[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

[Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy



But all the words and all the
 pictures in the world will not efface the
 role of imagination in human experience.

Mike ,

In your previous posts , you said of goal-oriented joint activity which presupposes the existence of the "ideal" and we also have the example of the best of the bees and the worst of the architects to the effect that the architect has the plan of the building in his imagination before the building has been erected and we additionally have the above saying of yours . To what extent is there an overlap ? Is there a matter of will and conscious awareness in one but not in the other ?

Best

Haydi



--------------------------------------------
On Mon, 12/7/15, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:

 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy
 To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
 Date: Monday, December 7, 2015, 4:35 AM
 
 Larry. Precisely the
 following point seems an important one to me.
 
 
 *My question
 is if (representation) looses a felt quality that
 (imaging)
 embodied  and expressed as moving
 (into the image) better captures.*
 
 I think the answer is generally *yes.*
 
 I venture that what is left
 has lost some of its affective charge when "in
 motion." Perhaps the loss of affect is
 indexed by the fact that
 representational
 theories of mind tend strongly to be cognitive theories.
 In moving from a process into a product, from
 verbs to nouns, the prior
 fusion of affect
 and cognition are effaced.
 
 However, to leave at "all is flux" is
 not awfully useful. So, as I
 understand
 it,  entifying, classifying, experimenting with the flow
 of
 experience seem to be essential to the
 cultural mode of thought, as
 characterized
 for example by LSV. Spoken words and more generally
 spoken
 discourse is are saturated with past
 cultural products constituting the
 present
 culturally mediated experience of the present.
 
 But all the words and all the
 pictures in the world will not efface the
 role of imagination in human experience.
 
 lots to think about
 mike
 
 On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at
 12:53 PM, Lplarry <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
 wrote:
 
