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[Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy



Mike
I fully concur with this summation that entifying, classifying, experimenting, be included in our understanding of  imaging.
The precise point is that there has been (something) lost while imaging was (in motion) towards representation. 
This (something) which is acknowledged as our human (nature) expressed within the metaphor of vo-obraz-zhenie and effective historicity.
Is this a moment when representation is now (in motion) towards embracing this (something) which goes unacknowledged in representational (models).
Could be a pregnant and fertile moment of remembering in anticipation of the motion of  imaging.
This precise point is Dewey's archway which we travel through while (in motion).
Possible worlds form under (this) archway which  Russian psychology may already acknowledge?
Vasilyuk's explorations and psychology are possible openings under this archway.






-----Original Message-----
From: "mike cole" <mcole@ucsd.edu>
Sent: ‎2015-‎12-‎06 5:08 PM
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy

Larry. Precisely the following point seems an important one to me.


*My question is if (representation) looses a felt quality that (imaging)
embodied  and expressed as moving (into the image) better captures.*

I think the answer is generally *yes.*

I venture that what is left has lost some of its affective charge when "in
motion." Perhaps the loss of affect is indexed by the fact that
representational theories of mind tend strongly to be cognitive theories.
In moving from a process into a product, from verbs to nouns, the prior
fusion of affect and cognition are effaced.

However, to leave at "all is flux" is not awfully useful. So, as I
understand it,  entifying, classifying, experimenting with the flow of
experience seem to be essential to the cultural mode of thought, as
characterized for example by LSV. Spoken words and more generally spoken
discourse is are saturated with past cultural products constituting the
present culturally mediated experience of the present.

But all the words and all the pictures in the world will not efface the
role of imagination in human experience.

lots to think about
mike

On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 12:53 PM, Lplarry <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:

