and in one place
>>        Vygotsky actually says that it is synonymous with
>>        the adult understanding
>>        that anything can be named. So what is the
>>        difference between knowing that
>>        everything has a name and the knowledge that any
>>        thing can be named?
>> 
>>        I think that the distinction is just as subtle and
>>        just as significant
>>        as the distinction between pointing to something
>>        with a gesture, pointing
>>        to something with a word like "this" or "that",
>>        and pointing to something
>>        with a word like "apple" or "pear". If I say that
>>        "everything has a name",
>>        the name could be extremely general ("everything"
>>        or "thing") or it could
>>        be highly specific ("Huw" or "this computer"). But
>>        I don't yet have the
>>        idea that names are invented, and that therefore
>>        it is possible to name
>>        objects which do not exist, and therefore to bring
>>        into existence modes of
>>        pure abstract thinking through language. That's
>>        signifying, and it is
>>        indeed a new moment, or a new instant, in the
>>        lifelong process of speech
>>        development.
>> 
>>        David Kellogg
>>        Macquarie University
>> 
>>        On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd
>>        <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>>        <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>>
>>        wrote:
>> 
>>            Thank you, David. That helps to explain a
>>            particular aspect that I thought
>>            Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative,
>>            which is that stimuli can not
>>            only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they
>>            afford the kind of dynamics you
>>            have elucidated from Volkelt's schema.
>> 
>>            I have also noted that the translation of
>>            phrases like "instances of a
>>            process" is probably off the mark too.  What
>>            is really meant, I believe, is
>>            "instants of a process".  These have two
>>            rather different meanings from the
>>            perspective of thinking about processes.
>> 
>>            Best,
>>            Huw
>> 
>>            On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg
>>            <dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>            <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> 
>>                Huw:
>> 
>>                Here's what Vygotsky really says:
>> 
>>                ???? ?????? ?? ????????? ???????????? ???
>>                ???????, ?? ??????????? ? ???
>>                ???????????????? ??? ??????????? ????????.
>>                ? ???? ??????? ????????? ???
>>                ????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????,
>>                ???????????? ???????????.
>> 
>>            (Russian
>> 
>>                Collected Works, p. 117).
>> 
>>                This means (as nearly as I can make out):
>>                "If the task did not go beyond
>>                the natural capability of the child, he
>>                could deal with it in an
>> 
>>            unmediated
>> 
>>                or primitive method. In this cases, the
>>                structure of his behavior would
>> 
>>            be
>> 
>>                completely similar to the scheme as
>>                presented by Volkelt".
>> 
>>                I think there is no diagramme, at least
>>                not in the sense of a two
>>                dimensional graphic one can have a copy
>>                of. What Vygotsky is referring to
>>                is Volkelt's attempt to explain all child
>>                behavior as the result of an
>>                affectively tinged FUSION of perception
>>                and behavior, an affectively
>>                colored, unanalyzable, whole  in which
>>                perception and behavior were
>>                absolutely inseparable. This was what Hans
>>                Volkelt concluded from a
>> 
>>            series
>> 
>>                of experiments that Vygotsky refers to
>>                repeatedly, both in HDHMF and in
>> 
>>            the
>> 
>>                Lectures on Pedology and elswhere.
>> 
>>                What Volkelt did was this: he had four
>>                baby bottles: one shaped like a
>>                triangle, one like a violin, one like a
>>                square, etc. They were all
>>                different colors as well. But three of
>>                them didn't have holes in the
>> 
>>            teat:
>> 
>>                you could see and smell the milk but you
>>                couldn't drink it. One did. He
>>                taught the infants to associate the
>>                drinking of milk and the feeling of
>>                satiation with one particular bottle, so
>>                that they would actually ignore
>>                the bottle unless it had all the
>>                characteristics: triangularity,
>> 
>>            blueness,
>> 
>>                etc. So Volkelt argued that from the
>>                child's point of view, he was not
>>                drinking milk but triangular blue milk.
>>                This kind of "affectively colored
>>                whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as
>>                "Volkelt's scheme", or "Volkelt's
>>                schemata".
>> 
>>                Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He
>>                eventually decided that we never
>>                grow out of unanalyzable affectively
>>                colored perception-behavior wholes,
>>                and this would explain the indivisible and
>>                inseparable devotion of the
>>                German volk to their Fuhrer. So in later
>>                work Vygotsky is very careful to
>>                distance himself from Volkelt even in his
>>                explanations of infant
>> 
>>            behavior:
>> 
>>                in the Lectures on Pedology he argues that
>>                ALL THREE layers of behavior
>>                (that is, instinct, habit, and
>>                intelligence) are present in infancy.
>> 
>>                David Kellogg
>>                Macquarie University
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>                On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM, Huw Lloyd
>>                <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>>                <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>>
>>                wrote:
>> 
>>                    Does anyone have a copy of "Volkelt's
>>                    diagram" to hand that is referred
>> 
>>                to
>> 
>>                    in The History of the Development of
>>                    Higher Mental Functions (1997,
>> 
>>            p.85
>> 
>>                    and onwards in ch. 4)?  I don't think
>>                    a reference is given.
>> 
>>                    Best,
>>                    Huw
>> 
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 2
> Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 09:04:40 +0000 (UTC)
> From: ?Haydi Zulfei? ? 	<haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> To: "ablunden@mira.net" <ablunden@mira.net>,	David Kellogg
> 	<dkellogg60@gmail.com>,	"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
> 	<xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>,	"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
> 	<xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<982319424.4805893.1452503080147.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> 
> Dear all ,
> Look at this please !
> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a thought experiment: 1) The
> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its essence can be revealed
> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental transformations; 3) this same
> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which the object is
> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented as a process of
> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment essentially becomes a
> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only within this special
> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]]
> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , action , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate even componential . As I can think of it , it is?a point in a circular succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal instants . By definition , in?a round of activity , neither itself , nor action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or independence or invariability. At each point of succession or motionality , because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives ,?emotional?incentives or stimuation ,?each of the three could be converted in the other as we all have seen .?
> And there's an affinity in music domain .?A whole melody is played with all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . It's a whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable feeling?is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a particular part or stage?orietating on which this or that kind of affect or ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think of how to express it?and he might? finally resort to?imitation . Then , the philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note in whole composition or?in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on which such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state occurs . Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is said to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources for such qurries?but I can't give a locus now .?
> 
> 
> Best
> Haydi??
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 3
> Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 09:04:40 +0000 (UTC)
> From: ?Haydi Zulfei? ? 	<haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> To: "ablunden@mira.net" <ablunden@mira.net>,	David Kellogg
> 	<dkellogg60@gmail.com>,	"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
> 	<xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>,	"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
> 	<xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<982319424.4805893.1452503080147.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> 
> Dear all ,
> Look at this please !
> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a thought experiment: 1) The
> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its essence can be revealed
> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental transformations; 3) this same
> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which the object is
> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented as a process of
> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment essentially becomes a
> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only within this special
> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]]
> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , action , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate even componential . As I can think of it , it is?a point in a circular succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal instants . By definition , in?a round of activity , neither itself , nor action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or independence or invariability. At each point of succession or motionality , because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives ,?emotional?incentives or stimuation ,?each of the three could be converted in the other as we all have seen .?
> And there's an affinity in music domain .?A whole melody is played with all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . It's a whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable feeling?is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a particular part or stage?orietating on which this or that kind of affect or ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think of how to express it?and he might? finally resort to?imitation . Then , the philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note in whole composition or?in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on which such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state occurs . Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is said to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources for such qurries?but I can't give a locus now .?
> 
> 
> Best
> Haydi??
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 4
> Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 11:23:19 +0000
> From: Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<CAG1MBOGnmxG3_NnfjgmnpVc_TXTT22XLjiWnzd+XzPBxz7AkHA@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> Hi Martin,
> 
> I don't think the usage of 'moment' in the link connects in a
> straightforward way with its usage in the HMF volume.
> 
> I would also like to say that this notion of wholes and moments presented
> in the blog is incomplete and incorrect.  For example, the assertion "You
> don?t take the color away from the mac mouse to study it in another room"
> is obviously false in the sense that you can walk into another room and
> recall the experience of its colour.  Likewise the notion of a 'whole' that
> is presented is rather crass, as if being an object that one can heft
> somehow qualified it as being independent.
> 
> Best,
> Huw
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On 11 January 2016 at 01:20, Martin John Packer <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co>
> wrote:
> 
>> The term "moment" has been used extensively in phenomenology.  Here is an
>> accessible account of the basics:
>> 
>> <
>> https://barebonescommunication.wordpress.com/2009/10/21/kleingeld-phenomenology-pieces-and-moments/
>>> 
>> 
>> Martin
>> 
>> On Jan 10, 2016, at 7:23 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>> 
>>> The theoretical point seems interesting and worth clarifying. The
>> differing
>>> interpretations have quite different implications.
>>> mike
>>> 
>>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:10 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> Actually, Hegel does not use "moment" as meaning a stage, phase or step,
>>>> David. He tends to use phase, category, stage or division for those
>>>> concepts.
>>>> 
>>>> Individual, Particular and Universal are typical examples of "moments"
>> but
>>>> these are not steps, phases or stages of the concepts, even though they
>> are
>>>> also exhibited in this way. Every concrete concept has all three
>> moments.
>>>> In a trade union, the members, the branches/divisions and the general
>>>> secretary are individual, universal and particular moments. We cannot
>>>> conceive of a union developing from an individual to a branch to a
>> general
>>>> secretary, can we?
>>>> 
>>>> I will look into the origins of this expression. I have always just
>>>> presumed it came from mathematics, as in the first, second, third, ...
>>>> moments of a function, and I know Hegel did study this branch of
>>>> mathematics, because he gives a lot of space to it in the Science of
>> Logic
>>>> in his critique of calculus. But I am probably quite wrong. I'll check.
>>>> 
>>>> Andy
>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>> On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> Huw:
>>>>> 
>>>>> Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even more often "moments", and the
>> word
>>>>> "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a phase, or a step (as in the
>> three
>>>>> "moments" of the formation of the concept in Hegel, as in "in itself",
>>>>> "for
>>>>> others", "for myself".
>>>>> 
>>>>> One of the most difficult problems we had to solve in translating the
>>>>> Lectures on Pedology was that Vygotsky very clearly distinguishes three
>>>>> moments of speech development: indicative, nominative, and signifying.
>>>>> "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a pointing gesture.
>> "Nominating" is
>>>>> ipso facto verbal, because it is the naming function: "every thing has
>> a
>>>>> name". But "signifying" is much harder to pin down, and in one place
>>>>> Vygotsky actually says that it is synonymous with the adult
>> understanding
>>>>> that anything can be named. So what is the difference between knowing
>> that
>>>>> everything has a name and the knowledge that any thing can be named?
>>>>> 
>>>>> I think that the distinction is just as subtle and just as significant
>>>>> as the distinction between pointing to something with a gesture,
>> pointing
>>>>> to something with a word like "this" or "that", and pointing to
>> something
>>>>> with a word like "apple" or "pear". If I say that "everything has a
>> name",
>>>>> the name could be extremely general ("everything" or "thing") or it
>> could
>>>>> be highly specific ("Huw" or "this computer"). But I don't yet have the
>>>>> idea that names are invented, and that therefore it is possible to name
>>>>> objects which do not exist, and therefore to bring into existence
>> modes of
>>>>> pure abstract thinking through language. That's signifying, and it is
>>>>> indeed a new moment, or a new instant, in the lifelong process of
>> speech
>>>>> development.
>>>>> 
>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>> Macquarie University
>>>>> 
>>>>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> Thank you, David. That helps to explain a particular aspect that I
>> thought
>>>>>> Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative, which is that stimuli can
>> not
>>>>>> only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they afford the kind of dynamics
>>>>>> you
>>>>>> have elucidated from Volkelt's schema.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I have also noted that the translation of phrases like "instances of a
>>>>>> process" is probably off the mark too.  What is really meant, I
>> believe,
>>>>>> is
>>>>>> "instants of a process".  These have two rather different meanings
>> from
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> perspective of thinking about processes.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Best,
>>>>>> Huw
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Huw:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Here's what Vygotsky really says:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> ???? ?????? ?? ????????? ???????????? ??? ???????, ?? ??????????? ?
>> ???
>>>>>>> ???????????????? ??? ??????????? ????????. ? ???? ??????? ?????????
>> ???
>>>>>>> ????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????, ???????????? ???????????.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> (Russian
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Collected Works, p. 117).
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> This means (as nearly as I can make out): "If the task did not go
>> beyond
>>>>>>> the natural capability of the child, he could deal with it in an
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> unmediated
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> or primitive method. In this cases, the structure of his behavior
>> would
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> be
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> completely similar to the scheme as presented by Volkelt".
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> I think there is no diagramme, at least not in the sense of a two
>>>>>>> dimensional graphic one can have a copy of. What Vygotsky is
>> referring
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>> is Volkelt's attempt to explain all child behavior as the result of
>> an
>>>>>>> affectively tinged FUSION of perception and behavior, an affectively
>>>>>>> colored, unanalyzable, whole  in which perception and behavior were
>>>>>>> absolutely inseparable. This was what Hans Volkelt concluded from a
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> series
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> of experiments that Vygotsky refers to repeatedly, both in HDHMF and
>> in
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Lectures on Pedology and elswhere.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> What Volkelt did was this: he had four baby bottles: one shaped like
>> a
>>>>>>> triangle, one like a violin, one like a square, etc. They were all
>>>>>>> different colors as well. But three of them didn't have holes in the
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> teat:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> you could see and smell the milk but you couldn't drink it. One did.
>> He
>>>>>>> taught the infants to associate the drinking of milk and the feeling
>> of
>>>>>>> satiation with one particular bottle, so that they would actually
>> ignore
>>>>>>> the bottle unless it had all the characteristics: triangularity,
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> blueness,
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> etc. So Volkelt argued that from the child's point of view, he was
>> not
>>>>>>> drinking milk but triangular blue milk. This kind of "affectively
>>>>>>> colored
>>>>>>> whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as "Volkelt's scheme", or
>> "Volkelt's
>>>>>>> schemata".
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He eventually decided that we
>> never
>>>>>>> grow out of unanalyzable affectively colored perception-behavior
>> wholes,
>>>>>>> and this would explain the indivisible and inseparable devotion of
>> the
>>>>>>> German volk to their Fuhrer. So in later work Vygotsky is very
>> careful
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>> distance himself from Volkelt even in his explanations of infant
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> behavior:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> in the Lectures on Pedology he argues that ALL THREE layers of
>> behavior
>>>>>>> (that is, instinct, habit, and intelligence) are present in infancy.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>> Macquarie University
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM, Huw Lloyd <
>> huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Does anyone have a copy of "Volkelt's diagram" to hand that is
>> referred
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> in The History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions (1997,
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> p.85
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> and onwards in ch. 4)?  I don't think a reference is given.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Best,
>>>>>>>> Huw
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> --
>>> 
>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an
>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
>> 
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 5
> Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 12:08:12 +0000
> From: Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> To: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>,	"eXtended Mind, Culture,
> 	Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<CAG1MBOEn3N=RqNF=JwYDFCOnWy55_cpuMhpoCeS4Mn8qvk5WhA@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> Is torque being used here in the sense that the moon influences the tides?
> E.g. conceiving stages as pendulum like things that, when, considered
> together may appear as 'torque' applied to a base form.  If so, then
> perhaps the meaning may be the same overall, i.e. a moment from one aspect
> appearing as torque in another.
> 
> Best,
> Huw
> 
> On 11 January 2016 at 01:59, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> 
>> According to the Oxford English Dictionary, in sense 9. "moment" means "An
>> essential element or significant aspect of a complex conceptual entity"
>> first used in a translation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in 1838.
>> But the OED also refers to "moment" in meaning 8c as "torque," so I guess
>> that exposes a bit of Cole word play going on there, yes?
>> Andy
>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>> *Andy Blunden*
>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>> On 11/01/2016 12:36 PM, mike cole wrote:
>> 
>>> I found Martin's blog entry helpful, Andy. Still working on the
>>> phenomenology of the usage. I think the form of part-whole relation is what
>>> is at issue and "moments" in this sense are qualitatively distinct, marked,
>>> events. Events whose conventional meaning is torqued by the exception.
>>> 
>>> still learning!
>>> mike
>>> 
>>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 5:29 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:
>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
>>> 
>>>    I am not at all clear about the context here, Mike.
>>>    Huw mentioned Vygotsky using "instances" which he
>>>    thought should have been "instants" and then David
>>>    introduced "moments" and Hegel's use of "moments,"
>>>    which was the subject of my comment.
>>> 
>>>    I did a search of "Thinking and Speech" and found that
>>>    all bar one instance of the use of the word "moment"
>>>    were in the sense of "at this moment in the story ..."
>>>    The one odd reference is this one:
>>> 
>>>       "We have consistently taken a genetic approach to the
>>>       analysis of our problem. We have, however, attempted to
>>>       represent the *moments* of this genetic process in
>>>    their
>>>       mature, classic forms. The inevitable result is that we
>>>       have diverged from the complex and twisting path that
>>>       characterizes the actual development of the child?s
>>>       concepts."
>>> 
>>>    It is possible that Vygotsky refers with "moment" here
>>>    to the distinct modes of conception which were
>>>    manifested in the child's activity, at different
>>>    stages, but which are combined in the most developed
>>>    pseudoconcept. It is a fact that associative
>>>    complexes, collection complexes, chain complexes,
>>>    diffuse complexes, and pseudocomplexes could not
>>>    possibly manifest themselves as successive stages.
>>>    Perhaps their *first appearance* in ontogenesis could
>>>    form some kind of regular sequence, possibly, but it
>>>    is also possible that Vygotsky saw these forms of
>>>    association as "moments" of concept formation in the
>>>    other sense of the word "moment" which is not
>>>    interchangeable with "instant". But I couldn't say for
>>>    sure.
>>> 
>>>    Andy
>>> 
>>>    ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>    *Andy Blunden*
>>>    http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>    <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>>    On 11/01/2016 11:23 AM, mike cole wrote:
>>> 
>>>        The theoretical point seems interesting and worth
>>>        clarifying. The differing interpretations have
>>>        quite different implications.
>>>        mike
>>> 
>>>        On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:10 PM, Andy Blunden
>>>        <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
>>>        <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
>>> 
>>>        <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> wrote:
>>> 
>>>            Actually, Hegel does not use "moment" as meaning a
>>>            stage, phase or step, David. He tends to use
>>>        phase,
>>>            category, stage or division for those concepts.
>>> 
>>>            Individual, Particular and Universal are typical
>>>            examples of "moments" but these are not steps,
>>>        phases
>>>            or stages of the concepts, even though they
>>>        are also
>>>            exhibited in this way. Every concrete concept
>>>        has all
>>>            three moments. In a trade union, the members, the
>>>            branches/divisions and the general secretary are
>>>            individual, universal and particular moments. We
>>>            cannot conceive of a union developing from an
>>>            individual to a branch to a general secretary,
>>>        can we?
>>> 
>>>            I will look into the origins of this expression. I
>>>            have always just presumed it came from
>>>        mathematics, as
>>>            in the first, second, third, ... moments of a
>>>            function, and I know Hegel did study this
>>>        branch of
>>>            mathematics, because he gives a lot of space
>>>        to it in
>>>            the Science of Logic in his critique of
>>>        calculus. But
>>>            I am probably quite wrong. I'll check.
>>> 
>>>            Andy
>>>        ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>            *Andy Blunden*
>>>        http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>        <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>>            <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>> 
>>>            On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote:
>>> 
>>>                Huw:
>>> 
>>>                Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even
>>>        more often
>>>                "moments", and the word
>>>                "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a
>>>        phase, or a
>>>                step (as in the three
>>>                "moments" of the formation of the concept in
>>>                Hegel, as in "in itself", "for
>>>                others", "for myself".
>>> 
>>>                One of the most difficult problems we had
>>>        to solve
>>>                in translating the
>>>                Lectures on Pedology was that Vygotsky very
>>>                clearly distinguishes three
>>>                moments of speech development: indicative,
>>>                nominative, and signifying.
>>>                "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a
>>>        pointing
>>>                gesture. "Nominating" is
>>>                ipso facto verbal, because it is the naming
>>>                function: "every thing has a
>>>                name". But "signifying" is much harder to pin
>>>                down, and in one place
>>>                Vygotsky actually says that it is
>>>        synonymous with
>>>                the adult understanding
>>>                that anything can be named. So what is the
>>>                difference between knowing that
>>>                everything has a name and the knowledge
>>>        that any
>>>                thing can be named?
>>> 
>>>                I think that the distinction is just as
>>>        subtle and
>>>                just as significant
>>>                as the distinction between pointing to
>>>        something
>>>                with a gesture, pointing
>>>                to something with a word like "this" or
>>>        "that",
>>>                and pointing to something
>>>                with a word like "apple" or "pear". If I
>>>        say that
>>>                "everything has a name",
>>>                the name could be extremely general
>>>        ("everything"
>>>                or "thing") or it could
>>>                be highly specific ("Huw" or "this
>>>        computer"). But
>>>                I don't yet have the
>>>                idea that names are invented, and that
>>>        therefore
>>>                it is possible to name
>>>                objects which do not exist, and therefore
>>>        to bring
>>>                into existence modes of
>>>                pure abstract thinking through language.
>>>        That's
>>>                signifying, and it is
>>>                indeed a new moment, or a new instant, in the
>>>                lifelong process of speech
>>>                development.
>>> 
>>>                David Kellogg
>>>                Macquarie University
>>> 
>>>                On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd
>>>                <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>>>        <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>>>                <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>>>        <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>>>
>>>                wrote:
>>> 
>>>                    Thank you, David. That helps to explain a
>>>                    particular aspect that I thought
>>>                    Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative,
>>>                    which is that stimuli can not
>>>                    only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they
>>>                    afford the kind of dynamics you
>>>                    have elucidated from Volkelt's schema.
>>> 
>>>                    I have also noted that the translation of
>>>                    phrases like "instances of a
>>>                    process" is probably off the mark
>>>        too.  What
>>>                    is really meant, I believe, is
>>>                    "instants of a process".  These have two
>>>                    rather different meanings from the
>>>                    perspective of thinking about processes.
>>> 
>>>                    Best,
>>>                    Huw
>>> 
>>>                    On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg
>>>                    <dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>>        <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>>                    <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>> 
>>>        <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>>> wrote:
>>> 
>>>                        Huw:
>>> 
>>>                        Here's what Vygotsky really says:
>>> 
>>>                        ???? ?????? ?? ?????????
>>>        ???????????? ???
>>>                        ???????, ?? ??????????? ? ???
>>>                        ???????????????? ??? ???????????
>>>        ????????.
>>>                        ? ???? ??????? ????????? ???
>>>                        ????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????,
>>>                        ???????????? ???????????.
>>> 
>>>                    (Russian
>>> 
>>>                        Collected Works, p. 117).
>>> 
>>>                        This means (as nearly as I can
>>>        make out):
>>>                        "If the task did not go beyond
>>>                        the natural capability of the
>>>        child, he
>>>                        could deal with it in an
>>> 
>>>                    unmediated
>>> 
>>>                        or primitive method. In this
>>>        cases, the
>>>                        structure of his behavior would
>>> 
>>>                    be
>>> 
>>>                        completely similar to the scheme as
>>>                        presented by Volkelt".
>>> 
>>>                        I think there is no diagramme, at
>>>        least
>>>                        not in the sense of a two
>>>                        dimensional graphic one can have a
>>>        copy
>>>                        of. What Vygotsky is referring to
>>>                        is Volkelt's attempt to explain
>>>        all child
>>>                        behavior as the result of an
>>>                        affectively tinged FUSION of
>>>        perception
>>>                        and behavior, an affectively
>>>                        colored, unanalyzable, whole  in which
>>>                        perception and behavior were
>>>                        absolutely inseparable. This was
>>>        what Hans
>>>                        Volkelt concluded from a
>>> 
>>>                    series
>>> 
>>>                        of experiments that Vygotsky refers to
>>>                        repeatedly, both in HDHMF and in
>>> 
>>>                    the
>>> 
>>>                        Lectures on Pedology and elswhere.
>>> 
>>>                        What Volkelt did was this: he had four
>>>                        baby bottles: one shaped like a
>>>                        triangle, one like a violin, one
>>>        like a
>>>                        square, etc. They were all
>>>                        different colors as well. But three of
>>>                        them didn't have holes in the
>>> 
>>>                    teat:
>>> 
>>>                        you could see and smell the milk
>>>        but you
>>>                        couldn't drink it. One did. He
>>>                        taught the infants to associate the
>>>                        drinking of milk and the feeling of
>>>                        satiation with one particular
>>>        bottle, so
>>>                        that they would actually ignore
>>>                        the bottle unless it had all the
>>>                        characteristics: triangularity,
>>> 
>>>                    blueness,
>>> 
>>>                        etc. So Volkelt argued that from the
>>>                        child's point of view, he was not
>>>                        drinking milk but triangular blue
>>>        milk.
>>>                        This kind of "affectively colored
>>>                        whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as
>>>                        "Volkelt's scheme", or "Volkelt's
>>>                        schemata".
>>> 
>>>                        Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He
>>>                        eventually decided that we never
>>>                        grow out of unanalyzable affectively
>>>                        colored perception-behavior wholes,
>>>                        and this would explain the
>>>        indivisible and
>>>                        inseparable devotion of the
>>>                        German volk to their Fuhrer. So in
>>>        later
>>>                        work Vygotsky is very careful to
>>>                        distance himself from Volkelt even
>>>        in his
>>>                        explanations of infant
>>> 
>>>                    behavior:
>>> 
>>>                        in the Lectures on Pedology he
>>>        argues that
>>>                        ALL THREE layers of behavior
>>>                        (that is, instinct, habit, and
>>>                        intelligence) are present in infancy.
>>> 
>>>                        David Kellogg
>>>                        Macquarie University
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>                        On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM,
>>>        Huw Lloyd
>>>                        <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>>>        <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>>>                        <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>>>        <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>>>
>>>                        wrote:
>>> 
>>>                            Does anyone have a copy of
>>>        "Volkelt's
>>>                            diagram" to hand that is referred
>>> 
>>>                        to
>>> 
>>>                            in The History of the
>>>        Development of
>>>                            Higher Mental Functions (1997,
>>> 
>>>                    p.85
>>> 
>>>                            and onwards in ch. 4)?  I
>>>        don't think
>>>                            a reference is given.
>>> 
>>>                            Best,
>>>                            Huw
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>        --
>>>        It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a
>>>        natural science with an
>>>        object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> --
>>> 
>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an
>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 6
> Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 23:17:56 +1100
> From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> To: Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>,	"eXtended Mind, Culture,
> 	Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID: <56939D74.6030605@mira.net>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed
> 
> No all the science-related meanings are derived from either 
> Integral of f(x) * (x to power n). Torque is related to 
> angular momentum which is an integral of mass* distance from 
> axis.
> The interpreation this leads to is that each "moment" 
> expresses a property of the whole function. A function can 
> be represented either by a series of values for each x, or 
> by the series of moments. The zero-th moment is the total 
> mass, the first moment is the "torque". Higher moments arise 
> when you are dealing with flexible systems, or dynamic 
> systems with inertia.
> 
> YOu also get the term arising with power series, I think, 
> which is a kind of inverse of the above.
> 
> yada yada yada,
> 
> Andy
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> On 11/01/2016 11:08 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote:
>> Is torque being used here in the sense that the moon 
>> influences the tides? E.g. conceiving stages as pendulum 
>> like things that, when, considered together may appear as 
>> 'torque' applied to a base form.  If so, then perhaps the 
>> meaning may be the same overall, i.e. a moment from one 
>> aspect appearing as torque in another.
>> 
>> Best,
>> Huw
>> 
>> On 11 January 2016 at 01:59, Andy Blunden 
>> <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
>> 
>>    According to the Oxford English Dictionary, in sense
>>    9. "moment" means "An essential element or significant
>>    aspect of a complex conceptual entity" first used in a
>>    translation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in 1838.
>>    But the OED also refers to "moment" in meaning 8c as
>>    "torque," so I guess that exposes a bit of Cole word
>>    play going on there, yes?
>>    Andy
>>    ------------------------------------------------------------
>>    *Andy Blunden*
>>    http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>    <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>    On 11/01/2016 12:36 PM, mike cole wrote:
>> 
>>        I found Martin's blog entry helpful, Andy. Still
>>        working on the phenomenology of the usage. I think
>>        the form of part-whole relation is what is at
>>        issue and "moments" in this sense are
>>        qualitatively distinct, marked, events. Events
>>        whose conventional meaning is torqued by the
>>        exception.
>> 
>>        still learning!
>>        mike
>> 
>>        On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 5:29 PM, Andy Blunden
>>        <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
>>        <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
>>        <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> wrote:
>> 
>>            I am not at all clear about the context here,
>>        Mike.
>>            Huw mentioned Vygotsky using "instances" which he
>>            thought should have been "instants" and then David
>>            introduced "moments" and Hegel's use of "moments,"
>>            which was the subject of my comment.
>> 
>>            I did a search of "Thinking and Speech" and
>>        found that
>>            all bar one instance of the use of the word
>>        "moment"
>>            were in the sense of "at this moment in the
>>        story ..."
>>            The one odd reference is this one:
>> 
>>               "We have consistently taken a genetic
>>        approach to the
>>               analysis of our problem. We have, however,
>>        attempted to
>>               represent the *moments* of this genetic
>>        process in
>>            their
>>               mature, classic forms. The inevitable
>>        result is that we
>>               have diverged from the complex and twisting
>>        path that
>>               characterizes the actual development of the
>>        child?s
>>               concepts."
>> 
>>            It is possible that Vygotsky refers with
>>        "moment" here
>>            to the distinct modes of conception which were
>>            manifested in the child's activity, at different
>>            stages, but which are combined in the most
>>        developed
>>            pseudoconcept. It is a fact that associative
>>            complexes, collection complexes, chain complexes,
>>            diffuse complexes, and pseudocomplexes could not
>>            possibly manifest themselves as successive stages.
>>            Perhaps their *first appearance* in
>>        ontogenesis could
>>            form some kind of regular sequence, possibly,
>>        but it
>>            is also possible that Vygotsky saw these forms of
>>            association as "moments" of concept formation
>>        in the
>>            other sense of the word "moment" which is not
>>            interchangeable with "instant". But I couldn't
>>        say for
>>            sure.
>> 
>>            Andy
>> 
>>        ------------------------------------------------------------
>>            *Andy Blunden*
>>        http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>        <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>            <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>            On 11/01/2016 11:23 AM, mike cole wrote:
>> 
>>                The theoretical point seems interesting
>>        and worth
>>                clarifying. The differing interpretations have
>>                quite different implications.
>>                mike
>> 
>>                On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:10 PM, Andy Blunden
>>                <ablunden@mira.net
>>        <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
>>        <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
>>                <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
>>        <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
>> 
>>                <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
>>        <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>>> wrote:
>> 
>>                    Actually, Hegel does not use "moment"
>>        as meaning a
>>                    stage, phase or step, David. He tends
>>        to use
>>                phase,
>>                    category, stage or division for those
>>        concepts.
>> 
>>                    Individual, Particular and Universal
>>        are typical
>>                    examples of "moments" but these are
>>        not steps,
>>                phases
>>                    or stages of the concepts, even though
>>        they
>>                are also
>>                    exhibited in this way. Every concrete
>>        concept
>>                has all
>>                    three moments. In a trade union, the
>>        members, the
>>                    branches/divisions and the general
>>        secretary are
>>                    individual, universal and particular
>>        moments. We
>>                    cannot conceive of a union developing
>>        from an
>>                    individual to a branch to a general
>>        secretary,
>>                can we?
>> 
>>                    I will look into the origins of this
>>        expression. I
>>                    have always just presumed it came from
>>                mathematics, as
>>                    in the first, second, third, ...
>>        moments of a
>>                    function, and I know Hegel did study this
>>                branch of
>>                    mathematics, because he gives a lot of
>>        space
>>                to it in
>>                    the Science of Logic in his critique of
>>                calculus. But
>>                    I am probably quite wrong. I'll check.
>> 
>>                    Andy
>>        ------------------------------------------------------------
>>                    *Andy Blunden*
>>        http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>        <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>                <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>                    <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>> 
>>                    On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg
>>        wrote:
>> 
>>                        Huw:
>> 
>>                        Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even
>>                more often
>>                        "moments", and the word
>>                        "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a
>>                phase, or a
>>                        step (as in the three
>>                        "moments" of the formation of the
>>        concept in
>>                        Hegel, as in "in itself", "for
>>                        others", "for myself".
>> 
>>                        One of the most difficult problems
>>        we had
>>                to solve
>>                        in translating the
>>                        Lectures on Pedology was that
>>        Vygotsky very
>>                        clearly distinguishes three
>>                        moments of speech development:
>>        indicative,
>>                        nominative, and signifying.
>>                        "Indicative" is often non-verbal,
>>        e.g. a
>>                pointing
>>                        gesture. "Nominating" is
>>                        ipso facto verbal, because it is
>>        the naming
>>                        function: "every thing has a
>>                        name". But "signifying" is much
>>        harder to pin
>>                        down, and in one place
>>                        Vygotsky actually says that it is
>>                synonymous with
>>                        the adult understanding
>>                        that anything can be named. So
>>        what is the
>>                        difference between knowing that
>>                        everything has a name and the
>>        knowledge
>>                that any
>>                        thing can be named?
>> 
>>                        I think that the distinction is
>>        just as
>>                subtle and
>>                        just as significant
>>                        as the distinction between pointing to
>>                something
>>                        with a gesture, pointing
>>                        to something with a word like
>>        "this" or
>>                "that",
>>                        and pointing to something
>>                        with a word like "apple" or
>>        "pear". If I
>>                say that
>>                        "everything has a name",
>>                        the name could be extremely general
>>                ("everything"
>>                        or "thing") or it could
>>                        be highly specific ("Huw" or "this
>>                computer"). But
>>                        I don't yet have the
>>                        idea that names are invented, and that
>>                therefore
>>                        it is possible to name
>>                        objects which do not exist, and
>>        therefore
>>                to bring
>>                        into existence modes of
>>                        pure abstract thinking through
>>        language.
>>                That's
>>                        signifying, and it is
>>                        indeed a new moment, or a new
>>        instant, in the
>>                        lifelong process of speech
>>                        development.
>> 
>>                        David Kellogg
>>                        Macquarie University
>> 
>>                        On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM,
>>        Huw Lloyd
>>                        <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>>        <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>>                <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>>        <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>>
>>                        <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>>        <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>>                <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>>        <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>>>>
>>                        wrote:
>> 
>>                            Thank you, David. That helps
>>        to explain a
>>                            particular aspect that I thought
>>                            Vygotsky was overlooking in
>>        the narrative,
>>                            which is that stimuli can not
>>                            only signify but also
>>        symbolise, i.e. they
>>                            afford the kind of dynamics you
>>                            have elucidated from Volkelt's
>>        schema.
>> 
>>                            I have also noted that the
>>        translation of
>>                            phrases like "instances of a
>>                            process" is probably off the mark
>>                too.  What
>>                            is really meant, I believe, is
>>                            "instants of a process". 
>>        These have two
>>                            rather different meanings from the
>>                            perspective of thinking about
>>        processes.
>> 
>>                            Best,
>>                            Huw
>> 
>>                            On 10 January 2016 at 06:02,
>>        David Kellogg
>>                            <dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>        <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>                <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>        <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>>
>>                            <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>        <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>> 
>>                <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>        <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>>>> wrote:
>> 
>>                                Huw:
>> 
>>                                Here's what Vygotsky
>>        really says:
>> 
>>                                ???? ?????? ?? ?????????
>>                ???????????? ???
>>                                ???????, ?? ??????????? ? ???
>>                                ???????????????? ???
>>        ???????????
>>                ????????.
>>                                ? ???? ??????? ????????? ???
>>                                ????????? ??????????
>>        ?????????? ?????,
>>                                ???????????? ???????????.
>> 
>>                            (Russian
>> 
>>                                Collected Works, p. 117).
>> 
>>                                This means (as nearly as I can
>>                make out):
>>                                "If the task did not go beyond
>>                                the natural capability of the
>>                child, he
>>                                could deal with it in an
>> 
>>                            unmediated
>> 
>>                                or primitive method. In this
>>                cases, the
>>                                structure of his behavior
>>        would
>> 
>>                            be
>> 
>>                                completely similar to the
>>        scheme as
>>                                presented by Volkelt".
>> 
>>                                I think there is no
>>        diagramme, at
>>                least
>>                                not in the sense of a two
>>                                dimensional graphic one
>>        can have a
>>                copy
>>                                of. What Vygotsky is
>>        referring to
>>                                is Volkelt's attempt to
>>        explain
>>                all child
>>                                behavior as the result of an
>>                                affectively tinged FUSION of
>>                perception
>>                                and behavior, an affectively
>>                                colored, unanalyzable,
>>        whole in which
>>                                perception and behavior were
>>                                absolutely inseparable.
>>        This was
>>                what Hans
>>                                Volkelt concluded from a
>> 
>>                            series
>> 
>>                                of experiments that
>>        Vygotsky refers to
>>                                repeatedly, both in HDHMF
>>        and in
>> 
>>                            the
>> 
>>                                Lectures on Pedology and
>>        elswhere.
>> 
>>                                What Volkelt did was this:
>>        he had four
>>                                baby bottles: one shaped
>>        like a
>>                                triangle, one like a
>>        violin, one
>>                like a
>>                                square, etc. They were all
>>                                different colors as well.
>>        But three of
>>                                them didn't have holes in the
>> 
>>                            teat:
>> 
>>                                you could see and smell
>>        the milk
>>                but you
>>                                couldn't drink it. One did. He
>>                                taught the infants to
>>        associate the
>>                                drinking of milk and the
>>        feeling of
>>                                satiation with one particular
>>                bottle, so
>>                                that they would actually
>>        ignore
>>                                the bottle unless it had
>>        all the
>>                                characteristics:
>>        triangularity,
>> 
>>                            blueness,
>> 
>>                                etc. So Volkelt argued
>>        that from the
>>                                child's point of view, he
>>        was not
>>                                drinking milk but
>>        triangular blue
>>                milk.
>>                                This kind of "affectively
>>        colored
>>                                whole" is what Vygotsky
>>        refers to as
>>                                "Volkelt's scheme", or
>>        "Volkelt's
>>                                schemata".
>> 
>>                                Volkelt's scheme came to a
>>        bad end. He
>>                                eventually decided that we
>>        never
>>                                grow out of unanalyzable
>>        affectively
>>                                colored
>>        perception-behavior wholes,
>>                                and this would explain the
>>                indivisible and
>>                                inseparable devotion of the
>>                                German volk to their
>>        Fuhrer. So in
>>                later
>>                                work Vygotsky is very
>>        careful to
>>                                distance himself from
>>        Volkelt even
>>                in his
>>                                explanations of infant
>> 
>>                            behavior:
>> 
>>                                in the Lectures on Pedology he
>>                argues that
>>                                ALL THREE layers of behavior
>>                                (that is, instinct, habit, and
>>                                intelligence) are present
>>        in infancy.
>> 
>>                                David Kellogg
>>                                Macquarie University
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>                                On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at
>>        10:50 PM,
>>                Huw Lloyd
>>                                <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>>        <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>>                <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>>        <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>>
>> 
>>        <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>>        <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>>                <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>>        <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>>>>
>>                                wrote:
>> 
>>                                    Does anyone have a copy of
>>                "Volkelt's
>>                                    diagram" to hand that
>>        is referred
>> 
>>                                to
>> 
>>                                    in The History of the
>>                Development of
>>                                    Higher Mental
>>        Functions (1997,
>> 
>>                            p.85
>> 
>>                                    and onwards in ch. 4)?  I
>>                don't think
>>                                    a reference is given.
>> 
>>                                    Best,
>>                                    Huw
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>                --
>>                It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a
>>                natural science with an
>>                object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>        -- 
>> 
>>        It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a
>>        natural science with an
>>        object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 7
> Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 12:35:46 +0000
> From: Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> To: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<CAG1MBOF1KsbSkSXUK5NO50jQjvryvMXLbcTBxR7UFW8Tpbi=8g@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> moment (n.)
> <http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=moment&allowed_in_frame=0> [image:
> Look up moment at Dictionary.com]
> <http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=moment>
> mid-14c., "very brief portion of time, instant," in moment of time, from
> Old French moment (12c.) "moment, minute; importance, weight, value" or
> directly from Latin momentum "movement, motion; moving power; alteration,
> change;" also "short time, instant" (also source of Spanish, Italian momento),
> contraction of *movimentum, from movere "to move" (see move
> <http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=move&allowed_in_frame=0> (v.)).
> Some (but not OED) explain the sense evolution of the Latin word by notion
> of a particle so small it would just "move" the pointer of a scale, which
> led to the transferred sense of "minute time division." Sense of
> "importance, 'weight' " is attested in English from 1520s.
> 
> Phrase never a dull moment first recorded 1889 in Jerome K. Jerome's "Three
> Men in a Boat." Phrase moment of truth first recorded 1932 in Hemingway's
> "Death in the Afternoon," from Spanish el momento de la verdad, the final
> sword-thrust in a bull-fight.
> momentum (n.)
> <http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=momentum&allowed_in_frame=0> [image:
> Look up momentum at Dictionary.com]
> <http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=momentum>1690s, scientific use in
> mechanics, "quantity of motion of a moving body," from Latin momentum
> "movement,
> moving power" (see moment
> <http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=moment&allowed_in_frame=0>).
> Figurative use dates from 1782.
> 
> This would imply something like "the manifest force or expression at this
> point in time" or "the duration of time for which this manifest force is
> constant".
> 
> On 11 January 2016 at 12:17, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> 
>> No all the science-related meanings are derived from either Integral of
>> f(x) * (x to power n). Torque is related to angular momentum which is an
>> integral of mass* distance from axis.
>> The interpreation this leads to is that each "moment" expresses a property
>> of the whole function. A function can be represented either by a series of
>> values for each x, or by the series of moments. The zero-th moment is the
>> total mass, the first moment is the "torque". Higher moments arise when you
>> are dealing with flexible systems, or dynamic systems with inertia.
>> 
>> YOu also get the term arising with power series, I think, which is a kind
>> of inverse of the above.
>> 
>> yada yada yada,
>> 
>> Andy
>> ------------------------------
>> *Andy Blunden*
>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>> On 11/01/2016 11:08 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote:
>> 
>> Is torque being used here in the sense that the moon influences the tides?
>> E.g. conceiving stages as pendulum like things that, when, considered
>> together may appear as 'torque' applied to a base form.  If so, then
>> perhaps the meaning may be the same overall, i.e. a moment from one aspect
>> appearing as torque in another.
>> 
>> Best,
>> Huw
>> 
>> On 11 January 2016 at 01:59, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>> 
>>> According to the Oxford English Dictionary, in sense 9. "moment" means
>>> "An essential element or significant aspect of a complex conceptual entity"
>>> first used in a translation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in 1838.
>>> But the OED also refers to "moment" in meaning 8c as "torque," so I guess
>>> that exposes a bit of Cole word play going on there, yes?
>>> Andy
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>> On 11/01/2016 12:36 PM, mike cole wrote:
>>> 
>>>> I found Martin's blog entry helpful, Andy. Still working on the
>>>> phenomenology of the usage. I think the form of part-whole relation is what
>>>> is at issue and "moments" in this sense are qualitatively distinct, marked,
>>>> events. Events whose conventional meaning is torqued by the exception.
>>>> 
>>>> still learning!
>>>> mike
>>>> 
>>>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 5:29 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
>>>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>    I am not at all clear about the context here, Mike.
>>>>    Huw mentioned Vygotsky using "instances" which he
>>>>    thought should have been "instants" and then David
>>>>    introduced "moments" and Hegel's use of "moments,"
>>>>    which was the subject of my comment.
>>>> 
>>>>    I did a search of "Thinking and Speech" and found that
>>>>    all bar one instance of the use of the word "moment"
>>>>    were in the sense of "at this moment in the story ..."
>>>>    The one odd reference is this one:
>>>> 
>>>>       "We have consistently taken a genetic approach to the
>>>>       analysis of our problem. We have, however, attempted to
>>>>       represent the *moments* of this genetic process in
>>>>    their
>>>>       mature, classic forms. The inevitable result is that we
>>>>       have diverged from the complex and twisting path that
>>>>       characterizes the actual development of the child?s
>>>>       concepts."
>>>> 
>>>>    It is possible that Vygotsky refers with "moment" here
>>>>    to the distinct modes of conception which were
>>>>    manifested in the child's activity, at different
>>>>    stages, but which are combined in the most developed
>>>>    pseudoconcept. It is a fact that associative
>>>>    complexes, collection complexes, chain complexes,
>>>>    diffuse complexes, and pseudocomplexes could not
>>>>    possibly manifest themselves as successive stages.
>>>>    Perhaps their *first appearance* in ontogenesis could
>>>>    form some kind of regular sequence, possibly, but it
>>>>    is also possible that Vygotsky saw these forms of
>>>>    association as "moments" of concept formation in the
>>>>    other sense of the word "moment" which is not
>>>>    interchangeable with "instant". But I couldn't say for
>>>>    sure.
>>>> 
>>>>    Andy
>>>> 
>>>>    ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>    *Andy Blunden*
>>>>    http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>>    <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>>>    On 11/01/2016 11:23 AM, mike cole wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>        The theoretical point seems interesting and worth
>>>>        clarifying. The differing interpretations have
>>>>        quite different implications.
>>>>        mike
>>>> 
>>>>        On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:10 PM, Andy Blunden
>>>>        <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
>>>>        <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
>>>> 
>>>>        <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>            Actually, Hegel does not use "moment" as meaning a
>>>>            stage, phase or step, David. He tends to use
>>>>        phase,
>>>>            category, stage or division for those concepts.
>>>> 
>>>>            Individual, Particular and Universal are typical
>>>>            examples of "moments" but these are not steps,
>>>>        phases
>>>>            or stages of the concepts, even though they
>>>>        are also
>>>>            exhibited in this way. Every concrete concept
>>>>        has all
>>>>            three moments. In a trade union, the members, the
>>>>            branches/divisions and the general secretary are
>>>>            individual, universal and particular moments. We
>>>>            cannot conceive of a union developing from an
>>>>            individual to a branch to a general secretary,
>>>>        can we?
>>>> 
>>>>            I will look into the origins of this expression. I
>>>>            have always just presumed it came from
>>>>        mathematics, as
>>>>            in the first, second, third, ... moments of a
>>>>            function, and I know Hegel did study this
>>>>        branch of
>>>>            mathematics, because he gives a lot of space
>>>>        to it in
>>>>            the Science of Logic in his critique of
>>>>        calculus. But
>>>>            I am probably quite wrong. I'll check.
>>>> 
>>>>            Andy
>>>>        ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>            *Andy Blunden*
>>>>        http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>>        <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>>>            <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>>> 
>>>>            On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>                Huw:
>>>> 
>>>>                Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even
>>>>        more often
>>>>                "moments", and the word
>>>>                "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a
>>>>        phase, or a
>>>>                step (as in the three
>>>>                "moments" of the formation of the concept in
>>>>                Hegel, as in "in itself", "for
>>>>                others", "for myself".
>>>> 
>>>>                One of the most difficult problems we had
>>>>        to solve
>>>>                in translating the
>>>>                Lectures on Pedology was that Vygotsky very
>>>>                clearly distinguishes three
>>>>                moments of speech development: indicative,
>>>>                nominative, and signifying.
>>>>                "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a
>>>>        pointing
>>>>                gesture. "Nominating" is
>>>>                ipso facto verbal, because it is the naming
>>>>                function: "every thing has a
>>>>                name". But "signifying" is much harder to pin
>>>>                down, and in one place
>>>>                Vygotsky actually says that it is
>>>>        synonymous with
>>>>                the adult understanding
>>>>                that anything can be named. So what is the
>>>>                difference between knowing that
>>>>                everything has a name and the knowledge
>>>>        that any
>>>>                thing can be named?
>>>> 
>>>>                I think that the distinction is just as
>>>>        subtle and
>>>>                just as significant
>>>>                as the distinction between pointing to
>>>>        something
>>>>                with a gesture, pointing
>>>>                to something with a word like "this" or
>>>>        "that",
>>>>                and pointing to something
>>>>                with a word like "apple" or "pear". If I
>>>>        say that
>>>>                "everything has a name",
>>>>                the name could be extremely general
>>>>        ("everything"
>>>>                or "thing") or it could
>>>>                be highly specific ("Huw" or "this
>>>>        computer"). But
>>>>                I don't yet have the
>>>>                idea that names are invented, and that
>>>>        therefore
>>>>                it is possible to name
>>>>                objects which do not exist, and therefore
>>>>        to bring
>>>>                into existence modes of
>>>>                pure abstract thinking through language.
>>>>        That's
>>>>                signifying, and it is
>>>>                indeed a new moment, or a new instant, in the
>>>>                lifelong process of speech
>>>>                development.
>>>> 
>>>>                David Kellogg
>>>>                Macquarie University
>>>> 
>>>>                On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd
>>>>                <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>>>>        <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>>>>                <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>>>>        <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>>>
>>>>                wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>                    Thank you, David. That helps to explain a
>>>>                    particular aspect that I thought
>>>>                    Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative,
>>>>                    which is that stimuli can not
>>>>                    only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they
>>>>                    afford the kind of dynamics you
>>>>                    have elucidated from Volkelt's schema.
>>>> 
>>>>                    I have also noted that the translation of
>>>>                    phrases like "instances of a
>>>>                    process" is probably off the mark
>>>>        too.  What
>>>>                    is really meant, I believe, is
>>>>                    "instants of a process".  These have two
>>>>                    rather different meanings from the
>>>>                    perspective of thinking about processes.
>>>> 
>>>>                    Best,
>>>>                    Huw
>>>> 
>>>>                    On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg
>>>>                    <dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>>>        <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>>>                    <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>>> 
>>>>        <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>                        Huw:
>>>> 
>>>>                        Here's what Vygotsky really says:
>>>> 
>>>>                        ???? ?????? ?? ?????????
>>>>        ???????????? ???
>>>>                        ???????, ?? ??????????? ? ???
>>>>                        ???????????????? ??? ???????????
>>>>        ????????.
>>>>                        ? ???? ??????? ????????? ???
>>>>                        ????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????,
>>>>                        ???????????? ???????????.
>>>> 
>>>>                    (Russian
>>>> 
>>>>                        Collected Works, p. 117).
>>>> 
>>>>                        This means (as nearly as I can
>>>>        make out):
>>>>                        "If the task did not go beyond
>>>>                        the natural capability of the
>>>>        child, he
>>>>                        could deal with it in an
>>>> 
>>>>                    unmediated
>>>> 
>>>>                        or primitive method. In this
>>>>        cases, the
>>>>                        structure of his behavior would
>>>> 
>>>>                    be
>>>> 
>>>>                        completely similar to the scheme as
>>>>                        presented by Volkelt".
>>>> 
>>>>                        I think there is no diagramme, at
>>>>        least
>>>>                        not in the sense of a two
>>>>                        dimensional graphic one can have a
>>>>        copy
>>>>                        of. What Vygotsky is referring to
>>>>                        is Volkelt's attempt to explain
>>>>        all child
>>>>                        behavior as the result of an
>>>>                        affectively tinged FUSION of
>>>>        perception
>>>>                        and behavior, an affectively
>>>>                        colored, unanalyzable, whole  in which
>>>>                        perception and behavior were
>>>>                        absolutely inseparable. This was
>>>>        what Hans
>>>>                        Volkelt concluded from a
>>>> 
>>>>                    series
>>>> 
>>>>                        of experiments that Vygotsky refers to
>>>>                        repeatedly, both in HDHMF and in
>>>> 
>>>>                    the
>>>> 
>>>>                        Lectures on Pedology and elswhere.
>>>> 
>>>>                        What Volkelt did was this: he had four
>>>>                        baby bottles: one shaped like a
>>>>                        triangle, one like a violin, one
>>>>        like a
>>>>                        square, etc. They were all
>>>>                        different colors as well. But three of
>>>>                        them didn't have holes in the
>>>> 
>>>>                    teat:
>>>> 
>>>>                        you could see and smell the milk
>>>>        but you
>>>>                        couldn't drink it. One did. He
>>>>                        taught the infants to associate the
>>>>                        drinking of milk and the feeling of
>>>>                        satiation with one particular
>>>>        bottle, so
>>>>                        that they would actually ignore
>>>>                        the bottle unless it had all the
>>>>                        characteristics: triangularity,
>>>> 
>>>>                    blueness,
>>>> 
>>>>                        etc. So Volkelt argued that from the
>>>>                        child's point of view, he was not
>>>>                        drinking milk but triangular blue
>>>>        milk.
>>>>                        This kind of "affectively colored
>>>>                        whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as
>>>>                        "Volkelt's scheme", or "Volkelt's
>>>>                        schemata".