 > Ed,
 > In mike's editorial notes introducing
 Suvorov's article mike focuses and
 >
 draws our attention to a (gap) in American cognitive
 psychology. This gap
 > results in a
 difficulty in translation of the term vo-obraz-zhenie.
 > The suffix (zhenie) shifts the meaning
 (into-image) to (imaging) as
 >
 process.
 > Mike made a decision. Since he
 was addressing an American audience he left
 > this meaning (imaging) to one side and
 replaced (imaging) with a substitute
 >
 word (representation).
 > I am now drawing
 attention to why American cognitive psychology is better
 > able to understand and relate to
 (representation) than (imaging)?
 > I
 suspect it is because of cultural historical circumstances
 that
 > denigrated (imaging).
 > I am returning to vo-obraz-zenhie and
 trying to honour (imaging) as
 >
 expressing qualities that include the sensory experience but
 add other
 > characteristics.
 > Suvorov beliefs the fundamental act of
 cognition is the (stepping back)
 > from
 the world, which WHEN RECOMBINED with original sensation,
 yields
 > thought.
 > So
 the place of (imaging) and mike's decision to replace
 with the word
 > (representation) has a
 narrative to tell.
 > My question is if
 (representation) looses a felt quality that (imaging)
 > embodied  and expressed as moving (into
 the image) better captures.
 >
 Presentation and (re)presentation may be resting on this
 (imaging) that
 > has a (felt) quality.
 The movement of referring, indicating as
 > intentionally denotative presentational
 gestures may  rest in a more
 >
 primordial moment of (felt) moving within the image.
 > To say that the mom and infant move
 mutually and call this process
 > activity
 (shared actions) is not questioned.
 > My
 question is if this activity is (imaginal) at this felt
 level of mutual
 > synchronization (always
 marked but never identical) prior to being
 > (presented).
 > Are
 there qualities of vo-obraz-zenhie that (imaging) images
 better than
 > (presentation) images?
 >
 >
 >
 -----Original Message-----
 > From:
 "Ed Wall" <ewall@umich.edu>
 > Sent: ‎2015-‎12-‎06 10:43 AM
 > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture,
 Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
 > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or
 Fantasy
 >
 > Larry
 >
 >      As I think,
 to an extent, that one can imagine taste, touch, sound,
 > and smell (and, in a way, intellectually)
 focusing on ‘image’ seems to
 >
 obscure. Thus, your question, doesn’t, in a way, make much
 sense to me.
 > That doesn’t mean that
 it doesn’t to others. Also, I suspect you would, at
 > least, need to take the baby and mother
 back to -2 months to get at an
 >
 embryonic origin.
 >
 >
 Ed
 >
 > > On Dec 6,
 2015, at  10:42 AM, Lplarry <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
 wrote:
 > >
 > >
 Ed, mike, Michael,
 > > I will push my
 question to an earlier time period.
 >
 > Age 2 months.
 > > The baby
 (perceives) mom's activity and introduces her.own
 activity .
 > > Question
 > > With this mutual activity is the baby
 forming an image, moving into the
 > image
 and becoming an (imaging) human as het nature?
 > > Will say more but where does (image)
 have its embryonic origin?
 > >
 > > -----Original Message-----
 > > From: "Ed Wall" <ewall@umich.edu>
 > > Sent: ‎2015-‎12-‎05 4:48 PM
 > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture,
 Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
 > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or
 Fantasy
 > >
 > >
 Larry
 > >
 > > 
    I wan’t looking at the title, but, yes,
 ‘or’ can be inclusive or
 >
 exclusive.
 > >
 >
 >     I don’t think of it as a detour; that
 doesn’t seem to make sense if
 > I
 understand Vygotsky correctly.
 > >
 > >     I, personally,
 don’t equate ‘physical' and ‘concrete’;’
 perhaps I
 > wasn’t clear. In any case,
 I’ve never completely understood the tendency to
 > think of the physical (i.e. a thing in
 itself) as somehow extra-concrete.
 > The
 best I can do is imagine that in a certain cultural
 historical context
 > and at a certain
 stage of development people act as if certain things are
 > ‘concrete.’ This includes the
 'physical world' (whatever that is?).
 > >
 > >     
 I’m not quite sure where you are going with the
 development of
 > systems and
 concrete-like or even cultural historical.
 > >
 > >   
    Fantasy is a complicated word so I don’t
 know what you mean when
 > you allude to
 “assume that or let’ involving fantasy. My answer,
 perhaps,
 > would be neither is
 necessarily imaginal or fantasy
 > >
 > >       Since I have no
 clear idea what you mean by system or fantasy in
 > your email, I can’t give a reasonable
 answer to your final question. An
 >
 approximate answer might be “no”; however, I can imagine
 other
 > possibilities (smile).
 > >
 > > Ed
 > >
 > >> On Dec
 4, 2015, at  4:04 PM, Lplarry <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
 wrote:
 > >>
 >
 >> Ed,
 > >>
 > >> The title imagination (or)
 fantasy
 > >> Is different from
 > >> Imagination (equates) with
 fantasy.
 > >> To move from the
 physical concrete though a detour (a distanciation?)
 > and return to the mathematical
 concrete.
 > >> Is the same word
 (concrete) shift meaning in this transfer from the
 > physical to the mathematical?
 > >> If mathematics is actually a
 (system) that has emerged in historical
 >
 consciousness then is it reasonable to say that the physical
 (concrete)
 > which exists prior to the
 human understanding and the mathematical
 > (concrete) which is a cultural historical
 system emerging within the
 > imaginal are
 both (concrete) in identical ways?
 >
 >> It seems that systems (develop) and become
 concrete-like.
 > >> Is this the
 same meaning of concrete as the physical which originates
 > as concrete.
 > >>
 To (assume that or to let) involves the imaginal and
 fantasy.
 > >> Is there a clear
 demarcation between the imaginal and fantasy. Does one
 > imply it does not (actually) exist while
 the other implies the actual can
 > be
 mapped onto the physical with systems?
 >
 >> Is there a clear demarcation between systems and
 fantasy?
 > >> Larry
 > >>
 > >>
 -----Original Message-----
 > >>
 From: "Ed Wall" <ewall@umich.edu>
 > >> Sent: ‎2015-‎12-‎04 11:05
 AM
 > >> To: "eXtended Mind,
 Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
 > >> Subject: [Xmca-l]  Imagination
 or Fantasy
 > >>
 > >> All
 >
 >>
 > >>    For various
 reasons I have been thinking about a kind of imagination
 > that might be subsumed under statements
 like “assume that,” “let,” or
 >
 “Imagine that” (and these may be, in fact, very
 different statements
 > although, under
 certain circumstances, might be the same.” In doing so
 I
 > came across something written by
 Vygotsky in Imagination and Creativity in
 > the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: “It is
 characteristic for imagination that
 > it
 does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is
 only an
 > intermediate link, only a stage
 on the path of development, only a pass in
 > the process of its movement to the
 concrete. From our point of view,
 >
 imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed
 from a given
 > concrete toward a new
 concrete.”
 > >>
 > >>   I find this quote
 very interesting in view of a previous discussion
 > on the list regarding Davydov’s
 mathematics curriculum in that I am
 >
 wondering whether part of what is going on is that children
 are being asked
 > to “imagine." I
 have other mathematical examples of this join the
 > elementary school that are possibly a
 little more obvious (if somebody is
 >
 interested I can give them off list). Anyway, one reason for
 my wondering
 > is that for so many people
 mathematics is not concrete; i.e. there is no
 > stepping from concrete to concrete; the
 sort of get stuck, so to speak, in
 > the
 abstract. So let me give two examples of what I am wondering
 about and
 > then a question.
 > >>
 > >> 
 My first example:  It is possible that we would all agree
 that to see
 > a winged horse is imagine a
 winged horse as there is no such thing. In a
 > somewhat like manner, a simple proof that
 the square root of two is not a
 >
 fraction begins with “Assume that the square root of two
 is a fraction.”
 > This is not so thus,
 in sense, one must imagine that it is true and then
 > look at the consequences (the square root
 of -1 is perhaps another
 > example). This
 seems to be a case of concrete to concrete through
 > imagination and this type of proof (a
 proof through contradiction) seems to
 >
 be very hard for people to do.
 >
 >>
 > >>  My second example:
 The teacher goes up to the blackboard and draws
 > something rather circular and says “This
 is a circle.” She then draws a
 > point
 somewhat towards the center of the planar object and says,
 "This is
 > its center.” She then
 says “Every point on this circle (waving her hand at
 > the object on the blackboard) is
 equidistant from the center.” None of this
 > is true, but somehow we are meant to
 behave as if it were. Each step here
 >
 seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the
 concrete. (Hmm , I
 > see that I am really
 saying from the physical concrete to the mathematical
 > concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn’t
 allow this?)
 > >>
 > >> [I note by the way Poul Anderson
 took on the consequences of a winged
 >
 horse].
 > >>
 >
 >>   So my question, as Vygotsky seems to
 identify imagination with
 > fantasy (this
 may be a fault of the translation), what would Vygotsky
 have
 > called my examples? A case of
 sheer conceivability or something else? There
 > is, I note, good reason to call it
 imagination, but I’m interested in your
 > take on what Vygotsky’s take might
 be.
 > >>
 >
 >> Ed Wall
 > >>
 > >>
 > >>
 > >>
 > >>
 > >>
 > >>
 > >>
 > >>
 > >>
 > >
 > >
 >
 >
 >
 
 
 -- 
 
 It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a
 natural science with an
 object that creates
 history. Ernst Boesch