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[Xmca-l] Collective moments and perezhivanie - the Bowie phenomenon



Hi all, 

I am very interested in the recent discussion about moments and perhaps
how that might connect to current experiences in relation to the news
about David Bowie¹s death and possible experiences of individual and
collective perezhivanie.

The death of David Bowie has prompted a collective outpouring of grief,
and very public and personal recollections and sharing of
meaningful moments.  Across social media platforms, in the news and
conversations people recall the influence of his life and work, and on
things that made a difference in their own lives.   People are shedding
very real tears, sorry for a life cut short too soon but also perhaps
thinking about the person they themselves were, are, could have been or
could become. I notice in particular people reflecting on the importance
of Bowie¹s life and work for their own sexuality, creativity and courage
to explore difference. There is a sense that people are experiencing
Œperezhivanie¹, having a very real and very personal experience right now,
but they are also revisiting significant moments from their past, sharing
with others collectively, pausing to reflect, to construct and reconstruct
meaning and in some cases this may translate to new action and experience
in lives going forward.
 

I am intrigued by what is going on with these Œmoments' and times of
collective grieving and remembering, of how now opportunities for enormous
collective global grief occur, and make a mark on individual lives, on
networks and social worlds, and beyond. While there is a sense that these
experiences may be fleeting and soon be replaced in people¹s lives by the
latest crisis, disaster, gadget or internet sensation, there is also a
sense that something significant has happened, we have been connected to
something of momentary significance that is global, communal but also
deeply personal. This seems like a form of Œperezhivanie¹ to meŠ does
anyone have any other thoughts and reflections on this? On experiences of
communal perezhivanie and how this is being further enabled through social
media? 

Is this something anyone is currently researching or is this a potential
new area for investigation?


Kind regards

Sue 

Dr Susan Davis
Senior Lecturer | School of Education & the Arts/Higher Education Division
CQUniversity Noosa, PO Box 1128, Noosaville Qld 4566
P +61 (0)7 5440 7007 | M +61 (0)418 763 428 | E s.davis@cqu.edu.au

CQU Website: www.cqu.edu.au
 <http://www.cqu.edu.au/>
 





On 12/01/2016 5:35 pm, "Huw Lloyd" <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> wrote:

>Thank you David and Haydi. That's insightful.
>
>Would it be correct to summarise this idea as: a moment is the
>manifestation of the whole (transformation) in the instant, which is a
>progression in its transformation?
>
>Presumably molar goes back to molecule?  I can't see how it relates to to
>teeth/molars at present...
>
>Best,
>Huw
>
>
>
>
>
>On 12 January 2016 at 06:37, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in
>>the
>> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is.
>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation
>> between "moment" and music.
>>
>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant
>>is a
>> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three
>> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of
>>"moment"
>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the
>> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting").
>>
>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology
>>in a
>> way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something
>>like a
>> sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe
>> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is
>>almost
>> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the
>> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic
>> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it.
>>This
>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect:
>>as we
>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even
>>present,
>> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat
>> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a
>> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or
>> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the
>> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of
>> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because
>>even
>> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining
>> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of
>> angular momentum.
>>
>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and
>>sometimes
>> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The
>> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different
>>from
>> the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but
>> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context
>>of
>> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a
>> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed
>> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological
>> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis",
>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem,
>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible.
>>
>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described
>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can
>>seriously
>> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same
>> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly
>> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between
>>solar
>> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is
>> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the
>> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much
>>the
>> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech
>> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we
>> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the
>> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way
>>to
>> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for
>>example,
>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more
>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to
>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text).
>>
>> David Kellogg
>> Macquarie University
>>
>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> >
>> > Dear all ,
>> >
>> > Look at this please !
>> >
>> > [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a
>>thought
>> > experiment: 1) The
>> > object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its
>> > essence can be revealed
>> > particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental
>> > transformations; 3) this same
>> > experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which
>> the
>> > object is
>> > ³embedded.² If the construction of this object can still be
>>represented
>> as
>> > a process of
>> > abstraction of the real object¹s properties, then this third moment
>> > essentially becomes a
>> > productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only
>> > within this special
>> > system of links that the object¹s content gets revealed.]]
>> >
>> > This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity ,
>>action
>> > , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate
>> even
>> > componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular
>> > succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal
>> > instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself ,
>>nor
>> > action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or
>> > independence or invariability. At each point of succession or
>> motionality ,
>> > because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives
>> > , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be
>> converted
>> > in the other as we all have seen .
>> >
>> > And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played
>>with
>> > all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition .
>>It's a
>> > whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable
>> > feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a
>> > particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of
>>affect
>> or
>> > ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to
>>think
>> of
>> > how to express it and he might  finally resort to imitation . Then ,
>>the
>> > philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single
>>note in
>> > whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on
>> which
>> > such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state
>>occurs
>> .
>> > Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or
>> > immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute
>> > might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is
>>said
>> > to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources
>> for
>> > such qurries but I can't give a locus now .
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > Best
>> >
>> > Haydi
>> >
>> >
>> >
>>