[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

[Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)

Thank you , Andy ! especially when you refer to the opposition between mass material and molecular ; that's quite obvious ; you come near mine as 'variables in a state of fusion' . 

      From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
 To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu 
 Sent: Tuesday, 12 January 2016, 11:14:46
 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
molar is derivged from the Laton moler meaning "mass" and 
molecule is derived from the same root. "Molecule" 
originated from discussions around Descartes' ideas, in same 
sense as the modern usage. "Molar" only emerged in the 1870s 
with the sense of a *mass* of material, explicitly in 
contrast to molecular. So the words form a pair of 
opposites, both originating from the same root.


*Andy Blunden*
On 12/01/2016 6:35 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote:
> Thank you David and Haydi. That's insightful.
> Would it be correct to summarise this idea as: a moment is the
> manifestation of the whole (transformation) in the instant, which is a
> progression in its transformation?
> Presumably molar goes back to molecule?  I can't see how it relates to to
> teeth/molars at present...
> Best,
> Huw
> On 12 January 2016 at 06:37, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
>> Thanks, Haydi--I have always wondered what the word "molar" means (in the
>> wk of Leontiev) and what the relationship to chemistry and dentistry is.
>> Your explanation cleared this up, as well as clearing up the relation
>> between "moment" and music.
>> I'm not so sure that Andy's contribution--the idea that what is meant is a
>> moment in calculus--is so irrelevant. You see, for me there are three
>> problems that we have to work out in annotating Vygotsky's use of "moment"
>> (and actually I think that the task of annotating Vygotsky's work is the
>> real next step in Vygotsky studies, not mindless "mythbusting").
>> First of all, "moment" is used in Kant, in Hegel, and in phenomenology in a
>> way I would characterize as SYNOPTIC--that is, to describe something like a
>> sculpture which does not move, which we may circumambulate and describe
>> from various sides. But in Vygotsky the "object" being described is almost
>> always no object at all, but rather an unfolding process. Where the
>> synoptic object does not move and can be circumambulated, the dynamic
>> object moves, and we are usually stuck in one position, observing it. This
>> means that the "moments" are only aspects of the whole in retrospect: as we
>> observe they tend to appear as neoformations which were not even present,
>> much less typical, of the phenomenon previously. We could somehow treat
>> these moments as always inhering, the way that puberty is implicit in a
>> newborn infant) but treating real psychic phenomena like speech or
>> musicality that way seems absurdly teleological and seems to deny the
>> irreducible unpredictability of development. I think that the idea of
>> "moment" as being a moment of an integral gets us around this (because even
>> nonlinear functions can be integrated). Certainly if I were explaining
>> "moment" to a high school teacher of science, I would use the example of
>> angular momentum.
>> Secondly, Vygotsky (and also Hegel) sometimes uses "moment" and sometimes
>> uses "instance". Are these different? It seems to me that they are. The
>> cline of instantiation, in Hallidayan linguistics, is quite different from
>> the description of development. A text is an instance of a language, but
>> it's not a 'moment'. A context of situation is an instance of a context of
>> culture, but it's not a moment of it. We cannot say that "weather" is a
>> "moment" in the development of a climate: it's an instance. Viewed
>> synoptically, weather and climate are simply to different chronological
>> sections of one and the same phenomenon (akin to using "phylogenesis",
>> "ontogenesis", "microgenesis"). But that brings me to a third problem,
>> where it seems to me that Haydi's musical analogy is indispensible.
>> I think that it is only when we treat the phenomenon to be described
>> synoptically, and not when we treat it dynamically, that we can seriously
>> say that, for example, weather and climate are descriptions of the same
>> phenomenon which differ in granularity. In fact, weather is chiefly
>> influenced by wind; the angle of the sun (or the relationship between solar
>> radiation absorbed and solar radiation reflected out into space) is
>> present, but it is much less immediately causal. With climate, it's the
>> other way around. When we say that word meaning develops, we see much the
>> same qualitative shifts: sense is a constitutive moment of infant speech
>> while signiication is quite peripheral, whereas with dialogue on xmca we
>> have the reverse relationship. This shift in the organic make up of the
>> phenomenon also occurs with other dynamic phenomena, and an obvious way to
>> grasp this is Haydi's example of music: recitative in opera, for example,
>> is dominated by melody (derived from speech), but arias are much more
>> regular and rhythmical (and for this reason stand somewhat closer to
>> emotion and to logical thought, even when looked at as text).
>> David Kellogg
>> Macquarie University
>> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 6:04 PM, <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> wrote:
>>> Dear all ,
>>> Look at this please !
>>> [[V. S. Bibler has singled out the following basic features of a thought
>>> experiment: 1) The
>>> object of cognition is mentally transferred to conditions where its
>>> essence can be revealed
>>> particularly clearly; 2) this object then undergoes further mental
>>> transformations; 3) this same
>>> experiment leads to the formation of a system of mental links in which
>> the
>>> object is
>>> “embedded.” If the construction of this object can still be represented
>> as
>>> a process of
>>> abstraction of the real object’s properties, then this third moment
>>> essentially becomes a
>>> productive contribution to the mentally represented object. It is only
>>> within this special
>>> system of links that the object’s content gets revealed.]]
>>> This is the same with "activity" as "molar" , that is , activity , action
>>> , operation are not parts or stages of a whole , discrete and separate
>> even
>>> componential . As I can think of it , it is a point in a circular
>>> succession of a whole which could naturally be manifest in temporal
>>> instants . By definition , in a round of activity , neither itself , nor
>>> action , nor operation could keep to their constancy or stability or
>>> independence or invariability. At each point of succession or
>> motionality ,
>>> because of opposites , alterations in drives , motives
>>> , emotional incentives or stimuation , each of the three could be
>> converted
>>> in the other as we all have seen .
>>> And there's an affinity in music domain . A whole melody is played with
>>> all nuances , pitch , other contours in their entire composition . It's a
>>> whole to be absorbed in its entirety so that the invited pleasurable
>>> feeling is obtained . Usually some individual wouldn't refer to a
>>> particular part or stage orietating on which this or that kind of affect
>> or
>>> ecstacy runs through the soul . The individual might even stop to think
>> of
>>> how to express it and he might  finally resort to imitation . Then , the
>>> philosopher , might refer to that particular point or that single note in
>>> whole composition or in playing as moment or as a temporal instant on
>> which
>>> such and such a manifestation , event , episode , feature , state occurs
>> .
>>> Taking that single note apart from the whole might be uncognizable or
>>> immanipulative in itself and the whole without it or with a substitute
>>> might lose the favor . Another example might be the "ideal" which is said
>>> to be immersed in material activity . Davydov's works are good sources
>> for
>>> such qurries but I can't give a locus now .
>>> Best
>>> Haydi