[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

[Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)

Hi Huw,

As I said, the blog offers a simple and accessible account.  If you want something more detailed, you could try this:

Smith, B. (Ed.), Parts and moments studies in logic and formal ontology. Munich: Philosophia Verlag. 



On Jan 11, 2016, at 6:23 AM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hi Martin,
> I don't think the usage of 'moment' in the link connects in a
> straightforward way with its usage in the HMF volume.
> I would also like to say that this notion of wholes and moments presented
> in the blog is incomplete and incorrect.  For example, the assertion "You
> don’t take the color away from the mac mouse to study it in another room"
> is obviously false in the sense that you can walk into another room and
> recall the experience of its colour.  Likewise the notion of a 'whole' that
> is presented is rather crass, as if being an object that one can heft
> somehow qualified it as being independent.
> Best,
> Huw
> On 11 January 2016 at 01:20, Martin John Packer <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co>
> wrote:
>> The term "moment" has been used extensively in phenomenology.  Here is an
>> accessible account of the basics:
>> <
>> https://barebonescommunication.wordpress.com/2009/10/21/kleingeld-phenomenology-pieces-and-moments/
>> Martin
>> On Jan 10, 2016, at 7:23 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>> The theoretical point seems interesting and worth clarifying. The
>> differing
>>> interpretations have quite different implications.
>>> mike
>>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:10 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>>>> Actually, Hegel does not use "moment" as meaning a stage, phase or step,
>>>> David. He tends to use phase, category, stage or division for those
>>>> concepts.
>>>> Individual, Particular and Universal are typical examples of "moments"
>> but
>>>> these are not steps, phases or stages of the concepts, even though they
>> are
>>>> also exhibited in this way. Every concrete concept has all three
>> moments.
>>>> In a trade union, the members, the branches/divisions and the general
>>>> secretary are individual, universal and particular moments. We cannot
>>>> conceive of a union developing from an individual to a branch to a
>> general
>>>> secretary, can we?
>>>> I will look into the origins of this expression. I have always just
>>>> presumed it came from mathematics, as in the first, second, third, ...
>>>> moments of a function, and I know Hegel did study this branch of
>>>> mathematics, because he gives a lot of space to it in the Science of
>> Logic
>>>> in his critique of calculus. But I am probably quite wrong. I'll check.
>>>> Andy
>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>> On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote:
>>>>> Huw:
>>>>> Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even more often "moments", and the
>> word
>>>>> "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a phase, or a step (as in the
>> three
>>>>> "moments" of the formation of the concept in Hegel, as in "in itself",
>>>>> "for
>>>>> others", "for myself".
>>>>> One of the most difficult problems we had to solve in translating the
>>>>> Lectures on Pedology was that Vygotsky very clearly distinguishes three
>>>>> moments of speech development: indicative, nominative, and signifying.
>>>>> "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a pointing gesture.
>> "Nominating" is
>>>>> ipso facto verbal, because it is the naming function: "every thing has
>> a
>>>>> name". But "signifying" is much harder to pin down, and in one place
>>>>> Vygotsky actually says that it is synonymous with the adult
>> understanding
>>>>> that anything can be named. So what is the difference between knowing
>> that
>>>>> everything has a name and the knowledge that any thing can be named?
>>>>> I think that the distinction is just as subtle and just as significant
>>>>> as the distinction between pointing to something with a gesture,
>> pointing
>>>>> to something with a word like "this" or "that", and pointing to
>> something
>>>>> with a word like "apple" or "pear". If I say that "everything has a
>> name",
>>>>> the name could be extremely general ("everything" or "thing") or it
>> could
>>>>> be highly specific ("Huw" or "this computer"). But I don't yet have the
>>>>> idea that names are invented, and that therefore it is possible to name
>>>>> objects which do not exist, and therefore to bring into existence
>> modes of
