# [Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)

No all the science-related meanings are derived from either Integral of f(x) * (x to power n). Torque is related to angular momentum which is an integral of mass* distance from axis. The interpreation this leads to is that each "moment" expresses a property of the whole function. A function can be represented either by a series of values for each x, or by the series of moments. The zero-th moment is the total mass, the first moment is the "torque". Higher moments arise when you are dealing with flexible systems, or dynamic systems with inertia.
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YOu also get the term arising with power series, I think, which is a kind of inverse of the above.
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Andy
------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
On 11/01/2016 11:08 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote:
```
Is torque being used here in the sense that the moon influences the tides? E.g. conceiving stages as pendulum like things that, when, considered together may appear as 'torque' applied to a base form. If so, then perhaps the meaning may be the same overall, i.e. a moment from one aspect appearing as torque in another.
```
Best,
Huw

```
On 11 January 2016 at 01:59, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
```
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, in sense
9. "moment" means "An essential element or significant
aspect of a complex conceptual entity" first used in a
translation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in 1838.
But the OED also refers to "moment" in meaning 8c as
"torque," so I guess that exposes a bit of Cole word
play going on there, yes?
Andy
------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
<http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
On 11/01/2016 12:36 PM, mike cole wrote:

I found Martin's blog entry helpful, Andy. Still
working on the phenomenology of the usage. I think
the form of part-whole relation is what is at
issue and "moments" in this sense are
qualitatively distinct, marked, events. Events
whose conventional meaning is torqued by the
exception.

still learning!
mike

On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 5:29 PM, Andy Blunden
<ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
<mailto:ablunden@mira.net
<mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> wrote:

I am not at all clear about the context here,
Mike.
Huw mentioned Vygotsky using "instances" which he
thought should have been "instants" and then David
introduced "moments" and Hegel's use of "moments,"
which was the subject of my comment.

I did a search of "Thinking and Speech" and
found that
all bar one instance of the use of the word
"moment"
were in the sense of "at this moment in the
story ..."
The one odd reference is this one:

"We have consistently taken a genetic
approach to the
analysis of our problem. We have, however,
attempted to
represent the *moments* of this genetic
process in
their
mature, classic forms. The inevitable
result is that we
have diverged from the complex and twisting
path that
characterizes the actual development of the
child’s
concepts."

It is possible that Vygotsky refers with
"moment" here
to the distinct modes of conception which were
manifested in the child's activity, at different
stages, but which are combined in the most
developed
pseudoconcept. It is a fact that associative
complexes, collection complexes, chain complexes,
diffuse complexes, and pseudocomplexes could not
possibly manifest themselves as successive stages.
Perhaps their *first appearance* in
ontogenesis could
form some kind of regular sequence, possibly,
but it
is also possible that Vygotsky saw these forms of
association as "moments" of concept formation
in the
other sense of the word "moment" which is not
interchangeable with "instant". But I couldn't
say for
sure.

Andy

------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
<http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
<http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
On 11/01/2016 11:23 AM, mike cole wrote:

The theoretical point seems interesting
and worth
clarifying. The differing interpretations have
quite different implications.
mike

On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:10 PM, Andy Blunden
<ablunden@mira.net
<mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
<mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
<mailto:ablunden@mira.net
<mailto:ablunden@mira.net>

<mailto:ablunden@mira.net
<mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>>> wrote:

Actually, Hegel does not use "moment"
as meaning a
stage, phase or step, David. He tends
to use
phase,
category, stage or division for those
concepts.

Individual, Particular and Universal
are typical
examples of "moments" but these are
not steps,
phases
or stages of the concepts, even though
they
are also
exhibited in this way. Every concrete
concept
has all
three moments. In a trade union, the
members, the
branches/divisions and the general
secretary are
individual, universal and particular
moments. We
cannot conceive of a union developing
from an
individual to a branch to a general
secretary,
can we?

I will look into the origins of this
expression. I
have always just presumed it came from
mathematics, as
in the first, second, third, ...
moments of a
function, and I know Hegel did study this
branch of
mathematics, because he gives a lot of
space
to it in
the Science of Logic in his critique of
calculus. But
I am probably quite wrong. I'll check.

Andy
------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
<http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
<http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
<http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>

On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg
wrote:

Huw:

Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even
more often
"moments", and the word
"moment" sometimes means a stage, or a
phase, or a
step (as in the three
"moments" of the formation of the
concept in
Hegel, as in "in itself", "for
others", "for myself".