>>>> 
>>>>                        Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He
>>>>                        eventually decided that we never
>>>>                        grow out of unanalyzable affectively
>>>>                        colored perception-behavior wholes,
>>>>                        and this would explain the
>>>>        indivisible and
>>>>                        inseparable devotion of the
>>>>                        German volk to their Fuhrer. So in
>>>>        later
>>>>                        work Vygotsky is very careful to
>>>>                        distance himself from Volkelt even
>>>>        in his
>>>>                        explanations of infant
>>>> 
>>>>                    behavior:
>>>> 
>>>>                        in the Lectures on Pedology he
>>>>        argues that
>>>>                        ALL THREE layers of behavior
>>>>                        (that is, instinct, habit, and
>>>>                        intelligence) are present in infancy.
>>>> 
>>>>                        David Kellogg
>>>>                        Macquarie University
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>>                        On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM,
>>>>        Huw Lloyd
>>>>                        <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>>>>        <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>>>>                        <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>>>>        <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>>>
>>>>                        wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>                            Does anyone have a copy of
>>>>        "Volkelt's
>>>>                            diagram" to hand that is referred
>>>> 
>>>>                        to
>>>> 
>>>>                            in The History of the
>>>>        Development of
>>>>                            Higher Mental Functions (1997,
>>>> 
>>>>                    p.85
>>>> 
>>>>                            and onwards in ch. 4)?  I
>>>>        don't think
>>>>                            a reference is given.
>>>> 
>>>>                            Best,
>>>>                            Huw
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>>        --
>>>>        It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a
>>>>        natural science with an
>>>>        object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> --
>>>> 
>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an
>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 8
> Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 00:38:18 +1100
> From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> To: Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>,	"eXtended Mind, Culture,
> 	Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID: <5693B04A.5090306@mira.net>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed
> 
> So far as I can see the Latin "momentum" diverged along two 
> paths somewhere around the 15th century. From the idea of a 
> moment (of time) we had an "important moment," that is, an 
> event with powerful repercussions and this lead to 
> "momentum" meaning the inertia of a moving body, i.e., its 
> power to affect things, and a measure of the power of bodies 
> which (like angular momentum) integrated the mass and 
> spatial dimensions, as well as mass and velocity, so the 
> measure of angular momentum was generalised across different 
> types of function, and then to high powers.
> So the two streams of meaning have a common origin.
> 
> Andy
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> On 12/01/2016 12:27 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote:
>> Well, my understanding is that there isn't a hidden 
>> dimension to its usage in text.  That was the reason for 
>> questioning it.  But if you uncover something in the 
>> origins of the expression (your earlier email) then it 
>> would be interesting to know more.
>> 
>> Best,
>> Huw
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On 11 January 2016 at 13:21, Andy Blunden 
>> <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
>> 
>>    I don't know where this is going, Huw.
>>    There are several quite distinct meanings of "moment."
>>    Some to do with short periods of time, some to do with
>>    large force. But there are literally dozens of
>>    different shades of meaning.
>>    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moment_(physics)
>>    <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moment_%28physics%29>
>> 
>>    Andy
>>    ------------------------------------------------------------
>>    *Andy Blunden*
>>    http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>    <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>    On 11/01/2016 11:35 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote:
>>>    moment (n.)
>>>    <http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=moment&allowed_in_frame=0>
>>>    Look up moment at Dictionary.com
>>>    <http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=moment>
>>>        mid-14c., "very brief portion of time, instant,"
>>>        in moment of time, from Old French moment (12c.)
>>>        "moment, minute; importance, weight, value" or
>>>        directly from Latin momentum "movement, motion;
>>>        moving power; alteration, change;" also "short
>>>        time, instant" (also source of Spanish, Italian
>>>        momento), contraction of *movimentum, from
>>>        movere "to move" (see move
>>>        <http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=move&allowed_in_frame=0> (v.)).
>>>        Some (but not OED) explain the sense evolution of
>>>        the Latin word by notion of a particle so small
>>>        it would just "move" the pointer of a scale,
>>>        which led to the transferred sense of "minute
>>>        time division." Sense of "importance, 'weight' "
>>>        is attested in English from 1520s.
>>> 
>>>        Phrase never a dull moment first recorded 1889 in
>>>        Jerome K. Jerome's "Three Men in a Boat." Phrase
>>>        moment of truth first recorded 1932 in
>>>        Hemingway's "Death in the Afternoon," from
>>>        Spanish el momento de la verdad, the final
>>>        sword-thrust in a bull-fight.
>>>    momentum (n.)
>>>    <http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=momentum&allowed_in_frame=0>
>>>    Look up momentum at Dictionary.com
>>>    <http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=momentum>
>>>        1690s, scientific use in mechanics, "quantity of
>>>        motion of a moving body," from Latin
>>>        momentum "movement, moving power" (see moment
>>>        <http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=moment&allowed_in_frame=0>).
>>>        Figurative use dates from 1782.
>>> 
>>>    This would imply something like "the manifest force
>>>    or expression at this point in time" or "the duration
>>>    of time for which this manifest force is constant".
>>> 
>>>    On 11 January 2016 at 12:17, Andy Blunden
>>>    <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
>>> 
>>>        No all the science-related meanings are derived
>>>        from either Integral of f(x) * (x to power n).
>>>        Torque is related to angular momentum which is an
>>>        integral of mass* distance from axis.
>>>        The interpreation this leads to is that each
>>>        "moment" expresses a property of the whole
>>>        function. A function can be represented either by
>>>        a series of values for each x, or by the series
>>>        of moments. The zero-th moment is the total mass,
>>>        the first moment is the "torque". Higher moments
>>>        arise when you are dealing with flexible systems,
>>>        or dynamic systems with inertia.
>>> 
>>>        YOu also get the term arising with power series,
>>>        I think, which is a kind of inverse of the above.
>>> 
>>>        yada yada yada,
>>> 
>>>        Andy
>>>        ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>        *Andy Blunden*
>>>        http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>        <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>>        On 11/01/2016 11:08 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote:
>>>>        Is torque being used here in the sense that the
>>>>        moon influences the tides? E.g. conceiving
>>>>        stages as pendulum like things that, when,
>>>>        considered together may appear as 'torque'
>>>>        applied to a base form.  If so, then perhaps the
>>>>        meaning may be the same overall, i.e. a moment
>>>>        from one aspect appearing as torque in another.
>>>> 
>>>>        Best,
>>>>        Huw
>>>> 
>>>>        On 11 January 2016 at 01:59, Andy Blunden
>>>>        <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
>>>>        wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>            According to the Oxford English Dictionary,
>>>>            in sense 9. "moment" means "An essential
>>>>            element or significant aspect of a complex
>>>>            conceptual entity" first used in a
>>>>            translation of Kant's Critique of Pure
>>>>            Reason in 1838.
>>>>            But the OED also refers to "moment" in
>>>>            meaning 8c as "torque," so I guess that
>>>>            exposes a bit of Cole word play going on
>>>>            there, yes?
>>>>            Andy
>>>>            ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>            *Andy Blunden*
>>>>            http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>>            <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>>>            On 11/01/2016 12:36 PM, mike cole wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>                I found Martin's blog entry helpful,
>>>>                Andy. Still working on the phenomenology
>>>>                of the usage. I think the form of
>>>>                part-whole relation is what is at issue
>>>>                and "moments" in this sense are
>>>>                qualitatively distinct, marked, events.
>>>>                Events whose conventional meaning is
>>>>                torqued by the exception.
>>>> 
>>>>                still learning!
>>>>                mike
>>>> 
>>>>                On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 5:29 PM, Andy
>>>>                Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
>>>>                <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
>>>>                <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
>>>>                <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>                    I am not at all clear about the
>>>>                context here, Mike.
>>>>                    Huw mentioned Vygotsky using
>>>>                "instances" which he
>>>>                    thought should have been "instants"
>>>>                and then David
>>>>                    introduced "moments" and Hegel's use
>>>>                of "moments,"
>>>>                    which was the subject of my comment.
>>>> 
>>>>                    I did a search of "Thinking and
>>>>                Speech" and found that
>>>>                    all bar one instance of the use of
>>>>                the word "moment"
>>>>                    were in the sense of "at this moment
>>>>                in the story ..."
>>>>                    The one odd reference is this one:
>>>> 
>>>>                       "We have consistently taken a
>>>>                genetic approach to the
>>>>                       analysis of our problem. We have,
>>>>                however, attempted to
>>>>                       represent the *moments* of this
>>>>                genetic process in
>>>>                    their
>>>>                       mature, classic forms. The
>>>>                inevitable result is that we
>>>>                       have diverged from the complex
>>>>                and twisting path that
>>>>                       characterizes the actual
>>>>                development of the child?s
>>>>                       concepts."
>>>> 
>>>>                    It is possible that Vygotsky refers
>>>>                with "moment" here
>>>>                    to the distinct modes of conception
>>>>                which were
>>>>                    manifested in the child's activity,
>>>>                at different
>>>>                    stages, but which are combined in
>>>>                the most developed
>>>>                    pseudoconcept. It is a fact that
>>>>                associative
>>>>                    complexes, collection complexes,
>>>>                chain complexes,
>>>>                    diffuse complexes, and
>>>>                pseudocomplexes could not
>>>>                    possibly manifest themselves as
>>>>                successive stages.
>>>>                    Perhaps their *first appearance* in
>>>>                ontogenesis could
>>>>                    form some kind of regular sequence,
>>>>                possibly, but it
>>>>                    is also possible that Vygotsky saw
>>>>                these forms of
>>>>                    association as "moments" of concept
>>>>                formation in the
>>>>                    other sense of the word "moment"
>>>>                which is not
>>>>                    interchangeable with "instant". But
>>>>                I couldn't say for
>>>>                    sure.
>>>> 
>>>>                    Andy
>>>> 
>>>>                ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>                    *Andy Blunden*
>>>>                http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>>                <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>>>                    <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>>>                    On 11/01/2016 11:23 AM, mike cole wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>                        The theoretical point seems
>>>>                interesting and worth
>>>>                        clarifying. The differing
>>>>                interpretations have
>>>>                        quite different implications.
>>>>                        mike
>>>> 
>>>>                        On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:10 PM,
>>>>                Andy Blunden
>>>>                        <ablunden@mira.net
>>>>                <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
>>>>                <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
>>>>                <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
>>>>                        <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
>>>>                <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
>>>> 
>>>>                        <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
>>>>                <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>                            Actually, Hegel does not use
>>>>                "moment" as meaning a
>>>>                            stage, phase or step, David.
>>>>                He tends to use
>>>>                        phase,
>>>>                            category, stage or division
>>>>                for those concepts.
>>>> 
>>>>                            Individual, Particular and
>>>>                Universal are typical
>>>>                            examples of "moments" but
>>>>                these are not steps,
>>>>                        phases
>>>>                            or stages of the concepts,
>>>>                even though they
>>>>                        are also
>>>>                            exhibited in this way. Every
>>>>                concrete concept
>>>>                        has all
>>>>                            three moments. In a trade
>>>>                union, the members, the
>>>>                branches/divisions and the general
>>>>                secretary are
>>>>                            individual, universal and
>>>>                particular moments. We
>>>>                            cannot conceive of a union
>>>>                developing from an
>>>>                            individual to a branch to a
>>>>                general secretary,
>>>>                        can we?
>>>> 
>>>>                            I will look into the origins
>>>>                of this expression. I
>>>>                            have always just presumed it
>>>>                came from
>>>>                        mathematics, as
>>>>                            in the first, second, third,
>>>>                ... moments of a
>>>>                            function, and I know Hegel
>>>>                did study this
>>>>                        branch of
>>>>                            mathematics, because he
>>>>                gives a lot of space
>>>>                        to it in
>>>>                            the Science of Logic in his
>>>>                critique of
>>>>                        calculus. But
>>>>                            I am probably quite wrong.
>>>>                I'll check.
>>>> 
>>>>                            Andy
>>>>                ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>                            *Andy Blunden*
>>>>                http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>>                <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>>> 
>>>>                <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>>> 
>>>>                <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>>> 
>>>>                            On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David
>>>>                Kellogg wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>                                Huw:
>>>> 
>>>>                                Yes, Vygotsky uses
>>>>                "instants" and even
>>>>                        more often
>>>>                "moments", and the word
>>>>                                "moment" sometimes means
>>>>                a stage, or a
>>>>                        phase, or a
>>>>                                step (as in the three
>>>>                "moments" of the formation of the concept in
>>>>                                Hegel, as in "in
>>>>                itself", "for
>>>>                                others", "for myself".
>>>> 
>>>>                                One of the most
>>>>                difficult problems we had
>>>>                        to solve
>>>>                                in translating the
>>>>                                Lectures on Pedology was
>>>>                that Vygotsky very
>>>>                                clearly distinguishes three
>>>>                                moments of speech
>>>>                development: indicative,
>>>>                nominative, and signifying.
>>>>                "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a
>>>>                        pointing
>>>>                                gesture. "Nominating" is
>>>>                                ipso facto verbal,
>>>>                because it is the naming
>>>>                function: "every thing has a
>>>>                                name". But "signifying"
>>>>                is much harder to pin
>>>>                                down, and in one place
>>>>                                Vygotsky actually says
>>>>                that it is
>>>>                        synonymous with
>>>>                                the adult understanding
>>>>                                that anything can be
>>>>                named. So what is the
>>>>                difference between knowing that
>>>>                everything has a name and the knowledge
>>>>                        that any
>>>>                                thing can be named?
>>>> 
>>>>                                I think that the
>>>>                distinction is just as
>>>>                        subtle and
>>>>                                just as significant
>>>>                                as the distinction
>>>>                between pointing to
>>>>                        something
>>>>                                with a gesture, pointing
>>>>                                to something with a word
>>>>                like "this" or
>>>>                        "that",
>>>>                                and pointing to something
>>>>                                with a word like "apple"
>>>>                or "pear". If I
>>>>                        say that
>>>>                "everything has a name",
>>>>                                the name could be
>>>>                extremely general
>>>>                        ("everything"
>>>>                                or "thing") or it could
>>>>                                be highly specific
>>>>                ("Huw" or "this
>>>>                        computer"). But
>>>>                                I don't yet have the
>>>>                                idea that names are
>>>>                invented, and that
>>>>                        therefore
>>>>                                it is possible to name
>>>>                                objects which do not
>>>>                exist, and therefore
>>>>                        to bring
>>>>                                into existence modes of
>>>>                                pure abstract thinking
>>>>                through language.
>>>>                        That's
>>>>                signifying, and it is
>>>>                                indeed a new moment, or
>>>>                a new instant, in the
>>>>                                lifelong process of speech
>>>>                development.
>>>> 
>>>>                                David Kellogg
>>>>                Macquarie University
>>>> 
>>>>                                On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at
>>>>                4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd
>>>> 
>>>>                <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>>>>                <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>>>> 
>>>>                <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>>>>                <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>>
>>>> 
>>>>                <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>>>>                <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>>>> 
>>>>                <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>>>>                <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>>>>
>>>>                                wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>                                    Thank you, David.
>>>>                That helps to explain a
>>>>                particular aspect that I thought
>>>>                Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative,
>>>>                                    which is that
>>>>                stimuli can not
>>>>                                    only signify but
>>>>                also symbolise, i.e. they
>>>>                                    afford the kind of
>>>>                dynamics you
>>>>                                    have elucidated from
>>>>                Volkelt's schema.
>>>> 
>>>>                                    I have also noted
>>>>                that the translation of
>>>>                phrases like "instances of a
>>>>                process" is probably off the mark
>>>>                        too.  What
>>>>                                    is really meant, I
>>>>                believe, is
>>>>                "instants of a process". These have two
>>>>                                    rather different
>>>>                meanings from the
>>>>                perspective of thinking about processes.
>>>> 
>>>>                                    Best,
>>>>                                    Huw
>>>> 
>>>>                                    On 10 January 2016
>>>>                at 06:02, David Kellogg
>>>> 
>>>>                <dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>>>                <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>>>                        <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>>>                <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>>
>>>>                <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>>>                <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>>> 
>>>>                        <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>>>                <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>>>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>                Huw:
>>>> 
>>>>                Here's what Vygotsky really says:
>>>> 
>>>>                ???? ?????? ?? ?????????
>>>>                        ???????????? ???
>>>>                ???????, ?? ??????????? ? ???
>>>>                ???????????????? ??? ???????????
>>>>                        ????????.
>>>>                ? ???? ??????? ????????? ???
>>>>                ????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????,
>>>>                ???????????? ???????????.
>>>> 
>>>>                (Russian
>>>> 
>>>>                Collected Works, p. 117).
>>>> 
>>>>                This means (as nearly as I can
>>>>                        make out):
>>>>                "If the task did not go beyond
>>>>                the natural capability of the
>>>>                        child, he
>>>>                could deal with it in an
>>>> 
>>>>                unmediated
>>>> 
>>>>                or primitive method. In this
>>>>                        cases, the
>>>>                structure of his behavior would
>>>> 
>>>>                                    be
>>>> 
>>>>                completely similar to the scheme as
>>>>                presented by Volkelt".
>>>> 
>>>>                I think there is no diagramme, at
>>>>                        least
>>>>                not in the sense of a two
>>>>                dimensional graphic one can have a
>>>>                        copy
>>>>                of. What Vygotsky is referring to
>>>>                is Volkelt's attempt to explain
>>>>                        all child
>>>>                behavior as the result of an
>>>>                affectively tinged FUSION of
>>>>                        perception
>>>>                and behavior, an affectively
>>>>                colored, unanalyzable, whole  in which
>>>>                perception and behavior were
>>>>                absolutely inseparable. This was
>>>>                        what Hans
>>>>                Volkelt concluded from a
>>>> 
>>>>                series
>>>> 
>>>>                of experiments that Vygotsky refers to
>>>>                repeatedly, both in HDHMF and in
>>>> 
>>>>                                    the
>>>> 
>>>>                Lectures on Pedology and elswhere.
>>>> 
>>>>                What Volkelt did was this: he had four
>>>>                baby bottles: one shaped like a
>>>>                triangle, one like a violin, one
>>>>                        like a
>>>>                square, etc. They were all
>>>>                different colors as well. But three of
>>>>                them didn't have holes in the
>>>> 
>>>>                teat:
>>>> 
>>>>                you could see and smell the milk
>>>>                        but you
>>>>                couldn't drink it. One did. He
>>>>                taught the infants to associate the
>>>>                drinking of milk and the feeling of
>>>>                satiation with one particular
>>>>                        bottle, so
>>>>                that they would actually ignore
>>>>                the bottle unless it had all the
>>>>                characteristics: triangularity,
>>>> 
>>>>                blueness,
>>>> 
>>>>                etc. So Volkelt argued that from the
>>>>                child's point of view, he was not
>>>>                drinking milk but triangular blue
>>>>                        milk.
>>>>                This kind of "affectively colored
>>>>                whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as
>>>>                "Volkelt's scheme", or "Volkelt's
>>>>                schemata".
>>>> 
>>>>                Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He
>>>>                eventually decided that we never
>>>>                grow out of unanalyzable affectively
>>>>                colored perception-behavior wholes,
>>>>                and this would explain the
>>>>                        indivisible and
>>>>                inseparable devotion of the
>>>>                German volk to their Fuhrer. So in
>>>>                        later
>>>>                work Vygotsky is very careful to
>>>>                distance himself from Volkelt even
>>>>                        in his
>>>>                explanations of infant
>>>> 
>>>>                behavior:
>>>> 
>>>>                in the Lectures on Pedology he
>>>>                        argues that
>>>>                ALL THREE layers of behavior
>>>>                (that is, instinct, habit, and
>>>>                intelligence) are present in infancy.
>>>> 
>>>>                David Kellogg
>>>>                Macquarie University
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>>                On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM,
>>>>                        Huw Lloyd
>>>>                <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>>>>                <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>>>> 
>>>>                <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>>>>                <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>>
>>>>                <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>>>>                <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>>>> 
>>>>                <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>>>>                <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>>>>
>>>>                wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>                  Does anyone have a copy of
>>>>                        "Volkelt's
>>>>                  diagram" to hand that is referred
>>>> 
>>>>                                        to
>>>> 
>>>>                  in The History of the
>>>>                        Development of
>>>>                  Higher Mental Functions (1997,
>>>> 
>>>>                                    p.85
>>>> 
>>>>                  and onwards in ch. 4)? I
>>>>                        don't think
>>>>                  a reference is given.
>>>> 
>>>>                  Best,
>>>>                  Huw
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>>                        --
>>>>                        It is the dilemma of psychology
>>>>                to deal as a
>>>>                        natural science with an
>>>>                        object that creates history.
>>>>                Ernst Boesch
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>>                -- 
>>>> 
>>>>                It is the dilemma of psychology to deal
>>>>                as a natural science with an
>>>>                object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 9
> Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 14:07:08 +0000
> From: Martin John Packer <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID: <67965018-2A54-4C11-91D0-8C65451F9C9E@uniandes.edu.co>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
> 
> Hi Huw,
> 
> As I said, the blog offers a simple and accessible account.  If you want something more detailed, you could try this:
> 
> Smith, B. (Ed.), Parts and moments studies in logic and formal ontology. Munich: Philosophia Verlag. 
> 
> <http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/book/P&M/>
> 
> Martin
> 
> On Jan 11, 2016, at 6:23 AM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
>> Hi Martin,
>> 
>> I don't think the usage of 'moment' in the link connects in a
>> straightforward way with its usage in the HMF volume.
>> 
>> I would also like to say that this notion of wholes and moments presented
>> in the blog is incomplete and incorrect.  For example, the assertion "You
>> don?t take the color away from the mac mouse to study it in another room"
>> is obviously false in the sense that you can walk into another room and
>> recall the experience of its colour.  Likewise the notion of a 'whole' that
>> is presented is rather crass, as if being an object that one can heft
>> somehow qualified it as being independent.
>> 
>> Best,
>> Huw
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On 11 January 2016 at 01:20, Martin John Packer <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co>
>> wrote:
>> 
>>> The term "moment" has been used extensively in phenomenology.  Here is an
>>> accessible account of the basics:
>>> 
>>> <
>>> https://barebonescommunication.wordpress.com/2009/10/21/kleingeld-phenomenology-pieces-and-moments/
>>>> 
>>> 
>>> Martin
>>> 
>>> On Jan 10, 2016, at 7:23 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> The theoretical point seems interesting and worth clarifying. The
>>> differing
>>>> interpretations have quite different implications.
>>>> mike
>>>> 
>>>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:10 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> Actually, Hegel does not use "moment" as meaning a stage, phase or step,
>>>>> David. He tends to use phase, category, stage or division for those
>>>>> concepts.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Individual, Particular and Universal are typical examples of "moments"
>>> but
>>>>> these are not steps, phases or stages of the concepts, even though they
>>> are
>>>>> also exhibited in this way. Every concrete concept has all three
>>> moments.
>>>>> In a trade union, the members, the branches/divisions and the general
>>>>> secretary are individual, universal and particular moments. We cannot
>>>>> conceive of a union developing from an individual to a branch to a
>>> general
>>>>> secretary, can we?
>>>>> 
>>>>> I will look into the origins of this expression. I have always just
>>>>> presumed it came from mathematics, as in the first, second, third, ...
>>>>> moments of a function, and I know Hegel did study this branch of
>>>>> mathematics, because he gives a lot of space to it in the Science of
>>> Logic
>>>>> in his critique of calculus. But I am probably quite wrong. I'll check.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Andy
>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>>> On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>>> Huw:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even more often "moments", and the
>>> word
>>>>>> "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a phase, or a step (as in the
>>> three
>>>>>> "moments" of the formation of the concept in Hegel, as in "in itself",
>>>>>> "for
>>>>>> others", "for myself".
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> One of the most difficult problems we had to solve in translating the
>>>>>> Lectures on Pedology was that Vygotsky very clearly distinguishes three
>>>>>> moments of speech development: indicative, nominative, and signifying.
>>>>>> "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a pointing gesture.
>>> "Nominating" is
>>>>>> ipso facto verbal, because it is the naming function: "every thing has
>>> a
>>>>>> name". But "signifying" is much harder to pin down, and in one place
>>>>>> Vygotsky actually says that it is synonymous with the adult
>>> understanding
>>>>>> that anything can be named. So what is the difference between knowing
>>> that
>>>>>> everything has a name and the knowledge that any thing can be named?
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I think that the distinction is just as subtle and just as significant
>>>>>> as the distinction between pointing to something with a gesture,
>>> pointing
>>>>>> to something with a word like "this" or "that", and pointing to
>>> something
>>>>>> with a word like "apple" or "pear". If I say that "everything has a
>>> name",
>>>>>> the name could be extremely general ("everything" or "thing") or it
>>> could
>>>>>> be highly specific ("Huw" or "this computer"). But I don't yet have the
>>>>>> idea that names are invented, and that therefore it is possible to name
>>>>>> objects which do not exist, and therefore to bring into existence
>>> modes of
>>>>>> pure abstract thinking through language. That's signifying, and it is
>>>>>> indeed a new moment, or a new instant, in the lifelong process of
>>> speech
>>>>>> development.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>> Macquarie University
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Thank you, David. That helps to explain a particular aspect that I
>>> thought
>>>>>>> Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative, which is that stimuli can
>>> not
>>>>>>> only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they afford the kind of dynamics
>>>>>>> you
>>>>>>> have elucidated from Volkelt's schema.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> I have also noted that the translation of phrases like "instances of a
>>>>>>> process" is probably off the mark too.  What is really meant, I
>>> believe,
>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>> "instants of a process".  These have two rather different meanings
>>> from
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> perspective of thinking about processes.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Best,
>>>>>>> Huw
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Huw:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Here's what Vygotsky really says:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> ???? ?????? ?? ????????? ???????????? ??? ???????, ?? ??????????? ?
>>> ???
>>>>>>>> ???????????????? ??? ??????????? ????????. ? ???? ??????? ?????????
>>> ???
>>>>>>>> ????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????, ???????????? ???????????.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> (Russian
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Collected Works, p. 117).
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> This means (as nearly as I can make out): "If the task did not go
>>> beyond
>>>>>>>> the natural capability of the child, he could deal with it in an
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> unmediated
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> or primitive method. In this cases, the structure of his behavior
>>> would
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> be
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> completely similar to the scheme as presented by Volkelt".
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> I think there is no diagramme, at least not in the sense of a two
>>>>>>>> dimensional graphic one can have a copy of. What Vygotsky is
>>> referring
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> is Volkelt's attempt to explain all child behavior as the result of
>>> an
>>>>>>>> affectively tinged FUSION of perception and behavior, an affectively
>>>>>>>> colored, unanalyzable, whole  in which perception and behavior were
>>>>>>>> absolutely inseparable. This was what Hans Volkelt concluded from a
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> series
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> of experiments that Vygotsky refers to repeatedly, both in HDHMF and
>>> in
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Lectures on Pedology and elswhere.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> What Volkelt did was this: he had four baby bottles: one shaped like
>>> a
>>>>>>>> triangle, one like a violin, one like a square, etc. They were all
>>>>>>>> different colors as well. But three of them didn't have holes in the
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> teat:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> you could see and smell the milk but you couldn't drink it. One did.
>>> He
>>>>>>>> taught the infants to associate the drinking of milk and the feeling
>>> of
>>>>>>>> satiation with one particular bottle, so that they would actually
>>> ignore
>>>>>>>> the bottle unless it had all the characteristics: triangularity,
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> blueness,
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> etc. So Volkelt argued that from the child's point of view, he was
>>> not
>>>>>>>> drinking milk but triangular blue milk. This kind of "affectively
>>>>>>>> colored
>>>>>>>> whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as "Volkelt's scheme", or
>>> "Volkelt's
>>>>>>>> schemata".
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He eventually decided that we
>>> never
>>>>>>>> grow out of unanalyzable affectively colored perception-behavior
>>> wholes,
>>>>>>>> and this would explain the indivisible and inseparable devotion of
>>> the
>>>>>>>> German volk to their Fuhrer. So in later work Vygotsky is very
>>> careful
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> distance himself from Volkelt even in his explanations of infant
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> behavior:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> in the Lectures on Pedology he argues that ALL THREE layers of
>>> behavior
>>>>>>>> (that is, instinct, habit, and intelligence) are present in infancy.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>>> Macquarie University
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM, Huw Lloyd <
>>> huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Does anyone have a copy of "Volkelt's diagram" to hand that is
>>> referred
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> in The History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions (1997,
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> p.85
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> and onwards in ch. 4)?  I don't think a reference is given.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Best,
>>>>>>>>> Huw
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> --
>>>> 
>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an
>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 10
> Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 14:38:05 +0000
> From: Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<CAG1MBOGVcpkYCmNoz75FTA-Eu8QwW+k-QDXgbcOgW=aoJSrFKw@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> How delightful. :) Thanks Martin.
> 
> 
> 
> On 11 January 2016 at 14:07, Martin John Packer <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co>
> wrote:
> 
>> Hi Huw,
>> 
>> As I said, the blog offers a simple and accessible account.  If you want
>> something more detailed, you could try this:
>> 
>> Smith, B. (Ed.), Parts and moments studies in logic and formal ontology.
>> Munich: Philosophia Verlag.
>> 
>> <http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/book/P&M/>
>> 
>> Martin
>> 
>> On Jan 11, 2016, at 6:23 AM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> wrote:
>> 
>>> Hi Martin,
>>> 
>>> I don't think the usage of 'moment' in the link connects in a
>>> straightforward way with its usage in the HMF volume.
>>> 
>>> I would also like to say that this notion of wholes and moments presented
>>> in the blog is incomplete and incorrect.  For example, the assertion "You
>>> don?t take the color away from the mac mouse to study it in another room"
>>> is obviously false in the sense that you can walk into another room and
>>> recall the experience of its colour.  Likewise the notion of a 'whole'
>> that
>>> is presented is rather crass, as if being an object that one can heft
>>> somehow qualified it as being independent.
>>> 
>>> Best,
>>> Huw
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 11 January 2016 at 01:20, Martin John Packer <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co
>>> 
>>> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> The term "moment" has been used extensively in phenomenology.  Here is
>> an
>>>> accessible account of the basics:
>>>> 
>>>> <
>>>> 
>> https://barebonescommunication.wordpress.com/2009/10/21/kleingeld-phenomenology-pieces-and-moments/
>>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Martin
>>>> 
>>>> On Jan 10, 2016, at 7:23 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> The theoretical point seems interesting and worth clarifying. The
>>>> differing
>>>>> interpretations have quite different implications.
>>>>> mike
>>>>> 
>>>>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:10 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
>> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>>> Actually, Hegel does not use "moment" as meaning a stage, phase or
>> step,
>>>>>> David. He tends to use phase, category, stage or division for those
>>>>>> concepts.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Individual, Particular and Universal are typical examples of "moments"
>>>> but
>>>>>> these are not steps, phases or stages of the concepts, even though
>> they
>>>> are
>>>>>> also exhibited in this way. Every concrete concept has all three
>>>> moments.
>>>>>> In a trade union, the members, the branches/divisions and the general
>>>>>> secretary are individual, universal and particular moments. We cannot
>>>>>> conceive of a union developing from an individual to a branch to a
>>>> general
>>>>>> secretary, can we?
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I will look into the origins of this expression. I have always just
>>>>>> presumed it came from mathematics, as in the first, second, third, ...
>>>>>> moments of a function, and I know Hegel did study this branch of
>>>>>> mathematics, because he gives a lot of space to it in the Science of
>>>> Logic
>>>>>> in his critique of calculus. But I am probably quite wrong. I'll
>> check.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>>>> On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Huw:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even more often "moments", and the
>>>> word
>>>>>>> "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a phase, or a step (as in the
>>>> three
>>>>>>> "moments" of the formation of the concept in Hegel, as in "in
>> itself",
>>>>>>> "for
>>>>>>> others", "for myself".
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> One of the most difficult problems we had to solve in translating the
>>>>>>> Lectures on Pedology was that Vygotsky very clearly distinguishes
>> three
>>>>>>> moments of speech development: indicative, nominative, and
>> signifying.
>>>>>>> "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a pointing gesture.
>>>> "Nominating" is
>>>>>>> ipso facto verbal, because it is the naming function: "every thing
>> has
>>>> a
>>>>>>> name". But "signifying" is much harder to pin down, and in one place
>>>>>>> Vygotsky actually says that it is synonymous with the adult
>>>> understanding
>>>>>>> that anything can be named. So what is the difference between knowing
>>>> that
>>>>>>> everything has a name and the knowledge that any thing can be named?
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> I think that the distinction is just as subtle and just as
>> significant
>>>>>>> as the distinction between pointing to something with a gesture,
>>>> pointing
>>>>>>> to something with a word like "this" or "that", and pointing to
>>>> something
>>>>>>> with a word like "apple" or "pear". If I say that "everything has a
>>>> name",
>>>>>>> the name could be extremely general ("everything" or "thing") or it
>>>> could
>>>>>>> be highly specific ("Huw" or "this computer"). But I don't yet have
>> the
>>>>>>> idea that names are invented, and that therefore it is possible to
>> name
>>>>>>> objects which do not exist, and therefore to bring into existence
>>>> modes of
>>>>>>> pure abstract thinking through language. That's signifying, and it is
>>>>>>> indeed a new moment, or a new instant, in the lifelong process of
>>>> speech
>>>>>>> development.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>> Macquarie University
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd <
>> huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Thank you, David. That helps to explain a particular aspect that I
>>>> thought
>>>>>>>> Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative, which is that stimuli can
>>>> not
>>>>>>>> only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they afford the kind of
>> dynamics
>>>>>>>> you
>>>>>>>> have elucidated from Volkelt's schema.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> I have also noted that the translation of phrases like "instances
>> of a
>>>>>>>> process" is probably off the mark too.  What is really meant, I
>>>> believe,
>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>> "instants of a process".  These have two rather different meanings
>>>> from
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> perspective of thinking about processes.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Best,
>>>>>>>> Huw
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Huw:
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Here's what Vygotsky really says:
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> ???? ?????? ?? ????????? ???????????? ??? ???????, ?? ??????????? ?
>>>> ???
>>>>>>>>> ???????????????? ??? ??????????? ????????. ? ???? ??????? ?????????
>>>> ???
>>>>>>>>> ????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????, ???????????? ???????????.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> (Russian
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Collected Works, p. 117).
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> This means (as nearly as I can make out): "If the task did not go
>>>> beyond
>>>>>>>>> the natural capability of the child, he could deal with it in an
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> unmediated
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> or primitive method. In this cases, the structure of his behavior
>>>> would
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> be
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> completely similar to the scheme as presented by Volkelt".
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> I think there is no diagramme, at least not in the sense of a two
>>>>>>>>> dimensional graphic one can have a copy of. What Vygotsky is
>>>> referring
>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>> is Volkelt's attempt to explain all child behavior as the result of
>>>> an
>>>>>>>>> affectively tinged FUSION of perception and behavior, an
>> affectively
>>>>>>>>> colored, unanalyzable, whole  in which perception and behavior were
>>>>>>>>> absolutely inseparable. This was what Hans Volkelt concluded from a
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> series
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> of experiments that Vygotsky refers to repeatedly, both in HDHMF
>> and
>>>> in
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Lectures on Pedology and elswhere.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> What Volkelt did was this: he had four baby bottles: one shaped
>> like
>>>> a
>>>>>>>>> triangle, one like a violin, one like a square, etc. They were all
>>>>>>>>> different colors as well. But three of them didn't have holes in
>> the
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> teat:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> you could see and smell the milk but you couldn't drink it. One
>> did.
>>>> He
>>>>>>>>> taught the infants to associate the drinking of milk and the
>> feeling
>>>> of
>>>>>>>>> satiation with one particular bottle, so that they would actually
>>>> ignore
>>>>>>>>> the bottle unless it had all the characteristics: triangularity,
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> blueness,
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> etc. So Volkelt argued that from the child's point of view, he was
>>>> not
>>>>>>>>> drinking milk but triangular blue milk. This kind of "affectively
>>>>>>>>> colored
>>>>>>>>> whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as "Volkelt's scheme", or
>>>> "Volkelt's
>>>>>>>>> schemata".
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He eventually decided that we
>>>> never
>>>>>>>>> grow out of unanalyzable affectively colored perception-behavior
>>>> wholes,
>>>>>>>>> and this would explain the indivisible and inseparable devotion of
>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> German volk to their Fuhrer. So in later work Vygotsky is very
>>>> careful
>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>> distance himself from Volkelt even in his explanations of infant
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> behavior:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> in the Lectures on Pedology he argues that ALL THREE layers of
>>>> behavior
>>>>>>>>> (that is, instinct, habit, and intelligence) are present in
>> infancy.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM, Huw Lloyd <
>>>> huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Does anyone have a copy of "Volkelt's diagram" to hand that is
>>>> referred
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> in The History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions
>> (1997,
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> p.85
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> and onwards in ch. 4)?  I don't think a reference is given.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Best,
>>>>>>>>>> Huw
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> --
>>>>> 
>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an
>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 11
> Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 16:27:27 +0000
> From: "Hugh O'Donnell" <bluetanso@googlemail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Digital game-based learning
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<CAJ750_xtDcV5i03OidmdxbX66v7kn1gYBHSoq44=EvfMGNMkTA@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> Hi, Huw!
> 
> (I like your 'Shug' reference - you are obviously aware of our Scots
> monikers)
> 
> Yes, I am new to this - the article comes after long months of reducing a
> Masters Degree Dissertation...
> 
> No need to tell you, that I have learnt so much about academic writing/the
> academic a community.
> 
> This is the first of two papers: the other - out for review at the moment -
> looks more at the Cultural Historical Activity Theory nature of the action
> research project in light of game playing and language use.  The one I
> distributed throws up some areas of further exploration as a result of what
> was for my pupils a nice way to attempt to use narrative to acquire Science
> learning.
> 
> My main theme is how to use narrative successfully to increase Science and
> Literacy attainment through digital game based collaboration.
> 
> I'm also interested in the collocations of words as a way to examine social
> engagement using a digital game and writing about the simulated experience
> - is use of We/I linked to attainment success? Can specific game playing
> episodes  correlate with science content knowledge is effectively deployed?
> 
> CHAT is interesting in relation to my ongoing study of game playing and
> learning. Obviously the pupils' collaborations and tool use are important
> to the systems of activity, but I want to *learn* how I can achieve better
> integration of Science and Literacy through group collaboration...
> 
> If the English Teacher (me) and the Science Teacher (a-n-other) could have
> pupils write creative writing pieces that contained the necessary elements
> to satisfy both disciplines... Well, that is the Holy Grail, as they say.
> 
> Thanks for getting in touch!
> H
> 
> Kind Regards,
> Hugh O'Donnell
> 
> http://bluetanso.WordPress.com
> Twitter: @bluetanso
> On 9 Jan 2016 20:21, "Huw Lloyd" <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
>> Dear Hugh (or should that be Shug?)
>> 
>> You might get more responses on this list if you anticipate the kinds of
>> exchanges you are hoping for, by drawing our attention to some aspects of
>> your paper you find interesting, problematic etc.
>> 
>> For instance, in reading your abstract it appears to me that you have
>> traversed an area of classroom activity that is realising a qualitative
>> gain, but in the abstract you don't mention any theoretical basis for
>> this.  For example, I would be interested in looking for a qualitative
>> difference in the nature of the engagement or orientation to activity (i.e.
>> the behaviour itself), which happens to be a significant interest of mine.
>> 
>> I think you can draw us in, yes?
>> 
>> Best,
>> Huw
>> 
>> 
>> On 5 January 2016 at 07:20, Hugh O'Donnell <bluetanso@googlemail.com>
>> wrote:
>> 
>>> Greetings,
>>> 
>>> Please allow me to direct you to a new article on game-based learning:
>>> 
>>> http://press-start.gla.ac.uk/index.php/press-start/article/view/19
>>> 
>>> I would appreciate any comments on this Secondary School action research.
>>> 
>>> Kind Regards,
>>> Hugh O'Donnell
>>> 
>>> http://bluetanso.WordPress.com
>>> Twitter: @bluetanso
>>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 12
> Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 16:48:15 +0000
> From: Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Digital game-based learning
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<CAG1MBOGigVrn=S1W6isihrtjgeCxe-crwhVT1NFd6G707qo0xQ@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> Nice to hear back from you, Hugh.
> 
> My quick impression to your response for me is: it is necessary to have
> something worth writing about to warrant the effort of writing it well.
> 
> So your second paper discusses the same content from a different
> perspective, is that right?  That might be interesting to look through.
> 
> Best,
> Huw
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On 11 January 2016 at 16:27, Hugh O'Donnell <bluetanso@googlemail.com>
> wrote:
> 
>> Hi, Huw!
>> 
>> (I like your 'Shug' reference - you are obviously aware of our Scots
>> monikers)
>> 
>> Yes, I am new to this - the article comes after long months of reducing a
>> Masters Degree Dissertation...
>> 
>> No need to tell you, that I have learnt so much about academic writing/the
>> academic a community.
>> 
>> This is the first of two papers: the other - out for review at the moment -
>> looks more at the Cultural Historical Activity Theory nature of the action
>> research project in light of game playing and language use.  The one I
>> distributed throws up some areas of further exploration as a result of what
>> was for my pupils a nice way to attempt to use narrative to acquire Science
>> learning.
>> 
>> My main theme is how to use narrative successfully to increase Science and
>> Literacy attainment through digital game based collaboration.
>> 
>> I'm also interested in the collocations of words as a way to examine social
>> engagement using a digital game and writing about the simulated experience
>> - is use of We/I linked to attainment success? Can specific game playing
>> episodes  correlate with science content knowledge is effectively deployed?
>> 
>> CHAT is interesting in relation to my ongoing study of game playing and
>> learning. Obviously the pupils' collaborations and tool use are important
>> to the systems of activity, but I want to *learn* how I can achieve better
>> integration of Science and Literacy through group collaboration...
>> 
>> If the English Teacher (me) and the Science Teacher (a-n-other) could have
>> pupils write creative writing pieces that contained the necessary elements
>> to satisfy both disciplines... Well, that is the Holy Grail, as they say.
>> 
>> Thanks for getting in touch!
>> H
>> 
>> Kind Regards,
>> Hugh O'Donnell
>> 
>> http://bluetanso.WordPress.com
>> Twitter: @bluetanso
>> On 9 Jan 2016 20:21, "Huw Lloyd" <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> wrote:
>> 
>>> Dear Hugh (or should that be Shug?)
>>> 
>>> You might get more responses on this list if you anticipate the kinds of
>>> exchanges you are hoping for, by drawing our attention to some aspects of
>>> your paper you find interesting, problematic etc.
>>> 
>>> For instance, in reading your abstract it appears to me that you have
>>> traversed an area of classroom activity that is realising a qualitative
>>> gain, but in the abstract you don't mention any theoretical basis for
>>> this.  For example, I would be interested in looking for a qualitative
>>> difference in the nature of the engagement or orientation to activity
>> (i.e.
>>> the behaviour itself), which happens to be a significant interest of
>> mine.
>>> 
>>> I think you can draw us in, yes?
>>> 
>>> Best,
>>> Huw
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 5 January 2016 at 07:20, Hugh O'Donnell <bluetanso@googlemail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> Greetings,
>>>> 
>>>> Please allow me to direct you to a new article on game-based learning:
>>>> 
>>>> http://press-start.gla.ac.uk/index.php/press-start/article/view/19
>>>> 
>>>> I would appreciate any comments on this Secondary School action
>> research.
>>>> 
>>>> Kind Regards,
>>>> Hugh O'Donnell
>>>> 
>>>> http://bluetanso.WordPress.com
>>>> Twitter: @bluetanso
>>>> 
>>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 13
> Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 09:22:17 -0800
> From: mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Request for Articles: Anti-Poverty Policy
> 	Innovations
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<CAHCnM0D=A-jPAnY-ZKi43OukxSg-JM1yk1rpy1xq0yqJ6UPTOA@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: Russell Sage Foundation <communications@rsage.org>
> Date: Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:38 AM
> Subject: Request for Articles: Anti-Poverty Policy Innovations
> To: mcole@ucsd.edu
> 
> 
> Click here to view this message in a browser
> <http://app.streamsend.com/c/25762573/19109/4s8cGMQ/NA3C?redirect_to=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.russellsage.org%2Fsites%2Fall%2Ffiles%2FRSF-Bulletin%2Frfa_antipoverty_01112016.html%3Futm_source%3Dstreamsend%26utm_medium%3Demail%26utm_content%3D25762573%26utm_campaign%3DRequest%2520for%2520Articles%3A%2520Anti-Poverty%2520Policy%2520Innovations>
> .
> 
> 
> [image: Image]
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> *CALL FOR ARTICLESRSF: THE RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION JOURNAL OF THE SOCIAL
> SCIENCESANTI-POVERTY POLICY INNOVATIONS: NEW PROPOSALS FOR ADDRESSING
> POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES*
> 
> Edited by *Lawrence M. Berger* and *Katherine Magnuson*, University of
> Wisconsin-Madison; we also expect that
> *Maria Cancian* will join us as a coeditor when she returns from leave in
> 2016-2017
> 
> The Institute for Research on Poverty (IRP) and the Russell Sage Foundation
> have historically collaborated on a series of edited volumes on poverty and
> poverty policy, which includes *Fighting Poverty, Confronting Poverty,
> Understanding Poverty, and Changing Poverty, Changing Policies*. This
> series has been widely used by teachers and scholars of poverty and related
> issues, and has traditionally been comprised of state-of-the art review
> chapters. The last volume, *Changing Poverty, Changing Policies*, was
> published in 2009. Since that time, there have been a number of volumes
> focusing on the Great Recession, as well as the fifty years of the War on
> Poverty. These works have extensively reviewed recent trends, research, and
> policy in the poverty arena. However, much less attention has been focused
> on innovative, specific anti-poverty policy proposals in light of this
> evidence. We believe that an issue of *RSF* highlighting such proposals
> would greatly serve the field. We outline our vision for the issue below.
> 
> The journal issue will showcase a collection of innovative and specific
> policy proposals intended to *reduce poverty in the short- and/or long-term
> or improve economic wellbeing*. Each article will focus on a specific
> social problem and/or population group. The issue aims to set the
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> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an
> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 14
> Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 18:48:42 +0000
> From: "Hugh O'Donnell" <bluetanso@googlemail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Digital game-based learning
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<CAJ750_yToNcMyJawzFfknPAt+3qGteR5R9=g+=D+YndqS=q6Tw@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> Yes, I think it was Vygotsky who said that children want to write; they
> just want to write about something that matters. That's why we use the
> simulation: it allows pupils and teams to be engaged with mission critical
> activities that are supported by Science. Eg. Connect water pumps fitted
> with heaters: heat melts subterranean ice, water flow begins... You have
> water, you have hydrogen and oxygen for fuel and breathing.
> 
> Of course, pupils could present narratives orally...
> 
> I'll let you have a look at the second paper.
> 
> Kind Regards,
> Hugh O'Donnell
> 
> http://bluetanso.WordPress.com
> Twitter: @bluetanso
> On 11 Jan 2016 4:50 pm, "Huw Lloyd" <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
>> Nice to hear back from you, Hugh.
>> 
>> My quick impression to your response for me is: it is necessary to have
>> something worth writing about to warrant the effort of writing it well.
>> 
>> So your second paper discusses the same content from a different
>> perspective, is that right?  That might be interesting to look through.
>> 
>> Best,
>> Huw
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On 11 January 2016 at 16:27, Hugh O'Donnell <bluetanso@googlemail.com>
>> wrote:
>> 
>>> Hi, Huw!
>>> 
>>> (I like your 'Shug' reference - you are obviously aware of our Scots
>>> monikers)
>>> 
>>> Yes, I am new to this - the article comes after long months of reducing a
>>> Masters Degree Dissertation...
>>> 
>>> No need to tell you, that I have learnt so much about academic
>> writing/the
>>> academic a community.
>>> 
>>> This is the first of two papers: the other - out for review at the
>> moment -
>>> looks more at the Cultural Historical Activity Theory nature of the
>> action
>>> research project in light of game playing and language use.  The one I
>>> distributed throws up some areas of further exploration as a result of
>> what
>>> was for my pupils a nice way to attempt to use narrative to acquire
>> Science
>>> learning.
>>> 
>>> My main theme is how to use narrative successfully to increase Science
>> and
>>> Literacy attainment through digital game based collaboration.
>>> 
>>> I'm also interested in the collocations of words as a way to examine
>> social
>>> engagement using a digital game and writing about the simulated
>> experience
>>> - is use of We/I linked to attainment success? Can specific game playing
>>> episodes  correlate with science content knowledge is effectively
>> deployed?
>>> 
>>> CHAT is interesting in relation to my ongoing study of game playing and
>>> learning. Obviously the pupils' collaborations and tool use are important
>>> to the systems of activity, but I want to *learn* how I can achieve
>> better
>>> integration of Science and Literacy through group collaboration...
>>> 
>>> If the English Teacher (me) and the Science Teacher (a-n-other) could
>> have
>>> pupils write creative writing pieces that contained the necessary
>> elements
>>> to satisfy both disciplines... Well, that is the Holy Grail, as they say.
>>> 
>>> Thanks for getting in touch!
>>> H
>>> 
>>> Kind Regards,
>>> Hugh O'Donnell
>>> 
>>> http://bluetanso.WordPress.com
>>> Twitter: @bluetanso
>>> On 9 Jan 2016 20:21, "Huw Lloyd" <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> Dear Hugh (or should that be Shug?)
>>>> 
>>>> You might get more responses on this list if you anticipate the kinds
>> of
>>>> exchanges you are hoping for, by drawing our attention to some aspects
>> of
>>>> your paper you find interesting, problematic etc.
>>>> 
>>>> For instance, in reading your abstract it appears to me that you have
>>>> traversed an area of classroom activity that is realising a qualitative
>>>> gain, but in the abstract you don't mention any theoretical basis for
>>>> this.  For example, I would be interested in looking for a qualitative
>>>> difference in the nature of the engagement or orientation to activity
>>> (i.e.
>>>> the behaviour itself), which happens to be a significant interest of
>>> mine.
>>>> 
>>>> I think you can draw us in, yes?
>>>> 
>>>> Best,
>>>> Huw
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On 5 January 2016 at 07:20, Hugh O'Donnell <bluetanso@googlemail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> Greetings,
>>>>> 
>>>>> Please allow me to direct you to a new article on game-based
>> learning:
>>>>> 
>>>>> http://press-start.gla.ac.uk/index.php/press-start/article/view/19
>>>>> 
>>>>> I would appreciate any comments on this Secondary School action
>>> research.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Kind Regards,
>>>>> Hugh O'Donnell
>>>>> 
>>>>> http://bluetanso.WordPress.com
>>>>> Twitter: @bluetanso
>>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 15
> Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 23:08:22 +0000
> From: Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l]  missionaries and cannibals
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<CAG1MBOG_mb=rQYgA_HbzhjsBTjF5-SWFBKb-QeH1a8kmpdD6Rw@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> I introduced are 4.5 year old to the missionaries and cannibals game, post
> dinner in rather noisy circumstances.
> 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Missionaries_and_cannibals_problem
> 
> He proceeded to ferry across all the cannibals, brought two missionaries to
> shore and then wavered for a while.  Next thing I know he is taking them
> down stream, where they can come ashore "at a safe distance from the
> cannibals".
> 
> What can you do? :)
> 
> Best,
> Huw
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 16
> Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 23:09:26 +0000
> From: Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: missionaries and cannibals
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<CAG1MBOHMw5Z_pnY2C3mJCW3x21rimsOOftr4Dx_JUhFTayyLLQ@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> are -> our
> 
> On 11 January 2016 at 23:08, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
>> I introduced are 4.5 year old to the missionaries and cannibals game, post
>> dinner in rather noisy circumstances.
>> 
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Missionaries_and_cannibals_problem
>> 
>> He proceeded to ferry across all the cannibals, brought two missionaries
>> to shore and then wavered for a while.  Next thing I know he is taking them
>> down stream, where they can come ashore "at a safe distance from the
>> cannibals".
>> 
>> What can you do? :)
>> 
>> Best,
>> Huw
>> 
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 17
> Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 23:18:51 +0000
> From: Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu>
> Subject: [Xmca-l]   What is the word
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<BY2PR07MB10701F3728BB63C1BC874E7C1C90@BY2PR07MB107.namprd07.prod.outlook.com>
> 	
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
> 
> In keeping with the recent vogue, I thought this poem by Samuel Beckett was of timely deliverance:
> 
> 
> WHAT IS THE WORD
> 
> Samuel Beckett
> 
> for Joe Chaikin
> 
> folly -
> folly for to -
> for to -
> what is the word -
> folly from this -
> all this -
> folly from all this -
> given -
> folly given all this -
> seeing -
> folly seeing all this -
> this -
> what is the word -
> this this -
> this this here -
> all this this here -
> folly given all this -
> seeing -
> folly seeing all this this here -
> for to -
> what is the word -
> see -
> glimpse -
> seem to glimpse -
> need to seem to glimpse -
> folly for to need to seem to glimpse -
> what -
> what is the word -
> and where -
> folly for to need to seem to glimpse what where -
> where -
> what is the word -
> there -
> over there -
> away over there -
> afar -
> afar away over there -
> afaint -
> afaint afar away over there what -
> what -
> what is the word -
> seeing all this -
> all this this -
> all this this here -
> folly for to see what -
> glimpse -
> seem to glimpse -
> need to seem to glimpse -
> afaint afar away over there what -
> folly for to need to seem to glimpse afaint afar away over there what -
> what -
> what is the word -
> 
> what is the word
> 
> 
> [from: Grand Street, Vol. 9, No. 2, Winter 1990, pp.17-18, N.Y., ISSN 0734-5496]
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 18
> Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 00:00:00 +0000
> From: Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<CAG1MBOELek3Ua7qg7HaUtVzqp+WNgR2WNa-6TyhPWKdpJ=Nwzg@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> Reminiscent of Hopkins' "The leaden echo and the golden echo".