>>>>> pure abstract thinking through language. That's signifying, and it is
>>>>> indeed a new moment, or a new instant, in the lifelong process of
>> speech
>>>>> development.
>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>> Macquarie University
>>>>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>> Thank you, David. That helps to explain a particular aspect that I
>> thought
>>>>>> Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative, which is that stimuli can
>> not
>>>>>> only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they afford the kind of dynamics
>>>>>> you
>>>>>> have elucidated from Volkelt's schema.
>>>>>> I have also noted that the translation of phrases like "instances of a
>>>>>> process" is probably off the mark too.  What is really meant, I
>> believe,
>>>>>> is
>>>>>> "instants of a process".  These have two rather different meanings
>> from
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> perspective of thinking about processes.
>>>>>> Best,
>>>>>> Huw
>>>>>> On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>>>>> Huw:
>>>>>>> Here's what Vygotsky really says:
>>>>>>> Если задача не превышает естественных сил ребенка, он справляется с
>> ней
>>>>>>> непосредственным или примитивным способом. В этих случаях структура
>> его
>>>>>>> поведения совершенно напоминает схему, нарисованную Фолькельтом.
>>>>>> (Russian
>>>>>>> Collected Works, p. 117).
>>>>>>> This means (as nearly as I can make out): "If the task did not go
>> beyond
>>>>>>> the natural capability of the child, he could deal with it in an
>>>>>> unmediated
>>>>>>> or primitive method. In this cases, the structure of his behavior
>> would
>>>>>> be
>>>>>>> completely similar to the scheme as presented by Volkelt".
>>>>>>> I think there is no diagramme, at least not in the sense of a two
>>>>>>> dimensional graphic one can have a copy of. What Vygotsky is
>> referring
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>> is Volkelt's attempt to explain all child behavior as the result of
>> an
>>>>>>> affectively tinged FUSION of perception and behavior, an affectively
>>>>>>> colored, unanalyzable, whole  in which perception and behavior were
>>>>>>> absolutely inseparable. This was what Hans Volkelt concluded from a
>>>>>> series
>>>>>>> of experiments that Vygotsky refers to repeatedly, both in HDHMF and
>> in
>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> Lectures on Pedology and elswhere.
>>>>>>> What Volkelt did was this: he had four baby bottles: one shaped like
>> a
>>>>>>> triangle, one like a violin, one like a square, etc. They were all
>>>>>>> different colors as well. But three of them didn't have holes in the
>>>>>> teat:
>>>>>>> you could see and smell the milk but you couldn't drink it. One did.
>> He
>>>>>>> taught the infants to associate the drinking of milk and the feeling
>> of
>>>>>>> satiation with one particular bottle, so that they would actually
>> ignore
>>>>>>> the bottle unless it had all the characteristics: triangularity,
>>>>>> blueness,
>>>>>>> etc. So Volkelt argued that from the child's point of view, he was
>> not
>>>>>>> drinking milk but triangular blue milk. This kind of "affectively
>>>>>>> colored
>>>>>>> whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as "Volkelt's scheme", or
>> "Volkelt's
>>>>>>> schemata".
>>>>>>> Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He eventually decided that we
>> never
>>>>>>> grow out of unanalyzable affectively colored perception-behavior
>> wholes,
>>>>>>> and this would explain the indivisible and inseparable devotion of
>> the
>>>>>>> German volk to their Fuhrer. So in later work Vygotsky is very
>> careful
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>> distance himself from Volkelt even in his explanations of infant
>>>>>> behavior:
>>>>>>> in the Lectures on Pedology he argues that ALL THREE layers of
>> behavior
>>>>>>> (that is, instinct, habit, and intelligence) are present in infancy.
>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>> Macquarie University
>>>>>>> On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM, Huw Lloyd <
>> huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>> Does anyone have a copy of "Volkelt's diagram" to hand that is
>> referred
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> in The History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions (1997,
>>>>>>> p.85
>>>>>>> and onwards in ch. 4)?  I don't think a reference is given.
>>>>>>>> Best,
>>>>>>>> Huw
>>> --
>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an
>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch