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[Xmca-l] Re: Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie phenomenon

er - "quite" not "which appropriate." :)
*Andy Blunden*
On 14/01/2016 2:17 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
Very interesting questions, Sue.
* browse around research on the impact of the death of Princess Dianna Spencer. In my experience it had an even greater emotional impact globally. * Check out the work of Alain Badiou on the Event - not stuff I like, but there is a lot of discussion around it. * I think the idea of such moments and the period of their "overcoming" being instances of collective perezhivanie is which appropriate. I don't know of anyone looking at just this angle though.

*Andy Blunden*
On 14/01/2016 11:44 AM, Susan Davis wrote:
Hi all,

I am very interested in the recent discussion about moments and perhaps how that might connect to current experiences in relation to the news about David Bowie¹s death and possible experiences of individual and
collective perezhivanie.

The death of David Bowie has prompted a collective outpouring of grief,
and very public and personal recollections and sharing of
meaningful moments. Across social media platforms, in the news and conversations people recall the influence of his life and work, and on things that made a difference in their own lives. People are shedding very real tears, sorry for a life cut short too soon but also perhaps thinking about the person they themselves were, are, could have been or could become. I notice in particular people reflecting on the importance of Bowie¹s life and work for their own sexuality, creativity and courage to explore difference. There is a sense that people are experiencing Œperezhivanie¹, having a very real and very personal experience right now, but they are also revisiting significant moments from their past, sharing with others collectively, pausing to reflect, to construct and reconstruct meaning and in some cases this may translate to new action and experience
in lives going forward.

I am intrigued by what is going on with these Œmoments' and times of collective grieving and remembering, of how now opportunities for enormous collective global grief occur, and make a mark on individual lives, on networks and social worlds, and beyond. While there is a sense that these experiences may be fleeting and soon be replaced in people¹s lives by the latest crisis, disaster, gadget or internet sensation, there is also a sense that something significant has happened, we have been connected to something of momentary significance that is global, communal but also deeply personal. This seems like a form of Œperezhivanie¹ to meŠ does anyone have any other thoughts and reflections on this? On experiences of communal perezhivanie and how this is being further enabled through social

Is this something anyone is currently researching or is this a potential
new area for investigation?

Kind regards


Dr Susan Davis
Senior Lecturer | School of Education & the Arts/Higher Education Division
CQUniversity Noosa, PO Box 1128, Noosaville Qld 4566
P +61 (0)7 5440 7007 | M +61 (0)418 763 428 | E s.davis@cqu.edu.au

CQU Website: www.cqu.edu.au

On 12/01/2016 5:35 pm, "Huw Lloyd" <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> wrote:

Thank you David and Haydi. That's insightful.

Would it be correct to summarise this idea as: a moment is the manifestation of the whole (transformation) in the instant, which is a
progression in its transformation?

Presumably molar goes back to molecule? I can't see how it relates to to
teeth/molars at present...


On 12 January 2016 at 06:37, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:

Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in
wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is. Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation
between "moment" and music.

I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant
is a
moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of
(and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting").

First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology
in a
way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something
like a
sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is
always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it.
means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect:
as we
observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even
much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because
nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of
angular momentum.

Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and
uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different
the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context
culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis", "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem, where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible.

I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can
say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between
radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much
same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way
grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for
is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text).

David Kellogg
Macquarie University

On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> wrote:

Dear all ,

Look at this please !

[[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a
experiment: 1) The
object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its
essence can be revealed
particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental
transformations; 3) this same
experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which
object is
³embedded.² If the construction of this object can still be
a process of
abstraction of the real object¹s properties, then this third moment
essentially becomes a
productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only
within this special
system of links that the object¹s content gets revealed.]]

This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity ,
, operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate
componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself ,
action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or independence or invariability. At each point of succession or
motionality ,
because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives
, emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be
in the other as we all have seen .

And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played
all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition .
It's a
whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of
ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to
how to express it and he might finally resort to imitation . Then ,
philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single
note in
whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on
such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state
Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is
to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources
such qurries but I can't give a locus now .