> 
> What is the vogue?  Why is it timely?
> 
> Best,
> Huw
> 
> On 11 January 2016 at 23:18, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu> wrote:
> 
>> In keeping with the recent vogue, I thought this poem by Samuel Beckett
>> was of timely deliverance:
>> 
>> 
>> WHAT IS THE WORD
>> 
>> Samuel Beckett
>> 
>> for Joe Chaikin
>> 
>> folly -
>> folly for to -
>> for to -
>> what is the word -
>> folly from this -
>> all this -
>> folly from all this -
>> given -
>> folly given all this -
>> seeing -
>> folly seeing all this -
>> this -
>> what is the word -
>> this this -
>> this this here -
>> all this this here -
>> folly given all this -
>> seeing -
>> folly seeing all this this here -
>> for to -
>> what is the word -
>> see -
>> glimpse -
>> seem to glimpse -
>> need to seem to glimpse -
>> folly for to need to seem to glimpse -
>> what -
>> what is the word -
>> and where -
>> folly for to need to seem to glimpse what where -
>> where -
>> what is the word -
>> there -
>> over there -
>> away over there -
>> afar -
>> afar away over there -
>> afaint -
>> afaint afar away over there what -
>> what -
>> what is the word -
>> seeing all this -
>> all this this -
>> all this this here -
>> folly for to see what -
>> glimpse -
>> seem to glimpse -
>> need to seem to glimpse -
>> afaint afar away over there what -
>> folly for to need to seem to glimpse afaint afar away over there what -
>> what -
>> what is the word -
>> 
>> what is the word
>> 
>> 
>> [from: Grand Street, Vol. 9, No. 2, Winter 1990, pp.17-18, N.Y., ISSN
>> 0734-5496]
>> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 19
> Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 00:19:39 +0000
> From: Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<BY2PR07MB107BEE2EF08CE254A9852E9C1CA0@BY2PR07MB107.namprd07.prod.outlook.com>
> 	
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
> 
> Huw,
> 
> Why in vogue: Has there not been discussion lately of pointing and words and signifying? 
> 
> Why timely: I'd run into this poem and thought it revealed something about that moment before signifying. 
> 
> It is as if Beckett were attempting to show the meaning of the construction of meaning, before it occurs, with words, using words. 
> 
> That's all. 
> 
> Kind regards,
> 
> Annalisa
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 20
> Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 00:28:23 +0000
> From: Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<CAG1MBOGV-XqrbE0QfpxiNy6_YgXewV=FDuxaUT+dJVs5ktjZ6A@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> Okey-dokes.
> 
> I thought it might have been vaguely Bowie related. Bowie of later years
> seemed rather 'soft' to me, though impressions were fleeting and far
> between.  However, this interview with Paxman of all people, is
> refreshing.  Lovely to see him dancing around Paxman's stern, unimaginative
> conservatism.
> 
> http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-35286749
> 
> Its nice to see that he gets the role of art and mediation intellectually
> and expresses it in those 'micro-genetic' gaps (mocking Paxman gently).
> 
> Best,
> Huw
> 
> 
> On 12 January 2016 at 00:19, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu> wrote:
> 
>> Huw,
>> 
>> Why in vogue: Has there not been discussion lately of pointing and words
>> and signifying?
>> 
>> Why timely: I'd run into this poem and thought it revealed something about
>> that moment before signifying.
>> 
>> It is as if Beckett were attempting to show the meaning of the
>> construction of meaning, before it occurs, with words, using words.
>> 
>> That's all.
>> 
>> Kind regards,
>> 
>> Annalisa
>> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 21
> Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 00:43:27 +0000
> From: Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<CAG1MBOEr-Z2bugZ+ttOyWK0huv2FKu+trSB2SnotFggQvJVCeQ@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> More musical micro-ingenuity:
> 
> http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-35276200
> 
> Best,
> Huw
> 
> On 12 January 2016 at 00:28, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
>> Okey-dokes.
>> 
>> I thought it might have been vaguely Bowie related. Bowie of later years
>> seemed rather 'soft' to me, though impressions were fleeting and far
>> between.  However, this interview with Paxman of all people, is
>> refreshing.  Lovely to see him dancing around Paxman's stern, unimaginative
>> conservatism.
>> 
>> http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-35286749
>> 
>> Its nice to see that he gets the role of art and mediation intellectually
>> and expresses it in those 'micro-genetic' gaps (mocking Paxman gently).
>> 
>> Best,
>> Huw
>> 
>> 
>> On 12 January 2016 at 00:19, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu> wrote:
>> 
>>> Huw,
>>> 
>>> Why in vogue: Has there not been discussion lately of pointing and words
>>> and signifying?
>>> 
>>> Why timely: I'd run into this poem and thought it revealed something
>>> about that moment before signifying.
>>> 
>>> It is as if Beckett were attempting to show the meaning of the
>>> construction of meaning, before it occurs, with words, using words.
>>> 
>>> That's all.
>>> 
>>> Kind regards,
>>> 
>>> Annalisa
>>> 
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 22
> Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 00:53:13 +0000
> From: Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<BY2PR07MB10726D9C17D7E2C05994B2BC1CA0@BY2PR07MB107.namprd07.prod.outlook.com>
> 	
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
> 
> Huw,
> 
> Well, the poem *was* linked to in a Bowie Obit at the New Yorker as well, but I thought Becket's poem still coincides with the list's recent occupations:
> http://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/%E2%80%AAthe-beautiful-meaninglessness-of-david-bowie
> 
> This one was also intriguing:
> David Bowie explained how he used 'cut ups' to create lyrics
> http://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-35281247
> 
> Bowie also had spent time in a Buddhist monastery as a young man, so it likely plays a part in this. Meditation is frequently about being without thought, which to me is about being without words.
> 
> Kind regards,
> 
> Annalisa
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 23
> Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 17:07:08 -0800
> From: mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: missionaries and cannibals
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<CAHCnM0DhRdDRTHVo1fnwrK7PB9YyX1SJyJJG8Ts4GG0MRO2DgQ@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> Sounds like a sensible solution to me, Huw.
> Nice to see him getting his feet wet!
> :-)
> mike
> 
> 
> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 3:09 PM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> 
>> are -> our
>> 
>> On 11 January 2016 at 23:08, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> wrote:
>> 
>>> I introduced are 4.5 year old to the missionaries and cannibals game,
>> post
>>> dinner in rather noisy circumstances.
>>> 
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Missionaries_and_cannibals_problem
>>> 
>>> He proceeded to ferry across all the cannibals, brought two missionaries
>>> to shore and then wavered for a while.  Next thing I know he is taking
>> them
>>> down stream, where they can come ashore "at a safe distance from the
>>> cannibals".
>>> 
>>> What can you do? :)
>>> 
>>> Best,
>>> Huw
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> 
> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an
> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 24
> Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 01:31:48 +0000
> From: Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<CAG1MBOEjSJR=9wz-fcrg3kDgf3c=sNL0+NpFo8G0Q+oY4E_uvw@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> Apropos of Bowie's "western tarot" (or divination), this video is about a
> savant, Daniel Tammet. The whole documentary is interesting.  However,
> there is an interesting parallel between unconscious divination activity
> and the kinds of experience Daniel describes during a poker experiment (see
> the clip between 28:00 to 31:00).  "But something in my head was telling me
> to do that anyway, because of the imagery I was experiencing".
> 
> Also of immediate acitivity-historical interest in this footage are the
> Japanese children's use of imaginary abaci (soroban).
> 
> Best,
> Huw
> 
> On 12 January 2016 at 00:53, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu> wrote:
> 
>> Huw,
>> 
>> Well, the poem *was* linked to in a Bowie Obit at the New Yorker as well,
>> but I thought Becket's poem still coincides with the list's recent
>> occupations:
>> 
>> http://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/%E2%80%AAthe-beautiful-meaninglessness-of-david-bowie
>> 
>> This one was also intriguing:
>> David Bowie explained how he used 'cut ups' to create lyrics
>> http://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-35281247
>> 
>> Bowie also had spent time in a Buddhist monastery as a young man, so it
>> likely plays a part in this. Meditation is frequently about being without
>> thought, which to me is about being without words.
>> 
>> Kind regards,
>> 
>> Annalisa
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 25
> Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 01:43:12 +0000
> From: Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: missionaries and cannibals
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<CAG1MBOGvy9U3XK6xZ_PNRHTjt+=J+wQmzLWSFZd=A=g=LMOuGg@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> Not sure whether to give it another go (destination a ship) or move on to
> something else.
> 
> The little one has started a wording; it is all about trying out meanings
> now -- joy.
> 
> Best,
> Huw
> 
> On 12 January 2016 at 01:07, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
> 
>> Sounds like a sensible solution to me, Huw.
>> Nice to see him getting his feet wet!
>> :-)
>> mike
>> 
>> 
>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 3:09 PM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>> 
>>> are -> our
>>> 
>>> On 11 January 2016 at 23:08, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> I introduced are 4.5 year old to the missionaries and cannibals game,
>>> post
>>>> dinner in rather noisy circumstances.
>>>> 
>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Missionaries_and_cannibals_problem
>>>> 
>>>> He proceeded to ferry across all the cannibals, brought two
>> missionaries
>>>> to shore and then wavered for a while.  Next thing I know he is taking
>>> them
>>>> down stream, where they can come ashore "at a safe distance from the
>>>> cannibals".
>>>> 
>>>> What can you do? :)
>>>> 
>>>> Best,
>>>> Huw
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> --
>> 
>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an
>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
>> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 26
> Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 01:59:14 +0000
> From: Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<BY2PR07MB107C01F063F940CFA678841C1CA0@BY2PR07MB107.namprd07.prod.outlook.com>
> 	
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
> 
> Was there a link coming forth?
> 
> 
> From:  Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> Sent: Monday, January 11, 2016 6:31 PM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word
> 
> Apropos of Bowie's "western tarot" (or divination), this video is about a
> savant, Daniel Tammet. The whole documentary is interesting.  However,
> there is an interesting parallel between unconscious divination activity
> and the kinds of experience Daniel describes during a poker experiment (see
> the clip between 28:00 to 31:00).  "But something in my head was telling me
> to do that anyway, because of the imagery I was experiencing".
> 
> Also of immediate acitivity-historical interest in this footage are the
> Japanese children's use of imaginary abaci (soroban).
> 
> Best,
> Huw
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 27
> Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 02:02:57 +0000
> From: Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<CAG1MBOGRzMtRb3Y6ocVAZKQjJ3A-uYuptPAO5yhKZvfFrPjhoA@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> Keeping you waiting?  :)
> 
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kf3-el-dJAw
> 
> Best,
> Huw
> 
> On 12 January 2016 at 01:59, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu> wrote:
> 
>> Was there a link coming forth?
>> 
>> 
>> From:  Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>> Sent: Monday, January 11, 2016 6:31 PM
>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word
>> 
>> Apropos of Bowie's "western tarot" (or divination), this video is about a
>> savant, Daniel Tammet. The whole documentary is interesting.  However,
>> there is an interesting parallel between unconscious divination activity
>> and the kinds of experience Daniel describes during a poker experiment (see
>> the clip between 28:00 to 31:00).  "But something in my head was telling me
>> to do that anyway, because of the imagery I was experiencing".
>> 
>> Also of immediate acitivity-historical interest in this footage are the
>> Japanese children's use of imaginary abaci (soroban).
>> 
>> Best,
>> Huw
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 28
> Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 06:25:04 +0000
> From: Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<BY2PR07MB107717DE0C05EF5EC3DABEDC1CA0@BY2PR07MB107.namprd07.prod.outlook.com>
> 	
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
> 
> Hello,
> 
> I didn't quite see your comparison of David Bowie's word cutouts with Daniel Tammet. I don't think Bowie himself thought of them as divinations, not literally anyway, but a means of creating songs. He was using a method shared with him by William Burroughs and Brion Gyson, as indicated here (read to the bottom):
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cut-up_technique
> 
> They do say they *seem* like divinations, but I didn't get the feeling they were doing them for the sake of divining.
> 
> What you are talking about with Tammet and the Japanese soroban almost seems like I Ching to me, but neither do they seem to be divining, they are just exploring their abilities. 
> 
> I Ching however is practiced for divining, for the sake of it. 
> 
> In any case, the connection that I'd make about all this is that there is something tying everything together, which we cannot perceive, and since we can't perceive it, we also cannot measure it. And since we can't measure it, we usually will say it doesn't exist, tending toward scepticism.
> 
> Kind regards,
> 
> Annalisa
> 
> ________________________________________
> From:  behalf of Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> Sent: Monday, January 11, 2016 7:02 PM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word
> 
> Keeping you waiting?  :)
> 
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kf3-el-dJAw
> 
> Best,
> Huw
> 
> On 12 January 2016 at 01:59, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu> wrote:
> 
>> Was there a link coming forth?
>> 
>> 
>> From:  Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>> Sent: Monday, January 11, 2016 6:31 PM
>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word
>> 
>> Apropos of Bowie's "western tarot" (or divination), this video is about a
>> savant, Daniel Tammet. The whole documentary is interesting.  However,
>> there is an interesting parallel between unconscious divination activity
>> and the kinds of experience Daniel describes during a poker experiment (see
>> the clip between 28:00 to 31:00).  "But something in my head was telling me
>> to do that anyway, because of the imagery I was experiencing".
>> 
>> Also of immediate acitivity-historical interest in this footage are the
>> Japanese children's use of imaginary abaci (soroban).
>> 
>> Best,
>> Huw
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 29
> Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 15:37:32 +0900
> From: David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l]  Fwd:  Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<CACwG6DuZg6kLvFFCbe0XXVwVnOWY9nD2m=Q59kXsd+CdaFuNWA@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in the
> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is.
> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation
> between "moment" and music.
> 
> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant is a
> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three
> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of "moment"
> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the
> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting").
> 
> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology in a
> way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something like a
> sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe
> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is almost
> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the
> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic
> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. This
> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: as we
> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even present,
> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat
> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a
> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or
> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the
> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of
> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because even
> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining
> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of
> angular momentum.
> 
> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and sometimes
> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The
> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different from
> the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but
> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context of
> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a
> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed
> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological
> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis",
> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem,
> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible.
> 
> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described
> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can seriously
> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same
> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly
> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between solar
> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is
> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the
> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much the
> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech
> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we
> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the
> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way to
> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for example,
> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more
> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to
> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text).
> 
> David Kellogg
> Macquarie University
> 
> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> wrote:
> 
>> 
>> Dear all ,
>> 
>> Look at this please !
>> 
>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a thought
>> experiment: 1) The
>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its
>> essence can be revealed
>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental
>> transformations; 3) this same
>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which the
>> object is
>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented as
>> a process of
>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment
>> essentially becomes a
>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only
>> within this special
>> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]]
>> 
>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , action
>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate even
>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular
>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal
>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , nor
>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or
>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or motionality ,
>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives
>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be converted
>> in the other as we all have seen .
>> 
>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played with
>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . It's a
>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable
>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a
>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of affect or
>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think of
>> how to express it and he might  finally resort to imitation . Then , the
>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note in
>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on which
>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state occurs .
>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or
>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute
>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is said
>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources for
>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now .
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Best
>> 
>> Haydi
>> 
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 30
> Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 06:52:42 +0000
> From: Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<CAG1MBOEObgOrUvkbMs5YryfoVge6=hXhLXF-EV2-JDBMuYyJvA@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> The imaginary soroban is different to the poker account (which was merely
> compared with divination).  The imaginary soroban has obvious historical
> manifestations of how it is learnt.  The divination was merely a comparison
> -- I have nothing to add to it.
> 
> Best,
> Huw
> 
> On 12 January 2016 at 06:25, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu> wrote:
> 
>> Hello,
>> 
>> I didn't quite see your comparison of David Bowie's word cutouts with
>> Daniel Tammet. I don't think Bowie himself thought of them as divinations,
>> not literally anyway, but a means of creating songs. He was using a method
>> shared with him by William Burroughs and Brion Gyson, as indicated here
>> (read to the bottom):
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cut-up_technique
>> 
>> They do say they *seem* like divinations, but I didn't get the feeling
>> they were doing them for the sake of divining.
>> 
>> What you are talking about with Tammet and the Japanese soroban almost
>> seems like I Ching to me, but neither do they seem to be divining, they are
>> just exploring their abilities.
>> 
>> I Ching however is practiced for divining, for the sake of it.
>> 
>> In any case, the connection that I'd make about all this is that there is
>> something tying everything together, which we cannot perceive, and since we
>> can't perceive it, we also cannot measure it. And since we can't measure
>> it, we usually will say it doesn't exist, tending toward scepticism.
>> 
>> Kind regards,
>> 
>> Annalisa
>> 
>> ________________________________________
>> From:  behalf of Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>> Sent: Monday, January 11, 2016 7:02 PM
>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word
>> 
>> Keeping you waiting?  :)
>> 
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kf3-el-dJAw
>> 
>> Best,
>> Huw
>> 
>> On 12 January 2016 at 01:59, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu> wrote:
>> 
>>> Was there a link coming forth?
>>> 
>>> 
>>> From:  Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>>> Sent: Monday, January 11, 2016 6:31 PM
>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: What is the word
>>> 
>>> Apropos of Bowie's "western tarot" (or divination), this video is about a
>>> savant, Daniel Tammet. The whole documentary is interesting.  However,
>>> there is an interesting parallel between unconscious divination activity
>>> and the kinds of experience Daniel describes during a poker experiment
>> (see
>>> the clip between 28:00 to 31:00).  "But something in my head was telling
>> me
>>> to do that anyway, because of the imagery I was experiencing".
>>> 
>>> Also of immediate acitivity-historical interest in this footage are the
>>> Japanese children's use of imaginary abaci (soroban).
>>> 
>>> Best,
>>> Huw
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 31
> Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 07:13:07 +0000 (UTC)
> From: ?Haydi Zulfei? ? 	<haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l]  help !
> To: EXtended Mind Culture Activity <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<1245065931.5807756.1452582787833.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> Dear all, 
> Now I'm facing a problem . When I write a message , the "send" button gets lost . Practically I cannot send a post . I hope this one appears on the list . Thanks !
> Best
> Haydi
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 32
> Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 18:29:21 +1100
> From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: help !
> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> Message-ID: <5694AB51.1000502@mira.net>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed
> 
> Haydi, there is nothing wrong with your computer or the xmca 
> system. All your messages are getting through and being read.
> Andy
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> On 12/01/2016 6:13 PM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote:
>>  Dear all,
>> Now I'm facing a problem . When I write a message , the "send" button gets lost . Practically I cannot send a post . I hope this one appears on the list . Thanks !
>> Best
>> Haydi
>> 
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 33
> Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 07:33:28 +0000
> From: Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: help !
> To: Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>,	"eXtended Mind,
> 	Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<CAG1MBOEond6R2assQO=ciDhQk+=m-oYn9kOguGRLN0EWnvK6Sg@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> This one got through, though not the previous one that David replied to.
> 
> Best,
> Huw
> 
> On 12 January 2016 at 07:13, <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> wrote:
> 
>> Dear all,
>> Now I'm facing a problem . When I write a message , the "send" button gets
>> lost . Practically I cannot send a post . I hope this one appears on the
>> list . Thanks !
>> Best
>> Haydi
>> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 34
> Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 07:35:13 +0000
> From: Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<CAG1MBOHkrz_eE+WRUqJLcCyiikRhyxOUPUe0aK-0jeTHY4D0kg@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> Thank you David and Haydi. That's insightful.
> 
> Would it be correct to summarise this idea as: a moment is the
> manifestation of the whole (transformation) in the instant, which is a
> progression in its transformation?
> 
> Presumably molar goes back to molecule?  I can't see how it relates to to
> teeth/molars at present...
> 
> Best,
> Huw
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On 12 January 2016 at 06:37, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in the
>> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is.
>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation
>> between "moment" and music.
>> 
>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant is a
>> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three
>> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of "moment"
>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the
>> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting").
>> 
>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology in a
>> way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something like a
>> sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe
>> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is almost
>> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the
>> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic
>> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. This
>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: as we
>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even present,
>> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat
>> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a
>> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or
>> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the
>> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of
>> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because even
>> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining
>> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of
>> angular momentum.
>> 
>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and sometimes
>> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The
>> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different from
>> the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but
>> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context of
>> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a
>> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed
>> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological
>> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis",
>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem,
>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible.
>> 
>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described
>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can seriously
>> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same
>> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly
>> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between solar
>> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is
>> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the
>> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much the
>> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech
>> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we
>> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the
>> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way to
>> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for example,
>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more
>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to
>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text).
>> 
>> David Kellogg
>> Macquarie University
>> 
>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> wrote:
>> 
>>> 
>>> Dear all ,
>>> 
>>> Look at this please !
>>> 
>>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a thought
>>> experiment: 1) The
>>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its
>>> essence can be revealed
>>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental
>>> transformations; 3) this same
>>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which
>> the
>>> object is
>>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented
>> as
>>> a process of
>>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment
>>> essentially becomes a
>>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only
>>> within this special
>>> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]]
>>> 
>>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , action
>>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate
>> even
>>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular
>>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal
>>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , nor
>>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or
>>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or
>> motionality ,
>>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives
>>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be
>> converted
>>> in the other as we all have seen .
>>> 
>>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played with
>>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . It's a
>>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable
>>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a
>>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of affect
>> or
>>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think
>> of
>>> how to express it and he might  finally resort to imitation . Then , the
>>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note in
>>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on
>> which
>>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state occurs
>> .
>>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or
>>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute
>>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is said
>>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources
>> for
>>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now .
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Best
>>> 
>>> Haydi
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 35
> Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 18:44:46 +1100
> From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> Message-ID: <5694AEEE.8050309@mira.net>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed
> 
> molar is derivged from the Laton moler meaning "mass" and 
> molecule is derived from the same root. "Molecule" 
> originated from discussions around Descartes' ideas, in same 
> sense as the modern usage. "Molar" only emerged in the 1870s 
> with the sense of a *mass* of material, explicitly in 
> contrast to molecular. So the words form a pair of 
> opposites, both originating from the same root.
> 
> Andy
> 
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> On 12/01/2016 6:35 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote:
>> Thank you David and Haydi. That's insightful.
>> 
>> Would it be correct to summarise this idea as: a moment is the
>> manifestation of the whole (transformation) in the instant, which is a
>> progression in its transformation?
>> 
>> Presumably molar goes back to molecule?  I can't see how it relates to to
>> teeth/molars at present...
>> 
>> Best,
>> Huw
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On 12 January 2016 at 06:37, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
>> 
>>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in the
>>> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is.
>>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation
>>> between "moment" and music.
>>> 
>>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant is a
>>> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three
>>> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of "moment"
>>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the
>>> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting").
>>> 
>>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology in a
>>> way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something like a
>>> sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe
>>> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is almost
>>> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the
>>> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic
>>> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. This
>>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: as we
>>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even present,
>>> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat
>>> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a
>>> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or
>>> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the
>>> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of
>>> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because even
>>> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining
>>> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of
>>> angular momentum.
>>> 
>>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and sometimes
>>> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The
>>> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different from
>>> the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but
>>> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context of
>>> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a
>>> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed
>>> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological
>>> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis",
>>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem,
>>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible.
>>> 
>>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described
>>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can seriously
>>> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same
>>> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly
>>> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between solar
>>> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is
>>> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the
>>> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much the
>>> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech
>>> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we
>>> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the
>>> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way to
>>> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for example,
>>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more
>>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to
>>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text).
>>> 
>>> David Kellogg
>>> Macquarie University
>>> 
>>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> Dear all ,
>>>> 
>>>> Look at this please !
>>>> 
>>>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a thought
>>>> experiment: 1) The
>>>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its
>>>> essence can be revealed
>>>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental
>>>> transformations; 3) this same
>>>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which
>>> the
>>>> object is
>>>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented
>>> as
>>>> a process of
>>>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment
>>>> essentially becomes a
>>>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only
>>>> within this special
>>>> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]]
>>>> 
>>>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , action
>>>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate
>>> even
>>>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular
>>>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal
>>>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , nor
>>>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or
>>>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or
>>> motionality ,
>>>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives
>>>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be
>>> converted
>>>> in the other as we all have seen .
>>>> 
>>>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played with
>>>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . It's a
>>>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable
>>>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a
>>>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of affect
>>> or
>>>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think
>>> of
>>>> how to express it and he might  finally resort to imitation . Then , the
>>>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note in
>>>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on
>>> which
>>>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state occurs
>>> .
>>>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or
>>>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute
>>>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is said
>>>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources
>>> for
>>>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now .
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Best
>>>> 
>>>> Haydi
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 36
> Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 07:45:46 +0000 (UTC)
> From: ?Haydi Zulfei? ? 	<haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: help !
> To: Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>,	"eXtended Mind, Culture,
> 	Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<1081823808.5708789.1452584746800.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> Thanks Andy and Huw ! But as?Hew says , he's not received my message of Jan.11th while Andy says : I received it . We all did. And I cannot see my messages appear on the list myself . And I receive some messages in pairs like the one sent by David . I wrote to Bruce jones , too . I should wait for more guidance , then .?Thanks?all ! H
> 
> 
>      From: Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> To: Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> 
> Sent: Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 11:03:28
> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] help !
> 
> This one got through, though not the previous one that David replied to.?
> Best,Huw
> 
> On 12 January 2016 at 07:13, <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> wrote:
> 
> ?Dear all,
> Now I'm facing a problem . When I write a message , the "send" button gets lost . Practically I cannot send a post . I hope this one appears on the list . Thanks !
> Best
> Haydi
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 37
> Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 09:12:57 +0000 (UTC)
> From: ?Haydi Zulfei? ? 	<haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l]  Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> To: EXtended Mind Culture Activity <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<820642578.5882801.1452589977563.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> Thanks for help and my apologies , Andy . Yes , "Current Messages" confirms you but something might have been wrong with my Galaxy Phone or my eyes acting as means of visionaries not as that of vision or sight which caused my misunderstanding . However David Bakhurst's "Russian Philosophy up to Ilyenko" which pays greatest tribute to both Vygotsky and Ilyenko (though we are yet lacking in direct quotes) , and Davydov's articles and?his?as yet two translated books especially the one translated by Peter?Moxhay which also gratifies Both Vygotsky and Ilyenko are?treasures to be excavated . I think at such critical moments of discussing a term or a concept , one is better search for the "sense" rather than for the "meaning"?of a word (emphasized by both Vygotsky and Leontiev) and this could be realized through examples and usages of particular contexts . Locke is not Hegel , Hegel is neither Marx nor Berkley , so on so forth . With a last one I finish this short dialogue :
> [[Human sensibility, being a result of the development of people?s object-oriented,
> practical activity, is contradictory in its content. Sensation and perception, in themselves,
> reflect existent being. But a different content?the mediatedness and connectedness of being,
> its inner content??seeps in? through practical action, where things (the object and the means
> of labor) are purposefully brought together. Practical action, being sensible and objectoriented, unites in itself the opposing elements of its content?the external and the internal,
> the existent and the mediated, the individual and the universal. In practical action,?[THESE MOMENTS] are located in direct unity.]] Davydov , page 96 . 
> With Davydov's quote of Bibler , the intent was that?each of the three was a 'moment' and that with the third necessarily realized?, the supposedly interruption between the moment of "sense cognition" and the moment of "rational or theoretical cognition" is removed . Davydov adds that empirical thinking and theoretical thinking are not two?separate stages in cognition but that rational cognition just starts from the very beginning because of the continuity (advent) of the moments of a whole process .?Thanks !
> David,
> Concerning the problem I began writing to Andy and the above was the last to be sent which was not ; now "send" winks at me ; hope it's not lost again . I read your response in passing because of the problem . But before I can think about its difficult content , I'd like you to read the other parags in which "moment" has been contextually used . What I wrote was based on my understanding of these notions .
> [[The particular changes and connections of a thing can be considered as moments in a
> broader interaction, within which the thing is naturally replaced by another thing. Such a
> transition, however, preserves everything positive in the first thing that is necessary for this
> broader, holistic system of interactions. This is what is meant by a theoretical approach to the
> very coming-into-being of things, the mediation of one thing by another.]]
> [[Marx used the example of social production to show the significance of the whole for
> understanding its separate components:
> In all forms of society there is one specific kind of production which predominates
> over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others. It is a general
> illumination which bathes all the other colors and modifies their particularity. It is a
> particular ether which determines the specific gravity of every being which has
> materialized within it.]]
> [[In (EMPIRICAL DEPENDENCES) , the individual thing is an independent reality. In the
> dependences revealed by theory, one thing is a method for manifesting another within a
> certain whole. This transition of thing into thing, the sublation of one thing?s specificity when
> it is transformed into its own ?other??i.e. their internal connection?is the object of
> theoretical thought. This kind of thought is always dealing with real, sensibly given things,
> but discerns the process of their mutual transition, their connection within a certain whole and
> in their dependence on that whole. Marx wrote, ?It is the work of science to resolve the
> visible, merely external moment into the true intrinsic movement??]]
> [[The difference in content of empirical and theoretical thinking gave rise to a difference in
> their forms. As was mentioned above, empirical dependences are the results of sensory
> observations, verbally described. Since these dependences recur, it is necessary to distinguish
> certain classes of dependences from others. Differentiation and classification are just
> precisely the functions of general conceptions or empirical concepts. Marx gives the
> following description of the empirical understanding of things, which is typical of an
> ?unscientific observer? and which, instead of penetrating into the internal connection, ?takes
> the external phenomena of life, as they seem and appear and merely describes, catalogues,
> recounts and arranges them under formal definitions.?[26] External repeatability,
> resemblance, differentiation?these are the general properties of reality that are grasped and
> subsumed ?under schematizing definitions? (BY EMPIRICAL CONCEPTS).]]
> [[In dialectical materialism, this objective whole that exists through the connection of
> individual things is usually called the concrete. The concrete, according to Marx, is the ?unity
> of the diverse.?[27] In its externality, as having come into being, it is given in contemplation,
> in a conception that grasps the moment of the general, mutual interconnectedness of its
> manifestations. But the problem is how to represent this concrete as coming into being, in the
> process of its origin and mediation, for it is only this process that leads to the entire manifold
> of manifestations of the whole. This is the problem of studying the concrete in development,
> in movement, which is the only way to reveal the system?s internal links and thus the
> connection between the individual and the universal.
> It is important to emphasize that the primary distinction between theoretical concepts and
> general conceptions is that theoretical concepts reproduce the process of development or
> formation of the system, its holisticity, as something concrete, and it is only within this
> process that the features and interconnections of individual objects get revealed.]]
> Aside from the current discussion , once there was a diagram augmenting from the concrete to abstract general ; the last parag. discusses what is really concrete and universal within the domain of dialectical logic . I try to get immersed in CHAT but if I don't succeed , it's because of my ESSENCE :-) . Now give me time to delve into your response . Thanks a lot . 
> BestHaydi
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> BestHaydi??
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 38
> Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 05:34:01 -0500
> From: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" <pmocombe@mocombeian.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l]  NYTimes.com: When Philosophy Lost Its Way
> To: "eXtended Mind Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID: <46hpx1gnlt98ox00yqxnbd27.1452594840913@email.android.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
> 
>> From The New York Times:
> 
> When Philosophy Lost Its Way
> 
> Once upon a time, acquiring wisdom and being a good person were intimately linked. The modern university changed all that.
> 
> http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/01/11/when-philosophy-lost-its-way/?mwrsm=Email
> 
> 
> 
> Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 39
> Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 21:35:24 +1100
> From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> Message-ID: <5694D6EC.2090000@mira.net>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed
> 
> Haydi,
> Your quote from the Grundrisse:
> 
>    "It is a general illumination which bathes all the other
>    colours and modifies their particularity. "
> 
> A beautiful metaphor which reminds me of the explanation of 
> the perception of colour in this video excerpt from "The 
> Devil Wears Prada":
> 
>    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yj8mHwvFxMc
> 
> Not even a colour, let alone a word, has meaning outside of 
> the social context of its production.
> 
> Andy
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> On 12/01/2016 8:12 PM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote:
>>  Thanks for help and my apologies , Andy . Yes , "Current Messages" confirms you but something might have been wrong with my Galaxy Phone or my eyes acting as means of visionaries not as that of vision or sight which caused my misunderstanding . However David Bakhurst's "Russian Philosophy up to Ilyenko" which pays greatest tribute to both Vygotsky and Ilyenko (though we are yet lacking in direct quotes) , and Davydov's articles and his as yet two translated books especially the one translated by Peter Moxhay which also gratifies Both Vygotsky and Ilyenko are treasures to be excavated . I think at such critical moments of discussing a term or a concept , one is better search for the "sense" rather than for the "meaning" of a word (emphasized by both Vygotsky and Leontiev) and this could be realized through examples and usages of particular contexts . Locke is not Hegel , Hegel is neither Marx nor Berkley , so on so forth . With a last one I finish this short dialogue :
>> [[Human sensibility, being a result of the development of people?s object-oriented,
>> practical activity, is contradictory in its content. Sensation and perception, in themselves,
>> reflect existent being. But a different content?the mediatedness and connectedness of being,
>> its inner content??seeps in? through practical action, where things (the object and the means
>> of labor) are purposefully brought together. Practical action, being sensible and objectoriented, unites in itself the opposing elements of its content?the external and the internal,
>> the existent and the mediated, the individual and the universal. In practical action, [THESE MOMENTS] are located in direct unity.]] Davydov , page 96 .
>> With Davydov's quote of Bibler , the intent was that each of the three was a 'moment' and that with the third necessarily realized , the supposedly interruption between the moment of "sense cognition" and the moment of "rational or theoretical cognition" is removed . Davydov adds that empirical thinking and theoretical thinking are not two separate stages in cognition but that rational cognition just starts from the very beginning because of the continuity (advent) of the moments of a whole process . Thanks !
>> David,
>> Concerning the problem I began writing to Andy and the above was the last to be sent which was not ; now "send" winks at me ; hope it's not lost again . I read your response in passing because of the problem . But before I can think about its difficult content , I'd like you to read the other parags in which "moment" has been contextually used . What I wrote was based on my understanding of these notions .
>> [[The particular changes and connections of a thing can be considered as moments in a
>> broader interaction, within which the thing is naturally replaced by another thing. Such a
>> transition, however, preserves everything positive in the first thing that is necessary for this
>> broader, holistic system of interactions. This is what is meant by a theoretical approach to the
>> very coming-into-being of things, the mediation of one thing by another.]]
>> [[Marx used the example of social production to show the significance of the whole for
>> understanding its separate components:
>> In all forms of society there is one specific kind of production which predominates
>> over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others. It is a general
>> illumination which bathes all the other colors and modifies their particularity. It is a
>> particular ether which determines the specific gravity of every being which has
>> materialized within it.]]
>> [[In (EMPIRICAL DEPENDENCES) , the individual thing is an independent reality. In the
>> dependences revealed by theory, one thing is a method for manifesting another within a
>> certain whole. This transition of thing into thing, the sublation of one thing?s specificity when
>> it is transformed into its own ?other??i.e. their internal connection?is the object of
>> theoretical thought. This kind of thought is always dealing with real, sensibly given things,
>> but discerns the process of their mutual transition, their connection within a certain whole and
>> in their dependence on that whole. Marx wrote, ?It is the work of science to resolve the
>> visible, merely external moment into the true intrinsic movement??]]
>> [[The difference in content of empirical and theoretical thinking gave rise to a difference in
>> their forms. As was mentioned above, empirical dependences are the results of sensory
>> observations, verbally described. Since these dependences recur, it is necessary to distinguish
>> certain classes of dependences from others. Differentiation and classification are just
>> precisely the functions of general conceptions or empirical concepts. Marx gives the
>> following description of the empirical understanding of things, which is typical of an
>> ?unscientific observer? and which, instead of penetrating into the internal connection, ?takes
>> the external phenomena of life, as they seem and appear and merely describes, catalogues,
>> recounts and arranges them under formal definitions.?[26] External repeatability,
>> resemblance, differentiation?these are the general properties of reality that are grasped and
>> subsumed ?under schematizing definitions? (BY EMPIRICAL CONCEPTS).]]
>> [[In dialectical materialism, this objective whole that exists through the connection of
>> individual things is usually called the concrete. The concrete, according to Marx, is the ?unity
>> of the diverse.?[27] In its externality, as having come into being, it is given in contemplation,
>> in a conception that grasps the moment of the general, mutual interconnectedness of its
>> manifestations. But the problem is how to represent this concrete as coming into being, in the
>> process of its origin and mediation, for it is only this process that leads to the entire manifold
>> of manifestations of the whole. This is the problem of studying the concrete in development,
>> in movement, which is the only way to reveal the system?s internal links and thus the
>> connection between the individual and the universal.
>> It is important to emphasize that the primary distinction between theoretical concepts and
>> general conceptions is that theoretical concepts reproduce the process of development or
>> formation of the system, its holisticity, as something concrete, and it is only within this
>> process that the features and interconnections of individual objects get revealed.]]
>> Aside from the current discussion , once there was a diagram augmenting from the concrete to abstract general ; the last parag. discusses what is really concrete and universal within the domain of dialectical logic . I try to get immersed in CHAT but if I don't succeed , it's because of my ESSENCE :-) . Now give me time to delve into your response . Thanks a lot .
>> BestHaydi
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> BestHaydi
>> 
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 40
> Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 15:06:39 +0000 (UTC)
> From: ?Haydi Zulfei? ? 	<haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> To: David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>,	EXtended Mind Culture
> 	Activity <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<149838728.6270871.1452611199482.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> 
> Thanks , David , for the two-parag. epigraph as always !
> --First of all, Kant says we cannot know / cognize a material object in itself because a priori we don't have an image of it so??we are unable to have an overlap between the two ; hence agnosticism let alone 'inner connections' of a whole as 'moments'?. Dialectical Logic (close relative to CHAT) says as man?relies on object-related activity while an ideal adaptable to the future coming object ever runs through the activity to the finish , is able to penetrate the depths . When you put the mental model into a material?model ,?in reifying or objectifying that model into a finished?product and all through the durational time , you can see what is necessary?, essential and what is not . In higher momentums of conception , you reach concepts and this is the time you've got a theoretical rational cognitive copy of the inner mechanisms and transformations of the related object or objects . When we say 'ideal' is a moment of an activity , we mean it's ever?running through uninterruptedly because?the?whole entity falls down , collapses otherwise . Or if you aim to take it wholly apart , again nothing is left for objectfication . Davydov says?we cannot stop at phenomenology ; it's not to our will or taste ; we should ever reproduce our ever changing needs and products and that needs true science and true science needs true concepts . Yes , we want the object to move (dynamicity) according to its inner transformations (moments) which has come to us as fixated knowledge in speech and skills historically .?We don't want to be stuck in our position observing it to move . If you take moments as moments of your positioning while observing ,?you've not been able to convert those phenomenal aspects (empiricism)?into innermost movements hence agnosticism prevails . Yes ,? We could somehow treat these moments as always inhering , how ? Are neoformations parts and parcels of?some detachable independent separate phnomenon ? Are they not fused , interwoven , intertwined moments of?inner mechanisms?of whole development (internalization , appropriation?, instruction , development , upbringing involved) ? Does development?or even periods of development contain , include some parts and parcels or do they subsume some moments of developmental transformations , those moments still sublated within the whole process reversible if development defects ??
> --Secondly , we?agreed that moment is different from the instance as we took it as tokens , samples , etc. Everything began with the very fact . 
> --Thirdly , with what I?said ,?I suppose you've been responded to . Our focus is on moment as some (aspect as you say ;?I first refrained from using 'aspectual' because aspect , too , does not convey the intention precisely) variable of a successive uninterrupted incessant moving movable whole in contrast to parts and parcels even components of some static?internally immovable pseudo-stagnant whole which , if potentially realizable , will damage genuine cognition . 
> BestHaydi
> ?
> 
>      From: David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> To: Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> 
> Sent: Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 9:08:03
> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> 
> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in the wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is. Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation between "moment" and music.?
> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant is a moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of "moment" (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting").?
> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology in a way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something like a sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is almost always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. This means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: as we observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even present, much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because even nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of angular momentum.
> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and sometimes uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different from the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context of culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis", "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem, where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible.
> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can seriously say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between solar radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much the same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way to grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for example, is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text).
> David KelloggMacquarie University
> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> Dear all ,
> Look at this please !
> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a thought experiment: 1) The
> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its essence can be revealed
> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental transformations; 3) this same
> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which the object is
> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented as a process of
> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment essentially becomes a
> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only within this special
> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]]
> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , action , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate even componential . As I can think of it , it is?a point in a circular succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal instants . By definition , in?a round of activity , neither itself , nor action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or independence or invariability. At each point of succession or motionality , because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives ,?emotional?incentives or stimuation ,?each of the three could be converted in the other as we all have seen .?
> And there's an affinity in music domain .?A whole melody is played with all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . It's a whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable feeling?is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a particular part or stage?orietating on which this or that kind of affect or ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think of how to express it?and he might? finally resort to?imitation . Then , the philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note in whole composition or?in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on which such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state occurs . Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is said to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources for such qurries?but I can't give a locus now .?
> 
> 
> Best
> Haydi??
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 41
> Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 15:33:29 +0000 (UTC)
> From: ?Haydi Zulfei? ? 	<haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<300561455.6277070.1452612809075.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> 
> Hi huw !?I don't know about?David's opinion but as for myself I agree to what you define so succinctly?especially when we read Davydov's 'dissolving particularities' to reach 'concrete universals' in one of the quotes I delivered . Thanks a lot !
> Best
> Haydi
> ?
> 
>      From: Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> 
> Sent: Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 11:05:13
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> 
> Thank you David and Haydi. That's insightful.
> 
> Would it be correct to summarise this idea as: a moment is the
> manifestation of the whole (transformation) in the instant, which is a
> progression in its transformation?
> 
> Presumably molar goes back to molecule?? I can't see how it relates to to
> teeth/molars at present...
> 
> Best,
> Huw
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On 12 January 2016 at 06:37, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in the
>> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is.
>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation
>> between "moment" and music.
>> 
>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant is a
>> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three
>> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of "moment"
>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the
>> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting").
>> 
>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology in a
>> way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something like a
>> sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe
>> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is almost
>> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the
>> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic
>> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. This
>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: as we
>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even present,
>> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat
>> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a
>> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or
>> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the
>> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of
>> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because even
>> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining
>> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of
>> angular momentum.
>> 
>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and sometimes
>> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The
>> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different from
>> the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but
>> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context of
>> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a
>> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed
>> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological
>> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis",
>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem,
>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible.
>> 
>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described
>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can seriously
>> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same
>> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly
>> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between solar
>> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is
>> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the
>> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much the
>> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech
>> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we
>> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the
>> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way to
>> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for example,
>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more
>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to
>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text).
>> 
>> David Kellogg
>> Macquarie University
>> 
>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> wrote:
>> 
>>> 
>>> Dear all ,
>>> 
>>> Look at this please !
>>> 
>>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a thought
>>> experiment: 1) The
>>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its
>>> essence can be revealed
>>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental
>>> transformations; 3) this same
>>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which
>> the
>>> object is
>>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented
>> as
>>> a process of
>>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment
>>> essentially becomes a
>>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only
>>> within this special
>>> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]]
>>> 
>>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , action
>>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate
>> even
>>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular
>>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal
>>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , nor
>>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or
>>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or
>> motionality ,
>>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives
>>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be
>> converted
>>> in the other as we all have seen .
>>> 
>>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played with
>>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . It's a
>>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable
>>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a
>>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of affect
>> or
>>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think
>> of
>>> how to express it and he might? finally resort to imitation . Then , the
>>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note in
>>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on
>> which
>>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state occurs
>> .
>>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or
>>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute
>>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is said
>>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources
>> for
>>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now .
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Best
>>> 
>>> Haydi
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 42
> Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 15:40:15 +0000 (UTC)
> From: ?Haydi Zulfei? ? 	<haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> To: "ablunden@mira.net" <ablunden@mira.net>,	"xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu"
> 	<xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>,	"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
> 	<xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<694795909.6221451.1452613215224.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> 
> Thank you , Andy ! especially when you?refer to the opposition between mass material and molecular ; that's quite obvious ; you come near mine as 'variables in a state of fusion' . 
> BestHaydi
> ?
> 
>      From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu 
> Sent: Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 11:14:46
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> 
> molar is derivged from the Laton moler meaning "mass" and 
> molecule is derived from the same root. "Molecule" 
> originated from discussions around Descartes' ideas, in same 
> sense as the modern usage. "Molar" only emerged in the 1870s 
> with the sense of a *mass* of material, explicitly in 
> contrast to molecular. So the words form a pair of 
> opposites, both originating from the same root.
> 
> Andy
> 
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> On 12/01/2016 6:35 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote:
>> Thank you David and Haydi. That's insightful.
>> 
>> Would it be correct to summarise this idea as: a moment is the
>> manifestation of the whole (transformation) in the instant, which is a
>> progression in its transformation?
>> 
>> Presumably molar goes back to molecule?? I can't see how it relates to to
>> teeth/molars at present...
>> 
>> Best,
>> Huw
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On 12 January 2016 at 06:37, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
>> 
>>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in the
>>> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is.
>>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation
>>> between "moment" and music.
>>> 
>>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant is a
>>> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three
>>> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of "moment"
>>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the
>>> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting").
>>> 
>>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology in a
>>> way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something like a
>>> sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe
>>> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is almost
>>> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the
>>> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic
>>> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. This
>>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: as we
>>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even present,
>>> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat
>>> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a
>>> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or
>>> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the
>>> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of
>>> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because even
>>> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining
>>> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of
>>> angular momentum.
>>> 
>>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and sometimes
>>> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The
>>> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different from
>>> the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but
>>> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context of
>>> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a
>>> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed
>>> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological
>>> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis",
>>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem,
>>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible.
>>> 
>>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described
>>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can seriously
>>> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same
>>> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly
>>> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between solar
>>> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is
>>> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the
>>> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much the
>>> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech
>>> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we
>>> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the
>>> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way to
>>> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for example,
>>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more
>>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to
>>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text).
>>> 
>>> David Kellogg
>>> Macquarie University
>>> 
>>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> Dear all ,
>>>> 
>>>> Look at this please !
>>>> 
>>>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a thought
>>>> experiment: 1) The
>>>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its
>>>> essence can be revealed
>>>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental
>>>> transformations; 3) this same
>>>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which
>>> the
>>>> object is
>>>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented
>>> as
>>>> a process of
>>>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment
>>>> essentially becomes a
>>>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only
>>>> within this special
>>>> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]]
>>>> 
>>>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , action
>>>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate
>>> even
>>>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular
>>>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal
>>>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , nor
>>>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or
>>>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or
>>> motionality ,
>>>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives
>>>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be
>>> converted
>>>> in the other as we all have seen .
>>>> 
>>>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played with
>>>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . It's a
>>>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable
>>>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a
>>>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of affect
>>> or
>>>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think
>>> of
>>>> how to express it and he might? finally resort to imitation . Then , the
>>>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note in
>>>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on
>>> which
>>>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state occurs
>>> .
>>>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or
>>>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute
>>>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is said
>>>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources
>>> for
>>>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now .
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Best
>>>> 
>>>> Haydi
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 43
> Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 15:40:15 +0000 (UTC)
> From: ?Haydi Zulfei? ? 	<haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> To: "ablunden@mira.net" <ablunden@mira.net>,	"xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu"
> 	<xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>,	"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
> 	<xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<694795909.6221451.1452613215224.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> 
> Thank you , Andy ! especially when you?refer to the opposition between mass material and molecular ; that's quite obvious ; you come near mine as 'variables in a state of fusion' . 
> BestHaydi
> ?
> 
>      From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu 
> Sent: Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 11:14:46
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> 
> molar is derivged from the Laton moler meaning "mass" and 
> molecule is derived from the same root. "Molecule" 
> originated from discussions around Descartes' ideas, in same 
> sense as the modern usage. "Molar" only emerged in the 1870s 
> with the sense of a *mass* of material, explicitly in 
> contrast to molecular. So the words form a pair of 
> opposites, both originating from the same root.
> 
> Andy
> 
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> On 12/01/2016 6:35 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote:
>> Thank you David and Haydi. That's insightful.
>> 
>> Would it be correct to summarise this idea as: a moment is the
>> manifestation of the whole (transformation) in the instant, which is a
>> progression in its transformation?
>> 
>> Presumably molar goes back to molecule?? I can't see how it relates to to
>> teeth/molars at present...
>> 
>> Best,
>> Huw
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On 12 January 2016 at 06:37, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
>> 
>>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in the
>>> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is.
>>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation
>>> between "moment" and music.
>>> 
>>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant is a
>>> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three
>>> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of "moment"
>>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the
>>> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting").
>>> 
>>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology in a
>>> way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something like a
>>> sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe
>>> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is almost
>>> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the
>>> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic
>>> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. This
>>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: as we
>>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even present,
>>> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat
>>> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a
>>> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or
>>> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the
>>> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of
>>> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because even
>>> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining
>>> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of
>>> angular momentum.
>>> 
>>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and sometimes
>>> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The
>>> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different from
>>> the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but
>>> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context of
>>> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a
>>> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed
>>> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological
>>> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis",
>>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem,
>>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible.
>>> 
>>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described
>>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can seriously
>>> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same
>>> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly
>>> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between solar
>>> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is
>>> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the
>>> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much the
>>> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech
>>> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we
>>> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the
>>> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way to
>>> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for example,
>>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more
>>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to
>>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text).
>>> 
>>> David Kellogg
>>> Macquarie University
>>> 
>>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> Dear all ,
>>>> 
>>>> Look at this please !
>>>> 
>>>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a thought
>>>> experiment: 1) The
>>>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its
>>>> essence can be revealed
>>>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental
>>>> transformations; 3) this same
>>>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which
>>> the
>>>> object is
>>>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented
>>> as
>>>> a process of
>>>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment
>>>> essentially becomes a
>>>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only
>>>> within this special
>>>> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]]
>>>> 
>>>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , action
>>>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate
>>> even
>>>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular
>>>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal
>>>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , nor
>>>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or
>>>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or
>>> motionality ,
>>>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives
>>>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be
>>> converted
>>>> in the other as we all have seen .
>>>> 
>>>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played with
>>>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . It's a
>>>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable
>>>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a
>>>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of affect
>>> or
>>>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think
>>> of
>>>> how to express it and he might? finally resort to imitation . Then , the
>>>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note in
>>>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on
>>> which
>>>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state occurs
>>> .
>>>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or
>>>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute
>>>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is said
>>>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources
>>> for
>>>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now .
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Best
>>>> 
>>>> Haydi
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 44
> Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2016 04:48:01 +0000 (UTC)
> From: ?Haydi Zulfei? ? 	<haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> To: "ablunden@mira.net" <ablunden@mira.net>,	"xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu"
> 	<xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>,	"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
> 	<xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<315151224.6688990.1452660481374.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> 
> Thanks Andy,
> I watched and downloaded all 5 sequences . relevant and interesting . And your referring to very excellent points . H
> ?
> 
>      From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu 
> Sent: Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 14:05:24
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> 
> Haydi,
> Your quote from the Grundrisse:
> 
> ? ? "It is a general illumination which bathes all the other
> ? ? colours and modifies their particularity. "
> 
> A beautiful metaphor which reminds me of the explanation of 
> the perception of colour in this video excerpt from "The 
> Devil Wears Prada":
> 
> ? ? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yj8mHwvFxMc
> 
> Not even a colour, let alone a word, has meaning outside of 
> the social context of its production.
> 
> Andy
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> On 12/01/2016 8:12 PM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote:
>> ? Thanks for help and my apologies , Andy . Yes , "Current Messages" confirms you but something might have been wrong with my Galaxy Phone or my eyes acting as means of visionaries not as that of vision or sight which caused my misunderstanding . However David Bakhurst's "Russian Philosophy up to Ilyenko" which pays greatest tribute to both Vygotsky and Ilyenko (though we are yet lacking in direct quotes) , and Davydov's articles and his as yet two translated books especially the one translated by Peter Moxhay which also gratifies Both Vygotsky and Ilyenko are treasures to be excavated . I think at such critical moments of discussing a term or a concept , one is better search for the "sense" rather than for the "meaning" of a word (emphasized by both Vygotsky and Leontiev) and this could be realized through examples and usages of particular contexts . Locke is not Hegel , Hegel is neither Marx nor Berkley , so on so forth . With a last one I finish this short dialogue :
>> [[Human sensibility, being a result of the development of people?s object-oriented,
>> practical activity, is contradictory in its content. Sensation and perception, in themselves,
>> reflect existent being. But a different content?the mediatedness and connectedness of being,
>> its inner content??seeps in? through practical action, where things (the object and the means
>> of labor) are purposefully brought together. Practical action, being sensible and objectoriented, unites in itself the opposing elements of its content?the external and the internal,
>> the existent and the mediated, the individual and the universal. In practical action, [THESE MOMENTS] are located in direct unity.]] Davydov , page 96 .
>> With Davydov's quote of Bibler , the intent was that each of the three was a 'moment' and that with the third necessarily realized , the supposedly interruption between the moment of "sense cognition" and the moment of "rational or theoretical cognition" is removed . Davydov adds that empirical thinking and theoretical thinking are not two separate stages in cognition but that rational cognition just starts from the very beginning because of the continuity (advent) of the moments of a whole process . Thanks !
>> David,
>> Concerning the problem I began writing to Andy and the above was the last to be sent which was not ; now "send" winks at me ; hope it's not lost again . I read your response in passing because of the problem . But before I can think about its difficult content , I'd like you to read the other parags in which "moment" has been contextually used . What I wrote was based on my understanding of these notions .
>> [[The particular changes and connections of a thing can be considered as moments in a
>> broader interaction, within which the thing is naturally replaced by another thing. Such a
>> transition, however, preserves everything positive in the first thing that is necessary for this
>> broader, holistic system of interactions. This is what is meant by a theoretical approach to the
>> very coming-into-being of things, the mediation of one thing by another.]]
>> [[Marx used the example of social production to show the significance of the whole for
>> understanding its separate components:
>> In all forms of society there is one specific kind of production which predominates
>> over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others. It is a general
>> illumination which bathes all the other colors and modifies their particularity. It is a
>> particular ether which determines the specific gravity of every being which has
>> materialized within it.]]
>> [[In (EMPIRICAL DEPENDENCES) , the individual thing is an independent reality. In the
>> dependences revealed by theory, one thing is a method for manifesting another within a
>> certain whole. This transition of thing into thing, the sublation of one thing?s specificity when
>> it is transformed into its own ?other??i.e. their internal connection?is the object of
>> theoretical thought. This kind of thought is always dealing with real, sensibly given things,
>> but discerns the process of their mutual transition, their connection within a certain whole and
>> in their dependence on that whole. Marx wrote, ?It is the work of science to resolve the
>> visible, merely external moment into the true intrinsic movement??]]
>> [[The difference in content of empirical and theoretical thinking gave rise to a difference in
>> their forms. As was mentioned above, empirical dependences are the results of sensory
>> observations, verbally described. Since these dependences recur, it is necessary to distinguish
>> certain classes of dependences from others. Differentiation and classification are just
>> precisely the functions of general conceptions or empirical concepts. Marx gives the
>> following description of the empirical understanding of things, which is typical of an
>> ?unscientific observer? and which, instead of penetrating into the internal connection, ?takes
>> the external phenomena of life, as they seem and appear and merely describes, catalogues,
>> recounts and arranges them under formal definitions.?[26] External repeatability,
>> resemblance, differentiation?these are the general properties of reality that are grasped and
>> subsumed ?under schematizing definitions? (BY EMPIRICAL CONCEPTS).]]
>> [[In dialectical materialism, this objective whole that exists through the connection of
>> individual things is usually called the concrete. The concrete, according to Marx, is the ?unity
>> of the diverse.?[27] In its externality, as having come into being, it is given in contemplation,
>> in a conception that grasps the moment of the general, mutual interconnectedness of its
>> manifestations. But the problem is how to represent this concrete as coming into being, in the
>> process of its origin and mediation, for it is only this process that leads to the entire manifold
>> of manifestations of the whole. This is the problem of studying the concrete in development,
>> in movement, which is the only way to reveal the system?s internal links and thus the
>> connection between the individual and the universal.
>> It is important to emphasize that the primary distinction between theoretical concepts and
>> general conceptions is that theoretical concepts reproduce the process of development or
>> formation of the system, its holisticity, as something concrete, and it is only within this
>> process that the features and interconnections of individual objects get revealed.]]
>> Aside from the current discussion , once there was a diagram augmenting from the concrete to abstract general ; the last parag. discusses what is really concrete and universal within the domain of dialectical logic . I try to get immersed in CHAT but if I don't succeed , it's because of my ESSENCE :-) . Now give me time to delve into your response . Thanks a lot .
>> BestHaydi
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> BestHaydi
>> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 45
> Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2016 04:48:01 +0000 (UTC)
> From: ?Haydi Zulfei? ? 	<haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> To: "ablunden@mira.net" <ablunden@mira.net>,	"xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu"
> 	<xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>,	"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
> 	<xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<315151224.6688990.1452660481374.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> 
> Thanks Andy,
> I watched and downloaded all 5 sequences . relevant and interesting . And your referring to very excellent points . H
> ?
> 
>      From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu 
> Sent: Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 14:05:24
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> 
> Haydi,
> Your quote from the Grundrisse:
> 
> ? ? "It is a general illumination which bathes all the other
> ? ? colours and modifies their particularity. "
> 
> A beautiful metaphor which reminds me of the explanation of 
> the perception of colour in this video excerpt from "The 
> Devil Wears Prada":
> 
> ? ? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yj8mHwvFxMc
> 
> Not even a colour, let alone a word, has meaning outside of 
> the social context of its production.
> 
> Andy
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> On 12/01/2016 8:12 PM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote:
>> ? Thanks for help and my apologies , Andy . Yes , "Current Messages" confirms you but something might have been wrong with my Galaxy Phone or my eyes acting as means of visionaries not as that of vision or sight which caused my misunderstanding . However David Bakhurst's "Russian Philosophy up to Ilyenko" which pays greatest tribute to both Vygotsky and Ilyenko (though we are yet lacking in direct quotes) , and Davydov's articles and his as yet two translated books especially the one translated by Peter Moxhay which also gratifies Both Vygotsky and Ilyenko are treasures to be excavated . I think at such critical moments of discussing a term or a concept , one is better search for the "sense" rather than for the "meaning" of a word (emphasized by both Vygotsky and Leontiev) and this could be realized through examples and usages of particular contexts . Locke is not Hegel , Hegel is neither Marx nor Berkley , so on so forth . With a last one I finish this short dialogue :
>> [[Human sensibility, being a result of the development of people?s object-oriented,
>> practical activity, is contradictory in its content. Sensation and perception, in themselves,
>> reflect existent being. But a different content?the mediatedness and connectedness of being,
>> its inner content??seeps in? through practical action, where things (the object and the means
>> of labor) are purposefully brought together. Practical action, being sensible and objectoriented, unites in itself the opposing elements of its content?the external and the internal,
>> the existent and the mediated, the individual and the universal. In practical action, [THESE MOMENTS] are located in direct unity.]] Davydov , page 96 .
>> With Davydov's quote of Bibler , the intent was that each of the three was a 'moment' and that with the third necessarily realized , the supposedly interruption between the moment of "sense cognition" and the moment of "rational or theoretical cognition" is removed . Davydov adds that empirical thinking and theoretical thinking are not two separate stages in cognition but that rational cognition just starts from the very beginning because of the continuity (advent) of the moments of a whole process . Thanks !
>> David,
>> Concerning the problem I began writing to Andy and the above was the last to be sent which was not ; now "send" winks at me ; hope it's not lost again . I read your response in passing because of the problem . But before I can think about its difficult content , I'd like you to read the other parags in which "moment" has been contextually used . What I wrote was based on my understanding of these notions .
>> [[The particular changes and connections of a thing can be considered as moments in a
>> broader interaction, within which the thing is naturally replaced by another thing. Such a
>> transition, however, preserves everything positive in the first thing that is necessary for this
>> broader, holistic system of interactions. This is what is meant by a theoretical approach to the
>> very coming-into-being of things, the mediation of one thing by another.]]
>> [[Marx used the example of social production to show the significance of the whole for
>> understanding its separate components:
>> In all forms of society there is one specific kind of production which predominates
>> over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others. It is a general
>> illumination which bathes all the other colors and modifies their particularity. It is a
>> particular ether which determines the specific gravity of every being which has
>> materialized within it.]]
>> [[In (EMPIRICAL DEPENDENCES) , the individual thing is an independent reality. In the
>> dependences revealed by theory, one thing is a method for manifesting another within a
>> certain whole. This transition of thing into thing, the sublation of one thing?s specificity when
>> it is transformed into its own ?other??i.e. their internal connection?is the object of
>> theoretical thought. This kind of thought is always dealing with real, sensibly given things,
>> but discerns the process of their mutual transition, their connection within a certain whole and
>> in their dependence on that whole. Marx wrote, ?It is the work of science to resolve the
>> visible, merely external moment into the true intrinsic movement??]]
>> [[The difference in content of empirical and theoretical thinking gave rise to a difference in
>> their forms. As was mentioned above, empirical dependences are the results of sensory
>> observations, verbally described. Since these dependences recur, it is necessary to distinguish
>> certain classes of dependences from others. Differentiation and classification are just
>> precisely the functions of general conceptions or empirical concepts. Marx gives the
>> following description of the empirical understanding of things, which is typical of an
>> ?unscientific observer? and which, instead of penetrating into the internal connection, ?takes
>> the external phenomena of life, as they seem and appear and merely describes, catalogues,
>> recounts and arranges them under formal definitions.?[26] External repeatability,
>> resemblance, differentiation?these are the general properties of reality that are grasped and
>> subsumed ?under schematizing definitions? (BY EMPIRICAL CONCEPTS).]]
>> [[In dialectical materialism, this objective whole that exists through the connection of
>> individual things is usually called the concrete. The concrete, according to Marx, is the ?unity
>> of the diverse.?[27] In its externality, as having come into being, it is given in contemplation,
>> in a conception that grasps the moment of the general, mutual interconnectedness of its
>> manifestations. But the problem is how to represent this concrete as coming into being, in the
>> process of its origin and mediation, for it is only this process that leads to the entire manifold
>> of manifestations of the whole. This is the problem of studying the concrete in development,
>> in movement, which is the only way to reveal the system?s internal links and thus the
>> connection between the individual and the universal.
>> It is important to emphasize that the primary distinction between theoretical concepts and
>> general conceptions is that theoretical concepts reproduce the process of development or
>> formation of the system, its holisticity, as something concrete, and it is only within this
>> process that the features and interconnections of individual objects get revealed.]]
>> Aside from the current discussion , once there was a diagram augmenting from the concrete to abstract general ; the last parag. discusses what is really concrete and universal within the domain of dialectical logic . I try to get immersed in CHAT but if I don't succeed , it's because of my ESSENCE :-) . Now give me time to delve into your response . Thanks a lot .
>> BestHaydi
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> BestHaydi
>> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 46
> Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2016 19:02:31 +0900
> From: David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> To: Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>,	"eXtended Mind,
> 	Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<CACwG6DtTtHnLtBNzgJtHZyx2jQMOQo838D1N766p4t8MC9CHtA@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> Dear Haydi:
> 
> In the very beginning of the text that Huw is reading, the HIstory of the
> Development of the Higher Psychic Functions, Vygotsky writes of the basic
> division psychology, between those who would treat the mind as something
> made by "Deus Sive Natura" ("God, i.e. Nature"), like the eye or the hand
> or any other physical phenomenon, and those who would treat the mind as (to
> quote Mike's epigraph) an object which itself creates history. In one case,
> we have an object which really can be usefully described synoptically, like
> a sculpture that we can walk all the way around. But in the other we have a
> process which can only be described dynamically, like a piece of theatre
> that walks around us while we sit and observe.
> 
> Of course, we CAN argue, the way that Vico would argue, that to produce the
> process is to fully understand it: we cannot fully understand the eye or
> the hand, because although these things are part of us, they were made by
> God. We can understand a telescope or a hammer, because although these
> things are not part of us, they were made by ourselves. And we can even
> argue that the process of making it is essentially the process of
> understanding it: once you have made a telescope or a hammer and used it,
> you have understood everything there is to know about it. That is, I
> understand it, the position you attribute to dialectical logic, to CHAT,
> and to Davydov, and I think you attribute it correctly. The problem is that
> I am not sure that the position itself is correct.
> 
> The reason is this: we may be able to actively participate in the process
> of producing and using a telescope or a hammer. We may even (although this
> is much more problematic) actively participate in the process of producing
> and using a mind or a personality. But our observational standpoint is
> nevertheless fixed by our position in time: we can never "actively
> participate" in constructing the counterfactual potential, the  meaning
> potential, of a telescope or a hammer, much less a mind or a personality.
> Our active participation is always fixed in the actual, and meaning
> potential is accessible only through contemplation. It may be contemplation
> with activity firmly in mind, but it is only potentially active and not
> actually so.
> 
> I think this is a fundamental difference between Vygotsky and Leontiev, and
> the activity theory that followed him: For Vygotsky, the autistic function
> (that is, the irrealist function, the contemplative function which turns
> away from immediate activity) may come late (as Vygotsky points out, it
> receives major impetus from the acquisition of words and then concepts,
> both of which come well after the beginning of social life), but this
> "autistic" contemplative function is then never out of date: concepts are
> not formed purely through activity, but also through the turning away from
> reality oriented activity. And in that, he has the complete support of
> Lenin, who knew a thing or two about how concepts are joined to action.
> 
> David Kellogg
> Macquarie University
> 
> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 12:06 AM, <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> wrote:
> 
>> 
>> Thanks , David , for the two-parag. epigraph as always !
>> 
>> --First of all, Kant says we cannot know / cognize a material object in
>> itself because a priori we don't have an image of it so  we are unable to
>> have an overlap between the two ; hence agnosticism let alone 'inner
>> connections' of a whole as 'moments' . Dialectical Logic (close relative to
>> CHAT) says as man relies on object-related activity while an ideal
>> adaptable to the future coming object ever runs through the activity to the
>> finish , is able to penetrate the depths . When you put the mental model
>> into a material model , in reifying or objectifying that model into a
>> finished product and all through the durational time , you can see what is
>> necessary , essential and what is not . In higher momentums of conception ,
>> you reach concepts and this is the time you've got a theoretical rational
>> cognitive copy of the inner mechanisms and transformations of the related
>> object or objects . When we say 'ideal' is a moment of an activity , we
>> mean it's ever running through uninterruptedly because the whole entity
>> falls down , collapses otherwise . Or if you aim to take it wholly apart ,
>> again nothing is left for objectfication . Davydov says we cannot stop at
>> phenomenology ; it's not to our will or taste ; we should ever reproduce
>> our ever changing needs and products and that needs true science and true
>> science needs true concepts . Yes , we want the object to move (dynamicity)
>> according to its inner transformations (moments) which has come to us as
>> fixated knowledge in speech and skills historically . We don't want to be
>> stuck in our position observing it to move . If you take moments as moments
>> of your positioning while observing , you've not been able to convert those
>> phenomenal aspects (empiricism) into innermost movements hence agnosticism
>> prevails . Yes ,  We could somehow treat these moments as always inhering ,
>> how ? Are neoformations parts and parcels of some detachable independent
>> separate phnomenon ? Are they not fused , interwoven , intertwined moments
>> of inner mechanisms of whole development (internalization , appropriation ,
>> instruction , development , upbringing involved) ? Does development or even
>> periods of development contain , include some parts and parcels or do they
>> subsume some moments of developmental transformations , those moments still
>> sublated within the whole process reversible if development defects ?
>> 
>> --Secondly , we agreed that moment is different from the instance as we
>> took it as tokens , samples , etc. Everything began with the very fact .
>> 
>> --Thirdly , with what I said , I suppose you've been responded to . Our
>> focus is on moment as some (aspect as you say ; I first refrained from
>> using 'aspectual' because aspect , too , does not convey the intention
>> precisely) variable of a successive uninterrupted incessant moving movable
>> whole in contrast to parts and parcels even components of some
>> static internally immovable pseudo-stagnant whole which , if potentially
>> realizable , will damage genuine cognition .
>> 
>> Best
>> Haydi
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> ------------------------------
>> *From:* David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>> *To:* Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
>> *Sent:* Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 9:08:03
>> *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
>> 
>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in the
>> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is.
>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation
>> between "moment" and music.
>> 
>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant is a
>> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three
>> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of "moment"
>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the
>> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting").
>> 
>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology in
>> a way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something like
>> a sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe
>> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is almost
>> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the
>> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic
>> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. This
>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: as we
>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even present,
>> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat
>> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a
>> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or
>> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the
>> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of
>> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because even
>> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining
>> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of
>> angular momentum.
>> 
>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and sometimes
>> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The
>> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different from
>> the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but
>> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context of
>> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a
>> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed
>> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological
>> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis",
>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem,
>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible.
>> 
>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described
>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can seriously
>> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same
>> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly
>> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between solar
>> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is
>> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the
>> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much the
>> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech
>> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we
>> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the
>> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way to
>> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for example,
>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more
>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to
>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text).
>> 
>> David Kellogg
>> Macquarie University
>> 
>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> Dear all ,
>> 
>> Look at this please !
>> 
>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a thought
>> experiment: 1) The
>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its
>> essence can be revealed
>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental
>> transformations; 3) this same
>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which the
>> object is
>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented as
>> a process of
>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment
>> essentially becomes a
>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only
>> within this special
>> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]]
>> 
>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , action
>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate even
>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular
>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal
>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , nor
>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or
>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or motionality ,
>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives
>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be converted
>> in the other as we all have seen .
>> 
>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played with
>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . It's a
>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable
>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a
>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of affect or
>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think of
>> how to express it and he might  finally resort to imitation . Then , the
>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note in
>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on which
>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state occurs .
>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or
>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute
>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is said
>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources for
>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now .
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Best
>> 
>> Haydi
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 47
> Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2016 14:05:13 +0000
> From: Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<CAG1MBOGu5bjMsb6rboe7fGRGcfVTNKUd4Auaof+rd5pzh8tA9w@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
>> From what I have been reading and thinking, the biggest difference between
> the conceptual system presented by Vygotsky and the of Leontiev (most of
> which is well known) is the difference of the conceptualisation of activity
> or the symbolic level (which is mostly absent for Vygotsky).
> 
> Without necessarily refuting David's points, but indicating an alternative
> interpretation, I would say:
> 
> 1. Learning how to apply or use something is still a constructive act.  One
> does not have to understand the full technical make up of a component in
> order to make use of it.  Indeed this is would entail an infinite regress.
> 
> 2. I'm not fully clear what the assertion is with respect to active
> participation in meaning potential, but it is perfectly reasonable to
> revisit the problem space that an old artefact is drawn from only to
> rediscover what this product achieves in terms of design.  This is actually
> an excellent source of edification.
> 
> 3. Contemplation can be understood to be in response to an active problem.
> There is nothing to say that activity must be glued to a specific site.
> When I am programming, I am forever walking away from the computer to solve
> or express a particular problem.
> 
> Best,
> Huw
> 
> 
> On 13 January 2016 at 10:02, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
>> Dear Haydi:
>> 
>> In the very beginning of the text that Huw is reading, the HIstory of the
>> Development of the Higher Psychic Functions, Vygotsky writes of the basic
>> division psychology, between those who would treat the mind as something
>> made by "Deus Sive Natura" ("God, i.e. Nature"), like the eye or the hand
>> or any other physical phenomenon, and those who would treat the mind as (to
>> quote Mike's epigraph) an object which itself creates history. In one case,
>> we have an object which really can be usefully described synoptically, like
>> a sculpture that we can walk all the way around. But in the other we have a
>> process which can only be described dynamically, like a piece of theatre
>> that walks around us while we sit and observe.
>> 
>> Of course, we CAN argue, the way that Vico would argue, that to produce the
>> process is to fully understand it: we cannot fully understand the eye or
>> the hand, because although these things are part of us, they were made by
>> God. We can understand a telescope or a hammer, because although these
>> things are not part of us, they were made by ourselves. And we can even
>> argue that the process of making it is essentially the process of
>> understanding it: once you have made a telescope or a hammer and used it,
>> you have understood everything there is to know about it. That is, I
>> understand it, the position you attribute to dialectical logic, to CHAT,
>> and to Davydov, and I think you attribute it correctly. The problem is that
>> I am not sure that the position itself is correct.
>> 
>> The reason is this: we may be able to actively participate in the process
>> of producing and using a telescope or a hammer. We may even (although this
>> is much more problematic) actively participate in the process of producing
>> and using a mind or a personality. But our observational standpoint is
>> nevertheless fixed by our position in time: we can never "actively
>> participate" in constructing the counterfactual potential, the  meaning
>> potential, of a telescope or a hammer, much less a mind or a personality.
>> Our active participation is always fixed in the actual, and meaning
>> potential is accessible only through contemplation. It may be contemplation
>> with activity firmly in mind, but it is only potentially active and not
>> actually so.
>> 
>> I think this is a fundamental difference between Vygotsky and Leontiev, and
>> the activity theory that followed him: For Vygotsky, the autistic function
>> (that is, the irrealist function, the contemplative function which turns
>> away from immediate activity) may come late (as Vygotsky points out, it
>> receives major impetus from the acquisition of words and then concepts,
>> both of which come well after the beginning of social life), but this
>> "autistic" contemplative function is then never out of date: concepts are
>> not formed purely through activity, but also through the turning away from
>> reality oriented activity. And in that, he has the complete support of
>> Lenin, who knew a thing or two about how concepts are joined to action.
>> 
>> David Kellogg
>> Macquarie University
>> 
>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 12:06 AM, <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> wrote:
>> 
>>> 
>>> Thanks , David , for the two-parag. epigraph as always !
>>> 
>>> --First of all, Kant says we cannot know / cognize a material object in
>>> itself because a priori we don't have an image of it so  we are unable to
>>> have an overlap between the two ; hence agnosticism let alone 'inner
>>> connections' of a whole as 'moments' . Dialectical Logic (close relative
>> to
>>> CHAT) says as man relies on object-related activity while an ideal
>>> adaptable to the future coming object ever runs through the activity to
>> the
>>> finish , is able to penetrate the depths . When you put the mental model
>>> into a material model , in reifying or objectifying that model into a
>>> finished product and all through the durational time , you can see what
>> is
>>> necessary , essential and what is not . In higher momentums of
>> conception ,
>>> you reach concepts and this is the time you've got a theoretical rational
>>> cognitive copy of the inner mechanisms and transformations of the related
>>> object or objects . When we say 'ideal' is a moment of an activity , we
>>> mean it's ever running through uninterruptedly because the whole entity
>>> falls down , collapses otherwise . Or if you aim to take it wholly apart
>> ,
>>> again nothing is left for objectfication . Davydov says we cannot stop at
>>> phenomenology ; it's not to our will or taste ; we should ever reproduce
>>> our ever changing needs and products and that needs true science and true
>>> science needs true concepts . Yes , we want the object to move
>> (dynamicity)
>>> according to its inner transformations (moments) which has come to us as
>>> fixated knowledge in speech and skills historically . We don't want to be
>>> stuck in our position observing it to move . If you take moments as
>> moments
>>> of your positioning while observing , you've not been able to convert
>> those
>>> phenomenal aspects (empiricism) into innermost movements hence
>> agnosticism
>>> prevails . Yes ,  We could somehow treat these moments as always
>> inhering ,
>>> how ? Are neoformations parts and parcels of some detachable independent
>>> separate phnomenon ? Are they not fused , interwoven , intertwined
>> moments
>>> of inner mechanisms of whole development (internalization ,
>> appropriation ,
>>> instruction , development , upbringing involved) ? Does development or
>> even
>>> periods of development contain , include some parts and parcels or do
>> they
>>> subsume some moments of developmental transformations , those moments
>> still
>>> sublated within the whole process reversible if development defects ?
>>> 
>>> --Secondly , we agreed that moment is different from the instance as we
>>> took it as tokens , samples , etc. Everything began with the very fact .
>>> 
>>> --Thirdly , with what I said , I suppose you've been responded to . Our
>>> focus is on moment as some (aspect as you say ; I first refrained from
>>> using 'aspectual' because aspect , too , does not convey the intention
>>> precisely) variable of a successive uninterrupted incessant moving
>> movable
>>> whole in contrast to parts and parcels even components of some
>>> static internally immovable pseudo-stagnant whole which , if potentially
>>> realizable , will damage genuine cognition .
>>> 
>>> Best
>>> Haydi
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> ------------------------------
>>> *From:* David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>> *To:* Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
>>> *Sent:* Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 9:08:03
>>> *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
>>> 
>>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in the
>>> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is.
>>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation
>>> between "moment" and music.
>>> 
>>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant is
>> a
>>> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three
>>> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of
>> "moment"
>>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the
>>> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting").
>>> 
>>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology in
>>> a way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something
>> like
>>> a sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe
>>> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is
>> almost
>>> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the
>>> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic
>>> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it.
>> This
>>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: as
>> we
>>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even present,
>>> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat
>>> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a
>>> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or
>>> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the
>>> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of
>>> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because
>> even
>>> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining
>>> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of
>>> angular momentum.
>>> 
>>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and sometimes
>>> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The
>>> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different
>> from
>>> the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but
>>> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context
>> of
>>> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a
>>> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed
>>> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological
>>> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis",
>>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem,
>>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible.
>>> 
>>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described
>>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can seriously
>>> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same
>>> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly
>>> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between
>> solar
>>> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is
>>> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the
>>> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much the
>>> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech
>>> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we
>>> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the
>>> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way
>> to
>>> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for example,
>>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more
>>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to
>>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text).
>>> 
>>> David Kellogg
>>> Macquarie University
>>> 
>>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Dear all ,
>>> 
>>> Look at this please !
>>> 
>>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a thought
>>> experiment: 1) The
>>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its
>>> essence can be revealed
>>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental
>>> transformations; 3) this same
>>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which
>> the
>>> object is
>>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented
>> as
>>> a process of
>>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment
>>> essentially becomes a
>>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only
>>> within this special
>>> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]]
>>> 
>>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , action
>>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate
>> even
>>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular
>>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal
>>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , nor
>>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or
>>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or
>> motionality ,
>>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives
>>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be
>> converted
>>> in the other as we all have seen .
>>> 
>>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played with
>>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . It's a
>>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable
>>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a
>>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of affect
>> or
>>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think
>> of
>>> how to express it and he might  finally resort to imitation . Then , the
>>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note in
>>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on
>> which
>>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state occurs
>> .
>>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or
>>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute
>>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is said
>>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources
>> for
>>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now .
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Best
>>> 
>>> Haydi
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 48
> Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2016 17:15:38 +0000
> From: Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] [Lchc-l] A remarkable act of courage in American
> 	civil discourse
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>,
> 	"lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu" <lchc-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<BY2PR07MB107A6BFB7A5EF83C03751DBC1CB0@BY2PR07MB107.namprd07.prod.outlook.com>
> 	
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
> 
> Hello,
> 
> 
> Sorry for cross posting on two lists, but this was too good to not post. Please share! If we could enact more of these kinds of engagements, what would tomorrow bring?
> 
> 
> I so admire Kaddie Abdul's bravery. She reminds us of many important things.
> 
> http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jan/13/i-went-to-donald-trump-rally-in-my-hijab-supporters-arent-just-racist-caricatures
> 
> 
> Kind regards,
> 
> 
> Annalisa
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 49
> Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2016 19:03:25 +0000
> From: Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu>
> Subject: [Xmca-l]   Beware Hysterical Librarians!
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<BY2PR07MB107BB2B2EA204C0FC97FB74C1CB0@BY2PR07MB107.namprd07.prod.outlook.com>
> 	
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
> 
> Hello,
> 
> 
> Another nice find today!
> 
> 
> How librarians are the gatekeepers of ignorance:
> 
> http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jan/13/us-library-records-purged-data-privacy
> 
> 
> So many things one could discuss from what this article implies.
> 
> 
> Kind regards,
> 
> 
> Annalisa
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 50
> Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 00:44:19 +0000
> From: Susan Davis <s.davis@cqu.edu.au>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie
> 	phenomenon
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID: <D2BD2D80.1F5DC%s.davis@cqu.edu.au>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="Windows-1252"
> 
> Hi all, 
> 
> I am very interested in the recent discussion about moments and perhaps
> how that might connect to current experiences in relation to the news
> about David Bowie?s death and possible experiences of individual and
> collective perezhivanie.
> 
> The death of David Bowie has prompted a collective outpouring of grief,
> and very public and personal recollections and sharing of
> meaningful moments.  Across social media platforms, in the news and
> conversations people recall the influence of his life and work, and on
> things that made a difference in their own lives.   People are shedding
> very real tears, sorry for a life cut short too soon but also perhaps
> thinking about the person they themselves were, are, could have been or
> could become. I notice in particular people reflecting on the importance
> of Bowie?s life and work for their own sexuality, creativity and courage
> to explore difference. There is a sense that people are experiencing
> ?perezhivanie?, having a very real and very personal experience right now,
> but they are also revisiting significant moments from their past, sharing
> with others collectively, pausing to reflect, to construct and reconstruct
> meaning and in some cases this may translate to new action and experience
> in lives going forward.
> 
> 
> I am intrigued by what is going on with these ?moments' and times of
> collective grieving and remembering, of how now opportunities for enormous
> collective global grief occur, and make a mark on individual lives, on
> networks and social worlds, and beyond. While there is a sense that these
> experiences may be fleeting and soon be replaced in people?s lives by the
> latest crisis, disaster, gadget or internet sensation, there is also a
> sense that something significant has happened, we have been connected to
> something of momentary significance that is global, communal but also
> deeply personal. This seems like a form of ?perezhivanie? to me? does
> anyone have any other thoughts and reflections on this? On experiences of
> communal perezhivanie and how this is being further enabled through social
> media? 
> 
> Is this something anyone is currently researching or is this a potential
> new area for investigation?
> 
> 
> Kind regards
> 
> Sue 
> 
> Dr Susan Davis
> Senior Lecturer | School of Education & the Arts/Higher Education Division
> CQUniversity Noosa, PO Box 1128, Noosaville Qld 4566
> P +61 (0)7 5440 7007 | M +61 (0)418 763 428 | E s.davis@cqu.edu.au
> 
> CQU Website: www.cqu.edu.au
> <http://www.cqu.edu.au/>
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On 12/01/2016 5:35 pm, "Huw Lloyd" <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
>> Thank you David and Haydi. That's insightful.
>> 
>> Would it be correct to summarise this idea as: a moment is the
>> manifestation of the whole (transformation) in the instant, which is a
>> progression in its transformation?
>> 
>> Presumably molar goes back to molecule?  I can't see how it relates to to
>> teeth/molars at present...
>> 
>> Best,
>> Huw
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On 12 January 2016 at 06:37, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
>> 
>>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in
>>> the
>>> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is.
>>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation
>>> between "moment" and music.
>>> 
>>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant
>>> is a
>>> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three
>>> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of
>>> "moment"
>>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the
>>> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting").
>>> 
>>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology
>>> in a
>>> way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something
>>> like a
>>> sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe
>>> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is
>>> almost
>>> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the
>>> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic
>>> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it.
>>> This
>>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect:
>>> as we
>>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even
>>> present,
>>> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat
>>> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a
>>> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or
>>> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the
>>> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of
>>> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because
>>> even
>>> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining
>>> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of
>>> angular momentum.
>>> 
>>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and
>>> sometimes
>>> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The
>>> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different
>>> from
>>> the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but
>>> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context
>>> of
>>> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a
>>> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed
>>> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological
>>> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis",
>>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem,
>>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible.
>>> 
>>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described
>>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can
>>> seriously
>>> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same
>>> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly
>>> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between
>>> solar
>>> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is
>>> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the
>>> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much
>>> the
>>> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech
>>> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we
>>> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the
>>> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way
>>> to
>>> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for
>>> example,
>>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more
>>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to
>>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text).
>>> 
>>> David Kellogg
>>> Macquarie University
>>> 
>>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Dear all ,
>>>> 
>>>> Look at this please !
>>>> 
>>>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a
>>> thought
>>>> experiment: 1) The
>>>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its
>>>> essence can be revealed
>>>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental
>>>> transformations; 3) this same
>>>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which
>>> the
>>>> object is
>>>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be
>>> represented
>>> as
>>>> a process of
>>>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment
>>>> essentially becomes a
>>>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only
>>>> within this special
>>>> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]]
>>>> 
>>>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity ,
>>> action
>>>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate
>>> even
>>>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular
>>>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal
>>>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself ,
>>> nor
>>>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or
>>>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or
>>> motionality ,
>>>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives
>>>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be
>>> converted
>>>> in the other as we all have seen .
>>>> 
>>>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played
>>> with
>>>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition .
>>> It's a
>>>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable
>>>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a
>>>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of
>>> affect
>>> or
>>>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to
>>> think
>>> of
>>>> how to express it and he might  finally resort to imitation . Then ,
>>> the
>>>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single
>>> note in
>>>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on
>>> which
>>>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state
>>> occurs
>>> .
>>>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or
>>>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute
>>>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is
>>> said
>>>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources
>>> for
>>>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now .
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Best
>>>> 
>>>> Haydi
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 51
> Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 01:54:02 +0000
> From: Ana Marjanovic-Shane <anamshane@gmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l]  Fwd: The Day Without Adjuncts at Northeastern
> To: PIG group <ud-pig@yahoogroups.com>,	"OSE@yahoogroups.com"
> 	<OSE@yahoogroups.com>,	"xmca-l@ucsd.edu" <xmca-l@ucsd.edu>
> Cc: Carrie Lobman <carrie.lobman@gse.rutgers.edu>,	Tony Perone
> 	<tonyp129@gmail.com>
> Message-ID:
> 	<CALqp6zMpbAnHrcf710Ucrhq_wg=LVBa+KXN5fbZvYJeNnPKMrg@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> Dear colleagues,
> 
> As a former adjunct professor for many years, I am very sensitive when it
> comes to the faculty rights! There should be no double standards when it
> comes to the rights, working conditions, pay, benefits, and status of the
> faculty, anyway! Period.
> 
> Please, help the Northeastern University adjunct faculty get a fair
> contract.
> 
> Ana
> 
> ---------- Forwarded message ---------
> From: Faculty Forward Network <info@facultyforwardnetwork.org>
> Date: Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 8:29 PM
> Subject: The Day Without Adjuncts at Northeastern
> To: Ana Marjanovic-Shane <anamshane@gmail.com>
> 
> 
> Friend us on Facebook
> <http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bad/2144494657/VEsH/>
> Follow
> us on Twitter
> <http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bae/2144494657/VEsE/>
> [image: Faculty Forward Logo]
> 
> Dear Colleague,
> 
> My name is Haley Malm. I am an adjunct lecturer at Northeastern University.
> And I'm going on strike next week.
> 
> For 16 months, my colleagues and I have been bargaining with Northeastern
> for fair pay and better working conditions, only to be met with endless
> stall tactics, and other disrespect for our work.
> At Northeastern, that means treating adjuncts as marginal, disposable
> employees to help minimize instructional costs.
> 
> *That's why January 19, one week from today, will be A Day Without Adjuncts
> at Northeastern
> <http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77baf/2144494657/VEsF/>
> -- if we don't have a contract by then.*
> 
> Students have stood by us for months, even taking dramatic action
> <http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77ba8/2144494657/VEsC/>
> to push the administration to act.
> 
> Now we need help from fellow faculty. Please send a message
> <http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77ba9/2144494657/VEsD/>
> to Northeastern President Joseph Aoun and Provost James Bean urging them to
> show real leadership and reach an agreement that respects the work of
> part-time faculty.
> 
> *I'm asking you to send a message to the Northeastern administration,
> demanding that they reach a fair contract for adjunct faculty.*
> <http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77ba9/2144494657/VEsA/>
> 
> *Why am I going on strike?*
> 
>   -     In the College of Professional Studies, where I teach, some
>   adjunct faculty make as little as $2,259 per course. President Aoun makes
>   more than that in a day.
>   -     Rather than offer equitable health benefits to adjunct faculty who
>   work full-time, Northeastern unilaterally implemented separate, more
>   expensive coverage just for adjunct faculty, in violation of federal labor
>   law.
>   -     If Northeastern values me and my fellow adjunct faculty so little,
>   we should let them try and run things without us for a day.
>   -     Most importantly, our students deserve better. Our teaching
>   conditions are their learning conditions, after all -- and this
>   administration does not prioritize good working conditions for faculty.
> 
> Northeastern is one of the largest universities in Massachusetts, with a
> billion-dollar operating budget and a millionaire president. It can easily
> afford the cents on the dollar a fair contract would cost. And if we win
> better working conditions here, it could influence working conditions at
> your school, as well.
> 
> *Please take a moment to tell President Aoun and Provost Bean that it's
> time to treat adjunct faculty fairly.
> <http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77ba9/2144494657/VEsB/>*
> 
> In gratitude and solidarity,
> 
> Haley Malm
> Adjunct Lecturer, Northeastern University
> 
> 
> Copyright ? 2016 Faculty Forward
> All rights reserved.
> 666 West End Ave, Suite 1B, New York, NY 10025
> This email was sent to: anamshane@gmail.com
> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/unsubscribe
> <http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77baa/2144494657/VEsO/>
> <http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bad/2144494657/VEsP/>
> <http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bae/2144494657/VEsHBQ/>
> Friend us on Facebook
> <http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bad/2144494657/VEsHBA/>
> Follow us on Twitter
> <http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bae/2144494657/VEsHBw/>
> -- 
> *Ana Marjanovic-Shane*
> Dialogic Pedagogy Journal editor (dpj.pitt.edu)
> Associate Professor of Education
> Chestnut Hill College
> phone: 267-334-2905
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 52
> Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 14:17:43 +1100
> From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie
> 	phenomenon
> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> Message-ID: <56971357.7030007@mira.net>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed
> 
> Very interesting questions, Sue.
> * browse around research on the impact of the death of 
> Princess Dianna Spencer. In my experience it had an even 
> greater emotional impact globally.
> * Check out the work of Alain Badiou on the Event - not 
> stuff I like, but there is a lot of discussion around it.
> * I think the idea of such moments and the period of their 
> "overcoming" being instances of collective perezhivanie is 
> which appropriate. I don't know of anyone looking at just 
> this angle though.
> 
> Andy
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> On 14/01/2016 11:44 AM, Susan Davis wrote:
>> Hi all,
>> 
>> I am very interested in the recent discussion about moments and perhaps
>> how that might connect to current experiences in relation to the news
>> about David Bowie?s death and possible experiences of individual and
>> collective perezhivanie.
>> 
>> The death of David Bowie has prompted a collective outpouring of grief,
>> and very public and personal recollections and sharing of
>> meaningful moments.  Across social media platforms, in the news and
>> conversations people recall the influence of his life and work, and on
>> things that made a difference in their own lives.   People are shedding
>> very real tears, sorry for a life cut short too soon but also perhaps
>> thinking about the person they themselves were, are, could have been or
>> could become. I notice in particular people reflecting on the importance
>> of Bowie?s life and work for their own sexuality, creativity and courage
>> to explore difference. There is a sense that people are experiencing
>> ?perezhivanie?, having a very real and very personal experience right now,
>> but they are also revisiting significant moments from their past, sharing
>> with others collectively, pausing to reflect, to construct and reconstruct
>> meaning and in some cases this may translate to new action and experience
>> in lives going forward.
>> 
>> 
>> I am intrigued by what is going on with these ?moments' and times of
>> collective grieving and remembering, of how now opportunities for enormous
>> collective global grief occur, and make a mark on individual lives, on
>> networks and social worlds, and beyond. While there is a sense that these
>> experiences may be fleeting and soon be replaced in people?s lives by the
>> latest crisis, disaster, gadget or internet sensation, there is also a
>> sense that something significant has happened, we have been connected to
>> something of momentary significance that is global, communal but also
>> deeply personal. This seems like a form of ?perezhivanie? to me? does
>> anyone have any other thoughts and reflections on this? On experiences of
>> communal perezhivanie and how this is being further enabled through social
>> media?
>> 
>> Is this something anyone is currently researching or is this a potential
>> new area for investigation?
>> 
>> 
>> Kind regards
>> 
>> Sue
>> 
>> Dr Susan Davis
>> Senior Lecturer | School of Education & the Arts/Higher Education Division
>> CQUniversity Noosa, PO Box 1128, Noosaville Qld 4566
>> P +61 (0)7 5440 7007 | M +61 (0)418 763 428 | E s.davis@cqu.edu.au
>> 
>> CQU Website: www.cqu.edu.au
>>  <http://www.cqu.edu.au/>
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On 12/01/2016 5:35 pm, "Huw Lloyd" <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> wrote:
>> 
>>> Thank you David and Haydi. That's insightful.
>>> 
>>> Would it be correct to summarise this idea as: a moment is the
>>> manifestation of the whole (transformation) in the instant, which is a
>>> progression in its transformation?
>>> 
>>> Presumably molar goes back to molecule?  I can't see how it relates to to
>>> teeth/molars at present...
>>> 
>>> Best,
>>> Huw
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 12 January 2016 at 06:37, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in
>>>> the
>>>> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is.
>>>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation
>>>> between "moment" and music.
>>>> 
>>>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant
>>>> is a
>>>> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three
>>>> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of
>>>> "moment"
>>>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the
>>>> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting").
>>>> 
>>>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology
>>>> in a
>>>> way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something
>>>> like a
>>>> sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe
>>>> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is
>>>> almost
>>>> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the
>>>> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic
>>>> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it.
>>>> This
>>>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect:
>>>> as we
>>>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even
>>>> present,
>>>> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat
>>>> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a
>>>> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or
>>>> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the
>>>> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of
>>>> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because
>>>> even
>>>> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining
>>>> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of
>>>> angular momentum.
>>>> 
>>>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and
>>>> sometimes
>>>> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The
>>>> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different
>>>> from
>>>> the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but
>>>> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context
>>>> of
>>>> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a
>>>> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed
>>>> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological
>>>> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis",
>>>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem,
>>>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible.
>>>> 
>>>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described
>>>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can
>>>> seriously
>>>> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same
>>>> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly
>>>> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between
>>>> solar
>>>> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is
>>>> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the
>>>> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much
>>>> the
>>>> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech
>>>> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we
>>>> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the
>>>> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way
>>>> to
>>>> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for
>>>> example,
>>>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more
>>>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to
>>>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text).
>>>> 
>>>> David Kellogg
>>>> Macquarie University
>>>> 
>>>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> Dear all ,
>>>>> 
>>>>> Look at this please !
>>>>> 
>>>>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a
>>>> thought
>>>>> experiment: 1) The
>>>>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its
>>>>> essence can be revealed
>>>>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental
>>>>> transformations; 3) this same
>>>>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which
>>>> the
>>>>> object is
>>>>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be
>>>> represented
>>>> as
>>>>> a process of
>>>>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment
>>>>> essentially becomes a
>>>>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only
>>>>> within this special
>>>>> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]]
>>>>> 
>>>>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity ,
>>>> action
>>>>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate
>>>> even
>>>>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular
>>>>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal
>>>>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself ,
>>>> nor
>>>>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or
>>>>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or
>>>> motionality ,
>>>>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives
>>>>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be
>>>> converted
>>>>> in the other as we all have seen .
>>>>> 
>>>>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played
>>>> with
>>>>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition .
>>>> It's a
>>>>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable
>>>>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a
>>>>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of
>>>> affect
>>>> or
>>>>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to
>>>> think
>>>> of
>>>>> how to express it and he might  finally resort to imitation . Then ,
>>>> the
>>>>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single
>>>> note in
>>>>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on
>>>> which
>>>>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state
>>>> occurs
>>>> .
>>>>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or
>>>>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute
>>>>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is
>>>> said
>>>>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources
>>>> for
>>>>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now .
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> Best
>>>>> 
>>>>> Haydi
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 53
> Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 14:25:05 +1100
> From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie
> 	phenomenon
> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> Message-ID: <56971511.40008@mira.net>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed
> 
> er - "quite" not "which appropriate." :)
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> On 14/01/2016 2:17 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>> Very interesting questions, Sue.
>> * browse around research on the impact of the death of 
>> Princess Dianna Spencer. In my experience it had an even 
>> greater emotional impact globally.
>> * Check out the work of Alain Badiou on the Event - not 
>> stuff I like, but there is a lot of discussion around it.
>> * I think the idea of such moments and the period of their 
>> "overcoming" being instances of collective perezhivanie is 
>> which appropriate. I don't know of anyone looking at just 
>> this angle though.
>> 
>> Andy
>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>> *Andy Blunden*
>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>> On 14/01/2016 11:44 AM, Susan Davis wrote:
>>> Hi all,
>>> 
>>> I am very interested in the recent discussion about 
>>> moments and perhaps
>>> how that might connect to current experiences in relation 
>>> to the news
>>> about David Bowie?s death and possible experiences of 
>>> individual and
>>> collective perezhivanie.
>>> 
>>> The death of David Bowie has prompted a collective 
>>> outpouring of grief,
>>> and very public and personal recollections and sharing of
>>> meaningful moments.  Across social media platforms, in 
>>> the news and
>>> conversations people recall the influence of his life and 
>>> work, and on
>>> things that made a difference in their own lives.   
>>> People are shedding
>>> very real tears, sorry for a life cut short too soon but 
>>> also perhaps
>>> thinking about the person they themselves were, are, 
>>> could have been or
>>> could become. I notice in particular people reflecting on 
>>> the importance
>>> of Bowie?s life and work for their own sexuality, 
>>> creativity and courage
>>> to explore difference. There is a sense that people are 
>>> experiencing
>>> ?perezhivanie?, having a very real and very personal 
>>> experience right now,
>>> but they are also revisiting significant moments from 
>>> their past, sharing
>>> with others collectively, pausing to reflect, to 
>>> construct and reconstruct
>>> meaning and in some cases this may translate to new 
>>> action and experience
>>> in lives going forward.
>>> 
>>> I am intrigued by what is going on with these ?moments' 
>>> and times of
>>> collective grieving and remembering, of how now 
>>> opportunities for enormous
>>> collective global grief occur, and make a mark on 
>>> individual lives, on
>>> networks and social worlds, and beyond. While there is a 
>>> sense that these
>>> experiences may be fleeting and soon be replaced in 
>>> people?s lives by the
>>> latest crisis, disaster, gadget or internet sensation, 
>>> there is also a
>>> sense that something significant has happened, we have 
>>> been connected to
>>> something of momentary significance that is global, 
>>> communal but also
>>> deeply personal. This seems like a form of ?perezhivanie? 
>>> to me? does
>>> anyone have any other thoughts and reflections on this? 
>>> On experiences of
>>> communal perezhivanie and how this is being further 
>>> enabled through social
>>> media?
>>> 
>>> Is this something anyone is currently researching or is 
>>> this a potential
>>> new area for investigation?
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Kind regards
>>> 
>>> Sue
>>> 
>>> Dr Susan Davis
>>> Senior Lecturer | School of Education & the Arts/Higher 
>>> Education Division
>>> CQUniversity Noosa, PO Box 1128, Noosaville Qld 4566
>>> P +61 (0)7 5440 7007 | M +61 (0)418 763 428 | E 
>>> s.davis@cqu.edu.au
>>> 
>>> CQU Website: www.cqu.edu.au
>>>  <http://www.cqu.edu.au/>
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 12/01/2016 5:35 pm, "Huw Lloyd" 
>>> <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> Thank you David and Haydi. That's insightful.
>>>> 
>>>> Would it be correct to summarise this idea as: a moment 
>>>> is the
>>>> manifestation of the whole (transformation) in the 
>>>> instant, which is a
>>>> progression in its transformation?
>>>> 
>>>> Presumably molar goes back to molecule?  I can't see how 
>>>> it relates to to
>>>> teeth/molars at present...
>>>> 
>>>> Best,
>>>> Huw
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On 12 January 2016 at 06:37, David Kellogg 
>>>> <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word 
>>>>> "molar" means (in
>>>>> the
>>>>> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry 
>>>>> and dentistry is.
>>>>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing 
>>>>> up the relation
>>>>> between "moment" and music.
>>>>> 
>>>>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that 
>>>>> what is meant
>>>>> is a
>>>>> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me 
>>>>> there are three
>>>>> problems that we have to work out in annotating 
>>>>> Vygotsky's use of
>>>>> "moment"
>>>>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating 
>>>>> Vygotsky's work is the
>>>>> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless 
>>>>> "mythbusting").
>>>>> 
>>>>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and 
>>>>> in phenomenology
>>>>> in a
>>>>> way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to 
>>>>> describe something
>>>>> like a
>>>>> sculpture which does not move, which we may 
>>>>> circumambulate and describe
>>>>> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being 
>>>>> described is
>>>>> almost
>>>>> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding 
>>>>> process. Where the
>>>>> synoptic object does not move and can be 
>>>>> circumambulated, the dynamic
>>>>> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, 
>>>>> observing it.
>>>>> This
>>>>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole 
>>>>> in retrospect:
>>>>> as we
>>>>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were 
>>>>> not even
>>>>> present,
>>>>> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We 
>>>>> could somehow treat
>>>>> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty 
>>>>> is implicit in a
>>>>> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena 
>>>>> like speech or
>>>>> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and 
>>>>> seems to deny the
>>>>> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think 
>>>>> that the idea of
>>>>> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us 
>>>>> around this (because
>>>>> even
>>>>> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I 
>>>>> were explaining
>>>>> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would 
>>>>> use the example of
>>>>> angular momentum.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses 
>>>>> "moment" and
>>>>> sometimes
>>>>> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me 
>>>>> that they are. The
>>>>> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is 
>>>>> quite different
>>>>> from
>>>>> the description of development. A text is an instance 
>>>>> of a language, but
>>>>> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an 
>>>>> instance of a context
>>>>> of
>>>>> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say 
>>>>> that "weather" is a
>>>>> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an 
>>>>> instance. Viewed
>>>>> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to 
>>>>> different chronological
>>>>> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using 
>>>>> "phylogenesis",
>>>>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a 
>>>>> third problem,
>>>>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is 
>>>>> indispensible.
>>>>> 
>>>>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to 
>>>>> be described
>>>>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, 
>>>>> that we can
>>>>> seriously
>>>>> say that, for example, weather and climate are 
>>>>> descriptions of the same
>>>>> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, 
>>>>> weather is chiefly
>>>>> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the 
>>>>> relationship between
>>>>> solar
>>>>> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out 
>>>>> into space) is
>>>>> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With 
>>>>> climate, it's the
>>>>> other way around. When we say that word meaning 
>>>>> develops, we see much
>>>>> the
>>>>> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment 
>>>>> of infant speech
>>>>> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with 
>>>>> dialogue on xmca we
>>>>> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the 
>>>>> organic make up of the
>>>>> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, 
>>>>> and an obvious way
>>>>> to
>>>>> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in 
>>>>> opera, for
>>>>> example,
>>>>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias 
>>>>> are much more
>>>>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand 
>>>>> somewhat closer to
>>>>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as 
>>>>> text).
>>>>> 
>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>> Macquarie University
>>>>> 
>>>>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, 
>>>>> <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>>> Dear all ,
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Look at this please !
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic 
>>>>>> features of a
>>>>> thought
>>>>>> experiment: 1) The
>>>>>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to 
>>>>>> conditions where its
>>>>>> essence can be revealed
>>>>>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes 
>>>>>> further mental
>>>>>> transformations; 3) this same
>>>>>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of 
>>>>>> mental links in which
>>>>> the
>>>>>> object is
>>>>>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can 
>>>>>> still be
>>>>> represented
>>>>> as
>>>>>> a process of
>>>>>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this 
>>>>>> third moment
>>>>>> essentially becomes a
>>>>>> productive contribution to the mentally represented 
>>>>>> object. It is only
>>>>>> within this special
>>>>>> system of links that the object?s content gets 
>>>>>> revealed.]]
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is 
>>>>>> , activity ,
>>>>> action
>>>>>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , 
>>>>>> discrete and separate
>>>>> even
>>>>>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in 
>>>>>> a circular
>>>>>> succession of a whole which could naturally be 
>>>>>> manifest in temporal
>>>>>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , 
>>>>>> neither itself ,
>>>>> nor
>>>>>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy 
>>>>>> or stability or
>>>>>> independence or invariability. At each point of 
>>>>>> succession or
>>>>> motionality ,
>>>>>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives
>>>>>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the 
>>>>>> three could be
>>>>> converted
>>>>>> in the other as we all have seen .
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole 
>>>>>> melody is played
>>>>> with
>>>>>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire 
>>>>>> composition .
>>>>> It's a
>>>>>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the 
>>>>>> invited pleasurable
>>>>>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't 
>>>>>> refer to a
>>>>>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or 
>>>>>> that kind of
>>>>> affect
>>>>> or
>>>>>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might 
>>>>>> even stop to
>>>>> think
>>>>> of
>>>>>> how to express it and he might finally resort to 
>>>>>> imitation . Then ,
>>>>> the
>>>>>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or 
>>>>>> that single
>>>>> note in
>>>>>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a 
>>>>>> temporal instant on
>>>>> which
>>>>>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , 
>>>>>> feature , state
>>>>> occurs
>>>>> .
>>>>>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be 
>>>>>> uncognizable or
>>>>>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or 
>>>>>> with a substitute
>>>>>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the 
>>>>>> "ideal" which is
>>>>> said
>>>>>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works 
>>>>>> are good sources
>>>>> for
>>>>>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now .
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Best
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Haydi
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 54
> Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 04:08:02 +0000
> From: "Glassman, Michael" <glassman.13@osu.edu>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie
> 	phenomenon
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9C34328@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
> 
> Hi Susan,
> 
> Interesting to raise this.  I think many consider Michael Jackson's death to be a watershed moment for the Internet.  I believe the Internet actually slowed in the days after his death due to traffic.  It was also a herald for the rise of the flash mob phenomenon - a really interesting relationship between cyberspace and place.  Individuals would gather in public areas, hundreds, brought together through the Internet and would start dancing to Billie Jean, following the dance moves introduced by Jackson.  It was breathtaking.  They were plastered all over Youtube for a while, but were taken down because of copyright infringement on the song.  The Internet giveth, media conglomerates taketh away.
> 
> There is probably some stuff written on those few days.  I wonder what would have happened if the Interne had been around when John Lennon died.  Bowie is more esoteric, I wonder if there is anybody today whose death would cause the outpouring of grief similar to Lennon and Jackson.  It would be really interesting to see how an internetworked world would react.
> 
> Michael
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Susan Davis
> Sent: Wednesday, January 13, 2016 7:44 PM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie phenomenon
> 
> Hi all, 
> 
> I am very interested in the recent discussion about moments and perhaps how that might connect to current experiences in relation to the news about David Bowie?s death and possible experiences of individual and collective perezhivanie.
> 
> The death of David Bowie has prompted a collective outpouring of grief, and very public and personal recollections and sharing of meaningful moments.  Across social media platforms, in the news and conversations people recall the influence of his life and work, and on
> things that made a difference in their own lives.   People are shedding
> very real tears, sorry for a life cut short too soon but also perhaps thinking about the person they themselves were, are, could have been or could become. I notice in particular people reflecting on the importance of Bowie?s life and work for their own sexuality, creativity and courage to explore difference. There is a sense that people are experiencing ?perezhivanie?, having a very real and very personal experience right now, but they are also revisiting significant moments from their past, sharing with others collectively, pausing to reflect, to construct and reconstruct meaning and in some cases this may translate to new action and experience in lives going forward.
> 
> 
> I am intrigued by what is going on with these ?moments' and times of collective grieving and remembering, of how now opportunities for enormous collective global grief occur, and make a mark on individual lives, on networks and social worlds, and beyond. While there is a sense that these experiences may be fleeting and soon be replaced in people?s lives by the latest crisis, disaster, gadget or internet sensation, there is also a sense that something significant has happened, we have been connected to something of momentary significance that is global, communal but also deeply personal. This seems like a form of ?perezhivanie? to me? does anyone have any other thoughts and reflections on this? On experiences of communal perezhivanie and how this is being further enabled through social media? 
> 
> Is this something anyone is currently researching or is this a potential new area for investigation?
> 
> 
> Kind regards
> 
> Sue 
> 
> Dr Susan Davis
> Senior Lecturer | School of Education & the Arts/Higher Education Division CQUniversity Noosa, PO Box 1128, Noosaville Qld 4566 P +61 (0)7 5440 7007 | M +61 (0)418 763 428 | E s.davis@cqu.edu.au
> 
> CQU Website: www.cqu.edu.au
> <http://www.cqu.edu.au/>
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On 12/01/2016 5:35 pm, "Huw Lloyd" <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
>> Thank you David and Haydi. That's insightful.
>> 
>> Would it be correct to summarise this idea as: a moment is the 
>> manifestation of the whole (transformation) in the instant, which is a 
>> progression in its transformation?
>> 
>> Presumably molar goes back to molecule?  I can't see how it relates to 
>> to teeth/molars at present...
>> 
>> Best,
>> Huw
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On 12 January 2016 at 06:37, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
>> 
>>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in 
>>> the  wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and 
>>> dentistry is.
>>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation  
>>> between "moment" and music.
>>> 
>>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant 
>>> is a  moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are 
>>> three  problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use 
>>> of "moment"
>>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is 
>>> the  real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting").
>>> 
>>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in 
>>> phenomenology in a  way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to 
>>> describe something like a  sculpture which does not move, which we may 
>>> circumambulate and describe  from various sides. But in Vygotsky the 
>>> "object" being described is almost  always no object at all, but 
>>> rather an unfolding process. Where the  synoptic object does not move 
>>> and can be circumambulated, the dynamic  object moves, and we are 
>>> usually stuck in one position, observing it.
>>> This
>>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect:
>>> as we
>>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even 
>>> present,  much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could 
>>> somehow treat  these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty 
>>> is implicit in a  newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena 
>>> like speech or  musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and 
>>> seems to deny the  irreducible unpredictability of development. I 
>>> think that the idea of  "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets 
>>> us around this (because even  nonlinear functions can be integrated). 
>>> Certainly if I were explaining  "moment" to a high school teacher of 
>>> science, I would use the example of  angular momentum.
>>> 
>>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and 
>>> sometimes  uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that 
>>> they are. The  cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is 
>>> quite different from  the description of development. A text is an 
>>> instance of a language, but  it's not a 'moment'. A context of 
>>> situation is an instance of a context of  culture, but it's not a 
>>> moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a  "moment" in the 
>>> development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed  synoptically, 
>>> weather and climate are simply to different chronological  sections of 
>>> one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis",  
>>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem,  
>>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible.
>>> 
>>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described  
>>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can 
>>> seriously  say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions 
>>> of the same  phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather 
>>> is chiefly  influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the 
>>> relationship between solar  radiation absorbed and solar radiation 
>>> reflected out into space) is  present, but it is much less immediately 
>>> causal. With climate, it's the  other way around. When we say that 
>>> word meaning develops, we see much the  same qualitative shifts: sense 
>>> is a constitutive moment of infant speech  while signiication is quite 
>>> peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we  have the reverse 
>>> relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the  phenomenon 
>>> also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way to  grasp 
>>> this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for example,  
>>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more  
>>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to  
>>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text).
>>> 
>>> David Kellogg
>>> Macquarie University
>>> 
>>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Dear all ,
>>>> 
>>>> Look at this please !
>>>> 
>>>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a
>>> thought
>>>> experiment: 1) The
>>>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its 
>>>> essence can be revealed particularly clearly; 2) this object then 
>>>> undergoes further mental transformations; 3) this same experiment 
>>>> leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which
>>> the
>>>> object is
>>>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be
>>> represented
>>> as
>>>> a process of
>>>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment 
>>>> essentially becomes a productive contribution to the mentally 
>>>> represented object. It is only within this special system of links 
>>>> that the object?s content gets revealed.]]
>>>> 
>>>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity ,
>>> action
>>>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and 
>>>> separate
>>> even
>>>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular 
>>>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal 
>>>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself 
>>>> ,
>>> nor
>>>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability 
>>>> or independence or invariability. At each point of succession or
>>> motionality ,
>>>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives , emotional 
>>>> incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be
>>> converted
>>>> in the other as we all have seen .
>>>> 
>>>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played
>>> with
>>>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition .
>>> It's a
>>>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited 
>>>> pleasurable feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't 
>>>> refer to a particular part or stage orietating on which this or 
>>>> that kind of
>>> affect
>>> or
>>>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to
>>> think
>>> of
>>>> how to express it and he might  finally resort to imitation . Then 
>>>> ,
>>> the
>>>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single
>>> note in
>>>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant 
>>>> on
>>> which
>>>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state
>>> occurs
>>> .
>>>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable 
>>>> or immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a 
>>>> substitute might lose the favor . Another example might be the 
>>>> "ideal" which is
>>> said
>>>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good 
>>>> sources
>>> for
>>>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now .
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Best
>>>> 
>>>> Haydi
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 55
> Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 04:23:50 +0000
> From: Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie
> 	phenomenon
> To: "xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>,
> 	"ablunden@mira.net"	<ablunden@mira.net>
> Message-ID:
> 	<BY2PR07MB10797E024D42CE5B6D499A1C1CC0@BY2PR07MB107.namprd07.prod.outlook.com>
> 	
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
> 
> 
> Hi Susan and others,
> 
> Yes, it does feel like over the past few days, at least in the media, there has been a kind of "global" perezhivanie for those who actually found meaning in the music and performance of David Bowie upon learning of his passing. 
> 
> As I've been considering his koan-like methods of creating art, perhaps a reason we feel kinship with him is not only because we may have grown up with this music, and we might have felt communion with his artistic content of difference and how that is joined with liberation. Perhaps also because he created large gaps that we could fill in ourselves and thereby construct our own meanings interwoven in his lyrics, so the work became "cognitively interactive" for want of a way to say it "differently."
> 
> One of the most hilarious stories I read recently is that when he lived in (walled) Berlin in the 80s one time on a whim he took the stage unasked at a cabaret and sang Frank Sinatra songs. The Berliners wouldn't have it. They "shrugged and asked him to step down." The article doesn't say so, but I can imagine him actually reveling in that experience. 
> 
> There are all these different meanings colliding:
> 
> What is: a Berlin cabaret in the 1980s?
> What is: a Frank Sinatra song?
> What is: David Bowie singing in a cabaret unasked?
> What is: being rejected by Berliners (who lived behind the wall)?
> 
> Thinking about this (like this) functions similarly to the way his art took form, all these overlapping meanings that must somehow be filled in my own summation, by what I bring to all those "meanings." Humor is also about filling in gaps.
> 
> However, on a more somber note, one of the aspects I consider while reflecting on David Bowie's lifework, is his short-lived fascination with fascism. I want to understand that too. I'm pretty sure he wasn't one, but rather, as an artist he was exploring how that worked, as in "taking on the body" to see its inner architectures and mechanisms, as performance artists are wont to do. Who knows if this was conscious or unconscious (probably both). I'm not claiming it was totally innocent, but there was something more going on than trying to shock for its own sake, nor was it some pathological desire for world domination. 
> 
> There is something "inside" fascism about filling in gaps that functions similarly, and, much like Arendt, and perhaps Bowie himself, I feel compelled to know how that works. 
> 
> Does this also pertain in some way to "global" perezhivanie? If it does, what makes it the same? And how it is different. Does it have to do with consent (or lack of it)? 
> 
> Does it mean there is a responsibility not only for the positive aspects of what one does, but also the absences as well? Which seems to be about not acting, or non-doing. 
> 
> Then, how does this link to ethics? I mean, we could be heroes. 
> 
> Kind regards,
> 
> Annalisa
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 56
> Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2016 20:32:49 -0800
> From: mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: The Day Without Adjuncts at Northeastern
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Cc: "OSE@yahoogroups.com" <OSE@yahoogroups.com>,	"xmca-l@ucsd.edu"
> 	<xmca-l@ucsd.edu>,	Carrie Lobman <carrie.lobman@gse.rutgers.edu>,	Tony
> 	Perone <tonyp129@gmail.com>, PIG group <ud-pig@yahoogroups.com>
> Message-ID:
> 	<CAHCnM0AFSJ6Eyp8Uxa2H=SZzN-n9ik6aSOeh5crK59+u=i67dQ@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> Great idea, Ana.  Its a major problem eroding higher education.
> mike
> 
> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 5:54 PM, Ana Marjanovic-Shane <anamshane@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> 
>> Dear colleagues,
>> 
>> As a former adjunct professor for many years, I am very sensitive when it
>> comes to the faculty rights! There should be no double standards when it
>> comes to the rights, working conditions, pay, benefits, and status of the
>> faculty, anyway! Period.
>> 
>> Please, help the Northeastern University adjunct faculty get a fair
>> contract.
>> 
>> Ana
>> 
>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------
>> From: Faculty Forward Network <info@facultyforwardnetwork.org>
>> Date: Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 8:29 PM
>> Subject: The Day Without Adjuncts at Northeastern
>> To: Ana Marjanovic-Shane <anamshane@gmail.com>
>> 
>> 
>> Friend us on Facebook
>> <
>> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bad/2144494657/VEsH/
>>> 
>> Follow
>> us on Twitter
>> <
>> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bae/2144494657/VEsE/
>>> 
>> [image: Faculty Forward Logo]
>> 
>> Dear Colleague,
>> 
>> My name is Haley Malm. I am an adjunct lecturer at Northeastern University.
>> And I'm going on strike next week.
>> 
>> For 16 months, my colleagues and I have been bargaining with Northeastern
>> for fair pay and better working conditions, only to be met with endless
>> stall tactics, and other disrespect for our work.
>> At Northeastern, that means treating adjuncts as marginal, disposable
>> employees to help minimize instructional costs.
>> 
>> *That's why January 19, one week from today, will be A Day Without Adjuncts
>> at Northeastern
>> <
>> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77baf/2144494657/VEsF/
>>> 
>> -- if we don't have a contract by then.*
>> 
>> Students have stood by us for months, even taking dramatic action
>> <
>> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77ba8/2144494657/VEsC/
>>> 
>> to push the administration to act.
>> 
>> Now we need help from fellow faculty. Please send a message
>> <
>> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77ba9/2144494657/VEsD/
>>> 
>> to Northeastern President Joseph Aoun and Provost James Bean urging them to
>> show real leadership and reach an agreement that respects the work of
>> part-time faculty.
>> 
>> *I'm asking you to send a message to the Northeastern administration,
>> demanding that they reach a fair contract for adjunct faculty.*
>> <
>> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77ba9/2144494657/VEsA/
>>> 
>> 
>> *Why am I going on strike?*
>> 
>>   -     In the College of Professional Studies, where I teach, some
>>   adjunct faculty make as little as $2,259 per course. President Aoun
>> makes
>>   more than that in a day.
>>   -     Rather than offer equitable health benefits to adjunct faculty who
>>   work full-time, Northeastern unilaterally implemented separate, more
>>   expensive coverage just for adjunct faculty, in violation of federal
>> labor
>>   law.
>>   -     If Northeastern values me and my fellow adjunct faculty so little,
>>   we should let them try and run things without us for a day.
>>   -     Most importantly, our students deserve better. Our teaching
>>   conditions are their learning conditions, after all -- and this
>>   administration does not prioritize good working conditions for faculty.
>> 
>> Northeastern is one of the largest universities in Massachusetts, with a
>> billion-dollar operating budget and a millionaire president. It can easily
>> afford the cents on the dollar a fair contract would cost. And if we win
>> better working conditions here, it could influence working conditions at
>> your school, as well.
>> 
>> *Please take a moment to tell President Aoun and Provost Bean that it's
>> time to treat adjunct faculty fairly.
>> <
>> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77ba9/2144494657/VEsB/
>>> *
>> 
>> In gratitude and solidarity,
>> 
>> Haley Malm
>> Adjunct Lecturer, Northeastern University
>> 
>> 
>> Copyright ? 2016 Faculty Forward
>> All rights reserved.
>> 666 West End Ave, Suite 1B, New York, NY 10025
>> This email was sent to: anamshane@gmail.com
>> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/unsubscribe
>> <
>> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77baa/2144494657/VEsO/
>>> 
>> <
>> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bad/2144494657/VEsP/
>>> 
>> <
>> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bae/2144494657/VEsHBQ/
>>> 
>> Friend us on Facebook
>> <
>> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bad/2144494657/VEsHBA/
>>> 
>> Follow us on Twitter
>> <
>> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bae/2144494657/VEsHBw/
>>> 
>> --
>> *Ana Marjanovic-Shane*
>> Dialogic Pedagogy Journal editor (dpj.pitt.edu)
>> Associate Professor of Education
>> Chestnut Hill College
>> phone: 267-334-2905
>> 
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> 
> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an
> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 57
> Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2016 20:32:49 -0800
> From: mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: The Day Without Adjuncts at Northeastern
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Cc: "OSE@yahoogroups.com" <OSE@yahoogroups.com>,	"xmca-l@ucsd.edu"
> 	<xmca-l@ucsd.edu>,	Carrie Lobman <carrie.lobman@gse.rutgers.edu>,	Tony
> 	Perone <tonyp129@gmail.com>, PIG group <ud-pig@yahoogroups.com>
> Message-ID:
> 	<CAHCnM0AFSJ6Eyp8Uxa2H=SZzN-n9ik6aSOeh5crK59+u=i67dQ@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> Great idea, Ana.  Its a major problem eroding higher education.
> mike
> 
> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 5:54 PM, Ana Marjanovic-Shane <anamshane@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> 
>> Dear colleagues,
>> 
>> As a former adjunct professor for many years, I am very sensitive when it
>> comes to the faculty rights! There should be no double standards when it
>> comes to the rights, working conditions, pay, benefits, and status of the
>> faculty, anyway! Period.
>> 
>> Please, help the Northeastern University adjunct faculty get a fair
>> contract.
>> 
>> Ana
>> 
>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------
>> From: Faculty Forward Network <info@facultyforwardnetwork.org>
>> Date: Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 8:29 PM
>> Subject: The Day Without Adjuncts at Northeastern
>> To: Ana Marjanovic-Shane <anamshane@gmail.com>
>> 
>> 
>> Friend us on Facebook
>> <
>> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bad/2144494657/VEsH/
>>> 
>> Follow
>> us on Twitter
>> <
>> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bae/2144494657/VEsE/
>>> 
>> [image: Faculty Forward Logo]
>> 
>> Dear Colleague,
>> 
>> My name is Haley Malm. I am an adjunct lecturer at Northeastern University.
>> And I'm going on strike next week.
>> 
>> For 16 months, my colleagues and I have been bargaining with Northeastern
>> for fair pay and better working conditions, only to be met with endless
>> stall tactics, and other disrespect for our work.
>> At Northeastern, that means treating adjuncts as marginal, disposable
>> employees to help minimize instructional costs.
>> 
>> *That's why January 19, one week from today, will be A Day Without Adjuncts
>> at Northeastern
>> <
>> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77baf/2144494657/VEsF/
>>> 
>> -- if we don't have a contract by then.*
>> 
>> Students have stood by us for months, even taking dramatic action
>> <
>> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77ba8/2144494657/VEsC/
>>> 
>> to push the administration to act.
>> 
>> Now we need help from fellow faculty. Please send a message
>> <
>> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77ba9/2144494657/VEsD/
>>> 
>> to Northeastern President Joseph Aoun and Provost James Bean urging them to
>> show real leadership and reach an agreement that respects the work of
>> part-time faculty.
>> 
>> *I'm asking you to send a message to the Northeastern administration,
>> demanding that they reach a fair contract for adjunct faculty.*
>> <
>> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77ba9/2144494657/VEsA/
>>> 
>> 
>> *Why am I going on strike?*
>> 
>>   -     In the College of Professional Studies, where I teach, some
>>   adjunct faculty make as little as $2,259 per course. President Aoun
>> makes
>>   more than that in a day.
>>   -     Rather than offer equitable health benefits to adjunct faculty who
>>   work full-time, Northeastern unilaterally implemented separate, more
>>   expensive coverage just for adjunct faculty, in violation of federal
>> labor
>>   law.
>>   -     If Northeastern values me and my fellow adjunct faculty so little,
>>   we should let them try and run things without us for a day.
>>   -     Most importantly, our students deserve better. Our teaching
>>   conditions are their learning conditions, after all -- and this
>>   administration does not prioritize good working conditions for faculty.
>> 
>> Northeastern is one of the largest universities in Massachusetts, with a
>> billion-dollar operating budget and a millionaire president. It can easily
>> afford the cents on the dollar a fair contract would cost. And if we win
>> better working conditions here, it could influence working conditions at
>> your school, as well.
>> 
>> *Please take a moment to tell President Aoun and Provost Bean that it's
>> time to treat adjunct faculty fairly.
>> <
>> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77ba9/2144494657/VEsB/
>>> *
>> 
>> In gratitude and solidarity,
>> 
>> Haley Malm
>> Adjunct Lecturer, Northeastern University
>> 
>> 
>> Copyright ? 2016 Faculty Forward
>> All rights reserved.
>> 666 West End Ave, Suite 1B, New York, NY 10025
>> This email was sent to: anamshane@gmail.com
>> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/unsubscribe
>> <
>> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77baa/2144494657/VEsO/
>>> 
>> <
>> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bad/2144494657/VEsP/
>>> 
>> <
>> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bae/2144494657/VEsHBQ/
>>> 
>> Friend us on Facebook
>> <
>> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bad/2144494657/VEsHBA/
>>> 
>> Follow us on Twitter
>> <
>> http://action.facultyforwardnetwork.org/page/m/18a1231b/1e8bfc3/49c2d5b9/1fe77bae/2144494657/VEsHBw/
>>> 
>> --
>> *Ana Marjanovic-Shane*
>> Dialogic Pedagogy Journal editor (dpj.pitt.edu)
>> Associate Professor of Education
>> Chestnut Hill College
>> phone: 267-334-2905
>> 
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> 
> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an
> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 58
> Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 14:28:53 +0900
> From: David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<CACwG6DuVhDXiKb949tc9ziemhBo76uA9W8CaEFUEvYU9o7SxrA@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> Huw:
> 
> I'm using meaning potential in a somewhat technical, Hallidayan, sense. For
> Halliday every utterance has both structure and system. Structure we know
> about: it's syntagmatic, in the sense that it is laid out one step at a
> time (in time with speech and in space with writing). It's non-Markovian,
> in the sense that each step has some influence on the next steps and not
> simply on the next step (e.g.if you start a sentence with "the" you are
> going to need noun pretty soon, but not necessarily right away).
> 
> For example, if I find myself saying
> 
> "The artist David Bowie was not a chameleon; he just hired a lot of
> different poorly paid adjuncts to write his songs"
> 
> My argument is laid out one step at a time: "The" and then "artist" and
> then "David" and then "Bowie" and then "was" (not "is", because of his
> death), etc.
> 
> System is a little different. First of all, it's paradigmatic, in the sense
> that it can be thought of as  kind of drop-down menu. It's a free choice,
> in the sense that although context will favor certain "canonical" choices
> over others, I can create contexts (and that is what writers of verbal art
> do). Each choice overlaps with a finite (often only two or three) number of
> choices not chosen. In this way "system" combines free will with
> cultural-historical determination.
> 
> For example, if I find myself saying "The artist David Bowie" when I get to
> the noun "artist" I could say "singer" or even "celebrity" but the choice
> is not infinite, particularly if I look at probability and not just
> possibility. Even with proper nouns, in place of "Bowie" I could say
> "Kellogg" or even "Cameron" but the number of choices is distinctly
> limited. I could have said "is", but Bowie's death makes "was" more
> canonical; by choosing "not", I am choosing from only two choices (because
> an indicative clause can be either positive or negative in polarity but not
> both and not anything else) and yet by choosing the negative I am probably
> saying something that goes against 99% of what will be said about Bowie in
> the days to come.
> 
> This set of many small choices (some of which, like polarity, are highly
> skewed in probability) is not only true at the level of words, it is also
> true at the level of wording: I can choose to make a major or minor clause;
> if major, I can choose to make an imperative or an indicative; if
> indicative, I can go declarative or interrogative, etc. Each utterance
> represents a kind of a path through an indefinite number of systems, each
> of which is a kind of menu providing a finite number of choices, and this
> is what makes language both infinitely complex and in practice easy to use.
> 
> There are three important consequences of this somewhat technical use of
> "meaning potential". First of all, the problem of grammar can be seen as a
> problem of volitional choice, and what needs to be explained in language
> development is the same thing that needs to be explained in other branches
> of Vygotskyan psychology, namely the emergence of free will. Secondly, the
> choices that the speaker makes are made significant (made meaningful) not
> simply by pointing to context (this is really only true of infant language)
> but instead by all the choices that the speaker did NOT make but COULD HAVE
> made (this "could have" prevents the theory from dualism--the ideal is
> simply the potentially real). And thirdly, finally, meaning potential is
> always linked to but distinct from meaning proper precisely in the sense of
> NON-participation: meaning potential is simply the road not taken.
> 
> David Kellogg
> Macquarie University
> 
> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 11:05 PM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> 
>>> From what I have been reading and thinking, the biggest difference between
>> the conceptual system presented by Vygotsky and the of Leontiev (most of
>> which is well known) is the difference of the conceptualisation of activity
>> or the symbolic level (which is mostly absent for Vygotsky).
>> 
>> Without necessarily refuting David's points, but indicating an alternative
>> interpretation, I would say:
>> 
>> 1. Learning how to apply or use something is still a constructive act.  One
>> does not have to understand the full technical make up of a component in
>> order to make use of it.  Indeed this is would entail an infinite regress.
>> 
>> 2. I'm not fully clear what the assertion is with respect to active
>> participation in meaning potential, but it is perfectly reasonable to
>> revisit the problem space that an old artefact is drawn from only to
>> rediscover what this product achieves in terms of design.  This is actually
>> an excellent source of edification.
>> 
>> 3. Contemplation can be understood to be in response to an active problem.
>> There is nothing to say that activity must be glued to a specific site.
>> When I am programming, I am forever walking away from the computer to solve
>> or express a particular problem.
>> 
>> Best,
>> Huw
>> 
>> 
>> On 13 January 2016 at 10:02, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
>> 
>>> Dear Haydi:
>>> 
>>> In the very beginning of the text that Huw is reading, the HIstory of the
>>> Development of the Higher Psychic Functions, Vygotsky writes of the basic
>>> division psychology, between those who would treat the mind as something
>>> made by "Deus Sive Natura" ("God, i.e. Nature"), like the eye or the hand
>>> or any other physical phenomenon, and those who would treat the mind as
>> (to
>>> quote Mike's epigraph) an object which itself creates history. In one
>> case,
>>> we have an object which really can be usefully described synoptically,
>> like
>>> a sculpture that we can walk all the way around. But in the other we
>> have a
>>> process which can only be described dynamically, like a piece of theatre
>>> that walks around us while we sit and observe.
>>> 
>>> Of course, we CAN argue, the way that Vico would argue, that to produce
>> the
>>> process is to fully understand it: we cannot fully understand the eye or
>>> the hand, because although these things are part of us, they were made by
>>> God. We can understand a telescope or a hammer, because although these
>>> things are not part of us, they were made by ourselves. And we can even
>>> argue that the process of making it is essentially the process of
>>> understanding it: once you have made a telescope or a hammer and used it,
>>> you have understood everything there is to know about it. That is, I
>>> understand it, the position you attribute to dialectical logic, to CHAT,
>>> and to Davydov, and I think you attribute it correctly. The problem is
>> that
>>> I am not sure that the position itself is correct.
>>> 
>>> The reason is this: we may be able to actively participate in the process
>>> of producing and using a telescope or a hammer. We may even (although
>> this
>>> is much more problematic) actively participate in the process of
>> producing
>>> and using a mind or a personality. But our observational standpoint is
>>> nevertheless fixed by our position in time: we can never "actively
>>> participate" in constructing the counterfactual potential, the  meaning
>>> potential, of a telescope or a hammer, much less a mind or a personality.
>>> Our active participation is always fixed in the actual, and meaning
>>> potential is accessible only through contemplation. It may be
>> contemplation
>>> with activity firmly in mind, but it is only potentially active and not
>>> actually so.
>>> 
>>> I think this is a fundamental difference between Vygotsky and Leontiev,
>> and
>>> the activity theory that followed him: For Vygotsky, the autistic
>> function
>>> (that is, the irrealist function, the contemplative function which turns
>>> away from immediate activity) may come late (as Vygotsky points out, it
>>> receives major impetus from the acquisition of words and then concepts,
>>> both of which come well after the beginning of social life), but this
>>> "autistic" contemplative function is then never out of date: concepts are
>>> not formed purely through activity, but also through the turning away
>> from
>>> reality oriented activity. And in that, he has the complete support of
>>> Lenin, who knew a thing or two about how concepts are joined to action.
>>> 
>>> David Kellogg
>>> Macquarie University
>>> 
>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 12:06 AM, <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Thanks , David , for the two-parag. epigraph as always !
>>>> 
>>>> --First of all, Kant says we cannot know / cognize a material object in
>>>> itself because a priori we don't have an image of it so  we are unable
>> to
>>>> have an overlap between the two ; hence agnosticism let alone 'inner
>>>> connections' of a whole as 'moments' . Dialectical Logic (close
>> relative
>>> to
>>>> CHAT) says as man relies on object-related activity while an ideal
>>>> adaptable to the future coming object ever runs through the activity to
>>> the
>>>> finish , is able to penetrate the depths . When you put the mental
>> model
>>>> into a material model , in reifying or objectifying that model into a
>>>> finished product and all through the durational time , you can see what
>>> is
>>>> necessary , essential and what is not . In higher momentums of
>>> conception ,
>>>> you reach concepts and this is the time you've got a theoretical
>> rational
>>>> cognitive copy of the inner mechanisms and transformations of the
>> related
>>>> object or objects . When we say 'ideal' is a moment of an activity , we
>>>> mean it's ever running through uninterruptedly because the whole entity
>>>> falls down , collapses otherwise . Or if you aim to take it wholly
>> apart
>>> ,
>>>> again nothing is left for objectfication . Davydov says we cannot stop
>> at
>>>> phenomenology ; it's not to our will or taste ; we should ever
>> reproduce
>>>> our ever changing needs and products and that needs true science and
>> true
>>>> science needs true concepts . Yes , we want the object to move
>>> (dynamicity)
>>>> according to its inner transformations (moments) which has come to us
>> as
>>>> fixated knowledge in speech and skills historically . We don't want to
>> be
>>>> stuck in our position observing it to move . If you take moments as
>>> moments
>>>> of your positioning while observing , you've not been able to convert
>>> those
>>>> phenomenal aspects (empiricism) into innermost movements hence
>>> agnosticism
>>>> prevails . Yes ,  We could somehow treat these moments as always
>>> inhering ,
>>>> how ? Are neoformations parts and parcels of some detachable
>> independent
>>>> separate phnomenon ? Are they not fused , interwoven , intertwined
>>> moments
>>>> of inner mechanisms of whole development (internalization ,
>>> appropriation ,
>>>> instruction , development , upbringing involved) ? Does development or
>>> even
>>>> periods of development contain , include some parts and parcels or do
>>> they
>>>> subsume some moments of developmental transformations , those moments
>>> still
>>>> sublated within the whole process reversible if development defects ?
>>>> 
>>>> --Secondly , we agreed that moment is different from the instance as we
>>>> took it as tokens , samples , etc. Everything began with the very fact
>> .
>>>> 
>>>> --Thirdly , with what I said , I suppose you've been responded to . Our
>>>> focus is on moment as some (aspect as you say ; I first refrained from
>>>> using 'aspectual' because aspect , too , does not convey the intention
>>>> precisely) variable of a successive uninterrupted incessant moving
>>> movable
>>>> whole in contrast to parts and parcels even components of some
>>>> static internally immovable pseudo-stagnant whole which , if
>> potentially
>>>> realizable , will damage genuine cognition .
>>>> 
>>>> Best
>>>> Haydi
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> ------------------------------
>>>> *From:* David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>>> *To:* Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
>>>> *Sent:* Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 9:08:03
>>>> *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
>>>> 
>>>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in
>> the
>>>> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry
>> is.
>>>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation
>>>> between "moment" and music.
>>>> 
>>>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant
>> is
>>> a
>>>> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three
>>>> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of
>>> "moment"
>>>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is
>> the
>>>> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting").
>>>> 
>>>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology
>> in
>>>> a way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something
>>> like
>>>> a sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and
>> describe
>>>> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is
>>> almost
>>>> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the
>>>> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic
>>>> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it.
>>> This
>>>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect:
>> as
>>> we
>>>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even
>> present,
>>>> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat
>>>> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a
>>>> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or
>>>> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the
>>>> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of
>>>> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because
>>> even
>>>> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining
>>>> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example
>> of
>>>> angular momentum.
>>>> 
>>>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and
>> sometimes
>>>> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The
>>>> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different
>>> from
>>>> the description of development. A text is an instance of a language,
>> but
>>>> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context
>>> of
>>>> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a
>>>> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed
>>>> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological
>>>> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis",
>>>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem,
>>>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible.
>>>> 
>>>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described
>>>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can
>> seriously
>>>> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same
>>>> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly
>>>> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between
>>> solar
>>>> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is
>>>> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the
>>>> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much
>> the
>>>> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant
>> speech
>>>> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca
>> we
>>>> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the
>>>> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way
>>> to
>>>> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for
>> example,
>>>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more
>>>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to
>>>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text).
>>>> 
>>>> David Kellogg
>>>> Macquarie University
>>>> 
>>>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Dear all ,
>>>> 
>>>> Look at this please !
>>>> 
>>>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a
>> thought
>>>> experiment: 1) The
>>>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its
>>>> essence can be revealed
>>>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental
>>>> transformations; 3) this same
>>>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which
>>> the
>>>> object is
>>>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented
>>> as
>>>> a process of
>>>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment
>>>> essentially becomes a
>>>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only
>>>> within this special
>>>> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]]
>>>> 
>>>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity ,
>> action
>>>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate
>>> even
>>>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular
>>>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal
>>>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself ,
>> nor
>>>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or
>>>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or
>>> motionality ,
>>>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives
>>>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be
>>> converted
>>>> in the other as we all have seen .
>>>> 
>>>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played with
>>>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition .
>> It's a
>>>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable
>>>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a
>>>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of
>> affect
>>> or
>>>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think
>>> of
>>>> how to express it and he might  finally resort to imitation . Then ,
>> the
>>>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note
>> in
>>>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on
>>> which
>>>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state
>> occurs
>>> .
>>>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or
>>>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute
>>>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is
>> said
>>>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources
>>> for
>>>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now .
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Best
>>>> 
>>>> Haydi
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 59
> Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 11:41:52 +0000
> From: Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<CAG1MBOEC=Zxkd80vXojEow1cs+Np-diEN1BoLp1335Gg1uTN7w@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> Hi David,
> 
> I think I can summarise your description of meaning potential as a
> performative act (Austen) which can be appreciated in terms of alternative
> acts which were not undertaken, i.e. a commonality and variability analysis
> of a unit expression for a given domain.
> 
> If we are taking activity and orientation into consideration, then it is
> sensible to widen the scope of this act to include the orientation and
> perhaps look for congruence in the content of the act with the orientation.
> 
> With respect to the construction of knowledge with respect to using tools
> and manufacturing tools, an appreciation of this meaning potential is
> indeed available, although once we are habituated to the use of a tool it
> is not so readily consciously available -- it is often most manifest when
> we are first becoming habituated to the operations that a tool affords.  It
> may be that an appreciation for the design of artefacts facilitates this
> appreciation.  The menu system you refer to is a sitting duck in this
> regard, although it makes some things easier for some people, it makes
> other things much harder.
> 
> In my attempt to understand how you are applying this to mind, my response
> is the same.  Yes, we can appreciate how having certain knowledge changes
> the landscape of capabilities of a student, and we can appreciate how
> different variants of this knowledge can induce different capabilities.
> This is the essential technical aspect of conceptual development in
> developmental psychology.
> 
> Best,
> Huw
> 
> On 14 January 2016 at 05:28, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
>> Huw:
>> 
>> I'm using meaning potential in a somewhat technical, Hallidayan, sense. For
>> Halliday every utterance has both structure and system. Structure we know
>> about: it's syntagmatic, in the sense that it is laid out one step at a
>> time (in time with speech and in space with writing). It's non-Markovian,
>> in the sense that each step has some influence on the next steps and not
>> simply on the next step (e.g.if you start a sentence with "the" you are
>> going to need noun pretty soon, but not necessarily right away).
>> 
>> For example, if I find myself saying
>> 
>> "The artist David Bowie was not a chameleon; he just hired a lot of
>> different poorly paid adjuncts to write his songs"
>> 
>> My argument is laid out one step at a time: "The" and then "artist" and
>> then "David" and then "Bowie" and then "was" (not "is", because of his
>> death), etc.
>> 
>> System is a little different. First of all, it's paradigmatic, in the sense
>> that it can be thought of as  kind of drop-down menu. It's a free choice,
>> in the sense that although context will favor certain "canonical" choices
>> over others, I can create contexts (and that is what writers of verbal art
>> do). Each choice overlaps with a finite (often only two or three) number of
>> choices not chosen. In this way "system" combines free will with
>> cultural-historical determination.
>> 
>> For example, if I find myself saying "The artist David Bowie" when I get to
>> the noun "artist" I could say "singer" or even "celebrity" but the choice
>> is not infinite, particularly if I look at probability and not just
>> possibility. Even with proper nouns, in place of "Bowie" I could say
>> "Kellogg" or even "Cameron" but the number of choices is distinctly
>> limited. I could have said "is", but Bowie's death makes "was" more
>> canonical; by choosing "not", I am choosing from only two choices (because
>> an indicative clause can be either positive or negative in polarity but not
>> both and not anything else) and yet by choosing the negative I am probably
>> saying something that goes against 99% of what will be said about Bowie in
>> the days to come.
>> 
>> This set of many small choices (some of which, like polarity, are highly
>> skewed in probability) is not only true at the level of words, it is also
>> true at the level of wording: I can choose to make a major or minor clause;
>> if major, I can choose to make an imperative or an indicative; if
>> indicative, I can go declarative or interrogative, etc. Each utterance
>> represents a kind of a path through an indefinite number of systems, each
>> of which is a kind of menu providing a finite number of choices, and this
>> is what makes language both infinitely complex and in practice easy to use.
>> 
>> There are three important consequences of this somewhat technical use of
>> "meaning potential". First of all, the problem of grammar can be seen as a
>> problem of volitional choice, and what needs to be explained in language
>> development is the same thing that needs to be explained in other branches
>> of Vygotskyan psychology, namely the emergence of free will. Secondly, the
>> choices that the speaker makes are made significant (made meaningful) not
>> simply by pointing to context (this is really only true of infant language)
>> but instead by all the choices that the speaker did NOT make but COULD HAVE
>> made (this "could have" prevents the theory from dualism--the ideal is
>> simply the potentially real). And thirdly, finally, meaning potential is
>> always linked to but distinct from meaning proper precisely in the sense of
>> NON-participation: meaning potential is simply the road not taken.
>> 
>> David Kellogg
>> Macquarie University
>> 
>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 11:05 PM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>> 
>>>> From what I have been reading and thinking, the biggest difference
>> between
>>> the conceptual system presented by Vygotsky and the of Leontiev (most of
>>> which is well known) is the difference of the conceptualisation of
>> activity
>>> or the symbolic level (which is mostly absent for Vygotsky).
>>> 
>>> Without necessarily refuting David's points, but indicating an
>> alternative
>>> interpretation, I would say:
>>> 
>>> 1. Learning how to apply or use something is still a constructive act.
>> One
>>> does not have to understand the full technical make up of a component in
>>> order to make use of it.  Indeed this is would entail an infinite
>> regress.
>>> 
>>> 2. I'm not fully clear what the assertion is with respect to active
>>> participation in meaning potential, but it is perfectly reasonable to
>>> revisit the problem space that an old artefact is drawn from only to
>>> rediscover what this product achieves in terms of design.  This is
>> actually
>>> an excellent source of edification.
>>> 
>>> 3. Contemplation can be understood to be in response to an active
>> problem.
>>> There is nothing to say that activity must be glued to a specific site.
>>> When I am programming, I am forever walking away from the computer to
>> solve
>>> or express a particular problem.
>>> 
>>> Best,
>>> Huw
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 13 January 2016 at 10:02, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> Dear Haydi:
>>>> 
>>>> In the very beginning of the text that Huw is reading, the HIstory of
>> the
>>>> Development of the Higher Psychic Functions, Vygotsky writes of the
>> basic
>>>> division psychology, between those who would treat the mind as
>> something
>>>> made by "Deus Sive Natura" ("God, i.e. Nature"), like the eye or the
>> hand
>>>> or any other physical phenomenon, and those who would treat the mind as
>>> (to
>>>> quote Mike's epigraph) an object which itself creates history. In one
>>> case,
>>>> we have an object which really can be usefully described synoptically,
>>> like
>>>> a sculpture that we can walk all the way around. But in the other we
>>> have a
>>>> process which can only be described dynamically, like a piece of
>> theatre
>>>> that walks around us while we sit and observe.
>>>> 
>>>> Of course, we CAN argue, the way that Vico would argue, that to produce
>>> the
>>>> process is to fully understand it: we cannot fully understand the eye
>> or
>>>> the hand, because although these things are part of us, they were made
>> by
>>>> God. We can understand a telescope or a hammer, because although these
>>>> things are not part of us, they were made by ourselves. And we can even
>>>> argue that the process of making it is essentially the process of
>>>> understanding it: once you have made a telescope or a hammer and used
>> it,
>>>> you have understood everything there is to know about it. That is, I
>>>> understand it, the position you attribute to dialectical logic, to
>> CHAT,
>>>> and to Davydov, and I think you attribute it correctly. The problem is
>>> that
>>>> I am not sure that the position itself is correct.
>>>> 
>>>> The reason is this: we may be able to actively participate in the
>> process
>>>> of producing and using a telescope or a hammer. We may even (although
>>> this
>>>> is much more problematic) actively participate in the process of
>>> producing
>>>> and using a mind or a personality. But our observational standpoint is
>>>> nevertheless fixed by our position in time: we can never "actively
>>>> participate" in constructing the counterfactual potential, the  meaning
>>>> potential, of a telescope or a hammer, much less a mind or a
>> personality.
>>>> Our active participation is always fixed in the actual, and meaning
>>>> potential is accessible only through contemplation. It may be
>>> contemplation
>>>> with activity firmly in mind, but it is only potentially active and not
>>>> actually so.
>>>> 
>>>> I think this is a fundamental difference between Vygotsky and Leontiev,
>>> and
>>>> the activity theory that followed him: For Vygotsky, the autistic
>>> function
>>>> (that is, the irrealist function, the contemplative function which
>> turns
>>>> away from immediate activity) may come late (as Vygotsky points out, it
>>>> receives major impetus from the acquisition of words and then concepts,
>>>> both of which come well after the beginning of social life), but this
>>>> "autistic" contemplative function is then never out of date: concepts
>> are
>>>> not formed purely through activity, but also through the turning away
>>> from
>>>> reality oriented activity. And in that, he has the complete support of
>>>> Lenin, who knew a thing or two about how concepts are joined to action.
>>>> 
>>>> David Kellogg
>>>> Macquarie University
>>>> 
>>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 12:06 AM, <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> Thanks , David , for the two-parag. epigraph as always !
>>>>> 
>>>>> --First of all, Kant says we cannot know / cognize a material object
>> in
>>>>> itself because a priori we don't have an image of it so  we are
>> unable
>>> to
>>>>> have an overlap between the two ; hence agnosticism let alone 'inner
>>>>> connections' of a whole as 'moments' . Dialectical Logic (close
>>> relative
>>>> to
>>>>> CHAT) says as man relies on object-related activity while an ideal
>>>>> adaptable to the future coming object ever runs through the activity
>> to
>>>> the
>>>>> finish , is able to penetrate the depths . When you put the mental
>>> model
>>>>> into a material model , in reifying or objectifying that model into a
>>>>> finished product and all through the durational time , you can see
>> what
>>>> is
>>>>> necessary , essential and what is not . In higher momentums of
>>>> conception ,
>>>>> you reach concepts and this is the time you've got a theoretical
>>> rational
>>>>> cognitive copy of the inner mechanisms and transformations of the
>>> related
>>>>> object or objects . When we say 'ideal' is a moment of an activity ,
>> we
>>>>> mean it's ever running through uninterruptedly because the whole
>> entity
>>>>> falls down , collapses otherwise . Or if you aim to take it wholly
>>> apart
>>>> ,
>>>>> again nothing is left for objectfication . Davydov says we cannot
>> stop
>>> at
>>>>> phenomenology ; it's not to our will or taste ; we should ever
>>> reproduce
>>>>> our ever changing needs and products and that needs true science and
>>> true
>>>>> science needs true concepts . Yes , we want the object to move
>>>> (dynamicity)
>>>>> according to its inner transformations (moments) which has come to us
>>> as
>>>>> fixated knowledge in speech and skills historically . We don't want
>> to
>>> be
>>>>> stuck in our position observing it to move . If you take moments as
>>>> moments
>>>>> of your positioning while observing , you've not been able to convert
>>>> those
>>>>> phenomenal aspects (empiricism) into innermost movements hence
>>>> agnosticism
>>>>> prevails . Yes ,  We could somehow treat these moments as always
>>>> inhering ,
>>>>> how ? Are neoformations parts and parcels of some detachable
>>> independent
>>>>> separate phnomenon ? Are they not fused , interwoven , intertwined
>>>> moments
>>>>> of inner mechanisms of whole development (internalization ,
>>>> appropriation ,
>>>>> instruction , development , upbringing involved) ? Does development
>> or
>>>> even
>>>>> periods of development contain , include some parts and parcels or do
>>>> they
>>>>> subsume some moments of developmental transformations , those moments
>>>> still
>>>>> sublated within the whole process reversible if development defects ?
>>>>> 
>>>>> --Secondly , we agreed that moment is different from the instance as
>> we
>>>>> took it as tokens , samples , etc. Everything began with the very
>> fact
>>> .
>>>>> 
>>>>> --Thirdly , with what I said , I suppose you've been responded to .
>> Our
>>>>> focus is on moment as some (aspect as you say ; I first refrained
>> from
>>>>> using 'aspectual' because aspect , too , does not convey the
>> intention
>>>>> precisely) variable of a successive uninterrupted incessant moving
>>>> movable
>>>>> whole in contrast to parts and parcels even components of some
>>>>> static internally immovable pseudo-stagnant whole which , if
>>> potentially
>>>>> realizable , will damage genuine cognition .
>>>>> 
>>>>> Best
>>>>> Haydi
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> ------------------------------
>>>>> *From:* David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>>>> *To:* Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
>>>>> *Sent:* Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 9:08:03
>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
>>>>> 
>>>>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in
>>> the
>>>>> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry
>>> is.
>>>>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation
>>>>> between "moment" and music.
>>>>> 
>>>>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant
>>> is
>>>> a
>>>>> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three
>>>>> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of
>>>> "moment"
>>>>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is
>>> the
>>>>> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting").
>>>>> 
>>>>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in
>> phenomenology
>>> in
>>>>> a way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe
>> something
>>>> like
>>>>> a sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and
>>> describe
>>>>> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is
>>>> almost
>>>>> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the
>>>>> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic
>>>>> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it.
>>>> This
>>>>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect:
>>> as
>>>> we
>>>>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even
>>> present,
>>>>> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow
>> treat
>>>>> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit
>> in a
>>>>> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or
>>>>> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the
>>>>> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of
>>>>> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this
>> (because
>>>> even
>>>>> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were
>> explaining
>>>>> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example
>>> of
>>>>> angular momentum.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and
>>> sometimes
>>>>> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are.
>> The
>>>>> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different
>>>> from
>>>>> the description of development. A text is an instance of a language,
>>> but
>>>>> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a
>> context
>>>> of
>>>>> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather"
>> is a
>>>>> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed
>>>>> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different
>> chronological
>>>>> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using
>> "phylogenesis",
>>>>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third
>> problem,
>>>>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible.
>>>>> 
>>>>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described
>>>>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can
>>> seriously
>>>>> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the
>> same
>>>>> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly
>>>>> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between
>>>> solar
>>>>> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is
>>>>> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's
>> the
>>>>> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much
>>> the
>>>>> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant
>>> speech
>>>>> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca
>>> we
>>>>> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of
>> the
>>>>> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious
>> way
>>>> to
>>>>> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for
>>> example,
>>>>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more
>>>>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to
>>>>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text).
>>>>> 
>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>> Macquarie University
>>>>> 
>>>>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> Dear all ,
>>>>> 
>>>>> Look at this please !
>>>>> 
>>>>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a
>>> thought
>>>>> experiment: 1) The
>>>>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its
>>>>> essence can be revealed
>>>>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental
>>>>> transformations; 3) this same
>>>>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in
>> which
>>>> the
>>>>> object is
>>>>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be
>> represented
>>>> as
>>>>> a process of
>>>>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment
>>>>> essentially becomes a
>>>>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is
>> only
>>>>> within this special
>>>>> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]]
>>>>> 
>>>>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity ,
>>> action
>>>>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and
>> separate
>>>> even
>>>>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular
>>>>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal
>>>>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself ,
>>> nor
>>>>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or
>>>>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or
>>>> motionality ,
>>>>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives
>>>>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be
>>>> converted
>>>>> in the other as we all have seen .
>>>>> 
>>>>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played
>> with
>>>>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition .
>>> It's a
>>>>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable
>>>>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a
>>>>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of
>>> affect
>>>> or
>>>>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to
>> think
>>>> of
>>>>> how to express it and he might  finally resort to imitation . Then ,
>>> the
>>>>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single
>> note
>>> in
>>>>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on
>>>> which
>>>>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state
>>> occurs
>>>> .
>>>>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or
>>>>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a
>> substitute
>>>>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is
>>> said
>>>>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good
>> sources
>>>> for
>>>>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now .
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> Best
>>>>> 
>>>>> Haydi
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 60
> Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 09:48:01 -0500
> From: Beth Ferholt <bferholt@gmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie
> 	phenomenon
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<CAGor_9JD1vQsO7voPPiK+m1upfUehAmMHQfxoxiUzL0TE+3C=w@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> Thanks, Susan.
> 
> What I have noticed in NYC about David Bowie's death day of his death is a
> lot of people crying in public or talking about crying in public earlier in
> the day.
> 
> It is sort of weird.  With other celebrity deaths I have seen people
> talking and sometimes a few tears but not so many people crying.  I think
> embodied emotion is a key part of perezhivanie that makes it generally
> harder to experience in a large group.
> 
> I thought I was just having this reaction because of my age/what this
> particular artist meant to me, but I wonder if reactions to his death are
> actually different than reactions to the other deaths mentioned above.  His
> being in role so often is important for perezhivanie, as is the lack of
> violence in his death, I think.
> 
> Beth
> 
> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 11:23 PM, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu> wrote:
> 
>> 
>> Hi Susan and others,
>> 
>> Yes, it does feel like over the past few days, at least in the media,
>> there has been a kind of "global" perezhivanie for those who actually found
>> meaning in the music and performance of David Bowie upon learning of his
>> passing.
>> 
>> As I've been considering his koan-like methods of creating art, perhaps a
>> reason we feel kinship with him is not only because we may have grown up
>> with this music, and we might have felt communion with his artistic content
>> of difference and how that is joined with liberation. Perhaps also because
>> he created large gaps that we could fill in ourselves and thereby construct
>> our own meanings interwoven in his lyrics, so the work became "cognitively
>> interactive" for want of a way to say it "differently."
>> 
>> One of the most hilarious stories I read recently is that when he lived in
>> (walled) Berlin in the 80s one time on a whim he took the stage unasked at
>> a cabaret and sang Frank Sinatra songs. The Berliners wouldn't have it.
>> They "shrugged and asked him to step down." The article doesn't say so, but
>> I can imagine him actually reveling in that experience.
>> 
>> There are all these different meanings colliding:
>> 
>> What is: a Berlin cabaret in the 1980s?
>> What is: a Frank Sinatra song?
>> What is: David Bowie singing in a cabaret unasked?
>> What is: being rejected by Berliners (who lived behind the wall)?
>> 
>> Thinking about this (like this) functions similarly to the way his art
>> took form, all these overlapping meanings that must somehow be filled in my
>> own summation, by what I bring to all those "meanings." Humor is also about
>> filling in gaps.
>> 
>> However, on a more somber note, one of the aspects I consider while
>> reflecting on David Bowie's lifework, is his short-lived fascination with
>> fascism. I want to understand that too. I'm pretty sure he wasn't one, but
>> rather, as an artist he was exploring how that worked, as in "taking on the
>> body" to see its inner architectures and mechanisms, as performance artists
>> are wont to do. Who knows if this was conscious or unconscious (probably
>> both). I'm not claiming it was totally innocent, but there was something
>> more going on than trying to shock for its own sake, nor was it some
>> pathological desire for world domination.
>> 
>> There is something "inside" fascism about filling in gaps that functions
>> similarly, and, much like Arendt, and perhaps Bowie himself, I feel
>> compelled to know how that works.
>> 
>> Does this also pertain in some way to "global" perezhivanie? If it does,
>> what makes it the same? And how it is different. Does it have to do with
>> consent (or lack of it)?
>> 
>> Does it mean there is a responsibility not only for the positive aspects
>> of what one does, but also the absences as well? Which seems to be about
>> not acting, or non-doing.
>> 
>> Then, how does this link to ethics? I mean, we could be heroes.
