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[Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)



just cole's intuitions as enacted at a crucial juncture by his fingers.
mike

On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 5:59 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:

> According to the Oxford English Dictionary, in sense 9. "moment" means "An
> essential element or significant aspect of a complex conceptual entity"
> first used in a translation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in 1838.
> But the OED also refers to "moment" in meaning 8c as "torque," so I guess
> that exposes a bit of Cole word play going on there, yes?
> Andy
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> On 11/01/2016 12:36 PM, mike cole wrote:
>
>> I found Martin's blog entry helpful, Andy. Still working on the
>> phenomenology of the usage. I think the form of part-whole relation is what
>> is at issue and "moments" in this sense are qualitatively distinct, marked,
>> events. Events whose conventional meaning is torqued by the exception.
>>
>> still learning!
>> mike
>>
>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 5:29 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:
>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
>>
>>     I am not at all clear about the context here, Mike.
>>     Huw mentioned Vygotsky using "instances" which he
>>     thought should have been "instants" and then David
>>     introduced "moments" and Hegel's use of "moments,"
>>     which was the subject of my comment.
>>
>>     I did a search of "Thinking and Speech" and found that
>>     all bar one instance of the use of the word "moment"
>>     were in the sense of "at this moment in the story ..."
>>     The one odd reference is this one:
>>
>>        "We have consistently taken a genetic approach to the
>>        analysis of our problem. We have, however, attempted to
>>        represent the *moments* of this genetic process in
>>     their
>>        mature, classic forms. The inevitable result is that we
>>        have diverged from the complex and twisting path that
>>        characterizes the actual development of the child’s
>>        concepts."
>>
>>     It is possible that Vygotsky refers with "moment" here
>>     to the distinct modes of conception which were
>>     manifested in the child's activity, at different
>>     stages, but which are combined in the most developed
>>     pseudoconcept. It is a fact that associative
>>     complexes, collection complexes, chain complexes,
>>     diffuse complexes, and pseudocomplexes could not
>>     possibly manifest themselves as successive stages.
>>     Perhaps their *first appearance* in ontogenesis could
>>     form some kind of regular sequence, possibly, but it
>>     is also possible that Vygotsky saw these forms of
>>     association as "moments" of concept formation in the
>>     other sense of the word "moment" which is not
>>     interchangeable with "instant". But I couldn't say for
>>     sure.
>>
>>     Andy
>>
>>     ------------------------------------------------------------
>>     *Andy Blunden*
>>     http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>     <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>     On 11/01/2016 11:23 AM, mike cole wrote:
>>
>>         The theoretical point seems interesting and worth
>>         clarifying. The differing interpretations have
>>         quite different implications.
>>         mike
>>
>>         On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:10 PM, Andy Blunden
>>         <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
>>         <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
>>
>>         <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> wrote:
>>
>>             Actually, Hegel does not use "moment" as meaning a
>>             stage, phase or step, David. He tends to use
>>         phase,
>>             category, stage or division for those concepts.
>>
>>             Individual, Particular and Universal are typical
>>             examples of "moments" but these are not steps,
>>         phases
>>             or stages of the concepts, even though they
>>         are also
>>             exhibited in this way. Every concrete concept
>>         has all
>>             three moments. In a trade union, the members, the
>>             branches/divisions and the general secretary are
>>             individual, universal and particular moments. We
>>             cannot conceive of a union developing from an
>>             individual to a branch to a general secretary,
>>         can we?
>>
>>             I will look into the origins of this expression. I
>>             have always just presumed it came from
>>         mathematics, as
>>             in the first, second, third, ... moments of a
>>             function, and I know Hegel did study this
>>         branch of
>>             mathematics, because he gives a lot of space
>>         to it in
>>             the Science of Logic in his critique of
>>         calculus. But
>>             I am probably quite wrong. I'll check.
>>
>>             Andy
>>         ------------------------------------------------------------
>>             *Andy Blunden*
>>         http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>         <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>             <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>
>>             On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote:
>>
>>                 Huw:
>>
>>                 Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even
>>         more often
>>                 "moments", and the word
>>                 "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a
>>         phase, or a
>>                 step (as in the three
>>                 "moments" of the formation of the concept in
>>                 Hegel, as in "in itself", "for
>>                 others", "for myself".
>>
>>                 One of the most difficult problems we had
>>         to solve
>>                 in translating the
>>                 Lectures on Pedology was that Vygotsky very
>>                 clearly distinguishes three
>>                 moments of speech development: indicative,
>>                 nominative, and signifying.
>>                 "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a
>>         pointing
>>                 gesture. "Nominating" is
>>                 ipso facto verbal, because it is the naming
>>                 function: "every thing has a
>>                 name". But "signifying" is much harder to pin
>>                 down, and in one place
>>                 Vygotsky actually says that it is
>>         synonymous with
>>                 the adult understanding
>>                 that anything can be named. So what is the
>>                 difference between knowing that
>>                 everything has a name and the knowledge
>>         that any
>>                 thing can be named?
>>
>>                 I think that the distinction is just as
>>         subtle and
>>                 just as significant
>>                 as the distinction between pointing to
>>         something
>>                 with a gesture, pointing
>>                 to something with a word like "this" or
>>         "that",
>>                 and pointing to something
>>                 with a word like "apple" or "pear". If I
>>         say that
>>                 "everything has a name",
>>                 the name could be extremely general
>>         ("everything"
>>                 or "thing") or it could
>>                 be highly specific ("Huw" or "this
>>         computer"). But
>>                 I don't yet have the
>>                 idea that names are invented, and that
>>         therefore
>>                 it is possible to name
>>                 objects which do not exist, and therefore
>>         to bring
>>                 into existence modes of
>>                 pure abstract thinking through language.
>>         That's
>>                 signifying, and it is
>>                 indeed a new moment, or a new instant, in the
>>                 lifelong process of speech
>>                 development.
>>
>>                 David Kellogg
>>                 Macquarie University
>>
>>                 On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd
>>                 <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>>         <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>>                 <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>>         <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>>>
>>                 wrote:
>>
>>                     Thank you, David. That helps to explain a
>>                     particular aspect that I thought
>>                     Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative,
>>                     which is that stimuli can not
>>                     only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they
>>                     afford the kind of dynamics you
>>                     have elucidated from Volkelt's schema.
>>
>>                     I have also noted that the translation of
>>                     phrases like "instances of a
>>                     process" is probably off the mark
>>         too.  What
>>                     is really meant, I believe, is
>>                     "instants of a process".  These have two
>>                     rather different meanings from the
>>                     perspective of thinking about processes.
>>
>>                     Best,
>>                     Huw
>>
>>                     On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg
>>                     <dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>         <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>                     <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>
>>         <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>>> wrote:
>>
>>                         Huw:
>>
>>                         Here's what Vygotsky really says:
>>
>>                         Если задача не превышает
>>         естественных сил
>>                         ребенка, он справляется с ней
>>                         непосредственным или примитивным
>>         способом.
>>                         В этих случаях структура его
>>                         поведения совершенно напоминает схему,
>>                         нарисованную Фолькельтом.
>>
>>                     (Russian
>>
>>                         Collected Works, p. 117).
>>
>>                         This means (as nearly as I can
>>         make out):
>>                         "If the task did not go beyond
>>                         the natural capability of the
>>         child, he
>>                         could deal with it in an
>>
>>                     unmediated
>>
>>                         or primitive method. In this
>>         cases, the
>>                         structure of his behavior would
>>
>>                     be
>>
>>                         completely similar to the scheme as
>>                         presented by Volkelt".
>>
>>                         I think there is no diagramme, at
>>         least
>>                         not in the sense of a two
>>                         dimensional graphic one can have a
>>         copy
>>                         of. What Vygotsky is referring to
>>                         is Volkelt's attempt to explain
>>         all child
>>                         behavior as the result of an
>>                         affectively tinged FUSION of
>>         perception
>>                         and behavior, an affectively
>>                         colored, unanalyzable, whole  in which
>>                         perception and behavior were
>>                         absolutely inseparable. This was
>>         what Hans
>>                         Volkelt concluded from a
>>
>>                     series
>>
>>                         of experiments that Vygotsky refers to
>>                         repeatedly, both in HDHMF and in
>>
>>                     the
>>
>>                         Lectures on Pedology and elswhere.
>>
>>                         What Volkelt did was this: he had four
>>                         baby bottles: one shaped like a
>>                         triangle, one like a violin, one
>>         like a
>>                         square, etc. They were all
>>                         different colors as well. But three of
>>                         them didn't have holes in the
>>
>>                     teat:
>>
>>                         you could see and smell the milk
>>         but you
>>                         couldn't drink it. One did. He
>>                         taught the infants to associate the
>>                         drinking of milk and the feeling of
>>                         satiation with one particular
>>         bottle, so
>>                         that they would actually ignore
>>                         the bottle unless it had all the
>>                         characteristics: triangularity,
>>
>>                     blueness,
>>
>>                         etc. So Volkelt argued that from the
>>                         child's point of view, he was not
>>                         drinking milk but triangular blue
>>         milk.
>>                         This kind of "affectively colored
>>                         whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as
>>                         "Volkelt's scheme", or "Volkelt's
>>                         schemata".
>>
>>                         Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He
>>                         eventually decided that we never
>>                         grow out of unanalyzable affectively
>>                         colored perception-behavior wholes,
>>                         and this would explain the
>>         indivisible and
>>                         inseparable devotion of the
>>                         German volk to their Fuhrer. So in
>>         later
>>                         work Vygotsky is very careful to
>>                         distance himself from Volkelt even
>>         in his
>>                         explanations of infant
>>
>>                     behavior:
>>
>>                         in the Lectures on Pedology he
>>         argues that
>>                         ALL THREE layers of behavior
>>                         (that is, instinct, habit, and
>>                         intelligence) are present in infancy.
>>
>>                         David Kellogg
>>                         Macquarie University
>>
>>
>>
>>                         On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM,
>>         Huw Lloyd
>>                         <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>>         <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>>                         <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>>         <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>>>
>>                         wrote:
>>
>>                             Does anyone have a copy of
>>         "Volkelt's
>>                             diagram" to hand that is referred
>>
>>                         to
>>
>>                             in The History of the
>>         Development of
>>                             Higher Mental Functions (1997,
>>
>>                     p.85
>>
>>                             and onwards in ch. 4)?  I
>>         don't think
>>                             a reference is given.
>>
>>                             Best,
>>                             Huw
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>         --
>>         It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a
>>         natural science with an
>>         object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>>
>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an
>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
>>
>>
>>
>>
>


-- 

It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an
object that creates history. Ernst Boesch