> Ed,
> In mike's editorial notes introducing Suvorov's article mike focuses and
> draws our attention to a (gap) in American cognitive psychology. This gap
> results in a difficulty in translation of the term vo-obraz-zhenie.
> The suffix (zhenie) shifts the meaning (into-image) to (imaging) as
> process.
> Mike made a decision. Since he was addressing an American audience he left
> this meaning (imaging) to one side and replaced (imaging) with a substitute
> word (representation).
> I am now drawing attention to why American cognitive psychology is better
> able to understand and relate to (representation) than (imaging)?
> I suspect it is because of cultural historical circumstances that
> denigrated (imaging).
> I am returning to vo-obraz-zenhie and trying to honour (imaging) as
> expressing qualities that include the sensory experience but add other
> characteristics.
> Suvorov beliefs the fundamental act of cognition is the (stepping back)
> from the world, which WHEN RECOMBINED with original sensation, yields
> thought.
> So the place of (imaging) and mike's decision to replace with the word
> (representation) has a narrative to tell.
> My question is if (representation) looses a felt quality that (imaging)
> embodied  and expressed as moving (into the image) better captures.
> Presentation and (re)presentation may be resting on this (imaging) that
> has a (felt) quality. The movement of referring, indicating as
> intentionally denotative presentational gestures may  rest in a more
> primordial moment of (felt) moving within the image.
> To say that the mom and infant move mutually and call this process
> activity (shared actions) is not questioned.
> My question is if this activity is (imaginal) at this felt level of mutual
> synchronization (always marked but never identical) prior to being
> (presented).
> Are there qualities of vo-obraz-zenhie that (imaging) images better than
> (presentation) images?
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: "Ed Wall" <ewall@umich.edu>
> Sent: ‎2015-‎12-‎06 10:43 AM
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy
>
> Larry
>
>      As I think, to an extent, that one can imagine taste, touch, sound,
> and smell (and, in a way, intellectually) focusing on ‘image’ seems to
> obscure. Thus, your question, doesn’t, in a way, make much sense to me.
> That doesn’t mean that it doesn’t to others. Also, I suspect you would, at
> least, need to take the baby and mother back to -2 months to get at an
> embryonic origin.
>
> Ed
>
> > On Dec 6, 2015, at  10:42 AM, Lplarry <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > Ed, mike, Michael,
> > I will push my question to an earlier time period.
> > Age 2 months.
> > The baby (perceives) mom's activity and introduces her.own activity .
> > Question
> > With this mutual activity is the baby forming an image, moving into the
> image and becoming an (imaging) human as het nature?
> > Will say more but where does (image) have its embryonic origin?
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: "Ed Wall" <ewall@umich.edu>
> > Sent: ‎2015-‎12-‎05 4:48 PM
> > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy
> >
> > Larry
> >
> >     I wan’t looking at the title, but, yes, ‘or’ can be inclusive or
> exclusive.
> >
> >     I don’t think of it as a detour; that doesn’t seem to make sense if
> I understand Vygotsky correctly.
> >
> >     I, personally, don’t equate ‘physical' and ‘concrete’;’ perhaps I
> wasn’t clear. In any case, I’ve never completely understood the tendency to
> think of the physical (i.e. a thing in itself) as somehow extra-concrete.
> The best I can do is imagine that in a certain cultural historical context
> and at a certain stage of development people act as if certain things are
> ‘concrete.’ This includes the 'physical world' (whatever that is?).
> >
> >      I’m not quite sure where you are going with the development of
> systems and concrete-like or even cultural historical.
> >
> >       Fantasy is a complicated word so I don’t know what you mean when
> you allude to “assume that or let’ involving fantasy. My answer, perhaps,
> would be neither is necessarily imaginal or fantasy
> >
> >       Since I have no clear idea what you mean by system or fantasy in
> your email, I can’t give a reasonable answer to your final question. An
> approximate answer might be “no”; however, I can imagine other
> possibilities (smile).
> >
> > Ed
> >
> >> On Dec 4, 2015, at  4:04 PM, Lplarry <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> Ed,
> >>
> >> The title imagination (or) fantasy
> >> Is different from
> >> Imagination (equates) with fantasy.
> >> To move from the physical concrete though a detour (a distanciation?)
> and return to the mathematical concrete.
> >> Is the same word (concrete) shift meaning in this transfer from the
> physical to the mathematical?
> >> If mathematics is actually a (system) that has emerged in historical
> consciousness then is it reasonable to say that the physical (concrete)
> which exists prior to the human understanding and the mathematical
> (concrete) which is a cultural historical system emerging within the
> imaginal are both (concrete) in identical ways?
> >> It seems that systems (develop) and become concrete-like.
> >> Is this the same meaning of concrete as the physical which originates
> as concrete.
> >> To (assume that or to let) involves the imaginal and fantasy.
> >> Is there a clear demarcation between the imaginal and fantasy. Does one
> imply it does not (actually) exist while the other implies the actual can
> be mapped onto the physical with systems?
> >> Is there a clear demarcation between systems and fantasy?
> >> Larry
> >>
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: "Ed Wall" <ewall@umich.edu>
> >> Sent: ‎2015-‎12-‎04 11:05 AM
> >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> >> Subject: [Xmca-l]  Imagination or Fantasy
> >>
> >> All
> >>
> >>    For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind of imagination
> that might be subsumed under statements like “assume that,” “let,” or
> “Imagine that” (and these may be, in fact, very different statements
> although, under certain circumstances, might be the same.” In doing so I
> came across something written by Vygotsky in Imagination and Creativity in
> the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: “It is characteristic for imagination that
> it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is only an
> intermediate link, only a stage on the path of development, only a pass in
> the process of its movement to the concrete. From our point of view,
> imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed from a given
> concrete toward a new concrete.”
> >>
> >>   I find this quote very interesting in view of a previous discussion
> on the list regarding Davydov’s mathematics curriculum in that I am
> wondering whether part of what is going on is that children are being asked
> to “imagine." I have other mathematical examples of this join the
> elementary school that are possibly a little more obvious (if somebody is
> interested I can give them off list). Anyway, one reason for my wondering
> is that for so many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e. there is no
> stepping from concrete to concrete; the sort of get stuck, so to speak, in
> the abstract. So let me give two examples of what I am wondering about and
> then a question.
> >>
> >>  My first example:  It is possible that we would all agree that to see
> a winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no such thing. In a
> somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square root of two is not a
> fraction begins with “Assume that the square root of two is a fraction.”
> This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it is true and then
> look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is perhaps another
> example). This seems to be a case of concrete to concrete through
> imagination and this type of proof (a proof through contradiction) seems to
> be very hard for people to do.
> >>
> >>  My second example: The teacher goes up to the blackboard and draws
> something rather circular and says “This is a circle.” She then draws a
> point somewhat towards the center of the planar object and says, "This is
> its center.” She then says “Every point on this circle (waving her hand at
> the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the center.” None of this
> is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. Each step here
> seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the concrete. (Hmm , I
> see that I am really saying from the physical concrete to the mathematical
> concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn’t allow this?)
> >>
> >> [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the consequences of a winged
> horse].
> >>
> >>   So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify imagination with
> fantasy (this may be a fault of the translation), what would Vygotsky have
> called my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or something else? There
> is, I note, good reason to call it imagination, but I’m interested in your
> take on what Vygotsky’s take might be.
> >>
> >> Ed Wall
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >
> >
>
>
>


-- 

It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an
object that creates history. Ernst Boesch