>> 
>> Kind regards,
>> 
>> Annalisa
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> Beth Ferholt
> Assistant Professor
> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education
> Brooklyn College, City University of New York
> 2900 Bedford Avenue
> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889
> 
> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu
> Phone: (718) 951-5205
> Fax: (718) 951-4816
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 61
> Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 15:15:05 +0000
> From: Bruce Robinson <brucerob1953@googlemail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie
> 	phenomenon
> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> Message-ID: <5697BB79.40108@brucerob.eu>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed
> 
> Even though I'm of the right age to have heard his early music as a 
> background to my undergraduate years, I too found the recent attention 
> to Bowie somewhat overblown - the entire first half of the BBC News, a 
> 12 page supplement in the Guardian and interviews with everyone ever 
> connected with him. The obvious parallel is Diana in 1997 when there 
> were also hundreds of people on the streets crying, spontaneously 
> embracing etc. Something strange that came out of nowhere and is now 
> seen as a break with the continued stiff upper lips of the royal family 
> and others, particularly men, of earlier generations. I found it 
> worrying at the time.
> 
> On Bowie and fascism - even if Bowie thought he was just playing with 
> ideas and identity, which I doubt, he was doing so in a context where 
> real fascism and extreme racism were on the rise in Britain in the 70s. 
> Some other musicians expressed anti-immigrant views too. Even if it was 
> 'playing', it was extremely irresponsible given his influence. However I 
> doubt that was the case. I think he was probably identifying with one of 
> the trends of the time.
> 
> Bruce R
> 
> 
> On 14/01/2016 14:48, Beth Ferholt wrote:
>> Thanks, Susan.  > > What I have noticed in NYC about David Bowie's death day of his > 
> death is a lot of people crying in public or talking about crying in > 
> public earlier in the day. > > It is sort of weird.  With other 
> celebrity deaths I have seen people >  talking and sometimes a few tears 
> but not so many people crying.  I > think embodied emotion is a key part 
> of perezhivanie that makes it > generally harder to experience in a 
> large group. > > I thought I was just having this reaction because of my 
> age/what this > particular artist meant to me, but I wonder if reactions 
> to his death > are actually different than reactions to the other deaths 
> mentioned > above.  His being in role so often is important for 
> perezhivanie, as > is the lack of violence in his death, I think. > > 
> Beth > > On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 11:23 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > 
> <annalisa@unm.edu> wrote: > >> >> Hi Susan and others, >> >> Yes, it 
> does feel like over the past few days, at least in the >> media, there 
> has been a kind of "global" perezhivanie for those >> who actually found 
> meaning in the music and performance of David >> Bowie upon learning of 
> his passing. >> >> As I've been considering his koan-like methods of 
> creating art, >> perhaps a reason we feel kinship with him is not only 
> because we >> may have grown up with this music, and we might have felt 
>>> communion with his artistic content of difference and how that is >> 
> joined with liberation. Perhaps also because he created large gaps >> 
> that we could fill in ourselves and thereby construct our own >> 
> meanings interwoven in his lyrics, so the work became "cognitively >>  
> interactive" for want of a way to say it "differently." >> >> One of the 
> most hilarious stories I read recently is that when he >> lived in 
> (walled) Berlin in the 80s one time on a whim he took the >> stage 
> unasked at a cabaret and sang Frank Sinatra songs. The >> Berliners 
> wouldn't have it. They "shrugged and asked him to step >> down." The 
> article doesn't say so, but I can imagine him actually >> reveling in 
> that experience. >> >> There are all these different meanings colliding: 
>>>>> What is: a Berlin cabaret in the 1980s? What is: a Frank Sinatra 
>>> song? What is: David Bowie singing in a cabaret unasked? What is: >> 
> being rejected by Berliners (who lived behind the wall)? >> >> Thinking 
> about this (like this) functions similarly to the way his >> art took 
> form, all these overlapping meanings that must somehow be >> filled in 
> my own summation, by what I bring to all those >> "meanings." Humor is 
> also about filling in gaps. >> >> However, on a more somber note, one of 
> the aspects I consider while >> reflecting on David Bowie's lifework, is 
> his short-lived >> fascination with fascism. I want to understand that 
> too. I'm >> pretty sure he wasn't one, but rather, as an artist he was 
>>> exploring how that worked, as in "taking on the body" to see its >> 
> inner architectures and mechanisms, as performance artists are wont >> 
> to do. Who knows if this was conscious or unconscious (probably >> 
> both). I'm not claiming it was totally innocent, but there was >> 
> something more going on than trying to shock for its own sake, nor >> 
> was it some pathological desire for world domination. >> >> There is 
> something "inside" fascism about filling in gaps that >> functions 
> similarly, and, much like Arendt, and perhaps Bowie >> himself, I feel 
> compelled to know how that works. >> >> Does this also pertain in some 
> way to "global" perezhivanie? If it >> does, what makes it the same? And 
> how it is different. Does it >> have to do with consent (or lack of it)? 
>>>>> Does it mean there is a responsibility not only for the positive 
>>> aspects of what one does, but also the absences as well? Which >> 
> seems to be about not acting, or non-doing. >> >> Then, how does this 
> link to ethics? I mean, we could be heroes. >> >> Kind regards, >> >> 
> Annalisa >> >> > >
> 
> a
> uc
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 62
> Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 09:11:19 -0700
> From: Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<CAHH++Pmsgp6jur2sC9+eRX1sj8iC1nT9NmHBWSX+g4yzwrNzVA@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> David,
> Just wondering if Halliday is getting this from Roman Jakobson's
> syntagmatic vs. paradigmatic contrast?
> If so, then I'm wondering what happened to the notion of poetics in
> Halliday's thought. Poetical patterning seems absolutely essential to
> language learning, but I'd also tend to think of poetics as less than
> entirely volitional.
> Or to put the question more plainly, can you provide a little more nuance
> to your statement:
> "The problem of grammar can be seen as aproblem of volitional choice, and
> what needs to be explained in language development is the same thing that
> needs to be explained in other branches of Vygotskyan psychology, namely
> the emergence of free will"
> -greg
> 
> 
> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 10:28 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> 
>> Huw:
>> 
>> I'm using meaning potential in a somewhat technical, Hallidayan, sense. For
>> Halliday every utterance has both structure and system. Structure we know
>> about: it's syntagmatic, in the sense that it is laid out one step at a
>> time (in time with speech and in space with writing). It's non-Markovian,
>> in the sense that each step has some influence on the next steps and not
>> simply on the next step (e.g.if you start a sentence with "the" you are
>> going to need noun pretty soon, but not necessarily right away).
>> 
>> For example, if I find myself saying
>> 
>> "The artist David Bowie was not a chameleon; he just hired a lot of
>> different poorly paid adjuncts to write his songs"
>> 
>> My argument is laid out one step at a time: "The" and then "artist" and
>> then "David" and then "Bowie" and then "was" (not "is", because of his
>> death), etc.
>> 
>> System is a little different. First of all, it's paradigmatic, in the sense
>> that it can be thought of as  kind of drop-down menu. It's a free choice,
>> in the sense that although context will favor certain "canonical" choices
>> over others, I can create contexts (and that is what writers of verbal art
>> do). Each choice overlaps with a finite (often only two or three) number of
>> choices not chosen. In this way "system" combines free will with
>> cultural-historical determination.
>> 
>> For example, if I find myself saying "The artist David Bowie" when I get to
>> the noun "artist" I could say "singer" or even "celebrity" but the choice
>> is not infinite, particularly if I look at probability and not just
>> possibility. Even with proper nouns, in place of "Bowie" I could say
>> "Kellogg" or even "Cameron" but the number of choices is distinctly
>> limited. I could have said "is", but Bowie's death makes "was" more
>> canonical; by choosing "not", I am choosing from only two choices (because
>> an indicative clause can be either positive or negative in polarity but not
>> both and not anything else) and yet by choosing the negative I am probably
>> saying something that goes against 99% of what will be said about Bowie in
>> the days to come.
>> 
>> This set of many small choices (some of which, like polarity, are highly
>> skewed in probability) is not only true at the level of words, it is also
>> true at the level of wording: I can choose to make a major or minor clause;
>> if major, I can choose to make an imperative or an indicative; if
>> indicative, I can go declarative or interrogative, etc. Each utterance
>> represents a kind of a path through an indefinite number of systems, each
>> of which is a kind of menu providing a finite number of choices, and this
>> is what makes language both infinitely complex and in practice easy to use.
>> 
>> There are three important consequences of this somewhat technical use of
>> "meaning potential". First of all, the problem of grammar can be seen as a
>> problem of volitional choice, and what needs to be explained in language
>> development is the same thing that needs to be explained in other branches
>> of Vygotskyan psychology, namely the emergence of free will. Secondly, the
>> choices that the speaker makes are made significant (made meaningful) not
>> simply by pointing to context (this is really only true of infant language)
>> but instead by all the choices that the speaker did NOT make but COULD HAVE
>> made (this "could have" prevents the theory from dualism--the ideal is
>> simply the potentially real). And thirdly, finally, meaning potential is
>> always linked to but distinct from meaning proper precisely in the sense of
>> NON-participation: meaning potential is simply the road not taken.
>> 
>> David Kellogg
>> Macquarie University
>> 
>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 11:05 PM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>> 
>>>> From what I have been reading and thinking, the biggest difference
>> between
>>> the conceptual system presented by Vygotsky and the of Leontiev (most of
>>> which is well known) is the difference of the conceptualisation of
>> activity
>>> or the symbolic level (which is mostly absent for Vygotsky).
>>> 
>>> Without necessarily refuting David's points, but indicating an
>> alternative
>>> interpretation, I would say:
>>> 
>>> 1. Learning how to apply or use something is still a constructive act.
>> One
>>> does not have to understand the full technical make up of a component in
>>> order to make use of it.  Indeed this is would entail an infinite
>> regress.
>>> 
>>> 2. I'm not fully clear what the assertion is with respect to active
>>> participation in meaning potential, but it is perfectly reasonable to
>>> revisit the problem space that an old artefact is drawn from only to
>>> rediscover what this product achieves in terms of design.  This is
>> actually
>>> an excellent source of edification.
>>> 
>>> 3. Contemplation can be understood to be in response to an active
>> problem.
>>> There is nothing to say that activity must be glued to a specific site.
>>> When I am programming, I am forever walking away from the computer to
>> solve
>>> or express a particular problem.
>>> 
>>> Best,
>>> Huw
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 13 January 2016 at 10:02, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> Dear Haydi:
>>>> 
>>>> In the very beginning of the text that Huw is reading, the HIstory of
>> the
>>>> Development of the Higher Psychic Functions, Vygotsky writes of the
>> basic
>>>> division psychology, between those who would treat the mind as
>> something
>>>> made by "Deus Sive Natura" ("God, i.e. Nature"), like the eye or the
>> hand
>>>> or any other physical phenomenon, and those who would treat the mind as
>>> (to
>>>> quote Mike's epigraph) an object which itself creates history. In one
>>> case,
>>>> we have an object which really can be usefully described synoptically,
>>> like
>>>> a sculpture that we can walk all the way around. But in the other we
>>> have a
>>>> process which can only be described dynamically, like a piece of
>> theatre
>>>> that walks around us while we sit and observe.
>>>> 
>>>> Of course, we CAN argue, the way that Vico would argue, that to produce
>>> the
>>>> process is to fully understand it: we cannot fully understand the eye
>> or
>>>> the hand, because although these things are part of us, they were made
>> by
>>>> God. We can understand a telescope or a hammer, because although these
>>>> things are not part of us, they were made by ourselves. And we can even
>>>> argue that the process of making it is essentially the process of
>>>> understanding it: once you have made a telescope or a hammer and used
>> it,
>>>> you have understood everything there is to know about it. That is, I
>>>> understand it, the position you attribute to dialectical logic, to
>> CHAT,
>>>> and to Davydov, and I think you attribute it correctly. The problem is
>>> that
>>>> I am not sure that the position itself is correct.
>>>> 
>>>> The reason is this: we may be able to actively participate in the
>> process
>>>> of producing and using a telescope or a hammer. We may even (although
>>> this
>>>> is much more problematic) actively participate in the process of
>>> producing
>>>> and using a mind or a personality. But our observational standpoint is
>>>> nevertheless fixed by our position in time: we can never "actively
>>>> participate" in constructing the counterfactual potential, the  meaning
>>>> potential, of a telescope or a hammer, much less a mind or a
>> personality.
>>>> Our active participation is always fixed in the actual, and meaning
>>>> potential is accessible only through contemplation. It may be
>>> contemplation
>>>> with activity firmly in mind, but it is only potentially active and not
>>>> actually so.
>>>> 
>>>> I think this is a fundamental difference between Vygotsky and Leontiev,
>>> and
>>>> the activity theory that followed him: For Vygotsky, the autistic
>>> function
>>>> (that is, the irrealist function, the contemplative function which
>> turns
>>>> away from immediate activity) may come late (as Vygotsky points out, it
>>>> receives major impetus from the acquisition of words and then concepts,
>>>> both of which come well after the beginning of social life), but this
>>>> "autistic" contemplative function is then never out of date: concepts
>> are
>>>> not formed purely through activity, but also through the turning away
>>> from
>>>> reality oriented activity. And in that, he has the complete support of
>>>> Lenin, who knew a thing or two about how concepts are joined to action.
>>>> 
>>>> David Kellogg
>>>> Macquarie University
>>>> 
>>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 12:06 AM, <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> Thanks , David , for the two-parag. epigraph as always !
>>>>> 
>>>>> --First of all, Kant says we cannot know / cognize a material object
>> in
>>>>> itself because a priori we don't have an image of it so  we are
>> unable
>>> to
>>>>> have an overlap between the two ; hence agnosticism let alone 'inner
>>>>> connections' of a whole as 'moments' . Dialectical Logic (close
>>> relative
>>>> to
>>>>> CHAT) says as man relies on object-related activity while an ideal
>>>>> adaptable to the future coming object ever runs through the activity
>> to
>>>> the
>>>>> finish , is able to penetrate the depths . When you put the mental
>>> model
>>>>> into a material model , in reifying or objectifying that model into a
>>>>> finished product and all through the durational time , you can see
>> what
>>>> is
>>>>> necessary , essential and what is not . In higher momentums of
>>>> conception ,
>>>>> you reach concepts and this is the time you've got a theoretical
>>> rational
>>>>> cognitive copy of the inner mechanisms and transformations of the
>>> related
>>>>> object or objects . When we say 'ideal' is a moment of an activity ,
>> we
>>>>> mean it's ever running through uninterruptedly because the whole
>> entity
>>>>> falls down , collapses otherwise . Or if you aim to take it wholly
>>> apart
>>>> ,
>>>>> again nothing is left for objectfication . Davydov says we cannot
>> stop
>>> at
>>>>> phenomenology ; it's not to our will or taste ; we should ever
>>> reproduce
>>>>> our ever changing needs and products and that needs true science and
>>> true
>>>>> science needs true concepts . Yes , we want the object to move
>>>> (dynamicity)
>>>>> according to its inner transformations (moments) which has come to us
>>> as
>>>>> fixated knowledge in speech and skills historically . We don't want
>> to
>>> be
>>>>> stuck in our position observing it to move . If you take moments as
>>>> moments
>>>>> of your positioning while observing , you've not been able to convert
>>>> those
>>>>> phenomenal aspects (empiricism) into innermost movements hence
>>>> agnosticism
>>>>> prevails . Yes ,  We could somehow treat these moments as always
>>>> inhering ,
>>>>> how ? Are neoformations parts and parcels of some detachable
>>> independent
>>>>> separate phnomenon ? Are they not fused , interwoven , intertwined
>>>> moments
>>>>> of inner mechanisms of whole development (internalization ,
>>>> appropriation ,
>>>>> instruction , development , upbringing involved) ? Does development
>> or
>>>> even
>>>>> periods of development contain , include some parts and parcels or do
>>>> they
>>>>> subsume some moments of developmental transformations , those moments
>>>> still
>>>>> sublated within the whole process reversible if development defects ?
>>>>> 
>>>>> --Secondly , we agreed that moment is different from the instance as
>> we
>>>>> took it as tokens , samples , etc. Everything began with the very
>> fact
>>> .
>>>>> 
>>>>> --Thirdly , with what I said , I suppose you've been responded to .
>> Our
>>>>> focus is on moment as some (aspect as you say ; I first refrained
>> from
>>>>> using 'aspectual' because aspect , too , does not convey the
>> intention
>>>>> precisely) variable of a successive uninterrupted incessant moving
>>>> movable
>>>>> whole in contrast to parts and parcels even components of some
>>>>> static internally immovable pseudo-stagnant whole which , if
>>> potentially
>>>>> realizable , will damage genuine cognition .
>>>>> 
>>>>> Best
>>>>> Haydi
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> ------------------------------
>>>>> *From:* David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>>>> *To:* Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
>>>>> *Sent:* Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 9:08:03
>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
>>>>> 
>>>>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in
>>> the
>>>>> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry
>>> is.
>>>>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation
>>>>> between "moment" and music.
>>>>> 
>>>>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant
>>> is
>>>> a
>>>>> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three
>>>>> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of
>>>> "moment"
>>>>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is
>>> the
>>>>> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting").
>>>>> 
>>>>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in
>> phenomenology
>>> in
>>>>> a way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe
>> something
>>>> like
>>>>> a sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and
>>> describe
>>>>> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is
>>>> almost
>>>>> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the
>>>>> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic
>>>>> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it.
>>>> This
>>>>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect:
>>> as
>>>> we
>>>>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even
>>> present,
>>>>> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow
>> treat
>>>>> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit
>> in a
>>>>> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or
>>>>> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the
>>>>> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of
>>>>> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this
>> (because
>>>> even
>>>>> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were
>> explaining
>>>>> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example
>>> of
>>>>> angular momentum.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and
>>> sometimes
>>>>> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are.
>> The
>>>>> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different
>>>> from
>>>>> the description of development. A text is an instance of a language,
>>> but
>>>>> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a
>> context
>>>> of
>>>>> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather"
>> is a
>>>>> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed
>>>>> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different
>> chronological
>>>>> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using
>> "phylogenesis",
>>>>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third
>> problem,
>>>>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible.
>>>>> 
>>>>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described
>>>>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can
>>> seriously
>>>>> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the
>> same
>>>>> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly
>>>>> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between
>>>> solar
>>>>> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is
>>>>> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's
>> the
>>>>> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much
>>> the
>>>>> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant
>>> speech
>>>>> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca
>>> we
>>>>> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of
>> the
>>>>> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious
>> way
>>>> to
>>>>> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for
>>> example,
>>>>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more
>>>>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to
>>>>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text).
>>>>> 
>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>> Macquarie University
>>>>> 
>>>>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> Dear all ,
>>>>> 
>>>>> Look at this please !
>>>>> 
>>>>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a
>>> thought
>>>>> experiment: 1) The
>>>>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its
>>>>> essence can be revealed
>>>>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental
>>>>> transformations; 3) this same
>>>>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in
>> which
>>>> the
>>>>> object is
>>>>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be
>> represented
>>>> as
>>>>> a process of
>>>>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment
>>>>> essentially becomes a
>>>>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is
>> only
>>>>> within this special
>>>>> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]]
>>>>> 
>>>>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity ,
>>> action
>>>>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and
>> separate
>>>> even
>>>>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular
>>>>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal
>>>>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself ,
>>> nor
>>>>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or
>>>>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or
>>>> motionality ,
>>>>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives
>>>>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be
>>>> converted
>>>>> in the other as we all have seen .
>>>>> 
>>>>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played
>> with
>>>>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition .
>>> It's a
>>>>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable
>>>>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a
>>>>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of
>>> affect
>>>> or
>>>>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to
>> think
>>>> of
>>>>> how to express it and he might  finally resort to imitation . Then ,
>>> the
>>>>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single
>> note
>>> in
>>>>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on
>>>> which
>>>>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state
>>> occurs
>>>> .
>>>>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or
>>>>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a
>> substitute
>>>>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is
>>> said
>>>>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good
>> sources
>>>> for
>>>>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now .
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> Best
>>>>> 
>>>>> Haydi
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> Assistant Professor
> Department of Anthropology
> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> Brigham Young University
> Provo, UT 84602
> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 63
> Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 09:18:37 -0700
> From: Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l]  Society for Psychological Anthropology Vimeo page
> To: "xmca-l@ucsd.edu" <xmca-l@ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<CAHH++P=7eArDqQWN6N1DEbQ3cX6AmuAS06+1Zwu-f-wEGVPstA@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> Thought that some folks on this listserve might be interested in the
> Society for Psychological Anthropology's new Vimeo page. This isn't
> edge-of-your-seat viewing, but there are lots of good talks posted from the
> recent Biennial conference. Lots on postcolonial theory, among many other
> things.
> 
> Here is the link:
> https://vimeo.com/channels/psychanthro
> 
> -greg
> 
> -- 
> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> Assistant Professor
> Department of Anthropology
> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> Brigham Young University
> Provo, UT 84602
> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 64
> Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 08:30:32 -0800
> From: Lplarry <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID: <5697cd45.c493420a.faff1.5f17@mx.google.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
> 
> David,
> I am curious how you will respond to the notion of meaning potential using a phenomenological composition.
> To say:
> Meaning potential is the presence of absence.
> The dialectic between the placings taken and the placings not taken but could be otherwise
> 
> Each choice as presence overlaps with the absent choice that could have been otherwise, 
> Leaving a (gap)
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: "David Kellogg" <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> Sent: ?2016-?01-?13 9:31 PM
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> 
> Huw:
> 
> I'm using meaning potential in a somewhat technical, Hallidayan, sense. For
> Halliday every utterance has both structure and system. Structure we know
> about: it's syntagmatic, in the sense that it is laid out one step at a
> time (in time with speech and in space with writing). It's non-Markovian,
> in the sense that each step has some influence on the next steps and not
> simply on the next step (e.g.if you start a sentence with "the" you are
> going to need noun pretty soon, but not necessarily right away).
> 
> For example, if I find myself saying
> 
> "The artist David Bowie was not a chameleon; he just hired a lot of
> different poorly paid adjuncts to write his songs"
> 
> My argument is laid out one step at a time: "The" and then "artist" and
> then "David" and then "Bowie" and then "was" (not "is", because of his
> death), etc.
> 
> System is a little different. First of all, it's paradigmatic, in the sense
> that it can be thought of as  kind of drop-down menu. It's a free choice,
> in the sense that although context will favor certain "canonical" choices
> over others, I can create contexts (and that is what writers of verbal art
> do). Each choice overlaps with a finite (often only two or three) number of
> choices not chosen. In this way "system" combines free will with
> cultural-historical determination.
> 
> For example, if I find myself saying "The artist David Bowie" when I get to
> the noun "artist" I could say "singer" or even "celebrity" but the choice
> is not infinite, particularly if I look at probability and not just
> possibility. Even with proper nouns, in place of "Bowie" I could say
> "Kellogg" or even "Cameron" but the number of choices is distinctly
> limited. I could have said "is", but Bowie's death makes "was" more
> canonical; by choosing "not", I am choosing from only two choices (because
> an indicative clause can be either positive or negative in polarity but not
> both and not anything else) and yet by choosing the negative I am probably
> saying something that goes against 99% of what will be said about Bowie in
> the days to come.
> 
> This set of many small choices (some of which, like polarity, are highly
> skewed in probability) is not only true at the level of words, it is also
> true at the level of wording: I can choose to make a major or minor clause;
> if major, I can choose to make an imperative or an indicative; if
> indicative, I can go declarative or interrogative, etc. Each utterance
> represents a kind of a path through an indefinite number of systems, each
> of which is a kind of menu providing a finite number of choices, and this
> is what makes language both infinitely complex and in practice easy to use.
> 
> There are three important consequences of this somewhat technical use of
> "meaning potential". First of all, the problem of grammar can be seen as a
> problem of volitional choice, and what needs to be explained in language
> development is the same thing that needs to be explained in other branches
> of Vygotskyan psychology, namely the emergence of free will. Secondly, the
> choices that the speaker makes are made significant (made meaningful) not
> simply by pointing to context (this is really only true of infant language)
> but instead by all the choices that the speaker did NOT make but COULD HAVE
> made (this "could have" prevents the theory from dualism--the ideal is
> simply the potentially real). And thirdly, finally, meaning potential is
> always linked to but distinct from meaning proper precisely in the sense of
> NON-participation: meaning potential is simply the road not taken.
> 
> David Kellogg
> Macquarie University
> 
> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 11:05 PM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> 
>>> From what I have been reading and thinking, the biggest difference between
>> the conceptual system presented by Vygotsky and the of Leontiev (most of
>> which is well known) is the difference of the conceptualisation of activity
>> or the symbolic level (which is mostly absent for Vygotsky).
>> 
>> Without necessarily refuting David's points, but indicating an alternative
>> interpretation, I would say:
>> 
>> 1. Learning how to apply or use something is still a constructive act.  One
>> does not have to understand the full technical make up of a component in
>> order to make use of it.  Indeed this is would entail an infinite regress.
>> 
>> 2. I'm not fully clear what the assertion is with respect to active
>> participation in meaning potential, but it is perfectly reasonable to
>> revisit the problem space that an old artefact is drawn from only to
>> rediscover what this product achieves in terms of design.  This is actually
>> an excellent source of edification.
>> 
>> 3. Contemplation can be understood to be in response to an active problem.
>> There is nothing to say that activity must be glued to a specific site.
>> When I am programming, I am forever walking away from the computer to solve
>> or express a particular problem.
>> 
>> Best,
>> Huw
>> 
>> 
>> On 13 January 2016 at 10:02, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
>> 
>>> Dear Haydi:
>>> 
>>> In the very beginning of the text that Huw is reading, the HIstory of the
>>> Development of the Higher Psychic Functions, Vygotsky writes of the basic
>>> division psychology, between those who would treat the mind as something
>>> made by "Deus Sive Natura" ("God, i.e. Nature"), like the eye or the hand
>>> or any other physical phenomenon, and those who would treat the mind as
>> (to
>>> quote Mike's epigraph) an object which itself creates history. In one
>> case,
>>> we have an object which really can be usefully described synoptically,
>> like
>>> a sculpture that we can walk all the way around. But in the other we
>> have a
>>> process which can only be described dynamically, like a piece of theatre
>>> that walks around us while we sit and observe.
>>> 
>>> Of course, we CAN argue, the way that Vico would argue, that to produce
>> the
>>> process is to fully understand it: we cannot fully understand the eye or
>>> the hand, because although these things are part of us, they were made by
>>> God. We can understand a telescope or a hammer, because although these
>>> things are not part of us, they were made by ourselves. And we can even
>>> argue that the process of making it is essentially the process of
>>> understanding it: once you have made a telescope or a hammer and used it,
>>> you have understood everything there is to know about it. That is, I
>>> understand it, the position you attribute to dialectical logic, to CHAT,
>>> and to Davydov, and I think you attribute it correctly. The problem is
>> that
>>> I am not sure that the position itself is correct.
>>> 
>>> The reason is this: we may be able to actively participate in the process
>>> of producing and using a telescope or a hammer. We may even (although
>> this
>>> is much more problematic) actively participate in the process of
>> producing
>>> and using a mind or a personality. But our observational standpoint is
>>> nevertheless fixed by our position in time: we can never "actively
>>> participate" in constructing the counterfactual potential, the  meaning
>>> potential, of a telescope or a hammer, much less a mind or a personality.
>>> Our active participation is always fixed in the actual, and meaning
>>> potential is accessible only through contemplation. It may be
>> contemplation
>>> with activity firmly in mind, but it is only potentially active and not
>>> actually so.
>>> 
>>> I think this is a fundamental difference between Vygotsky and Leontiev,
>> and
>>> the activity theory that followed him: For Vygotsky, the autistic
>> function
>>> (that is, the irrealist function, the contemplative function which turns
>>> away from immediate activity) may come late (as Vygotsky points out, it
>>> receives major impetus from the acquisition of words and then concepts,
>>> both of which come well after the beginning of social life), but this
>>> "autistic" contemplative function is then never out of date: concepts are
>>> not formed purely through activity, but also through the turning away
>> from
>>> reality oriented activity. And in that, he has the complete support of
>>> Lenin, who knew a thing or two about how concepts are joined to action.
>>> 
>>> David Kellogg
>>> Macquarie University
>>> 
>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 12:06 AM, <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Thanks , David , for the two-parag. epigraph as always !
>>>> 
>>>> --First of all, Kant says we cannot know / cognize a material object in
>>>> itself because a priori we don't have an image of it so  we are unable
>> to
>>>> have an overlap between the two ; hence agnosticism let alone 'inner
>>>> connections' of a whole as 'moments' . Dialectical Logic (close
>> relative
>>> to
>>>> CHAT) says as man relies on object-related activity while an ideal
>>>> adaptable to the future coming object ever runs through the activity to
>>> the
>>>> finish , is able to penetrate the depths . When you put the mental
>> model
>>>> into a material model , in reifying or objectifying that model into a
>>>> finished product and all through the durational time , you can see what
>>> is
>>>> necessary , essential and what is not . In higher momentums of
>>> conception ,
>>>> you reach concepts and this is the time you've got a theoretical
>> rational
>>>> cognitive copy of the inner mechanisms and transformations of the
>> related
>>>> object or objects . When we say 'ideal' is a moment of an activity , we
>>>> mean it's ever running through uninterruptedly because the whole entity
>>>> falls down , collapses otherwise . Or if you aim to take it wholly
>> apart
>>> ,
>>>> again nothing is left for objectfication . Davydov says we cannot stop
>> at
>>>> phenomenology ; it's not to our will or taste ; we should ever
>> reproduce
>>>> our ever changing needs and products and that needs true science and
>> true
>>>> science needs true concepts . Yes , we want the object to move
>>> (dynamicity)
>>>> according to its inner transformations (moments) which has come to us
>> as
>>>> fixated knowledge in speech and skills historically . We don't want to
>> be
>>>> stuck in our position observing it to move . If you take moments as
>>> moments
>>>> of your positioning while observing , you've not been able to convert
>>> those
>>>> phenomenal aspects (empiricism) into innermost movements hence
>>> agnosticism
>>>> prevails . Yes ,  We could somehow treat these moments as always
>>> inhering ,
>>>> how ? Are neoformations parts and parcels of some detachable
>> independent
>>>> separate phnomenon ? Are they not fused , interwoven , intertwined
>>> moments
>>>> of inner mechanisms of whole development (internalization ,
>>> appropriation ,
>>>> instruction , development , upbringing involved) ? Does development or
>>> even
>>>> periods of development contain , include some parts and parcels or do
>>> they
>>>> subsume some moments of developmental transformations , those moments
>>> still
>>>> sublated within the whole process reversible if development defects ?
>>>> 
>>>> --Secondly , we agreed that moment is different from the instance as we
>>>> took it as tokens , samples , etc. Everything began with the very fact
>> .
>>>> 
>>>> --Thirdly , with what I said , I suppose you've been responded to . Our
>>>> focus is on moment as some (aspect as you say ; I first refrained from
>>>> using 'aspectual' because aspect , too , does not convey the intention
>>>> precisely) variable of a successive uninterrupted incessant moving
>>> movable
>>>> whole in contrast to parts and parcels even components of some
>>>> static internally immovable pseudo-stagnant whole which , if
>> potentially
>>>> realizable , will damage genuine cognition .
>>>> 
>>>> Best
>>>> Haydi
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> ------------------------------
>>>> *From:* David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>>> *To:* Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
>>>> *Sent:* Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 9:08:03
>>>> *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
>>>> 
>>>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in
>> the
>>>> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry
>> is.
>>>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation
>>>> between "moment" and music.
>>>> 
>>>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant
>> is
>>> a
>>>> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three
>>>> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of
>>> "moment"
>>>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is
>> the
>>>> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting").
>>>> 
>>>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology
>> in
>>>> a way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something
>>> like
>>>> a sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and
>> describe
>>>> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is
>>> almost
>>>> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the
>>>> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic
>>>> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it.
>>> This
>>>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect:
>> as
>>> we
>>>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even
>> present,
>>>> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat
>>>> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a
>>>> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or
>>>> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the
>>>> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of
>>>> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because
>>> even
>>>> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining
>>>> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example
>> of
>>>> angular momentum.
>>>> 
>>>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and
>> sometimes
>>>> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The
>>>> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different
>>> from
>>>> the description of development. A text is an instance of a language,
>> but
>>>> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context
>>> of
>>>> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a
>>>> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed
>>>> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological
>>>> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis",
>>>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem,
>>>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible.
>>>> 
>>>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described
>>>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can
>> seriously
>>>> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same
>>>> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly
>>>> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between
>>> solar
>>>> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is
>>>> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the
>>>> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much
>> the
>>>> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant
>> speech
>>>> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca
>> we
>>>> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the
>>>> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way
>>> to
>>>> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for
>> example,
>>>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more
>>>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to
>>>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text).
>>>> 
>>>> David Kellogg
>>>> Macquarie University
>>>> 
>>>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Dear all ,
>>>> 
>>>> Look at this please !
>>>> 
>>>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a
>> thought
>>>> experiment: 1) The
>>>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its
>>>> essence can be revealed
>>>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental
>>>> transformations; 3) this same
>>>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which
>>> the
>>>> object is
>>>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be represented
>>> as
>>>> a process of
>>>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment
>>>> essentially becomes a
>>>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only
>>>> within this special
>>>> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]]
>>>> 
>>>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity ,
>> action
>>>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate
>>> even
>>>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular
>>>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal
>>>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself ,
>> nor
>>>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or
>>>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or
>>> motionality ,
>>>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives
>>>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be
>>> converted
>>>> in the other as we all have seen .
>>>> 
>>>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played with
>>>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition .
>> It's a
>>>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable
>>>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a
>>>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of
>> affect
>>> or
>>>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think
>>> of
>>>> how to express it and he might  finally resort to imitation . Then ,
>> the
>>>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note
>> in
>>>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on
>>> which
>>>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state
>> occurs
>>> .
>>>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or
>>>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute
>>>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is
>> said
>>>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources
>>> for
>>>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now .
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Best
>>>> 
>>>> Haydi
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 65
> Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 11:56:32 -0500
> From: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" <pmocombe@mocombeian.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l]  Fwd: BSA Work, Employment and Society Conference
> 	2016 - Call for Papers
> To: "eXtended Mind Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
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> 
> 
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> 
> 
> Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone
> 
> -------- Original message --------
> From: BSA events Team <events@britsoc.org.uk> 
> Date: 1/14/2016  11:50 AM  (GMT-05:00) 
> To: pmocombe@mocombeian.com 
> Subject: BSA Work, Employment and Society Conference 2016 - Call for Papers 
> 
> Abstract submission closes at midnight on Monday?7 March?Work, Employment and Society Conference 2016'Work in Crisis'Dates: Tuesday 6 ? Thursday 8 September 2016 (Postgraduate Workshop: 5 September 2016)Venue: University of Leeds?The BSA and the Work, employment and society Editorial Board are pleased to announce that the WES Conference 2016 will be hosted by the University of Leeds. Like the journal, the conference is internationally focused and sociologically oriented, though it welcomes contributions from related fields.
> 
> The conference comes at a critical time for the study of work internationally. The impact of the global financial crisis has not only been profound, but enduring. The crisis has not led to any fundamental reappraisal of the nature of capitalism, or how to ?govern? it. For the majority in work conditions have deteriorated, while those without employment have been subject to ever more punitive sanctions. Inequalities are increasing and working lives becoming more precarious. The WES 2016 conference will bring together sociologists of work from across the globe to consider the crisis within, and the possibility of moving beyond, capitalist work relations.??The full Call for Papers can be viewed at:? http://www.britsoc.co.uk/media/93221/WES2016_conference_CFP_070316.pdf?1448377582546???BSA Events TeamThe British Sociological Association
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> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 66
> Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2016 04:53:00 +0900
> From: David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<CACwG6DvbfFM=VLE8AWpN++2tVZiTWoaKQ=x7PsXjjGBbMqGE+Q@mail.gmail.com>
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> 
> Huw, Greg, Larry:
> 
> Austin, at least as understand him, is entirely interested in
> performatives: that is, speech acts in which the making of a structure (eg.
> "I promise") is actually constitutive of some pragmatic function. That's
> really not what I had in mind at all, Huw. First of all, I'm interested in
> development, and performatives are few and ar between at both ends of the
> developmental continuum (for infants, language is more often ancillary than
> constitutive and in adults some of the most developmentally important uses
> of language are not public at all). Secondly, I don't think that Austin's
> various felicity conditions are relevant to, say, negation: what does it
> mean to say that only a person who is empowered to negate can validly
> perform the function of negation? And thirdly--most importantly--I think
> that what Austin has in mind is only structure and not system. But perhaps
> I am an unenthusiastic and thus a rather poor reader of Austin: he always
> struck me as a thinly disguised social-behaviorist.
> 
> Neither Halliday nor Jakobson really came up with the
> paradigmatic/syntagmatic distinction, Greg: it goes back to de Saussure.
> But de Saussure  called his paradigmatic dimension "associative", and this
> placed him firmly in associationist psychology. Associationism really has
> no room for the development of free will, and Halliday's notion of "system"
> requires it. A selection requires a selector. And language development is,
> in Vygotskyan psychology, about the development of the selector. In HDHMF,
> for example, Vygotsky actually says that the most important and most
> fundamental problem in the whole of psychology is that of Buridan's donkey.
> 
> Consider a four panel cartoon--the sort of thing you see on the comics page
> of a paper. If we "read" the cartoon horizontally, we get an essentially
> syntagmatic relation--the default reading is that the events of the second
> panel transpire after those of the first, and the events of the third after
> the second, etc.  But within each panel, we find drawings of bodies
> (doing), faces (feeling), thought "bubbles" (thinking) and speech balloons
> (saying). These CAN be syntagmatically related but they can also be
> simultaneous, and if you are a Vygotskyan, hierarchically related (doing
> may control feeling and feeling control thinking, and--in volition--we can
> even imagine the very opposite chain of command).
> 
> Now, imagine a poetics in which these planes are related not only
> hierarchically but paradigmatically. That is, a novel COULD be written as a
> set of more or less simultaneous doings (a historical novel). But it could
> also be written as feelings (a sentimental novel), as thinkings (a novel of
> ideas) or as sayings (a novel of conversation). All of these are quite
> different from organizing a story along the syntagmatic axis, which would
> make it not a novel but an adventure story (here in France, the word for
> novel is "roman" and--confusingly--the word for an adventure story is
> "nouvelle", but back home in Korea novels are noun more descriptively as
> "little talk"). I think that one of the important differences between
> novels and adventure stories is precisely that the specific weight of
> the environment and of individual volition are reversed, and the way this
> is often realized is through a stress on syntagmatic, temporal relations in
> the adventure story and on paradigmatic, projective relations in the novel.
> 
> I don't think that meaning potential can be entirely explained as "presence
> of absence", Larry, because linguistic systems are not always binary, and
> even when they are, they tend to generate options within options rather
> than absence of presence (language abhors a vaccuum). Take, for example,
> intonation. We could argue that there are only two options: up or down. But
> in fact, we often find down-up ("RE-A-LLY?") and updown ('RE-A-LLY!"), and
> there is also a fairly flat, neutral intonation ("'Really. Interesting.").
> If I come to a branch in the road and go left instead of right, the right
> fork in the road doesn't thereby cease to exist, even in my mind.
> 
> David Kellogg
> Macquarie University
> 
> 
> 
> On Fri, Jan 15, 2016 at 1:11 AM, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> 
>> David,
>> Just wondering if Halliday is getting this from Roman Jakobson's
>> syntagmatic vs. paradigmatic contrast?
>> If so, then I'm wondering what happened to the notion of poetics in
>> Halliday's thought. Poetical patterning seems absolutely essential to
>> language learning, but I'd also tend to think of poetics as less than
>> entirely volitional.
>> Or to put the question more plainly, can you provide a little more nuance
>> to your statement:
>> "The problem of grammar can be seen as aproblem of volitional choice, and
>> what needs to be explained in language development is the same thing that
>> needs to be explained in other branches of Vygotskyan psychology, namely
>> the emergence of free will"
>> -greg
>> 
>> 
>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 10:28 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>> 
>>> Huw:
>>> 
>>> I'm using meaning potential in a somewhat technical, Hallidayan, sense.
>> For
>>> Halliday every utterance has both structure and system. Structure we know
>>> about: it's syntagmatic, in the sense that it is laid out one step at a
>>> time (in time with speech and in space with writing). It's non-Markovian,
>>> in the sense that each step has some influence on the next steps and not
>>> simply on the next step (e.g.if you start a sentence with "the" you are
>>> going to need noun pretty soon, but not necessarily right away).
>>> 
>>> For example, if I find myself saying
>>> 
>>> "The artist David Bowie was not a chameleon; he just hired a lot of
>>> different poorly paid adjuncts to write his songs"
>>> 
>>> My argument is laid out one step at a time: "The" and then "artist" and
>>> then "David" and then "Bowie" and then "was" (not "is", because of his
>>> death), etc.
>>> 
>>> System is a little different. First of all, it's paradigmatic, in the
>> sense
>>> that it can be thought of as  kind of drop-down menu. It's a free choice,
>>> in the sense that although context will favor certain "canonical" choices
>>> over others, I can create contexts (and that is what writers of verbal
>> art
>>> do). Each choice overlaps with a finite (often only two or three) number
>> of
>>> choices not chosen. In this way "system" combines free will with
>>> cultural-historical determination.
>>> 
>>> For example, if I find myself saying "The artist David Bowie" when I get
>> to
>>> the noun "artist" I could say "singer" or even "celebrity" but the choice
>>> is not infinite, particularly if I look at probability and not just
>>> possibility. Even with proper nouns, in place of "Bowie" I could say
>>> "Kellogg" or even "Cameron" but the number of choices is distinctly
>>> limited. I could have said "is", but Bowie's death makes "was" more
>>> canonical; by choosing "not", I am choosing from only two choices
>> (because
>>> an indicative clause can be either positive or negative in polarity but
>> not
>>> both and not anything else) and yet by choosing the negative I am
>> probably
>>> saying something that goes against 99% of what will be said about Bowie
>> in
>>> the days to come.
>>> 
>>> This set of many small choices (some of which, like polarity, are highly
>>> skewed in probability) is not only true at the level of words, it is also
>>> true at the level of wording: I can choose to make a major or minor
>> clause;
>>> if major, I can choose to make an imperative or an indicative; if
>>> indicative, I can go declarative or interrogative, etc. Each utterance
>>> represents a kind of a path through an indefinite number of systems, each
>>> of which is a kind of menu providing a finite number of choices, and this
>>> is what makes language both infinitely complex and in practice easy to
>> use.
>>> 
>>> There are three important consequences of this somewhat technical use of
>>> "meaning potential". First of all, the problem of grammar can be seen as
>> a
>>> problem of volitional choice, and what needs to be explained in language
>>> development is the same thing that needs to be explained in other
>> branches
>>> of Vygotskyan psychology, namely the emergence of free will. Secondly,
>> the
>>> choices that the speaker makes are made significant (made meaningful) not
>>> simply by pointing to context (this is really only true of infant
>> language)
>>> but instead by all the choices that the speaker did NOT make but COULD
>> HAVE
>>> made (this "could have" prevents the theory from dualism--the ideal is
>>> simply the potentially real). And thirdly, finally, meaning potential is
>>> always linked to but distinct from meaning proper precisely in the sense
>> of
>>> NON-participation: meaning potential is simply the road not taken.
>>> 
>>> David Kellogg
>>> Macquarie University
>>> 
>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 11:05 PM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>> 
>>>>> From what I have been reading and thinking, the biggest difference
>>> between
>>>> the conceptual system presented by Vygotsky and the of Leontiev (most
>> of
>>>> which is well known) is the difference of the conceptualisation of
>>> activity
>>>> or the symbolic level (which is mostly absent for Vygotsky).
>>>> 
>>>> Without necessarily refuting David's points, but indicating an
>>> alternative
>>>> interpretation, I would say:
>>>> 
>>>> 1. Learning how to apply or use something is still a constructive act.
>>> One
>>>> does not have to understand the full technical make up of a component
>> in
>>>> order to make use of it.  Indeed this is would entail an infinite
>>> regress.
>>>> 
>>>> 2. I'm not fully clear what the assertion is with respect to active
>>>> participation in meaning potential, but it is perfectly reasonable to
>>>> revisit the problem space that an old artefact is drawn from only to
>>>> rediscover what this product achieves in terms of design.  This is
>>> actually
>>>> an excellent source of edification.
>>>> 
>>>> 3. Contemplation can be understood to be in response to an active
>>> problem.
>>>> There is nothing to say that activity must be glued to a specific site.
>>>> When I am programming, I am forever walking away from the computer to
>>> solve
>>>> or express a particular problem.
>>>> 
>>>> Best,
>>>> Huw
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On 13 January 2016 at 10:02, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> Dear Haydi:
>>>>> 
>>>>> In the very beginning of the text that Huw is reading, the HIstory of
>>> the
>>>>> Development of the Higher Psychic Functions, Vygotsky writes of the
>>> basic
>>>>> division psychology, between those who would treat the mind as
>>> something
>>>>> made by "Deus Sive Natura" ("God, i.e. Nature"), like the eye or the
>>> hand
>>>>> or any other physical phenomenon, and those who would treat the mind
>> as
>>>> (to
>>>>> quote Mike's epigraph) an object which itself creates history. In one
>>>> case,
>>>>> we have an object which really can be usefully described
>> synoptically,
>>>> like
>>>>> a sculpture that we can walk all the way around. But in the other we
>>>> have a
>>>>> process which can only be described dynamically, like a piece of
>>> theatre
>>>>> that walks around us while we sit and observe.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Of course, we CAN argue, the way that Vico would argue, that to
>> produce
>>>> the
>>>>> process is to fully understand it: we cannot fully understand the eye
>>> or
>>>>> the hand, because although these things are part of us, they were
>> made
>>> by
>>>>> God. We can understand a telescope or a hammer, because although
>> these
>>>>> things are not part of us, they were made by ourselves. And we can
>> even
>>>>> argue that the process of making it is essentially the process of
>>>>> understanding it: once you have made a telescope or a hammer and used
>>> it,
>>>>> you have understood everything there is to know about it. That is, I
>>>>> understand it, the position you attribute to dialectical logic, to
>>> CHAT,
>>>>> and to Davydov, and I think you attribute it correctly. The problem
>> is
>>>> that
>>>>> I am not sure that the position itself is correct.
>>>>> 
>>>>> The reason is this: we may be able to actively participate in the
>>> process
>>>>> of producing and using a telescope or a hammer. We may even (although
>>>> this
>>>>> is much more problematic) actively participate in the process of
>>>> producing
>>>>> and using a mind or a personality. But our observational standpoint
>> is
>>>>> nevertheless fixed by our position in time: we can never "actively
>>>>> participate" in constructing the counterfactual potential, the
>> meaning
>>>>> potential, of a telescope or a hammer, much less a mind or a
>>> personality.
>>>>> Our active participation is always fixed in the actual, and meaning
>>>>> potential is accessible only through contemplation. It may be
>>>> contemplation
>>>>> with activity firmly in mind, but it is only potentially active and
>> not
>>>>> actually so.
>>>>> 
>>>>> I think this is a fundamental difference between Vygotsky and
>> Leontiev,
>>>> and
>>>>> the activity theory that followed him: For Vygotsky, the autistic
>>>> function
>>>>> (that is, the irrealist function, the contemplative function which
>>> turns
>>>>> away from immediate activity) may come late (as Vygotsky points out,
>> it
>>>>> receives major impetus from the acquisition of words and then
>> concepts,
>>>>> both of which come well after the beginning of social life), but this
>>>>> "autistic" contemplative function is then never out of date: concepts
>>> are
>>>>> not formed purely through activity, but also through the turning away
>>>> from
>>>>> reality oriented activity. And in that, he has the complete support
>> of
>>>>> Lenin, who knew a thing or two about how concepts are joined to
>> action.
>>>>> 
>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>> Macquarie University
>>>>> 
>>>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 12:06 AM, <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Thanks , David , for the two-parag. epigraph as always !
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> --First of all, Kant says we cannot know / cognize a material
>> object
>>> in
>>>>>> itself because a priori we don't have an image of it so  we are
>>> unable
>>>> to
>>>>>> have an overlap between the two ; hence agnosticism let alone
>> 'inner
>>>>>> connections' of a whole as 'moments' . Dialectical Logic (close
>>>> relative
>>>>> to
>>>>>> CHAT) says as man relies on object-related activity while an ideal
>>>>>> adaptable to the future coming object ever runs through the
>> activity
>>> to
>>>>> the
>>>>>> finish , is able to penetrate the depths . When you put the mental
>>>> model
>>>>>> into a material model , in reifying or objectifying that model
>> into a
>>>>>> finished product and all through the durational time , you can see
>>> what
>>>>> is
>>>>>> necessary , essential and what is not . In higher momentums of
>>>>> conception ,
>>>>>> you reach concepts and this is the time you've got a theoretical
>>>> rational
>>>>>> cognitive copy of the inner mechanisms and transformations of the
>>>> related
>>>>>> object or objects . When we say 'ideal' is a moment of an activity
>> ,
>>> we
>>>>>> mean it's ever running through uninterruptedly because the whole
>>> entity
>>>>>> falls down , collapses otherwise . Or if you aim to take it wholly
>>>> apart
>>>>> ,
>>>>>> again nothing is left for objectfication . Davydov says we cannot
>>> stop
>>>> at
>>>>>> phenomenology ; it's not to our will or taste ; we should ever
>>>> reproduce
>>>>>> our ever changing needs and products and that needs true science
>> and
>>>> true
>>>>>> science needs true concepts . Yes , we want the object to move
>>>>> (dynamicity)
>>>>>> according to its inner transformations (moments) which has come to
>> us
>>>> as
>>>>>> fixated knowledge in speech and skills historically . We don't want
>>> to
>>>> be
>>>>>> stuck in our position observing it to move . If you take moments as
>>>>> moments
>>>>>> of your positioning while observing , you've not been able to
>> convert
>>>>> those
>>>>>> phenomenal aspects (empiricism) into innermost movements hence
>>>>> agnosticism
>>>>>> prevails . Yes ,  We could somehow treat these moments as always
>>>>> inhering ,
>>>>>> how ? Are neoformations parts and parcels of some detachable
>>>> independent
>>>>>> separate phnomenon ? Are they not fused , interwoven , intertwined
>>>>> moments
>>>>>> of inner mechanisms of whole development (internalization ,
>>>>> appropriation ,
>>>>>> instruction , development , upbringing involved) ? Does development
>>> or
>>>>> even
>>>>>> periods of development contain , include some parts and parcels or
>> do
>>>>> they
>>>>>> subsume some moments of developmental transformations , those
>> moments
>>>>> still
>>>>>> sublated within the whole process reversible if development
>> defects ?
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> --Secondly , we agreed that moment is different from the instance
>> as
>>> we
>>>>>> took it as tokens , samples , etc. Everything began with the very
>>> fact
>>>> .
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> --Thirdly , with what I said , I suppose you've been responded to .
>>> Our
>>>>>> focus is on moment as some (aspect as you say ; I first refrained
>>> from
>>>>>> using 'aspectual' because aspect , too , does not convey the
>>> intention
>>>>>> precisely) variable of a successive uninterrupted incessant moving
>>>>> movable
>>>>>> whole in contrast to parts and parcels even components of some
>>>>>> static internally immovable pseudo-stagnant whole which , if
>>>> potentially
>>>>>> realizable , will damage genuine cognition .
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Best
>>>>>> Haydi
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> ------------------------------
>>>>>> *From:* David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>>>>> *To:* Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
>>>>>> *Sent:* Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 9:08:03
>>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means
>> (in
>>>> the
>>>>>> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and
>> dentistry
>>>> is.
>>>>>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the
>> relation
>>>>>> between "moment" and music.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is
>> meant
>>>> is
>>>>> a
>>>>>> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are
>> three
>>>>>> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of
>>>>> "moment"
>>>>>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work
>> is
>>>> the
>>>>>> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting").
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in
>>> phenomenology
>>>> in
>>>>>> a way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe
>>> something
>>>>> like
>>>>>> a sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and
>>>> describe
>>>>>> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is
>>>>> almost
>>>>>> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the
>>>>>> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the
>> dynamic
>>>>>> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing
>> it.
>>>>> This
>>>>>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in
>> retrospect:
>>>> as
>>>>> we
>>>>>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even
>>>> present,
>>>>>> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow
>>> treat
>>>>>> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit
>>> in a
>>>>>> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or
>>>>>> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny
>> the
>>>>>> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea
>> of
>>>>>> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this
>>> (because
>>>>> even
>>>>>> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were
>>> explaining
>>>>>> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the
>> example
>>>> of
>>>>>> angular momentum.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and
>>>> sometimes
>>>>>> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are.
>>> The
>>>>>> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite
>> different
>>>>> from
>>>>>> the description of development. A text is an instance of a
>> language,
>>>> but
>>>>>> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a
>>> context
>>>>> of
>>>>>> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather"
>>> is a
>>>>>> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed
>>>>>> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different
>>> chronological
>>>>>> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using
>>> "phylogenesis",
>>>>>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third
>>> problem,
>>>>>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be
>> described
>>>>>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can
>>>> seriously
>>>>>> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the
>>> same
>>>>>> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly
>>>>>> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship
>> between
>>>>> solar
>>>>>> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is
>>>>>> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's
>>> the
>>>>>> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see
>> much
>>>> the
>>>>>> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant
>>>> speech
>>>>>> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on
>> xmca
>>>> we
>>>>>> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of
>>> the
>>>>>> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious
>>> way
>>>>> to
>>>>>> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for
>>>> example,
>>>>>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much
>> more
>>>>>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer
>> to
>>>>>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text).
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>> Macquarie University
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Dear all ,
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Look at this please !
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a
>>>> thought
>>>>>> experiment: 1) The
>>>>>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its
>>>>>> essence can be revealed
>>>>>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental
>>>>>> transformations; 3) this same
>>>>>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in
>>> which
>>>>> the
>>>>>> object is
>>>>>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be
>>> represented
>>>>> as
>>>>>> a process of
>>>>>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third moment
>>>>>> essentially becomes a
>>>>>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is
>>> only
>>>>>> within this special
>>>>>> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]]
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity ,
>>>> action
>>>>>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and
>>> separate
>>>>> even
>>>>>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular
>>>>>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal
>>>>>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself
>> ,
>>>> nor
>>>>>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability
>> or
>>>>>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or
>>>>> motionality ,
>>>>>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives
>>>>>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be
>>>>> converted
>>>>>> in the other as we all have seen .
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played
>>> with
>>>>>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition .
>>>> It's a
>>>>>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited
>> pleasurable
>>>>>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a
>>>>>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of
>>>> affect
>>>>> or
>>>>>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to
>>> think
>>>>> of
>>>>>> how to express it and he might  finally resort to imitation . Then
>> ,
>>>> the
>>>>>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single
>>> note
>>>> in
>>>>>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant
>> on
>>>>> which
>>>>>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state
>>>> occurs
>>>>> .
>>>>>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable
>> or
>>>>>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a
>>> substitute
>>>>>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which
>> is
>>>> said
>>>>>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good
>>> sources
>>>>> for
>>>>>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now .
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Best
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Haydi
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> --
>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
>> Assistant Professor
>> Department of Anthropology
>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
>> Brigham Young University
>> Provo, UT 84602
>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 67
> Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 21:59:16 +0000
> From: Susan Davis <s.davis@cqu.edu.au>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie
> 	phenomenon
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID: <D2BE5293.1F687%s.davis@cqu.edu.au>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="windows-1252"
> 
> Thanks Beth, Annalisa, Michael and Andy for your reflections,
> 
> The news about another celebrity death this morning with Alan Rickman has
> also been met with a flood of social media response.  Is this just mass
> hysteria, people with empty lives searching for meaning in the lives of
> others, or is it perezhivanie?
> Looking through the types of post related to both what seems to be clear
> is that while people respected Rickman and admired his work, many more
> identified with something about Bowie and his work and the experiences are
> much more like perezhivanie.
> 
> 
> What I?m thinking is that some of these events or moments perhaps are more
> significant and perhaps could be called instances of cultural
> perezhivanie? (and I must apologise here as while I have been following
> the thread about moments and instances I am not sure I can reflect the
> nuanced understandings in these comments).  What makes it perezhivanie is
> that people are indeed ?living through? an experience that is both
> emotional and intellectual, there are notions of Badiou?s event (from my
> very brief reading Andy) with the recognition of ruptures revealed and the
> potential for transformation.  The life and death of Bowie have confirmed
> the experience of personal transformation for many ? through providing a
> vision of alternatives for sexuality, living and also of dying. He was
> able to provide the pivots for the imagined to be made manifest, and the
> prompt for examination and reinterpretation. I am sure people don?t?
> necessarily agree with everything he did or may have believed (and dabbled
> with Annalisa) but there are identities, roles, images, songs, film clips
> that they identify with.
> 
> 
> As people have identified, this example is not unique. The outpourings of
> public grief were similar for Princess Diana, Michael Jackson and others.
> In terms of the wider cultural landscape I reflect on what else has
> assumed such cultural significance across the social media zeitgeist in
> recent years - perhaps the Obama inauguration, the twin towers coming down
> (however that was before the widespread use of social media and would very
> much signal a  vision of negative transformation, but may well qualify as
> the most significant ?cultural perezhivanie? of our generation.)
> 
> 
> These kinds of events or moments (and even those in relation to celebrity
> deaths) are not confined to our era and their communal
> experiencing is also not new ? think for example of seminal moments such
> as the end of World War II and with ?celebrities? the death of people like
> Lord Byron,Dame Nellie Melba and many others were greeted by huge
> outpourings of public grief. However what is different now is the use of
> social media and elsewhere which enables people to move out of the
> position of witness and it becomes far
> more participatory.  This week some people have spent enormous effort
> finding images, music, creating memes, changing
> their profile pictures to select their favourite Bowie image and so forth.
> 
> 
> 
> Is this a good thing? Does it matter? What can we make of it? Perhaps it
> is about identifying these experiences of ?cultural perezhivanie? and
> certain markers within our overlapping social, personal, political,
> geographic worlds that are pivots for personal and social
> transformation????
> 
> Appreciate further reflection...
> 
> Cheers
> Sue. 
> 
> 
> 
> On 15/01/2016 12:48 am, "Beth Ferholt" <bferholt@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
>> Thanks, Susan.
>> 
>> What I have noticed in NYC about David Bowie's death day of his death is a
>> lot of people crying in public or talking about crying in public earlier
>> in
>> the day.
>> 
>> It is sort of weird.  With other celebrity deaths I have seen people
>> talking and sometimes a few tears but not so many people crying.  I think
>> embodied emotion is a key part of perezhivanie that makes it generally
>> harder to experience in a large group.
>> 
>> I thought I was just having this reaction because of my age/what this
>> particular artist meant to me, but I wonder if reactions to his death are
>> actually different than reactions to the other deaths mentioned above.
>> His
>> being in role so often is important for perezhivanie, as is the lack of
>> violence in his death, I think.
>> 
>> Beth
>> 
>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 11:23 PM, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu>
>> wrote:
>> 
>>> 
>>> Hi Susan and others,
>>> 
>>> Yes, it does feel like over the past few days, at least in the media,
>>> there has been a kind of "global" perezhivanie for those who actually
>>> found
>>> meaning in the music and performance of David Bowie upon learning of his
>>> passing.
>>> 
>>> As I've been considering his koan-like methods of creating art, perhaps
>>> a
>>> reason we feel kinship with him is not only because we may have grown up
>>> with this music, and we might have felt communion with his artistic
>>> content
>>> of difference and how that is joined with liberation. Perhaps also
>>> because
>>> he created large gaps that we could fill in ourselves and thereby
>>> construct
>>> our own meanings interwoven in his lyrics, so the work became
>>> "cognitively
>>> interactive" for want of a way to say it "differently."
>>> 
>>> One of the most hilarious stories I read recently is that when he lived
>>> in
>>> (walled) Berlin in the 80s one time on a whim he took the stage unasked
>>> at
>>> a cabaret and sang Frank Sinatra songs. The Berliners wouldn't have it.
>>> They "shrugged and asked him to step down." The article doesn't say so,
>>> but
>>> I can imagine him actually reveling in that experience.
>>> 
>>> There are all these different meanings colliding:
>>> 
>>> What is: a Berlin cabaret in the 1980s?
>>> What is: a Frank Sinatra song?
>>> What is: David Bowie singing in a cabaret unasked?
>>> What is: being rejected by Berliners (who lived behind the wall)?
>>> 
>>> Thinking about this (like this) functions similarly to the way his art
>>> took form, all these overlapping meanings that must somehow be filled
>>> in my
>>> own summation, by what I bring to all those "meanings." Humor is also
>>> about
>>> filling in gaps.
>>> 
>>> However, on a more somber note, one of the aspects I consider while
>>> reflecting on David Bowie's lifework, is his short-lived fascination
>>> with
>>> fascism. I want to understand that too. I'm pretty sure he wasn't one,
>>> but
>>> rather, as an artist he was exploring how that worked, as in "taking on
>>> the
>>> body" to see its inner architectures and mechanisms, as performance
>>> artists
>>> are wont to do. Who knows if this was conscious or unconscious (probably
>>> both). I'm not claiming it was totally innocent, but there was something
>>> more going on than trying to shock for its own sake, nor was it some
>>> pathological desire for world domination.
>>> 
>>> There is something "inside" fascism about filling in gaps that functions
>>> similarly, and, much like Arendt, and perhaps Bowie himself, I feel
>>> compelled to know how that works.
>>> 
>>> Does this also pertain in some way to "global" perezhivanie? If it does,
>>> what makes it the same? And how it is different. Does it have to do with
>>> consent (or lack of it)?
>>> 
>>> Does it mean there is a responsibility not only for the positive aspects
>>> of what one does, but also the absences as well? Which seems to be about
>>> not acting, or non-doing.
>>> 
>>> Then, how does this link to ethics? I mean, we could be heroes.
>>> 
>>> Kind regards,
>>> 
>>> Annalisa
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> -- 
>> Beth Ferholt
>> Assistant Professor
>> Department of Early Childhood and Art Education
>> Brooklyn College, City University of New York
>> 2900 Bedford Avenue
>> Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889
>> 
>> Email: bferholt@brooklyn.cuny.edu
>> Phone: (718) 951-5205
>> Fax: (718) 951-4816
> 
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> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 68
> Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 23:12:25 +0000
> From: Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie
> 	phenomenon
> To: "xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>,
> 	"bruce@brucerob.eu"	<bruce@brucerob.eu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<BY2PR07MB1079B3A5819549FBD6B5836C1CC0@BY2PR07MB107.namprd07.prod.outlook.com>
> 	
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="Windows-1252"
> 
> 
> Hi,
> 
> I'm glad to have Bruce's comments about Bowie and fascism, because as I said before, that is something I would like to understand. It's the fly in the ointment (or the milk). Being reminded of the times in the UK isn't something I have access to. I appreciate those insights/explanations.
> 
> Certainly Bowie was an individual with contradictions, as many of us have. His experiments in fascism could have just been a mistake, along the lines of young people today who post things on the indelible Internet and must be marked for the rest of their lives because of it.
> 
> As this thread has extended, I was thinking about Michael's and other's comparisons to other celebrity-deaths such as Princess Diana and Michael Jackson and what makes David Bowie's death different or the same. 
> 
> It may have to do with each individual's kind of demise. One could say all three were "too young", but Bowie was older then the others. His death seems more removed from the self-inflicted fall of Michael Jackson, and accidental tragedy of Diana. Dying of cancer is no walk in the park, and it's likely his past addictions contributed, but somehow dying of an illness is something more accessible to us, because many of us have friends and loved ones that have suffered and lost the battle against cancer.
> 
> There is also the fact that we are living on a "smaller planet." With news traveling over the globe with less friction, the pulse of emotion feels more palpable, just like that pulse of emotion created by watching the Vietnam war on evening news television in the 60s and 70s was its own kind of phenomenon, and contributed to our sense of a shrinking planet back then.
> 
> But after considering these things, there also appears to be several other kinds of factors that contribute to these " global happenings" concerning David Bowie's passing. 
> 
> One comes from his artistry, and while disputing its quality seems to be a matter of personal taste, the fact is, he was a working artist for several decades. Unlike like Madonna who really does have other people do A LOT of work in her name, identical to the po-mo way of Jeff Koons, David Bowie had an excellent singing voice, he was an accomplished musician, and he was also a successful music producer who helped other artists succeed. Then he was also an actor, and who knows what else we might learn about. But in addition to that, he was well known for collaborating equally with other not-known and well-known musicians, the list is quite long. In the celebrity writes ups, while it would be caddish for anyone to do it days after the news, I've yet to notice anyone who feels legitimate bitterness toward him. If someone wanted to settle the score it'll happen soon. Still, I don't recall any artist ever complaining about being ripped off by David Bowie even while he was alive and kicking.
> 
> The second is that the length of his working career crossed over three, maybe four generations, and each of those generations has a different kind of relationship to him because of the historical period and persona of his work at the time they came to know of him. That is something unusual in the lives of artists. This didn't happen with Elvis, for example. Bowie's trans-generational quality is quite unusual.
> 
> The third element I see to contributing to this "phenomenon" is that he adapted to the technology of the Internet. I think I can make this argument just on his BowieBonds, which was selling futures of his song royalties for 10 years, back in 2000 (I think it was). I don't think anything about this venture would have been feasible before the Internet. I'm sure many musicians envied his privilege to make such a move. I would.
> 
> The fourth element has to do with something discussed quite openly right now, and that has to do with the nature of questions his work raised with regard to gender and sexuality, and also race, long before it was "what people did." He challenged those limits. Many people are grateful to him for doing it.
> 
> A fifth element is the lack of friction in the media machine itself, always looking for the next "event" upon which to capitalize. Bowie's work and life is bursting of sound-byte-able material. These combined make great 3 minute videos and 1,000-word webpages.
> 
> Then we have his death occurring days after the release of his last album, which, to a person who stopped following him a few years ago, makes me consider how does an artist work on an album and music videos with cancer eating away at his body? And keeping all that under wraps? It must have not been easy. It doesn't seem to be sheer vanity. Marlene Dietrich not leaving her Paris apartment for fear of being seen is vanity.
> 
> Last of this list of elements is the oblique title of his last album "Blackstar" which can be deconstructed on a few levels. A somewhat anemic possibility: he is a "black star" as attributed to his roots in soul, R&B, and jazz. But this seems too facile. 
> But! More likely it is better to see it as an astronomical term (from wikipedia) and which is alluded to in his music video of that name:
> ? Dark star (Newtonian mechanics), a theoretical star that has a surface escape velocity that equals or exceeds the speed of light
> ? Dark star (dark matter), a theoretical star heated by dark matter annihilation in the early universe
> ? Dark-energy star, a hypothetical alternative to black holes
> ? Black star (semiclassical gravity), a theoretical star built using semiclassical gravity as an alternative to a black hole
> ? Black hole, any region of space time where escape to the outside universe is impossible
> ? Black dwarf, a type of degenerate dwarf star, specifically, a cold white dwarf
> 
> These definitions indicate unknowable astro-masses where light doesn't/cannot penetrate. As a poetical device, it is the most elegant metaphor I have ever heard used to symbolize death. While he posits/posited himself as a blackstar, as is customary with David Bowie's work, he leaves a gap for us to fill, for ourselves, which is to consider our own blackstar-ness. He is tapping into our own mortality. My reading of it, there is desire for pity from him, but instead he wants/wanted us to celebrate life while we still have it. This is his gift to me, how I read it. For me, all this is evidence of his generosity as an artist, and what paradigm the artist *should* fulfill in human society. 
> 
> Considering ALL these factors, I don't actually find the "phenomenon" that surprising, it seems reasonable that these consequences transpired, if I think of it as a coalescing of these different developments coming from different directions and locations.
> 
> Kind regards,
> 
> Annalisa
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 69
> Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 23:22:47 +0000
> From: Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie
> 	phenomenon
> To: "xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>,
> 	"bruce@brucerob.eu"	<bruce@brucerob.eu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<BY2PR07MB107E8A29C714C4FCE5E72B4C1CC0@BY2PR07MB107.namprd07.prod.outlook.com>
> 	
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
> 
> SB: "My reading of it, there is NO desire for pity from him, but instead he wants/wanted us to celebrate life while we still have it. "
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 70
> Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 21:05:29 -0700
> From: HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie
> 	phenomenon
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID: <17C96EE1-31BF-4C06-B773-E0327542EE79@gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain;	charset=windows-1252
> 
> Susan and Annalisa,
> Thank you very much for your posts. I understand better at this moment art, performance and agency. Regarding Bowie's trans-generational narrative, I have fantasized that I am, at 72, capable of late blooming, even if that only means dying with dignity, and maybe a bit of panache. And maybe even juice for more than that. My favorite part of teaching has been reaching across generation gaps, whatever the cultural differences between my students and me. I have craved their respect and trust, even as I reflected on my shortcomings. Were I famous, would those I have injured speak ill of me? I have fantasized such fame and that I made my apologies before the infamy of public shaming. We, the unfamous, will go to our graves without fear that we will be publically outed. But we will still be disappointed in ourselves when we let go a chance to learn from our screw ups and do better the next time. Else what is perizhvanie for?
> Henry
> 
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vkLE1Gno724 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vkLE1Gno724>
> 
> 
>> On Jan 14, 2016, at 4:12 PM, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> Hi,
>> 
>> I'm glad to have Bruce's comments about Bowie and fascism, because as I said before, that is something I would like to understand. It's the fly in the ointment (or the milk). Being reminded of the times in the UK isn't something I have access to. I appreciate those insights/explanations.
>> 
>> Certainly Bowie was an individual with contradictions, as many of us have. His experiments in fascism could have just been a mistake, along the lines of young people today who post things on the indelible Internet and must be marked for the rest of their lives because of it.
>> 
>> As this thread has extended, I was thinking about Michael's and other's comparisons to other celebrity-deaths such as Princess Diana and Michael Jackson and what makes David Bowie's death different or the same. 
>> 
>> It may have to do with each individual's kind of demise. One could say all three were "too young", but Bowie was older then the others. His death seems more removed from the self-inflicted fall of Michael Jackson, and accidental tragedy of Diana. Dying of cancer is no walk in the park, and it's likely his past addictions contributed, but somehow dying of an illness is something more accessible to us, because many of us have friends and loved ones that have suffered and lost the battle against cancer.
>> 
>> There is also the fact that we are living on a "smaller planet." With news traveling over the globe with less friction, the pulse of emotion feels more palpable, just like that pulse of emotion created by watching the Vietnam war on evening news television in the 60s and 70s was its own kind of phenomenon, and contributed to our sense of a shrinking planet back then.
>> 
>> But after considering these things, there also appears to be several other kinds of factors that contribute to these " global happenings" concerning David Bowie's passing. 
>> 
>> One comes from his artistry, and while disputing its quality seems to be a matter of personal taste, the fact is, he was a working artist for several decades. Unlike like Madonna who really does have other people do A LOT of work in her name, identical to the po-mo way of Jeff Koons, David Bowie had an excellent singing voice, he was an accomplished musician, and he was also a successful music producer who helped other artists succeed. Then he was also an actor, and who knows what else we might learn about. But in addition to that, he was well known for collaborating equally with other not-known and well-known musicians, the list is quite long. In the celebrity writes ups, while it would be caddish for anyone to do it days after the news, I've yet to notice anyone who feels legitimate bitterness toward him. If someone wanted to settle the score it'll happen soon. Still, I don't recall any artist ever complaining about being ripped off by David Bowie even while he was alive and kicking.
>> 
>> The second is that the length of his working career crossed over three, maybe four generations, and each of those generations has a different kind of relationship to him because of the historical period and persona of his work at the time they came to know of him. That is something unusual in the lives of artists. This didn't happen with Elvis, for example. Bowie's trans-generational quality is quite unusual.
>> 
>> The third element I see to contributing to this "phenomenon" is that he adapted to the technology of the Internet. I think I can make this argument just on his BowieBonds, which was selling futures of his song royalties for 10 years, back in 2000 (I think it was). I don't think anything about this venture would have been feasible before the Internet. I'm sure many musicians envied his privilege to make such a move. I would.
>> 
>> The fourth element has to do with something discussed quite openly right now, and that has to do with the nature of questions his work raised with regard to gender and sexuality, and also race, long before it was "what people did." He challenged those limits. Many people are grateful to him for doing it.
>> 
>> A fifth element is the lack of friction in the media machine itself, always looking for the next "event" upon which to capitalize. Bowie's work and life is bursting of sound-byte-able material. These combined make great 3 minute videos and 1,000-word webpages.
>> 
>> Then we have his death occurring days after the release of his last album, which, to a person who stopped following him a few years ago, makes me consider how does an artist work on an album and music videos with cancer eating away at his body? And keeping all that under wraps? It must have not been easy. It doesn't seem to be sheer vanity. Marlene Dietrich not leaving her Paris apartment for fear of being seen is vanity.
>> 
>> Last of this list of elements is the oblique title of his last album "Blackstar" which can be deconstructed on a few levels. A somewhat anemic possibility: he is a "black star" as attributed to his roots in soul, R&B, and jazz. But this seems too facile. 
>> But! More likely it is better to see it as an astronomical term (from wikipedia) and which is alluded to in his music video of that name:
>> ? Dark star (Newtonian mechanics), a theoretical star that has a surface escape velocity that equals or exceeds the speed of light
>> ? Dark star (dark matter), a theoretical star heated by dark matter annihilation in the early universe
>> ? Dark-energy star, a hypothetical alternative to black holes
>> ? Black star (semiclassical gravity), a theoretical star built using semiclassical gravity as an alternative to a black hole
>> ? Black hole, any region of space time where escape to the outside universe is impossible
>> ? Black dwarf, a type of degenerate dwarf star, specifically, a cold white dwarf
>> 
>> These definitions indicate unknowable astro-masses where light doesn't/cannot penetrate. As a poetical device, it is the most elegant metaphor I have ever heard used to symbolize death. While he posits/posited himself as a blackstar, as is customary with David Bowie's work, he leaves a gap for us to fill, for ourselves, which is to consider our own blackstar-ness. He is tapping into our own mortality. My reading of it, there is desire for pity from him, but instead he wants/wanted us to celebrate life while we still have it. This is his gift to me, how I read it. For me, all this is evidence of his generosity as an artist, and what paradigm the artist *should* fulfill in human society. 
>> 
>> Considering ALL these factors, I don't actually find the "phenomenon" that surprising, it seems reasonable that these consequences transpired, if I think of it as a coalescing of these different developments coming from different directions and locations.
>> 
>> Kind regards,
>> 
>> Annalisa
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 71
> Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2016 05:20:01 +0000
> From: Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<CAG1MBOG+T1C99GjZvOPLfOK87yfPyPDuKBVUCTjp-GceNk7P2A@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> In response to your points David,
> 
> 1.  A young child points to something and utters an inarticulate sound.  I
> then proceed to discern what the child does and doesn't mean by this act.
> What, in this context, could he be referring to? The water?  The paper
> towel?  I test my guess with him, and he repeats his 'request'.
> 2.  In the above scenario the child is not (initially) aware of the
> referents not intended.
> 3.  Structure and system as described are aspects of description.
> Descriptions are brought about by whole acts (descriptions) that yield
> incomplete descriptions. The wholeness of the act is always a given.  The
> 'completeness' of a description is contingent upon its adequacy.
> 
> Best,
> Huw
> 
> On 14 January 2016 at 19:53, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
>> Huw, Greg, Larry:
>> 
>> Austin, at least as understand him, is entirely interested in
>> performatives: that is, speech acts in which the making of a structure (eg.
>> "I promise") is actually constitutive of some pragmatic function. That's
>> really not what I had in mind at all, Huw. First of all, I'm interested in
>> development, and performatives are few and ar between at both ends of the
>> developmental continuum (for infants, language is more often ancillary than
>> constitutive and in adults some of the most developmentally important uses
>> of language are not public at all). Secondly, I don't think that Austin's
>> various felicity conditions are relevant to, say, negation: what does it
>> mean to say that only a person who is empowered to negate can validly
>> perform the function of negation? And thirdly--most importantly--I think
>> that what Austin has in mind is only structure and not system. But perhaps
>> I am an unenthusiastic and thus a rather poor reader of Austin: he always
>> struck me as a thinly disguised social-behaviorist.
>> 
>> Neither Halliday nor Jakobson really came up with the
>> paradigmatic/syntagmatic distinction, Greg: it goes back to de Saussure.
>> But de Saussure  called his paradigmatic dimension "associative", and this
>> placed him firmly in associationist psychology. Associationism really has
>> no room for the development of free will, and Halliday's notion of "system"
>> requires it. A selection requires a selector. And language development is,
>> in Vygotskyan psychology, about the development of the selector. In HDHMF,
>> for example, Vygotsky actually says that the most important and most
>> fundamental problem in the whole of psychology is that of Buridan's donkey.
>> 
>> Consider a four panel cartoon--the sort of thing you see on the comics page
>> of a paper. If we "read" the cartoon horizontally, we get an essentially
>> syntagmatic relation--the default reading is that the events of the second
>> panel transpire after those of the first, and the events of the third after
>> the second, etc.  But within each panel, we find drawings of bodies
>> (doing), faces (feeling), thought "bubbles" (thinking) and speech balloons
>> (saying). These CAN be syntagmatically related but they can also be
>> simultaneous, and if you are a Vygotskyan, hierarchically related (doing
>> may control feeling and feeling control thinking, and--in volition--we can
>> even imagine the very opposite chain of command).
>> 
>> Now, imagine a poetics in which these planes are related not only
>> hierarchically but paradigmatically. That is, a novel COULD be written as a
>> set of more or less simultaneous doings (a historical novel). But it could
>> also be written as feelings (a sentimental novel), as thinkings (a novel of
>> ideas) or as sayings (a novel of conversation). All of these are quite
>> different from organizing a story along the syntagmatic axis, which would
>> make it not a novel but an adventure story (here in France, the word for
>> novel is "roman" and--confusingly--the word for an adventure story is
>> "nouvelle", but back home in Korea novels are noun more descriptively as
>> "little talk"). I think that one of the important differences between
>> novels and adventure stories is precisely that the specific weight of
>> the environment and of individual volition are reversed, and the way this
>> is often realized is through a stress on syntagmatic, temporal relations in
>> the adventure story and on paradigmatic, projective relations in the novel.
>> 
>> I don't think that meaning potential can be entirely explained as "presence
>> of absence", Larry, because linguistic systems are not always binary, and
>> even when they are, they tend to generate options within options rather
>> than absence of presence (language abhors a vaccuum). Take, for example,
>> intonation. We could argue that there are only two options: up or down. But
>> in fact, we often find down-up ("RE-A-LLY?") and updown ('RE-A-LLY!"), and
>> there is also a fairly flat, neutral intonation ("'Really. Interesting.").
>> If I come to a branch in the road and go left instead of right, the right
>> fork in the road doesn't thereby cease to exist, even in my mind.
>> 
>> David Kellogg
>> Macquarie University
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Fri, Jan 15, 2016 at 1:11 AM, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>> 
>>> David,
>>> Just wondering if Halliday is getting this from Roman Jakobson's
>>> syntagmatic vs. paradigmatic contrast?
>>> If so, then I'm wondering what happened to the notion of poetics in
>>> Halliday's thought. Poetical patterning seems absolutely essential to
>>> language learning, but I'd also tend to think of poetics as less than
>>> entirely volitional.
>>> Or to put the question more plainly, can you provide a little more nuance
>>> to your statement:
>>> "The problem of grammar can be seen as aproblem of volitional choice, and
>>> what needs to be explained in language development is the same thing that
>>> needs to be explained in other branches of Vygotskyan psychology, namely
>>> the emergence of free will"
>>> -greg
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 10:28 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> Huw:
>>>> 
>>>> I'm using meaning potential in a somewhat technical, Hallidayan, sense.
>>> For
>>>> Halliday every utterance has both structure and system. Structure we
>> know
>>>> about: it's syntagmatic, in the sense that it is laid out one step at a
>>>> time (in time with speech and in space with writing). It's
>> non-Markovian,
>>>> in the sense that each step has some influence on the next steps and
>> not
>>>> simply on the next step (e.g.if you start a sentence with "the" you are
>>>> going to need noun pretty soon, but not necessarily right away).
>>>> 
>>>> For example, if I find myself saying
>>>> 
>>>> "The artist David Bowie was not a chameleon; he just hired a lot of
>>>> different poorly paid adjuncts to write his songs"
>>>> 
>>>> My argument is laid out one step at a time: "The" and then "artist" and
>>>> then "David" and then "Bowie" and then "was" (not "is", because of his
>>>> death), etc.
>>>> 
>>>> System is a little different. First of all, it's paradigmatic, in the
>>> sense
>>>> that it can be thought of as  kind of drop-down menu. It's a free
>> choice,
>>>> in the sense that although context will favor certain "canonical"
>> choices
>>>> over others, I can create contexts (and that is what writers of verbal
>>> art
>>>> do). Each choice overlaps with a finite (often only two or three)
>> number
>>> of
>>>> choices not chosen. In this way "system" combines free will with
>>>> cultural-historical determination.
>>>> 
>>>> For example, if I find myself saying "The artist David Bowie" when I
>> get
>>> to
>>>> the noun "artist" I could say "singer" or even "celebrity" but the
>> choice
>>>> is not infinite, particularly if I look at probability and not just
>>>> possibility. Even with proper nouns, in place of "Bowie" I could say
>>>> "Kellogg" or even "Cameron" but the number of choices is distinctly
>>>> limited. I could have said "is", but Bowie's death makes "was" more
>>>> canonical; by choosing "not", I am choosing from only two choices
>>> (because
>>>> an indicative clause can be either positive or negative in polarity but
>>> not
>>>> both and not anything else) and yet by choosing the negative I am
>>> probably
>>>> saying something that goes against 99% of what will be said about Bowie
>>> in
>>>> the days to come.
>>>> 
>>>> This set of many small choices (some of which, like polarity, are
>> highly
>>>> skewed in probability) is not only true at the level of words, it is
>> also
>>>> true at the level of wording: I can choose to make a major or minor
>>> clause;
>>>> if major, I can choose to make an imperative or an indicative; if
>>>> indicative, I can go declarative or interrogative, etc. Each utterance
>>>> represents a kind of a path through an indefinite number of systems,
>> each
>>>> of which is a kind of menu providing a finite number of choices, and
>> this
>>>> is what makes language both infinitely complex and in practice easy to
>>> use.
>>>> 
>>>> There are three important consequences of this somewhat technical use
>> of
>>>> "meaning potential". First of all, the problem of grammar can be seen
>> as
>>> a
>>>> problem of volitional choice, and what needs to be explained in
>> language
>>>> development is the same thing that needs to be explained in other
>>> branches
>>>> of Vygotskyan psychology, namely the emergence of free will. Secondly,
>>> the
>>>> choices that the speaker makes are made significant (made meaningful)
>> not
>>>> simply by pointing to context (this is really only true of infant
>>> language)
>>>> but instead by all the choices that the speaker did NOT make but COULD
>>> HAVE
>>>> made (this "could have" prevents the theory from dualism--the ideal is
>>>> simply the potentially real). And thirdly, finally, meaning potential
>> is
>>>> always linked to but distinct from meaning proper precisely in the
>> sense
>>> of
>>>> NON-participation: meaning potential is simply the road not taken.
>>>> 
>>>> David Kellogg
>>>> Macquarie University
>>>> 
>>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 11:05 PM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>>> 
>>>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>>> From what I have been reading and thinking, the biggest difference
>>>> between
>>>>> the conceptual system presented by Vygotsky and the of Leontiev (most
>>> of
>>>>> which is well known) is the difference of the conceptualisation of
>>>> activity
>>>>> or the symbolic level (which is mostly absent for Vygotsky).
>>>>> 
>>>>> Without necessarily refuting David's points, but indicating an
>>>> alternative
>>>>> interpretation, I would say:
>>>>> 
>>>>> 1. Learning how to apply or use something is still a constructive
>> act.
>>>> One
>>>>> does not have to understand the full technical make up of a component
>>> in
>>>>> order to make use of it.  Indeed this is would entail an infinite
>>>> regress.
>>>>> 
>>>>> 2. I'm not fully clear what the assertion is with respect to active
>>>>> participation in meaning potential, but it is perfectly reasonable to
>>>>> revisit the problem space that an old artefact is drawn from only to
>>>>> rediscover what this product achieves in terms of design.  This is
>>>> actually
>>>>> an excellent source of edification.
>>>>> 
>>>>> 3. Contemplation can be understood to be in response to an active
>>>> problem.
>>>>> There is nothing to say that activity must be glued to a specific
>> site.
>>>>> When I am programming, I am forever walking away from the computer to
>>>> solve
>>>>> or express a particular problem.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Best,
>>>>> Huw
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> On 13 January 2016 at 10:02, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>>> Dear Haydi:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> In the very beginning of the text that Huw is reading, the HIstory
>> of
>>>> the
>>>>>> Development of the Higher Psychic Functions, Vygotsky writes of the
>>>> basic
>>>>>> division psychology, between those who would treat the mind as
>>>> something
>>>>>> made by "Deus Sive Natura" ("God, i.e. Nature"), like the eye or
>> the
>>>> hand
>>>>>> or any other physical phenomenon, and those who would treat the
>> mind
>>> as
>>>>> (to
>>>>>> quote Mike's epigraph) an object which itself creates history. In
>> one
>>>>> case,
>>>>>> we have an object which really can be usefully described
>>> synoptically,
>>>>> like
>>>>>> a sculpture that we can walk all the way around. But in the other
>> we
>>>>> have a
>>>>>> process which can only be described dynamically, like a piece of
>>>> theatre
>>>>>> that walks around us while we sit and observe.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Of course, we CAN argue, the way that Vico would argue, that to
>>> produce
>>>>> the
>>>>>> process is to fully understand it: we cannot fully understand the
>> eye
>>>> or
>>>>>> the hand, because although these things are part of us, they were
>>> made
>>>> by
>>>>>> God. We can understand a telescope or a hammer, because although
>>> these
>>>>>> things are not part of us, they were made by ourselves. And we can
>>> even
>>>>>> argue that the process of making it is essentially the process of
>>>>>> understanding it: once you have made a telescope or a hammer and
>> used
>>>> it,
>>>>>> you have understood everything there is to know about it. That is,
>> I
>>>>>> understand it, the position you attribute to dialectical logic, to
>>>> CHAT,
>>>>>> and to Davydov, and I think you attribute it correctly. The problem
>>> is
>>>>> that
>>>>>> I am not sure that the position itself is correct.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> The reason is this: we may be able to actively participate in the
>>>> process
>>>>>> of producing and using a telescope or a hammer. We may even
>> (although
>>>>> this
>>>>>> is much more problematic) actively participate in the process of
>>>>> producing
>>>>>> and using a mind or a personality. But our observational standpoint
>>> is
>>>>>> nevertheless fixed by our position in time: we can never "actively
>>>>>> participate" in constructing the counterfactual potential, the
>>> meaning
>>>>>> potential, of a telescope or a hammer, much less a mind or a
>>>> personality.
>>>>>> Our active participation is always fixed in the actual, and meaning
>>>>>> potential is accessible only through contemplation. It may be
>>>>> contemplation
>>>>>> with activity firmly in mind, but it is only potentially active and
>>> not
>>>>>> actually so.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I think this is a fundamental difference between Vygotsky and
>>> Leontiev,
>>>>> and
>>>>>> the activity theory that followed him: For Vygotsky, the autistic
>>>>> function
>>>>>> (that is, the irrealist function, the contemplative function which
>>>> turns
>>>>>> away from immediate activity) may come late (as Vygotsky points
>> out,
>>> it
>>>>>> receives major impetus from the acquisition of words and then
>>> concepts,
>>>>>> both of which come well after the beginning of social life), but
>> this
>>>>>> "autistic" contemplative function is then never out of date:
>> concepts
>>>> are
>>>>>> not formed purely through activity, but also through the turning
>> away
>>>>> from
>>>>>> reality oriented activity. And in that, he has the complete support
>>> of
>>>>>> Lenin, who knew a thing or two about how concepts are joined to
>>> action.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>> Macquarie University
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 12:06 AM, <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Thanks , David , for the two-parag. epigraph as always !
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> --First of all, Kant says we cannot know / cognize a material
>>> object
>>>> in
>>>>>>> itself because a priori we don't have an image of it so  we are
>>>> unable
>>>>> to
>>>>>>> have an overlap between the two ; hence agnosticism let alone
>>> 'inner
>>>>>>> connections' of a whole as 'moments' . Dialectical Logic (close
>>>>> relative
>>>>>> to
>>>>>>> CHAT) says as man relies on object-related activity while an
>> ideal
>>>>>>> adaptable to the future coming object ever runs through the
>>> activity
>>>> to
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> finish , is able to penetrate the depths . When you put the
>> mental
>>>>> model
>>>>>>> into a material model , in reifying or objectifying that model
>>> into a
>>>>>>> finished product and all through the durational time , you can
>> see
>>>> what
>>>>>> is
>>>>>>> necessary , essential and what is not . In higher momentums of
>>>>>> conception ,
>>>>>>> you reach concepts and this is the time you've got a theoretical
>>>>> rational
>>>>>>> cognitive copy of the inner mechanisms and transformations of the
>>>>> related
>>>>>>> object or objects . When we say 'ideal' is a moment of an
>> activity
>>> ,
>>>> we
>>>>>>> mean it's ever running through uninterruptedly because the whole
>>>> entity
>>>>>>> falls down , collapses otherwise . Or if you aim to take it
>> wholly
>>>>> apart
>>>>>> ,
>>>>>>> again nothing is left for objectfication . Davydov says we cannot
>>>> stop
>>>>> at
>>>>>>> phenomenology ; it's not to our will or taste ; we should ever
>>>>> reproduce
>>>>>>> our ever changing needs and products and that needs true science
>>> and
>>>>> true
>>>>>>> science needs true concepts . Yes , we want the object to move
>>>>>> (dynamicity)
>>>>>>> according to its inner transformations (moments) which has come
>> to
>>> us
>>>>> as
>>>>>>> fixated knowledge in speech and skills historically . We don't
>> want
>>>> to
>>>>> be
>>>>>>> stuck in our position observing it to move . If you take moments
>> as
>>>>>> moments
>>>>>>> of your positioning while observing , you've not been able to
>>> convert
>>>>>> those
>>>>>>> phenomenal aspects (empiricism) into innermost movements hence
>>>>>> agnosticism
>>>>>>> prevails . Yes ,  We could somehow treat these moments as always
>>>>>> inhering ,
>>>>>>> how ? Are neoformations parts and parcels of some detachable
>>>>> independent
>>>>>>> separate phnomenon ? Are they not fused , interwoven ,
>> intertwined
>>>>>> moments
>>>>>>> of inner mechanisms of whole development (internalization ,
>>>>>> appropriation ,
>>>>>>> instruction , development , upbringing involved) ? Does
>> development
>>>> or
>>>>>> even
>>>>>>> periods of development contain , include some parts and parcels
>> or
>>> do
>>>>>> they
>>>>>>> subsume some moments of developmental transformations , those
>>> moments
>>>>>> still
>>>>>>> sublated within the whole process reversible if development
>>> defects ?
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> --Secondly , we agreed that moment is different from the instance
>>> as
>>>> we
>>>>>>> took it as tokens , samples , etc. Everything began with the very
>>>> fact
>>>>> .
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> --Thirdly , with what I said , I suppose you've been responded
>> to .
>>>> Our
>>>>>>> focus is on moment as some (aspect as you say ; I first refrained
>>>> from
>>>>>>> using 'aspectual' because aspect , too , does not convey the
>>>> intention
>>>>>>> precisely) variable of a successive uninterrupted incessant
>> moving
>>>>>> movable
>>>>>>> whole in contrast to parts and parcels even components of some
>>>>>>> static internally immovable pseudo-stagnant whole which , if
>>>>> potentially
>>>>>>> realizable , will damage genuine cognition .
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Best
>>>>>>> Haydi
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> ------------------------------
>>>>>>> *From:* David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>>>>>> *To:* Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
>>>>>>> *Sent:* Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 9:08:03
>>>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means
>>> (in
>>>>> the
>>>>>>> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and
>>> dentistry
>>>>> is.
>>>>>>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the
>>> relation
>>>>>>> between "moment" and music.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is
>>> meant
>>>>> is
>>>>>> a
>>>>>>> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are
>>> three
>>>>>>> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of
>>>>>> "moment"
>>>>>>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work
>>> is
>>>>> the
>>>>>>> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting").
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in
>>>> phenomenology
>>>>> in
>>>>>>> a way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe
>>>> something
>>>>>> like
>>>>>>> a sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and
>>>>> describe
>>>>>>> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described
>> is
>>>>>> almost
>>>>>>> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where
>> the
>>>>>>> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the
>>> dynamic
>>>>>>> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing
>>> it.
>>>>>> This
>>>>>>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in
>>> retrospect:
>>>>> as
>>>>>> we
>>>>>>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even
>>>>> present,
>>>>>>> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow
>>>> treat
>>>>>>> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is
>> implicit
>>>> in a
>>>>>>> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech
>> or
>>>>>>> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny
>>> the
>>>>>>> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the
>> idea
>>> of
>>>>>>> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this
>>>> (because
>>>>>> even
>>>>>>> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were
>>>> explaining
>>>>>>> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the
>>> example
>>>>> of
>>>>>>> angular momentum.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and
>>>>> sometimes
>>>>>>> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they
>> are.
>>>> The
>>>>>>> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite
>>> different
>>>>>> from
>>>>>>> the description of development. A text is an instance of a
>>> language,
>>>>> but
>>>>>>> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a
>>>> context
>>>>>> of
>>>>>>> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that
>> "weather"
>>>> is a
>>>>>>> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance.
>> Viewed
>>>>>>> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different
>>>> chronological
>>>>>>> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using
>>>> "phylogenesis",
>>>>>>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third
>>>> problem,
>>>>>>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is
>> indispensible.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be
>>> described
>>>>>>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can
>>>>> seriously
>>>>>>> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of
>> the
>>>> same
>>>>>>> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is
>> chiefly
>>>>>>> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship
>>> between
>>>>>> solar
>>>>>>> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space)
>> is
>>>>>>> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate,
>> it's
>>>> the
>>>>>>> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see
>>> much
>>>>> the
>>>>>>> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant
>>>>> speech
>>>>>>> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on
>>> xmca
>>>>> we
>>>>>>> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up
>> of
>>>> the
>>>>>>> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an
>> obvious
>>>> way
>>>>>> to
>>>>>>> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for
>>>>> example,
>>>>>>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much
>>> more
>>>>>>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer
>>> to
>>>>>>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text).
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>> Macquarie University
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Dear all ,
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Look at this please !
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a
>>>>> thought
>>>>>>> experiment: 1) The
>>>>>>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where
>> its
>>>>>>> essence can be revealed
>>>>>>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further
>> mental
>>>>>>> transformations; 3) this same
>>>>>>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in
>>>> which
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> object is
>>>>>>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be
>>>> represented
>>>>>> as
>>>>>>> a process of
>>>>>>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third
>> moment
>>>>>>> essentially becomes a
>>>>>>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is
>>>> only
>>>>>>> within this special
>>>>>>> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]]
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity
>> ,
>>>>> action
>>>>>>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and
>>>> separate
>>>>>> even
>>>>>>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular
>>>>>>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in
>> temporal
>>>>>>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither
>> itself
>>> ,
>>>>> nor
>>>>>>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability
>>> or
>>>>>>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or
>>>>>> motionality ,
>>>>>>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives
>>>>>>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be
>>>>>> converted
>>>>>>> in the other as we all have seen .
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is
>> played
>>>> with
>>>>>>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition
>> .
>>>>> It's a
>>>>>>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited
>>> pleasurable
>>>>>>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a
>>>>>>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of
>>>>> affect
>>>>>> or
>>>>>>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to
>>>> think
>>>>>> of
>>>>>>> how to express it and he might  finally resort to imitation .
>> Then
>>> ,
>>>>> the
>>>>>>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single
>>>> note
>>>>> in
>>>>>>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal
>> instant
>>> on
>>>>>> which
>>>>>>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state
>>>>> occurs
>>>>>> .
>>>>>>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be
>> uncognizable
>>> or
>>>>>>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a
>>>> substitute
>>>>>>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which
>>> is
>>>>> said
>>>>>>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good
>>>> sources
>>>>>> for
>>>>>>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now .
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Best
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Haydi
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> --
>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
>>> Assistant Professor
>>> Department of Anthropology
>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
>>> Brigham Young University
>>> Provo, UT 84602
>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 72
> Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2016 12:17:13 +0000
> From: Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<CAG1MBOE_xdMN17qg0HwiS4i=9-MjCpYP+0At9XMUbvEYJK7ACA@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> In partial response to the questions being posed on this thread, the paper
> from Wertsch and Kazak[1] may prove insightful.  It is quite a compact
> paper with references to semiotic, phenomenological and psychological
> accounts contributing to their conception of a process of discovering
> meanings in a social space through the use of signs etc.
> 
> Unfortunately the paper was published in a rather expensive volume, so it
> may only be available to those with access to inter-library loans or
> similar services.
> 
> Best,
> Huw
> 
> [1] http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4419-7582-9_9
> 
> On 15 January 2016 at 05:20, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
>> In response to your points David,
>> 
>> 1.  A young child points to something and utters an inarticulate sound.  I
>> then proceed to discern what the child does and doesn't mean by this act.
>> What, in this context, could he be referring to? The water?  The paper
>> towel?  I test my guess with him, and he repeats his 'request'.
>> 2.  In the above scenario the child is not (initially) aware of the
>> referents not intended.
>> 3.  Structure and system as described are aspects of description.
>> Descriptions are brought about by whole acts (descriptions) that yield
>> incomplete descriptions. The wholeness of the act is always a given.  The
>> 'completeness' of a description is contingent upon its adequacy.
>> 
>> Best,
>> Huw
>> 
>> 
>> On 14 January 2016 at 19:53, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
>> 
>>> Huw, Greg, Larry:
>>> 
>>> Austin, at least as understand him, is entirely interested in
>>> performatives: that is, speech acts in which the making of a structure
>>> (eg.
>>> "I promise") is actually constitutive of some pragmatic function. That's
>>> really not what I had in mind at all, Huw. First of all, I'm interested in
>>> development, and performatives are few and ar between at both ends of the
>>> developmental continuum (for infants, language is more often ancillary
>>> than
>>> constitutive and in adults some of the most developmentally important uses
>>> of language are not public at all). Secondly, I don't think that Austin's
>>> various felicity conditions are relevant to, say, negation: what does it
>>> mean to say that only a person who is empowered to negate can validly
>>> perform the function of negation? And thirdly--most importantly--I think
>>> that what Austin has in mind is only structure and not system. But perhaps
>>> I am an unenthusiastic and thus a rather poor reader of Austin: he always
>>> struck me as a thinly disguised social-behaviorist.
>>> 
>>> Neither Halliday nor Jakobson really came up with the
>>> paradigmatic/syntagmatic distinction, Greg: it goes back to de Saussure.
>>> But de Saussure  called his paradigmatic dimension "associative", and this
>>> placed him firmly in associationist psychology. Associationism really has
>>> no room for the development of free will, and Halliday's notion of
>>> "system"
>>> requires it. A selection requires a selector. And language development is,
>>> in Vygotskyan psychology, about the development of the selector. In HDHMF,
>>> for example, Vygotsky actually says that the most important and most
>>> fundamental problem in the whole of psychology is that of Buridan's
>>> donkey.
>>> 
>>> Consider a four panel cartoon--the sort of thing you see on the comics
>>> page
>>> of a paper. If we "read" the cartoon horizontally, we get an essentially
>>> syntagmatic relation--the default reading is that the events of the second
>>> panel transpire after those of the first, and the events of the third
>>> after
>>> the second, etc.  But within each panel, we find drawings of bodies
>>> (doing), faces (feeling), thought "bubbles" (thinking) and speech balloons
>>> (saying). These CAN be syntagmatically related but they can also be
>>> simultaneous, and if you are a Vygotskyan, hierarchically related (doing
>>> may control feeling and feeling control thinking, and--in volition--we can
>>> even imagine the very opposite chain of command).
>>> 
>>> Now, imagine a poetics in which these planes are related not only
>>> hierarchically but paradigmatically. That is, a novel COULD be written as
>>> a
>>> set of more or less simultaneous doings (a historical novel). But it could
>>> also be written as feelings (a sentimental novel), as thinkings (a novel
>>> of
>>> ideas) or as sayings (a novel of conversation). All of these are quite
>>> different from organizing a story along the syntagmatic axis, which would
>>> make it not a novel but an adventure story (here in France, the word for
>>> novel is "roman" and--confusingly--the word for an adventure story is
>>> "nouvelle", but back home in Korea novels are noun more descriptively as
>>> "little talk"). I think that one of the important differences between
>>> novels and adventure stories is precisely that the specific weight of
>>> the environment and of individual volition are reversed, and the way this
>>> is often realized is through a stress on syntagmatic, temporal relations
>>> in
>>> the adventure story and on paradigmatic, projective relations in the
>>> novel.
>>> 
>>> I don't think that meaning potential can be entirely explained as
>>> "presence
>>> of absence", Larry, because linguistic systems are not always binary, and
>>> even when they are, they tend to generate options within options rather
>>> than absence of presence (language abhors a vaccuum). Take, for example,
>>> intonation. We could argue that there are only two options: up or down.
>>> But
>>> in fact, we often find down-up ("RE-A-LLY?") and updown ('RE-A-LLY!"), and
>>> there is also a fairly flat, neutral intonation ("'Really. Interesting.").
>>> If I come to a branch in the road and go left instead of right, the right
>>> fork in the road doesn't thereby cease to exist, even in my mind.
>>> 
>>> David Kellogg
>>> Macquarie University
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Fri, Jan 15, 2016 at 1:11 AM, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
>>>> 
>>> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> David,
>>>> Just wondering if Halliday is getting this from Roman Jakobson's
>>>> syntagmatic vs. paradigmatic contrast?
>>>> If so, then I'm wondering what happened to the notion of poetics in
>>>> Halliday's thought. Poetical patterning seems absolutely essential to
>>>> language learning, but I'd also tend to think of poetics as less than
>>>> entirely volitional.
>>>> Or to put the question more plainly, can you provide a little more
>>> nuance
>>>> to your statement:
>>>> "The problem of grammar can be seen as aproblem of volitional choice,
>>> and
>>>> what needs to be explained in language development is the same thing
>>> that
>>>> needs to be explained in other branches of Vygotskyan psychology, namely
>>>> the emergence of free will"
>>>> -greg
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 10:28 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> Huw:
>>>>> 
>>>>> I'm using meaning potential in a somewhat technical, Hallidayan,
>>> sense.
>>>> For
>>>>> Halliday every utterance has both structure and system. Structure we
>>> know
>>>>> about: it's syntagmatic, in the sense that it is laid out one step at
>>> a
>>>>> time (in time with speech and in space with writing). It's
>>> non-Markovian,
>>>>> in the sense that each step has some influence on the next steps and
>>> not
>>>>> simply on the next step (e.g.if you start a sentence with "the" you
>>> are
>>>>> going to need noun pretty soon, but not necessarily right away).
>>>>> 
>>>>> For example, if I find myself saying
>>>>> 
>>>>> "The artist David Bowie was not a chameleon; he just hired a lot of
>>>>> different poorly paid adjuncts to write his songs"
>>>>> 
>>>>> My argument is laid out one step at a time: "The" and then "artist"
>>> and
>>>>> then "David" and then "Bowie" and then "was" (not "is", because of his
>>>>> death), etc.
>>>>> 
>>>>> System is a little different. First of all, it's paradigmatic, in the
>>>> sense
>>>>> that it can be thought of as  kind of drop-down menu. It's a free
>>> choice,
>>>>> in the sense that although context will favor certain "canonical"
>>> choices
>>>>> over others, I can create contexts (and that is what writers of verbal
>>>> art
>>>>> do). Each choice overlaps with a finite (often only two or three)
>>> number
>>>> of
>>>>> choices not chosen. In this way "system" combines free will with
>>>>> cultural-historical determination.
>>>>> 
>>>>> For example, if I find myself saying "The artist David Bowie" when I
>>> get
>>>> to
>>>>> the noun "artist" I could say "singer" or even "celebrity" but the
>>> choice
>>>>> is not infinite, particularly if I look at probability and not just
>>>>> possibility. Even with proper nouns, in place of "Bowie" I could say
>>>>> "Kellogg" or even "Cameron" but the number of choices is distinctly
>>>>> limited. I could have said "is", but Bowie's death makes "was" more
>>>>> canonical; by choosing "not", I am choosing from only two choices
>>>> (because
>>>>> an indicative clause can be either positive or negative in polarity
>>> but
>>>> not
>>>>> both and not anything else) and yet by choosing the negative I am
>>>> probably
>>>>> saying something that goes against 99% of what will be said about
>>> Bowie
>>>> in
>>>>> the days to come.
>>>>> 
>>>>> This set of many small choices (some of which, like polarity, are
>>> highly
>>>>> skewed in probability) is not only true at the level of words, it is
>>> also
>>>>> true at the level of wording: I can choose to make a major or minor
>>>> clause;
>>>>> if major, I can choose to make an imperative or an indicative; if
>>>>> indicative, I can go declarative or interrogative, etc. Each utterance
>>>>> represents a kind of a path through an indefinite number of systems,
>>> each
>>>>> of which is a kind of menu providing a finite number of choices, and
>>> this
>>>>> is what makes language both infinitely complex and in practice easy to
>>>> use.
>>>>> 
>>>>> There are three important consequences of this somewhat technical use
>>> of
>>>>> "meaning potential". First of all, the problem of grammar can be seen
>>> as
>>>> a
>>>>> problem of volitional choice, and what needs to be explained in
>>> language
>>>>> development is the same thing that needs to be explained in other
>>>> branches
>>>>> of Vygotskyan psychology, namely the emergence of free will. Secondly,
>>>> the
>>>>> choices that the speaker makes are made significant (made meaningful)
>>> not
>>>>> simply by pointing to context (this is really only true of infant
>>>> language)
>>>>> but instead by all the choices that the speaker did NOT make but COULD
>>>> HAVE
>>>>> made (this "could have" prevents the theory from dualism--the ideal is
>>>>> simply the potentially real). And thirdly, finally, meaning potential
>>> is
>>>>> always linked to but distinct from meaning proper precisely in the
>>> sense
>>>> of
>>>>> NON-participation: meaning potential is simply the road not taken.
>>>>> 
>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>> Macquarie University
>>>>> 
>>>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 11:05 PM, Huw Lloyd <
>>> huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>>>> From what I have been reading and thinking, the biggest difference
>>>>> between
>>>>>> the conceptual system presented by Vygotsky and the of Leontiev
>>> (most
>>>> of
>>>>>> which is well known) is the difference of the conceptualisation of
>>>>> activity
>>>>>> or the symbolic level (which is mostly absent for Vygotsky).
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Without necessarily refuting David's points, but indicating an
>>>>> alternative
>>>>>> interpretation, I would say:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 1. Learning how to apply or use something is still a constructive
>>> act.
>>>>> One
>>>>>> does not have to understand the full technical make up of a
>>> component
>>>> in
>>>>>> order to make use of it.  Indeed this is would entail an infinite
>>>>> regress.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 2. I'm not fully clear what the assertion is with respect to active
>>>>>> participation in meaning potential, but it is perfectly reasonable
>>> to
>>>>>> revisit the problem space that an old artefact is drawn from only to
>>>>>> rediscover what this product achieves in terms of design.  This is
>>>>> actually
>>>>>> an excellent source of edification.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 3. Contemplation can be understood to be in response to an active
>>>>> problem.
>>>>>> There is nothing to say that activity must be glued to a specific
>>> site.
>>>>>> When I am programming, I am forever walking away from the computer
>>> to
>>>>> solve
>>>>>> or express a particular problem.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Best,
>>>>>> Huw
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> On 13 January 2016 at 10:02, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Dear Haydi:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> In the very beginning of the text that Huw is reading, the
>>> HIstory of
>>>>> the
>>>>>>> Development of the Higher Psychic Functions, Vygotsky writes of
>>> the
>>>>> basic
>>>>>>> division psychology, between those who would treat the mind as
>>>>> something
>>>>>>> made by "Deus Sive Natura" ("God, i.e. Nature"), like the eye or
>>> the
>>>>> hand
>>>>>>> or any other physical phenomenon, and those who would treat the
>>> mind
>>>> as
>>>>>> (to
>>>>>>> quote Mike's epigraph) an object which itself creates history. In
>>> one
>>>>>> case,
>>>>>>> we have an object which really can be usefully described
>>>> synoptically,
>>>>>> like
>>>>>>> a sculpture that we can walk all the way around. But in the other
>>> we
>>>>>> have a
>>>>>>> process which can only be described dynamically, like a piece of
>>>>> theatre
>>>>>>> that walks around us while we sit and observe.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Of course, we CAN argue, the way that Vico would argue, that to
>>>> produce
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> process is to fully understand it: we cannot fully understand the
>>> eye
>>>>> or
>>>>>>> the hand, because although these things are part of us, they were
>>>> made
>>>>> by
>>>>>>> God. We can understand a telescope or a hammer, because although
>>>> these
>>>>>>> things are not part of us, they were made by ourselves. And we can
>>>> even
>>>>>>> argue that the process of making it is essentially the process of
>>>>>>> understanding it: once you have made a telescope or a hammer and
>>> used
>>>>> it,
>>>>>>> you have understood everything there is to know about it. That
>>> is, I
>>>>>>> understand it, the position you attribute to dialectical logic, to
>>>>> CHAT,
>>>>>>> and to Davydov, and I think you attribute it correctly. The
>>> problem
>>>> is
>>>>>> that
>>>>>>> I am not sure that the position itself is correct.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> The reason is this: we may be able to actively participate in the
>>>>> process
>>>>>>> of producing and using a telescope or a hammer. We may even
>>> (although
>>>>>> this
>>>>>>> is much more problematic) actively participate in the process of
>>>>>> producing
>>>>>>> and using a mind or a personality. But our observational
>>> standpoint
>>>> is
>>>>>>> nevertheless fixed by our position in time: we can never "actively
>>>>>>> participate" in constructing the counterfactual potential, the
>>>> meaning
>>>>>>> potential, of a telescope or a hammer, much less a mind or a
>>>>> personality.
>>>>>>> Our active participation is always fixed in the actual, and
>>> meaning
>>>>>>> potential is accessible only through contemplation. It may be
>>>>>> contemplation
>>>>>>> with activity firmly in mind, but it is only potentially active
>>> and
>>>> not
>>>>>>> actually so.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> I think this is a fundamental difference between Vygotsky and
>>>> Leontiev,
>>>>>> and
>>>>>>> the activity theory that followed him: For Vygotsky, the autistic
>>>>>> function
>>>>>>> (that is, the irrealist function, the contemplative function which
>>>>> turns
>>>>>>> away from immediate activity) may come late (as Vygotsky points
>>> out,
>>>> it
>>>>>>> receives major impetus from the acquisition of words and then
>>>> concepts,
>>>>>>> both of which come well after the beginning of social life), but
>>> this
>>>>>>> "autistic" contemplative function is then never out of date:
>>> concepts
>>>>> are
>>>>>>> not formed purely through activity, but also through the turning
>>> away
>>>>>> from
>>>>>>> reality oriented activity. And in that, he has the complete
>>> support
>>>> of
>>>>>>> Lenin, who knew a thing or two about how concepts are joined to
>>>> action.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>> Macquarie University
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 12:06 AM, <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Thanks , David , for the two-parag. epigraph as always !
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> --First of all, Kant says we cannot know / cognize a material
>>>> object
>>>>> in
>>>>>>>> itself because a priori we don't have an image of it so  we are
>>>>> unable
>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> have an overlap between the two ; hence agnosticism let alone
>>>> 'inner
>>>>>>>> connections' of a whole as 'moments' . Dialectical Logic (close
>>>>>> relative
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> CHAT) says as man relies on object-related activity while an
>>> ideal
>>>>>>>> adaptable to the future coming object ever runs through the
>>>> activity
>>>>> to
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> finish , is able to penetrate the depths . When you put the
>>> mental
>>>>>> model
>>>>>>>> into a material model , in reifying or objectifying that model
>>>> into a
>>>>>>>> finished product and all through the durational time , you can
>>> see
>>>>> what
>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>> necessary , essential and what is not . In higher momentums of
>>>>>>> conception ,
>>>>>>>> you reach concepts and this is the time you've got a theoretical
>>>>>> rational
>>>>>>>> cognitive copy of the inner mechanisms and transformations of
>>> the
>>>>>> related
>>>>>>>> object or objects . When we say 'ideal' is a moment of an
>>> activity
>>>> ,
>>>>> we
>>>>>>>> mean it's ever running through uninterruptedly because the whole
>>>>> entity
>>>>>>>> falls down , collapses otherwise . Or if you aim to take it
>>> wholly
>>>>>> apart
>>>>>>> ,
>>>>>>>> again nothing is left for objectfication . Davydov says we
>>> cannot
>>>>> stop
>>>>>> at
>>>>>>>> phenomenology ; it's not to our will or taste ; we should ever
>>>>>> reproduce
>>>>>>>> our ever changing needs and products and that needs true science
>>>> and
>>>>>> true
>>>>>>>> science needs true concepts . Yes , we want the object to move
>>>>>>> (dynamicity)
>>>>>>>> according to its inner transformations (moments) which has come
>>> to
>>>> us
>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>> fixated knowledge in speech and skills historically . We don't
>>> want
>>>>> to
>>>>>> be
>>>>>>>> stuck in our position observing it to move . If you take
>>> moments as
>>>>>>> moments
>>>>>>>> of your positioning while observing , you've not been able to
>>>> convert
>>>>>>> those
>>>>>>>> phenomenal aspects (empiricism) into innermost movements hence
>>>>>>> agnosticism
>>>>>>>> prevails . Yes ,  We could somehow treat these moments as always
>>>>>>> inhering ,
>>>>>>>> how ? Are neoformations parts and parcels of some detachable
>>>>>> independent
>>>>>>>> separate phnomenon ? Are they not fused , interwoven ,
>>> intertwined
>>>>>>> moments
>>>>>>>> of inner mechanisms of whole development (internalization ,
>>>>>>> appropriation ,
>>>>>>>> instruction , development , upbringing involved) ? Does
>>> development
>>>>> or
>>>>>>> even
>>>>>>>> periods of development contain , include some parts and parcels
>>> or
>>>> do
>>>>>>> they
>>>>>>>> subsume some moments of developmental transformations , those
>>>> moments
>>>>>>> still
>>>>>>>> sublated within the whole process reversible if development
>>>> defects ?
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> --Secondly , we agreed that moment is different from the
>>> instance
>>>> as
>>>>> we
>>>>>>>> took it as tokens , samples , etc. Everything began with the
>>> very
>>>>> fact
>>>>>> .
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> --Thirdly , with what I said , I suppose you've been responded
>>> to .
>>>>> Our
>>>>>>>> focus is on moment as some (aspect as you say ; I first
>>> refrained
>>>>> from
>>>>>>>> using 'aspectual' because aspect , too , does not convey the
>>>>> intention
>>>>>>>> precisely) variable of a successive uninterrupted incessant
>>> moving
>>>>>>> movable
>>>>>>>> whole in contrast to parts and parcels even components of some
>>>>>>>> static internally immovable pseudo-stagnant whole which , if
>>>>>> potentially
>>>>>>>> realizable , will damage genuine cognition .
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Best
>>>>>>>> Haydi
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> ------------------------------
>>>>>>>> *From:* David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>> *To:* Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
>>>>>>>> *Sent:* Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 9:08:03
>>>>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar"
>>> means
>>>> (in
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and
>>>> dentistry
>>>>>> is.
>>>>>>>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the
>>>> relation
>>>>>>>> between "moment" and music.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is
>>>> meant
>>>>>> is
>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are
>>>> three
>>>>>>>> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use
>>> of
>>>>>>> "moment"
>>>>>>>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's
>>> work
>>>> is
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting").
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in
>>>>> phenomenology
>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>> a way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe
>>>>> something
>>>>>>> like
>>>>>>>> a sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and
>>>>>> describe
>>>>>>>> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being
>>> described is
>>>>>>> almost
>>>>>>>> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where
>>> the
>>>>>>>> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the
>>>> dynamic
>>>>>>>> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position,
>>> observing
>>>> it.
>>>>>>> This
>>>>>>>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in
>>>> retrospect:
>>>>>> as
>>>>>>> we
>>>>>>>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even
>>>>>> present,
>>>>>>>> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could
>>> somehow
>>>>> treat
>>>>>>>> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is
>>> implicit
>>>>> in a
>>>>>>>> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech
>>> or
>>>>>>>> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to
>>> deny
>>>> the
>>>>>>>> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the
>>> idea
>>>> of
>>>>>>>> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this
>>>>> (because
>>>>>>> even
>>>>>>>> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were
>>>>> explaining
>>>>>>>> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the
>>>> example
>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> angular momentum.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and
>>>>>> sometimes
>>>>>>>> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they
>>> are.
>>>>> The
>>>>>>>> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite
>>>> different
>>>>>>> from
>>>>>>>> the description of development. A text is an instance of a
>>>> language,
>>>>>> but
>>>>>>>> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a
>>>>> context
>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that
>>> "weather"
>>>>> is a
>>>>>>>> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance.
>>> Viewed
>>>>>>>> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different
>>>>> chronological
>>>>>>>> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using
>>>>> "phylogenesis",
>>>>>>>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third
>>>>> problem,
>>>>>>>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is
>>> indispensible.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be
>>>> described
>>>>>>>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can
>>>>>> seriously
>>>>>>>> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of
>>> the
>>>>> same
>>>>>>>> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is
>>> chiefly
>>>>>>>> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship
>>>> between
>>>>>>> solar
>>>>>>>> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into
>>> space) is
>>>>>>>> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate,
>>> it's
>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see
>>>> much
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of
>>> infant
>>>>>> speech
>>>>>>>> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on
>>>> xmca
>>>>>> we
>>>>>>>> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make
>>> up of
>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an
>>> obvious
>>>>> way
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for
>>>>>> example,
>>>>>>>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much
>>>> more
>>>>>>>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat
>>> closer
>>>> to
>>>>>>>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text).
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>>> Macquarie University
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Dear all ,
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Look at this please !
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a
>>>>>> thought
>>>>>>>> experiment: 1) The
>>>>>>>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where
>>> its
>>>>>>>> essence can be revealed
>>>>>>>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further
>>> mental
>>>>>>>> transformations; 3) this same
>>>>>>>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in
>>>>> which
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> object is
>>>>>>>> ?embedded.? If the construction of this object can still be
>>>>> represented
>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>> a process of
>>>>>>>> abstraction of the real object?s properties, then this third
>>> moment
>>>>>>>> essentially becomes a
>>>>>>>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It
>>> is
>>>>> only
>>>>>>>> within this special
>>>>>>>> system of links that the object?s content gets revealed.]]
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is ,
>>> activity ,
>>>>>> action
>>>>>>>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and
>>>>> separate
>>>>>>> even
>>>>>>>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a
>>> circular
>>>>>>>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in
>>> temporal
>>>>>>>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither
>>> itself
>>>> ,
>>>>>> nor
>>>>>>>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or
>>> stability
>>>> or
>>>>>>>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or
>>>>>>> motionality ,
>>>>>>>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives
>>>>>>>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could
>>> be
>>>>>>> converted
>>>>>>>> in the other as we all have seen .
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is
>>> played
>>>>> with
>>>>>>>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire
>>> composition .
>>>>>> It's a
>>>>>>>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited
>>>> pleasurable
>>>>>>>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to
>>> a
>>>>>>>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind
>>> of
>>>>>> affect
>>>>>>> or
>>>>>>>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop
>>> to
>>>>> think
>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> how to express it and he might  finally resort to imitation .
>>> Then
>>>> ,
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that
>>> single
>>>>> note
>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal
>>> instant
>>>> on
>>>>>>> which
>>>>>>>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature ,
>>> state
>>>>>> occurs
>>>>>>> .
>>>>>>>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be
>>> uncognizable
>>>> or
>>>>>>>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a
>>>>> substitute
>>>>>>>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal"
>>> which
>>>> is
>>>>>> said
>>>>>>>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good
>>>>> sources
>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now .
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Best
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Haydi
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> --
>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
>>>> Assistant Professor
>>>> Department of Anthropology
>>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
>>>> Brigham Young University
>>>> Provo, UT 84602
>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 73
> Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2016 07:39:44 -0800
> From: Lplarry <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID: <569912e8.c493420a.faff1.4af7@mx.google.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
> 
> Huw,
> This is interesting.
> A concept of discovering meaning and what is meant by the term (discovery)?
> The notion that phenomenological references
> Semiotic references
> Psychological references 
> Each contribute a (portion?) to meaning developing through discovery processes in social spaces.
> This paper does seem to relate to our topic.
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: "Huw Lloyd" <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> Sent: ?2016-?01-?15 4:20 AM
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> 
> In partial response to the questions being posed on this thread, the paper
> from Wertsch and Kazak[1] may prove insightful.  It is quite a compact
> paper with references to semiotic, phenomenological and psychological
> accounts contributing to their conception of a process of discovering
> meanings in a social space through the use of signs etc.
> 
> Unfortunately the paper was published in a rather expensive volume, so it
> may only be available to those with access to inter-library loans or
> similar services.
> 
> Best,
> Huw
> 
> [1] http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4419-7582-9_9
> 
> On 15 January 2016 at 05:20, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
>> In response to your points David,
>> 
>> 1.  A young child points to something and utters an inarticulate sound.  I
>> then proceed to discern what the child does and doesn't mean by this act.
>> What, in this context, could he be referring to? The water?  The paper
>> towel?  I test my guess with him, and he repeats his 'request'.
>> 2.  In the above scenario the child is not (initially) aware of the
>> referents not intended.
>> 3.  Structure and system as described are aspects of description.
>> Descriptions are brought about by whole acts (descriptions) that yield
>> incomplete descriptions. The wholeness of the act is always a given.  The
>> 'completeness' of a description is contingent upon its adequacy.
>> 
>> Best,
>> Huw
>> 
>> 
>> On 14 January 2016 at 19:53, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
>> 
>>> Huw, Greg, Larry:
>>> 
>>> Austin, at least as understand him, is entirely interested in
>>> performatives: that is, speech acts in which the making of a structure
>>> (eg.
>>> "I promise") is actually constitutive of some pragmatic function. That's
>>> really not what I had in mind at all, Huw. First of all, I'm interested in
>>> development, and performatives are few and ar between at both ends of the
>>> developmental continuum (for infants, language is more often ancillary
>>> than
>>> constitutive and in adults some of the most developmentally important uses
>>> of language are not public at all). Secondly, I don't think that Austin's
>>> various felicity conditions are relevant to, say, negation: what does it
>>> mean to say that only a person who is empowered to negate can validly
>>> perform the function of negation? And thirdly--most importantly--I think
>>> that what Austin has in mind is only structure and not system. But perhaps
>>> I am an unenthusiastic and thus a rather poor reader of Austin: he always
>>> struck me as a thinly disguised social-behaviorist.
>>> 
>>> Neither Halliday nor Jakobson really came up with the
>>> paradigmatic/syntagmatic distinction, Greg: it goes back to de Saussure.
>>> But de Saussure  called his paradigmatic dimension "associative", and this
>>> placed him firmly in associationist psychology. Associationism really has
>>> no room for the development of free will, and Halliday's notion of
>>> "system"
>>> requires it. A selection requires a selector. And language development is,
>>> in Vygotskyan psychology, about the development of the selector. In HDHMF,
>>> for example, Vygotsky actually says that the most important and most
>>> fundamental problem in the whole of psychology is that of Buridan's
>>> donkey.
>>> 
>>> Consider a four panel cartoon--the sort of thing you see on the comics
>>> page
>>> of a paper. If we "read" the cartoon horizontally, we get an essentially
>>> syntagmatic relation--the default reading is that the events of the second
>>> panel transpire after those of the first, and the events of the third
>>> after
>>> the second, etc.  But within each panel, we find drawings of bodies
>>> (doing), faces (feeling), thought "bubbles" (thinking) and speech balloons
>>> (saying). These CAN be syntagmatically related but they can also be
>>> simultaneous, and if you are a Vygotskyan, hierarchically related (doing
>>> may control feeling and feeling control thinking, and--in volition--we can
>>> even imagine the very opposite chain of command).
>>> 
>>> Now, imagine a poetics in which these planes are related not only
>>> hierarchically but paradigmatically. That is, a novel COULD be written as
>>> a
>>> set of more or less simultaneous doings (a historical novel). But it could
>>> also be written as feelings (a sentimental novel), as thinkings (a novel
>>> of
>>> ideas) or as sayings (a novel of conversation). All of these are quite
>>> different from organizing a story along the syntagmatic axis, which would
>>> make it not a novel but an adventure story (here in France, the word for
>>> novel is "roman" and--confusingly--the word for an adventure story is
>>> "nouvelle", but back home in Korea novels are noun more descriptively as
>>> "little talk"). I think that one of the important differences between
>>> novels and adventure stories is precisely that the specific weight of
>>> the environment and of individual volition are reversed, and the way this
>>> is often realized is through a stress on syntagmatic, temporal relations
>>> in
>>> the adventure story and on paradigmatic, projective relations in the
>>> novel.
>>> 
>>> I don't think that meaning potential can be entirely explained as
>>> "presence
>>> of absence", Larry, because linguistic systems are not always binary, and
>>> even when they are, they tend to generate options within options rather
>>> than absence of presence (language abhors a vaccuum). Take, for example,
>>> intonation. We could argue that there are only two options: up or down.
>>> But
>>> in fact, we often find down-up ("RE-A-LLY?") and updown ('RE-A-LLY!"), and
>>> there is also a fairly flat, neutral intonation ("'Really. Interesting.").
>>> If I come to a branch in the road and go left instead of right, the right
>>> fork in the road doesn't thereby cease to exist, even in my mind.
>>> 
>>> David Kellogg
>>> Macquarie University
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Fri, Jan 15, 2016 at 1:11 AM, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
>>>> 
>>> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> David,
>>>> Just wondering if Halliday is getting this from Roman Jakobson's
>>>> syntagmatic vs. paradigmatic contrast?
>>>> If so, then I'm wondering what happened to the notion of poetics in
>>>> Halliday's thought. Poetical patterning seems absolutely essential to
>>>> language learning, but I'd also tend to think of poetics as less than
>>>> entirely volitional.
>>>> Or to put the question more plainly, can you provide a little more
>>> nuance
>>>> to your statement:
>>>> "The problem of grammar can be seen as aproblem of volitional choice,
>>> and
>>>> what needs to be explained in language development is the same thing
>>> that
>>>> needs to be explained in other branches of Vygotskyan psychology, namely
>>>> the emergence of free will"
>>>> -greg
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 10:28 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> Huw:
>>>>> 
>>>>> I'm using meaning potential in a somewhat technical, Hallidayan,
>>> sense.
>>>> For
>>>>> Halliday every utterance has both structure and system. Structure we
>>> know
>>>>> about: it's syntagmatic, in the sense that it is laid out one step at
>>> a
>>>>> time (in time with speech and in space with writing). It's
>>> non-Markovian,
>>>>> in the sense that each step has some influence on the next steps and
>>> not
>>>>> simply on the next step (e.g.if you start a sentence with "the" you
>>> are
>>>>> going to need noun pretty soon, but not necessarily right away).
>>>>> 
>>>>> For example, if I find myself saying
>>>>> 
>>>>> "The artist David Bowie was not a chameleon; he just hired a lot of
>>>>> different poorly paid adjuncts to write his songs"
>>>>> 
>>>>> My argument is laid out one step at a time: "The" and then "artist"
>>> and
>>>>> then "David" and then "Bowie" and then "was" (not "is", because of his
>>>>> death), etc.
>>>>> 
>>>>> System is a little different. First of all, it's paradigmatic, in the
>>>> sense
>>>>> that it can be thought of as  kind of drop-down menu. It's a free
>>> choice,
>>>>> in the sense that although context will favor certain "canonical"
>>> choices
>>>>> over others, I can create contexts (and that is what writers of verbal
>>>> art
>>>>> do). Each choice overlaps with a finite (often only two or three)
>>> number
>>>> of
>>>>> choices not chosen. In this way "system" combines free will with
>>>>> cultural-historical determination.
>>>>> 
>>>>> For example, if I find myself saying "The artist David Bowie" when I
>>> get
>>>> to
>>>>> the noun "artist" I could say "singer" or even "celebrity" but the
>>> choice
>>>>> is not infinite, particularly if I look at probability and not just
>>>>> possibility. Even with proper nouns, in place of "Bowie" I could say
>>>>> "Kellogg" or even "Cameron" but the number of choices is distinctly
>>>>> limited. I could have said "is", but Bowie's death makes "was" more
>>>>> canonical; by choosing "not", I am choosing from only two choices
>>>> (because
>>>>> an indicative clause can be either positive or negative in polarity
>>> but
>>>> not
>>>>> both and not anything else) and yet by choosing the negative I am
>>>> probably
>>>>> saying something that goes against 99% of what will be said about
>>> Bowie
>>>> in
>>>>> the days to come.
>>>>> 
>>>>> This set of many small choices (some of which, like polarity, are
>>> highly
>>>>> skewed in probability) is not only true at the level of words, it is
>>> also
>>>>> true at the level of wording: I can choose to make a major or minor
>>>> clause;
>>>>> if major, I can choose to make an imperative or an indicative; if
>>>>> indicative, I can go declarative or interrogative, etc. Each utterance
>>>>> represents a kind of a path through an indefinite number of systems,
>>> each
>>>>> of which is a kind of menu providing a finite number of choices, and
>>> this
>>>>> is what makes language both infinitely complex and in practice easy to
>>>> use.
>>>>> 
>>>>> There are three important consequences of this somewhat technical use
>>> of
>>>>> "meaning potential". First of all, the problem of grammar can be seen
>>> as
>>>> a
>>>>> problem of volitional choice, and what needs to be explained in
>>> language
>>>>> development is the same thing that needs to be explained in other
>>>> branches
>>>>> of Vygotskyan psychology, namely the emergence of free will. Secondly,
>>>> the
>>>>> choices that the speaker makes are made significant (made meaningful)
>>> not
>>>>> simply by pointing to context (this is really only true of infant
>>>> language)
>>>>> but instead by all the choices that the speaker did NOT make but COULD
>>>> HAVE
>>>>> made (this "could have" prevents the theory from dualism--the ideal is
>>>>> simply the potentially real). And thirdly, finally, meaning potential
>>> is
>>>>> always linked to but distinct from meaning proper precisely in the
>>> sense
>>>> of
>>>>> NON-participation: meaning potential is simply the road not taken.
>>>>> 
>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>> Macquarie University
>>>>> 
>>>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 11:05 PM, Huw Lloyd <
>>> huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>>>> From what I have been reading and thinking, the biggest difference
>>>>> between
>>>>>> the conceptual system presented by Vygotsky and the of Leontiev
>>> (most
>>>> of
>>>>>> which is well known) is the difference of the conceptualisation of
>>>>> activity
>>>>>> or the symbolic level (which is mostly absent for Vygotsky).
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Without necessarily refuting David's points, but indicating an
>>>>> alternative
>>>>>> interpretation, I would say:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 1. Learning how to apply or use something is still a constructive
>>> act.
>>>>> One
>>>>>> does not have to understand the full technical make up of a
>>> component
>>>> in
>>>>>> order to make use of it.  Indeed this is would entail an infinite
>>>>> regress.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 2. I'm not fully clear what the assertion is with respect to active
>>>>>> participation in meaning potential, but it is perfectly reasonable
>>> to
>>>>>> revisit the problem space that an old artefact is drawn from only to
>>>>>> rediscover what this product achieves in terms of design.  This is
>>>>> actually
>>>>>> an excellent source of edification.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 3. Contemplation can be understood to be in response to an active
>>>>> problem.
>>>>>> There is nothing to say that activity must be glued to a specific
>>> site.
>>>>>> When I am programming, I am forever walking away from the computer
>>> to
>>>>> solve
>>>>>> or express a particular problem.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Best,
>>>>>> Huw
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> On 13 January 2016 at 10:02, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Dear Haydi:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> In the very beginning of the text that Huw is reading, the
>>> HIstory of
>>>>> the
>>>>>>> Development of the Higher Psychic Functions, Vygotsky writes of
>>> the
>>>>> basic
>>>>>>> division psychology, between those who would treat the mind as
>>>>> something
>>>>>>> made by "Deus Sive Natura" ("God, i.e. Nature"), like the eye or
>>> the
>>>>> hand
>>>>>>> or any other physical phenomenon, and those who would treat the
>>> mind
>>>> as
>>>>>> (to
>>>>>>> quote Mike's epigraph) an object which itself creates history. In
>>> one
>>>>>> case,
>>>>>>> we have an object which really can be usefully described
>>>> synoptically,
>>>>>> like
>>>>>>> a sculpture that we can walk all the way around. But in the other
>>> we
>>>>>> have a
>>>>>>> process which can only be described dynamically, like a piece of
>>>>> theatre
>>>>>>> that walks around us while we sit and observe.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Of course, we CAN argue, the way that Vico would argue, that to
>>>> produce
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> process is to fully understand it: we cannot fully understand the
>>> eye
>>>>> or
>>>>>>> the hand, because although these things are part of us, they were
>>>> made
>>>>> by
>>>>>>> God. We can understand a telescope or a hammer, because although
>>>> these
>>>>>>> things are not part of us, they were made by ourselves. And we can
>>>> even
>>>>>>> argue that the process of making it is essentially the process of
>>>>>>> understanding it: once you have made a telescope or a hammer and
>>> used
>>>>> it,
>>>>>>> you have understood everything there is to know about it. That
>>> is, I
>>>>>>> understand it, the position you attribute to dialectical logic, to
>>>>> CHAT,
>>>>>>> and to Davydov, and I think you attribute it correctly. The
>>> problem
>>>> is
>>>>>> that
>>>>>>> I am not sure that the position itself is correct.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> The reason is this: we may be able to actively participate in the
>>>>> process
>>>>>>> of producing and using a telescope or a hammer. We may even
>>> (although
>>>>>> this
>>>>>>> is much more problematic) actively participate in the process of
>>>>>> producing
>>>>>>> and using a mind or a personality. But our observational
>>> standpoint
>>>> is
>>>>>>> nevertheless fixed by our position in time: we can never "actively
>>>>>>> participate" in constructing the counterfactual potential, the
>>>> meaning
>>>>>>> potential, of a telescope or a hammer, much less a mind or a
>>>>> personality.
>>>>>>> Our active participation is always fixed in the actual, and
>>> meaning
>>>>>>> potential is accessible only through contemplation. It may be
>>>>>> contemplation
>>>>>>> with activity firmly in mind, but it is only potentially active
>>> and
>>>> not
>>>>>>> actually so.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> I think this is a fundamental difference between Vygotsky and
>>>> Leontiev,
>>>>>> and
>>>>>>> the activity theory that followed him: For Vygotsky, the autistic
>>>>>> function
>>>>>>> (that is, the irrealist function, the contemplative function which
>>>>> turns
>>>>>>> away from immediate activity) may come late (as Vygotsky points
>>> out,
>>>> it
>>>>>>> receives major impetus from the acquisition of words and then
>>>> concepts,
>>>>>>> both of which come well after the beginning of social life), but
>>> this
>>>>>>> "autistic" contemplative function is then never out of date:
>>> concepts
>>>>> are
>>>>>>> not formed purely through activity, but also through the turning
>>> away
>>>>>> from
>>>>>>> reality oriented activity. And in that, he has the complete
>>> support
>>>> of
>>>>>>> Lenin, who knew a thing or two about how concepts are joined to
>>>> action.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>> Macquarie University
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 12:06 AM, <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Thanks , David , for the two-parag. epigraph as always !
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> --First of all, Kant says we cannot know / cognize a material
>>>> object
>>>>> in
>>>>>>>> itself because a priori we don't have an image of it so  we are
>>>>> unable
>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> have an overlap between the two ; hence agnosticism let alone
>>>> 'inner
>>>>>>>> connections' of a whole as 'moments' . Dialectical Logic (close
>>>>>> relative
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> CHAT) says as man relies on object-related activity while an
>>> ideal
>>>>>>>> adaptable to the future coming object ever runs through the
>>>> activity
>>>>> to
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> finish , is able to penetrate the depths . When you put the
>>> mental
>>>>>> model
>>>>>>>> into a material model , in reifying or objectifying that model
>>>> into a
>>>>>>>> finished product and all through the durational time , you can
>>> see
>>>>> what
>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>> necessary , essential and what is not . In higher momentums of
>>>>>>> conception ,
>>>>>>>> you reach concepts and this is the time you've got a theoretical
>>>>>> rational
>>>>>>>> cognitive copy of the inner mechanisms and transformations of
>>> the
>>>>>> related
>>>>>>>> object or objects . When we say 'ideal' is a moment of an
>>> activity
>>>> ,
>>>>> we
>>>>>>>> mean it's ever running through uninterruptedly because the whole
>>>>> entity
>>>>>>>> falls down , collapses otherwise . Or if you aim to take it
>>> wholly
>>>>>> apart
>>>>>>> ,
>>>>>>>> again nothing is left for objectfication . Davydov says we
>>> cannot
>>>>> stop
>>>>>> at
>>>>>>>> phenomenology ; it's not to our will or taste ; we should ever
>>>>>> reproduce
>>>>>>>> our ever changing needs and products and that needs true science
>>>> and
>>>>>> true
>>>>>>>> science needs true concepts . Yes , we want the object to move
>>>>>>> (dynamicity)
>>>>>>>> according to its inner transformations (moments) which has come
>>> to
>>>> us
>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>> fixated knowledge in speech and skills historically . We don't
>>> want
>>>>> to
>>>>>> be
>>>>>>>> stuck in our position observing it to move . If you take
>>> moments as
>>>>>>> moments
>>>>>>>> of your positioning while observing , you've not been able to
>>>> convert
>>>>>>> those
>>>>>>>> phenomenal aspects (empiricism) into innermost movements hence
>>>>>>> agnosticism
>>>>>>>> prevails . Yes ,  We could somehow treat these moments as always
>>>>>>> inhering ,
>>>>>>>> how ? Are neoformations parts and parcels of some detachable
>>>>>> independent
>>>>>>>> separate phnomenon ? Are they not fused , interwoven ,
>>> intertwined
>>>>>>> moments
>>>>>>>> of inner mechanisms of whole development (internalization ,
>>>>>>> appropriation ,
>>>>>>>> instruction , development , upbringing involved) ? Does
>>> development
>>>>> or
>>>>>>> even
>>>>>>>> periods of development contain , include some parts and parcels
>>> or
>>>> do
>>>>>>> they
>>>>>>>> subsume some moments of developmental transform
> 
> 
> [The entire original message is not included.]
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 74
> Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2016 15:53:50 +0000
> From: Martin John Packer <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID: <8B441D44-6AA7-45A8-AF04-28748647DDB6@uniandes.edu.co>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
> 
> I wrote a critique of the chapter by Wertsch and Kazak, published in the same book:
> 
> Packer, M. J. (2011). Schooling: Domestication or ontological construction? In T. Koschmann (Ed.), Theories of learning and studies of instructional practice (pp. 167-188). New York: Springer. 
> 
> Martin
> 
> On Jan 15, 2016, at 10:39 AM, Lplarry <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
>> Huw,
>> This is interesting.
>> A concept of discovering meaning and what is meant by the term (discovery)?
>> The notion that phenomenological references
>> Semiotic references
>> Psychological references 
>> Each contribute a (portion?) to meaning developing through discovery processes in social spaces.
>> This paper does seem to relate to our topic.
>> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: "Huw Lloyd" <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>> Sent: ?2016-?01-?15 4:20 AM
>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
>> 
>> In partial response to the questions being posed on this thread, the paper
>> from Wertsch and Kazak[1] may prove insightful.  It is quite a compact
>> paper with references to semiotic, phenomenological and psychological
>> accounts contributing to their conception of a process of discovering
>> meanings in a social space through the use of signs etc.
>> 
>> Unfortunately the paper was published in a rather expensive volume, so it
>> may only be available to those with access to inter-library loans or
>> similar services.
>> 
>> Best,
>> Huw
>> 
>> [1] http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4419-7582-9_9
>> 
>> On 15 January 2016 at 05:20, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> wrote:
>> 
>>> In response to your points David,
>>> 
>>> 1.  A young child points to something and utters an inarticulate sound.  I
>>> then proceed to discern what the child does and doesn't mean by this act.
>>> What, in this context, could he be referring to? The water?  The paper
>>> towel?  I test my guess with him, and he repeats his 'request'.
>>> 2.  In the above scenario the child is not (initially) aware of the
>>> referents not intended.
>>> 3.  Structure and system as described are aspects of description.
>>> Descriptions are brought about by whole acts (descriptions) that yield
>>> incomplete descriptions. The wholeness of the act is always a given.  The
>>> 'completeness' of a description is contingent upon its adequacy.
>>> 
>>> Best,
>>> Huw
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 14 January 2016 at 19:53, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> Huw, Greg, Larry:
>>>> 
>>>> Austin, at least as understand him, is entirely interested in
>>>> performatives: that is, speech acts in which the making of a structure
>>>> (eg.
>>>> "I promise") is actually constitutive of some pragmatic function. That's
>>>> really not what I had in mind at all, Huw. First of all, I'm interested in
>>>> development, and performatives are few and ar between at both ends of the
>>>> developmental continuum (for infants, language is more often ancillary
>>>> than
>>>> constitutive and in adults some of the most developmentally important uses
>>>> of language are not public at all). Secondly, I don't think that Austin's
>>>> various felicity conditions are relevant to, say, negation: what does it
>>>> mean to say that only a person who is empowered to negate can validly
>>>> perform the function of negation? And thirdly--most importantly--I think
>>>> that what Austin has in mind is only structure and not system. But perhaps
>>>> I am an unenthusiastic and thus a rather poor reader of Austin: he always
>>>> struck me as a thinly disguised social-behaviorist.
>>>> 
>>>> Neither Halliday nor Jakobson really came up with the
>>>> paradigmatic/syntagmatic distinction, Greg: it goes back to de Saussure.
>>>> But de Saussure  called his paradigmatic dimension "associative", and this
>>>> placed him firmly in associationist psychology. Associationism really has
>>>> no room for the development of free will, and Halliday's notion of
>>>> "system"
>>>> requires it. A selection requires a selector. And language development is,
>>>> in Vygotskyan psychology, about the development of the selector. In HDHMF,
>>>> for example, Vygotsky actually says that the most important and most
>>>> fundamental problem in the whole of psychology is that of Buridan's
>>>> donkey.
>>>> 
>>>> Consider a four panel cartoon--the sort of thing you see on the comics
>>>> page
>>>> of a paper. If we "read" the cartoon horizontally, we get an essentially
>>>> syntagmatic relation--the default reading is that the events of the second
>>>> panel transpire after those of the first, and the events of the third
>>>> after
>>>> the second, etc.  But within each panel, we find drawings of bodies
>>>> (doing), faces (feeling), thought "bubbles" (thinking) and speech balloons
>>>> (saying). These CAN be syntagmatically related but they can also be
>>>> simultaneous, and if you are a Vygotskyan, hierarchically related (doing
>>>> may control feeling and feeling control thinking, and--in volition--we can
>>>> even imagine the very opposite chain of command).
>>>> 
>>>> Now, imagine a poetics in which these planes are related not only
>>>> hierarchically but paradigmatically. That is, a novel COULD be written as
>>>> a
>>>> set of more or less simultaneous doings (a historical novel). But it could
>>>> also be written as feelings (a sentimental novel), as thinkings (a novel
>>>> of
>>>> ideas) or as sayings (a novel of conversation). All of these are quite
>>>> different from organizing a story along the syntagmatic axis, which would
>>>> make it not a novel but an adventure story (here in France, the word for
>>>> novel is "roman" and--confusingly--the word for an adventure story is
>>>> "nouvelle", but back home in Korea novels are noun more descriptively as
>>>> "little talk"). I think that one of the important differences between
>>>> novels and adventure stories is precisely that the specific weight of
>>>> the environment and of individual volition are reversed, and the way this
>>>> is often realized is through a stress on syntagmatic, temporal relations
>>>> in
>>>> the adventure story and on paradigmatic, projective relations in the
>>>> novel.
>>>> 
>>>> I don't think that meaning potential can be entirely explained as
>>>> "presence
>>>> of absence", Larry, because linguistic systems are not always binary, and
>>>> even when they are, they tend to generate options within options rather
>>>> than absence of presence (language abhors a vaccuum). Take, for example,
>>>> intonation. We could argue that there are only two options: up or down.
>>>> But
>>>> in fact, we often find down-up ("RE-A-LLY?") and updown ('RE-A-LLY!"), and
>>>> there is also a fairly flat, neutral intonation ("'Really. Interesting.").
>>>> If I come to a branch in the road and go left instead of right, the right
>>>> fork in the road doesn't thereby cease to exist, even in my mind.
>>>> 
>>>> David Kellogg
>>>> Macquarie University
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On Fri, Jan 15, 2016 at 1:11 AM, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
>>>>> 
>>>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> David,
>>>>> Just wondering if Halliday is getting this from Roman Jakobson's
>>>>> syntagmatic vs. paradigmatic contrast?
>>>>> If so, then I'm wondering what happened to the notion of poetics in
>>>>> Halliday's thought. Poetical patterning seems absolutely essential to
>>>>> language learning, but I'd also tend to think of poetics as less than
>>>>> entirely volitional.
>>>>> Or to put the question more plainly, can you provide a little more
>>>> nuance
>>>>> to your statement:
>>>>> "The problem of grammar can be seen as aproblem of volitional choice,
>>>> and
>>>>> what needs to be explained in language development is the same thing
>>>> that
>>>>> needs to be explained in other branches of Vygotskyan psychology, namely
>>>>> the emergence of free will"
>>>>> -greg
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 10:28 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>>> Huw:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I'm using meaning potential in a somewhat technical, Hallidayan,
>>>> sense.
>>>>> For
>>>>>> Halliday every utterance has both structure and system. Structure we
>>>> know
>>>>>> about: it's syntagmatic, in the sense that it is laid out one step at
>>>> a
>>>>>> time (in time with speech and in space with writing). It's
>>>> non-Markovian,
>>>>>> in the sense that each step has some influence on the next steps and
>>>> not
>>>>>> simply on the next step (e.g.if you start a sentence with "the" you
>>>> are
>>>>>> going to need noun pretty soon, but not necessarily right away).
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> For example, if I find myself saying
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> "The artist David Bowie was not a chameleon; he just hired a lot of
>>>>>> different poorly paid adjuncts to write his songs"
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> My argument is laid out one step at a time: "The" and then "artist"
>>>> and
>>>>>> then "David" and then "Bowie" and then "was" (not "is", because of his
>>>>>> death), etc.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> System is a little different. First of all, it's paradigmatic, in the
>>>>> sense
>>>>>> that it can be thought of as  kind of drop-down menu. It's a free
>>>> choice,
>>>>>> in the sense that although context will favor certain "canonical"
>>>> choices
>>>>>> over others, I can create contexts (and that is what writers of verbal
>>>>> art
>>>>>> do). Each choice overlaps with a finite (often only two or three)
>>>> number
>>>>> of
>>>>>> choices not chosen. In this way "system" combines free will with
>>>>>> cultural-historical determination.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> For example, if I find myself saying "The artist David Bowie" when I
>>>> get
>>>>> to
>>>>>> the noun "artist" I could say "singer" or even "celebrity" but the
>>>> choice
>>>>>> is not infinite, particularly if I look at probability and not just
>>>>>> possibility. Even with proper nouns, in place of "Bowie" I could say
>>>>>> "Kellogg" or even "Cameron" but the number of choices is distinctly
>>>>>> limited. I could have said "is", but Bowie's death makes "was" more
>>>>>> canonical; by choosing "not", I am choosing from only two choices
>>>>> (because
>>>>>> an indicative clause can be either positive or negative in polarity
>>>> but
>>>>> not
>>>>>> both and not anything else) and yet by choosing the negative I am
>>>>> probably
>>>>>> saying something that goes against 99% of what will be said about
>>>> Bowie
>>>>> in
>>>>>> the days to come.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> This set of many small choices (some of which, like polarity, are
>>>> highly
>>>>>> skewed in probability) is not only true at the level of words, it is
>>>> also
>>>>>> true at the level of wording: I can choose to make a major or minor
>>>>> clause;
>>>>>> if major, I can choose to make an imperative or an indicative; if
>>>>>> indicative, I can go declarative or interrogative, etc. Each utterance
>>>>>> represents a kind of a path through an indefinite number of systems,
>>>> each
>>>>>> of which is a kind of menu providing a finite number of choices, and
>>>> this
>>>>>> is what makes language both infinitely complex and in practice easy to
>>>>> use.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> There are three important consequences of this somewhat technical use
>>>> of
>>>>>> "meaning potential". First of all, the problem of grammar can be seen
>>>> as
>>>>> a
>>>>>> problem of volitional choice, and what needs to be explained in
>>>> language
>>>>>> development is the same thing that needs to be explained in other
>>>>> branches
>>>>>> of Vygotskyan psychology, namely the emergence of free will. Secondly,
>>>>> the
>>>>>> choices that the speaker makes are made significant (made meaningful)
>>>> not
>>>>>> simply by pointing to context (this is really only true of infant
>>>>> language)
>>>>>> but instead by all the choices that the speaker did NOT make but COULD
>>>>> HAVE
>>>>>> made (this "could have" prevents the theory from dualism--the ideal is
>>>>>> simply the potentially real). And thirdly, finally, meaning potential
>>>> is
>>>>>> always linked to but distinct from meaning proper precisely in the
>>>> sense
>>>>> of
>>>>>> NON-participation: meaning potential is simply the road not taken.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>> Macquarie University
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 11:05 PM, Huw Lloyd <
>>>> huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> From what I have been reading and thinking, the biggest difference
>>>>>> between
>>>>>>> the conceptual system presented by Vygotsky and the of Leontiev
>>>> (most
>>>>> of
>>>>>>> which is well known) is the difference of the conceptualisation of
>>>>>> activity
>>>>>>> or the symbolic level (which is mostly absent for Vygotsky).
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Without necessarily refuting David's points, but indicating an
>>>>>> alternative
>>>>>>> interpretation, I would say:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 1. Learning how to apply or use something is still a constructive
>>>> act.
>>>>>> One
>>>>>>> does not have to understand the full technical make up of a
>>>> component
>>>>> in
>>>>>>> order to make use of it.  Indeed this is would entail an infinite
>>>>>> regress.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 2. I'm not fully clear what the assertion is with respect to active
>>>>>>> participation in meaning potential, but it is perfectly reasonable
>>>> to
>>>>>>> revisit the problem space that an old artefact is drawn from only to
>>>>>>> rediscover what this product achieves in terms of design.  This is
>>>>>> actually
>>>>>>> an excellent source of edification.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 3. Contemplation can be understood to be in response to an active
>>>>>> problem.
>>>>>>> There is nothing to say that activity must be glued to a specific
>>>> site.
>>>>>>> When I am programming, I am forever walking away from the computer
>>>> to
>>>>>> solve
>>>>>>> or express a particular problem.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Best,
>>>>>>> Huw
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On 13 January 2016 at 10:02, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Dear Haydi:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> In the very beginning of the text that Huw is reading, the
>>>> HIstory of
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> Development of the Higher Psychic Functions, Vygotsky writes of
>>>> the
>>>>>> basic
>>>>>>>> division psychology, between those who would treat the mind as
>>>>>> something
>>>>>>>> made by "Deus Sive Natura" ("God, i.e. Nature"), like the eye or
>>>> the
>>>>>> hand
>>>>>>>> or any other physical phenomenon, and those who would treat the
>>>> mind
>>>>> as
>>>>>>> (to
>>>>>>>> quote Mike's epigraph) an object which itself creates history. In
>>>> one
>>>>>>> case,
>>>>>>>> we have an object which really can be usefully described
>>>>> synoptically,
>>>>>>> like
>>>>>>>> a sculpture that we can walk all the way around. But in the other
>>>> we
>>>>>>> have a
>>>>>>>> process which can only be described dynamically, like a piece of
>>>>>> theatre
>>>>>>>> that walks around us while we sit and observe.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Of course, we CAN argue, the way that Vico would argue, that to
>>>>> produce
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> process is to fully understand it: we cannot fully understand the
>>>> eye
>>>>>> or
>>>>>>>> the hand, because although these things are part of us, they were
>>>>> made
>>>>>> by
>>>>>>>> God. We can understand a telescope or a hammer, because although
>>>>> these
>>>>>>>> things are not part of us, they were made by ourselves. And we can
>>>>> even
>>>>>>>> argue that the process of making it is essentially the process of
>>>>>>>> understanding it: once you have made a telescope or a hammer and
>>>> used
>>>>>> it,
>>>>>>>> you have understood everything there is to know about it. That
>>>> is, I
>>>>>>>> understand it, the position you attribute to dialectical logic, to
>>>>>> CHAT,
>>>>>>>> and to Davydov, and I think you attribute it correctly. The
>>>> problem
>>>>> is
>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>> I am not sure that the position itself is correct.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> The reason is this: we may be able to actively participate in the
>>>>>> process
>>>>>>>> of producing and using a telescope or a hammer. We may even
>>>> (although
>>>>>>> this
>>>>>>>> is much more problematic) actively participate in the process of
>>>>>>> producing
>>>>>>>> and using a mind or a personality. But our observational
>>>> standpoint
>>>>> is
>>>>>>>> nevertheless fixed by our position in time: we can never "actively
>>>>>>>> participate" in constructing the counterfactual potential, the
>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>> potential, of a telescope or a hammer, much less a mind or a
>>>>>> personality.
>>>>>>>> Our active participation is always fixed in the actual, and
>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>> potential is accessible only through contemplation. It may be
>>>>>>> contemplation
>>>>>>>> with activity firmly in mind, but it is only potentially active
>>>> and
>>>>> not
>>>>>>>> actually so.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> I think this is a fundamental difference between Vygotsky and
>>>>> Leontiev,
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> the activity theory that followed him: For Vygotsky, the autistic
>>>>>>> function
>>>>>>>> (that is, the irrealist function, the contemplative function which
>>>>>> turns
>>>>>>>> away from immediate activity) may come late (as Vygotsky points
>>>> out,
>>>>> it
>>>>>>>> receives major impetus from the acquisition of words and then
>>>>> concepts,
>>>>>>>> both of which come well after the beginning of social life), but
>>>> this
>>>>>>>> "autistic" contemplative function is then never out of date:
>>>> concepts
>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>> not formed purely through activity, but also through the turning
>>>> away
>>>>>>> from
>>>>>>>> reality oriented activity. And in that, he has the complete
>>>> support
>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> Lenin, who knew a thing or two about how concepts are joined to
>>>>> action.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>>> Macquarie University
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 12:06 AM, <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Thanks , David , for the two-parag. epigraph as always !
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> --First of all, Kant says we cannot know / cognize a material
>>>>> object
>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>> itself because a priori we don't have an image of it so  we are
>>>>>> unable
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>> have an overlap between the two ; hence agnosticism let alone
>>>>> 'inner
>>>>>>>>> connections' of a whole as 'moments' . Dialectical Logic (close
>>>>>>> relative
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>> CHAT) says as man relies on object-related activity while an
>>>> ideal
>>>>>>>>> adaptable to the future coming object ever runs through the
>>>>> activity
>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> finish , is able to penetrate the depths . When you put the
>>>> mental
>>>>>>> model
>>>>>>>>> into a material model , in reifying or objectifying that model
>>>>> into a
>>>>>>>>> finished product and all through the durational time , you can
>>>> see
>>>>>> what
>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>> necessary , essential and what is not . In higher momentums of
>>>>>>>> conception ,
>>>>>>>>> you reach concepts and this is the time you've got a theoretical
>>>>>>> rational
>>>>>>>>> cognitive copy of the inner mechanisms and transformations of
>>>> the
>>>>>>> related
>>>>>>>>> object or objects . When we say 'ideal' is a moment of an
>>>> activity
>>>>> ,
>>>>>> we
>>>>>>>>> mean it's ever running through uninterruptedly because the whole
>>>>>> entity
>>>>>>>>> falls down , collapses otherwise . Or if you aim to take it
>>>> wholly
>>>>>>> apart
>>>>>>>> ,
>>>>>>>>> again nothing is left for objectfication . Davydov says we
>>>> cannot
>>>>>> stop
>>>>>>> at
>>>>>>>>> phenomenology ; it's not to our will or taste ; we should ever
>>>>>>> reproduce
>>>>>>>>> our ever changing needs and products and that needs true science
>>>>> and
>>>>>>> true
>>>>>>>>> science needs true concepts . Yes , we want the object to move
>>>>>>>> (dynamicity)
>>>>>>>>> according to its inner transformations (moments) which has come
>>>> to
>>>>> us
>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>>> fixated knowledge in speech and skills historically . We don't
>>>> want
>>>>>> to
>>>>>>> be
>>>>>>>>> stuck in our position observing it to move . If you take
>>>> moments as
>>>>>>>> moments
>>>>>>>>> of your positioning while observing , you've not been able to
>>>>> convert
>>>>>>>> those
>>>>>>>>> phenomenal aspects (empiricism) into innermost movements hence
>>>>>>>> agnosticism
>>>>>>>>> prevails . Yes ,  We could somehow treat these moments as always
>>>>>>>> inhering ,
>>>>>>>>> how ? Are neoformations parts and parcels of some detachable
>>>>>>> independent
>>>>>>>>> separate phnomenon ? Are they not fused , interwoven ,
>>>> intertwined
>>>>>>>> moments
>>>>>>>>> of inner mechanisms of whole development (internalization ,
>>>>>>>> appropriation ,
>>>>>>>>> instruction , development , upbringing involved) ? Does
>>>> development
>>>>>> or
>>>>>>>> even
>>>>>>>>> periods of development contain , include some parts and parcels
>>>> or
>>>>> do
>>>>>>>> they
>>>>>>>>> subsume some moments of developmental transform
>> 
>> 
>> [The entire original message is not included.]
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 75
> Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2016 11:45:23 -0500
> From: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" <pmocombe@mocombeian.com>
> Subject: [Xmca-l]  Fwd: Article
> To: "eXtended Mind Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID: <61q8yuu028ob9uo11yqr1cls.1452876322669@email.android.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone
> 
> -------- Original message --------
> From: Cecile Wright <Cecile.Wright@nottingham.ac.uk> 
> Date: 1/15/2016  11:05 AM  (GMT-05:00) 
> To: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" <pmocombe@mocombeian.com>, v.showunmi@ioe.ac.uk, carol tomlin <caroltomlin8@msn.com> 
> Subject: Article 
> 
> 
> 
> Greetings,
> ?
> Please find attached a recent article.
> ?
> Best wishes,
> Cecile
> 
> 
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