One of the most difficult problems
to solve
in translating the
Lectures on Pedology was that
Vygotsky very
clearly distinguishes three
moments of speech development:
indicative,
nominative, and signifying.
"Indicative" is often non-verbal,
e.g. a
pointing
gesture. "Nominating" is
ipso facto verbal, because it is
the naming
function: "every thing has a
name". But "signifying" is much
harder to pin
down, and in one place
Vygotsky actually says that it is
synonymous with
that anything can be named. So
what is the
difference between knowing that
everything has a name and the
knowledge
that any
thing can be named?

I think that the distinction is
just as
subtle and
just as significant
as the distinction between pointing to
something
with a gesture, pointing
to something with a word like
"this" or
"that",
and pointing to something
with a word like "apple" or
"pear". If I
say that
"everything has a name",
the name could be extremely general
("everything"
or "thing") or it could
be highly specific ("Huw" or "this
computer"). But
I don't yet have the
idea that names are invented, and that
therefore
it is possible to name
objects which do not exist, and
therefore
to bring
into existence modes of
pure abstract thinking through
language.
That's
signifying, and it is
indeed a new moment, or a new
instant, in the
lifelong process of speech
development.

David Kellogg
Macquarie University

On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM,
Huw Lloyd
<huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
<mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
<mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
<mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>>
<mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
<mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
<mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
<mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>>>>
wrote:

Thank you, David. That helps
to explain a
particular aspect that I thought
Vygotsky was overlooking in
the narrative,
which is that stimuli can not
only signify but also
symbolise, i.e. they
afford the kind of dynamics you
have elucidated from Volkelt's
schema.

I have also noted that the
translation of
phrases like "instances of a
process" is probably off the mark
too.  What
is really meant, I believe, is
```
"instants of a process". These have two
```                            rather different meanings from the
perspective of thinking about
processes.

Best,
Huw

On 10 January 2016 at 06:02,
David Kellogg
<dkellogg60@gmail.com
<mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>
<mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com
<mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>>
<mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com
<mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>

<mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com
<mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>>>> wrote:

Huw:

Here's what Vygotsky
really says:

Если задача не превышает
естественных сил
ребенка, он справляется с ней
непосредственным или
примитивным
способом.
В этих случаях структура его
поведения совершенно
напоминает схему,
нарисованную Фолькельтом.

(Russian

Collected Works, p. 117).

This means (as nearly as I can
make out):
"If the task did not go beyond
the natural capability of the
child, he
could deal with it in an

unmediated

or primitive method. In this
cases, the
structure of his behavior
would

be

completely similar to the
scheme as
presented by Volkelt".

I think there is no
diagramme, at
least
not in the sense of a two
dimensional graphic one
can have a
copy
of. What Vygotsky is
referring to
is Volkelt's attempt to
explain
all child
behavior as the result of an
affectively tinged FUSION of
perception
and behavior, an affectively
colored, unanalyzable,
whole in which
perception and behavior were
absolutely inseparable.
This was
what Hans
Volkelt concluded from a

series

of experiments that
Vygotsky refers to
repeatedly, both in HDHMF
and in

the

Lectures on Pedology and
elswhere.

baby bottles: one shaped
like a
triangle, one like a
violin, one
like a
square, etc. They were all
different colors as well.
But three of
them didn't have holes in the

teat:

you could see and smell
the milk
but you
couldn't drink it. One did. He
taught the infants to
associate the
drinking of milk and the
feeling of
satiation with one particular
bottle, so
that they would actually
ignore
the bottle unless it had
all the
characteristics:
triangularity,

blueness,

etc. So Volkelt argued
that from the
child's point of view, he
was not
drinking milk but
triangular blue
milk.
This kind of "affectively
colored
whole" is what Vygotsky
refers to as
"Volkelt's scheme", or
"Volkelt's
schemata".

Volkelt's scheme came to a
eventually decided that we
never
grow out of unanalyzable
affectively
colored
perception-behavior wholes,
and this would explain the
indivisible and
inseparable devotion of the
German volk to their
Fuhrer. So in
later
work Vygotsky is very
careful to
distance himself from
Volkelt even
in his
explanations of infant

behavior:

in the Lectures on Pedology he
argues that
ALL THREE layers of behavior
(that is, instinct, habit, and
intelligence) are present
in infancy.

David Kellogg
Macquarie University

On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at
10:50 PM,
Huw Lloyd
<huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
<mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
<mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
<mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>>
```
<mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
```        <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
<mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
<mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>>>>
wrote:

Does anyone have a copy of
"Volkelt's
diagram" to hand that
is referred

to

in The History of the
Development of
Higher Mental
Functions (1997,

p.85

and onwards in ch. 4)?  I
don't think
a reference is given.

Best,
Huw

--
It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a
natural science with an
object that creates history. Ernst Boesch

```
--
```        It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a
natural science with an
object that creates history. Ernst Boesch

```
```

```