I think you agree this be our last trial both for reasons
of participation rules and the coming in of new threads .
I said I don't know how the matrix and the Johari Window
work . I came in when Peter gave his figure . I was
partially known to that kind of matter . I resorted to
Davydov's and Ilyenko's writings . I said I believed for
some #unknown , now well-known reason , the vertical axis
should be reversed Because all three categories before
"true concept" somehow are defective . And you know it's
just true scientific concepts which are , to the extent
that and as long as they are workable in life , absolute .
Now forgive me if I have to read your text in parts (below) :
*From:* Andy Blunden <email@example.com>
*To:* "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
*Sent:* Sunday, 6 September 2015, 5:07:10
*Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: Oliver Sacks/Romantic Science
Haydi, you ask is it true that "All true concepts are both
concrete and universal"?
Vygotsky uses the expression "true concept" in a quite
specific sense, namely a concept as it is first acquired
purely through instruction. "Instruction" means in some
[[Acquisition of true concepts is not a matter of "where"
, is a matter of how . Read about this please on Ilyenko .
Davydov's reason for the specific type of teaching and
generalization he suggests is that with discrete items
learners even at post-puberty do not acquire
logical-theoretical conceptions appropriately . And now
you say what they get at school is a "concept" . Could we
as academics exactly and precisely enumerate items of
"furniture" . Because what we got was a table is something
you get around for dinner , has four legs , etc. In a
house , our learner groups according to the appearances :
tables , chairs , sofas ; rugs , curtains , blankets ,
etc. so on so forth . Then , when is the time to get the
concept of furniture ? and as with double stimulation ,
how can they find the commonalities between different
items of "furniture" ? having a seat , getting-around-ness
, succeptibility of being laid down , legged-ness?
house-ware-ness , fetchablity , fixability ? That's why
true workable concepts are absolute , concrete , and
universal because they need deeper and deeper thinking and
deeper and deeper analyses and deeper and deeper trials .]]
In this case a "true concept" is not concrete, it is
abstract. A "true concept" becomes concrete over time,
through experiences, but at first it is abstract.
Because it is acquired from an institution a "true concept"
is universal, that is to say, it is part of an entire social
[[Please agree in this case we don't yet have a 'true
concept" ; You're a scholar . please see what Davydov has
to say about "notions" and "concepts" . And what between
conceptions and concepts , maybe in Davydov . And did
Vygotsky (PROCESSES of concept formation) say or did I say
true concepts are there in that box . go take it ? At
first , it may not be a concept altogether . A.A.Leontiev
and Akhutina have worked on "production of speech" Those
in the West as well . Motive , inner planning , inner
speech , semantics (grammar) , external speech plus many
details . Yes , it takes time until "word" comes into
being and then word , that is , the cover for meaning
stabilizes . But inside , the value or the meaning MOVES .
A long way towards the end , the concept . In double
stimulation , too , what is carved into the bottom of the
blocks remains the same but though they're wooden , they
seem to have in them a turbulent sea of rising-falling
waves capable of ruining or erecting a world of values .
"universality" for me , as I've read , means our whole
(concept) in each case within typology has already been
purified of non-essentials and non-necessaries , such that
we have assigned the particulars in each phenomenon , then
have weighed the particulars of that phenomenon against
the particulars of other related phenomena to see if we
can make a generalization , in the end we reach a
'concept" ; I'ts in that case we can say we can find the
particular in the universal and the universal in the
These answers are given in the terms of Vygotsky's "Thinking
and Speech," that is to say from the point of view of
Psychology, yes, but Cultural Psychology, not positivist
From a Hegelian point of view (not psychology), a true
concept is abstract but also concrete, because it is the
product and expression of an entire historical development.
[[Nice and thanks as always for your co-operation . But I
stressed that I'm talking within my assigned limits ; the
least I can say is when Post-Hegelians freed the HEAD
which had been stuck to the earth , feet were fixed
instead and everything got upright .]]
That's my answer to your first question. I can't deal with
everything in this message. But ...
About "fuzzy boundaries." The way you specify this question:
'to blend some "matter" with some "idea" and some idea with
some matter' is ridiculed by Vygotsky. To talk of "fuzzy
boundaries" implies that there are different kinds of stuff,
i.e., existants, but by definition ideas are not existent.
[[the idea of the table does not exist#the idea of table
is not a BEING]]
The way you pose the question reifies ideas. In the
psychological sense, ideas are internal, psychological
entities and it is absurd to think of blurring a "boundary"
between consciousness and matter. No such boundary, fuzzy or
firm, exists. I think the only consistent way to make sense
of this is to accept that matter and consciousness are
*relational* not absolute concepts. What you do, including
what you think, is material (objective) from my point of
view but from your point of view there is an absolute sharp
distinction between your thoughts and your behaviour.
[[Dear Andy , if you consider that I denied "fuzzy
boundaries" within our context from the beginning , much
of your accusations will be removed . You still argued the
fuzzy boundaries is the revolutionary act which I now see
which I now don't and again I explained that I had taken
neither the fuzzy boundaries nor the revolutionary act as
such . The beginning refers to when you , taking my
"external transformables" as mere objective materials ,
posed the idea that in recent decades both terms have gone
further than the dimensions I had depicted . I took it
for some idea indicating that ontology penetrates
epistemology , vice versa . Then I referred you to my
previous message to this one . Now again you say the way
YOU specify . I've not specified and I'm not specifying .
I attributed that idea to the way YOU had argued . Now you
can say directly that I've been mistaken with your point
and add that you've even been justified with Vygostky's
ridicule . I remember Martin once telling me to be careful
with my Farsi translation of the "Crisis" especially to
the end when I reach the concepts of ontology and
epistemology . The point is so delicate and intriguing ,
you agree . And now it's my turn to tell you , but Andy ,
"Now you argue ontology could talk even about the being of
thoughts and ideas Now you say by definition ideas are not
existent" . And if someone (other than me and within this
context) tends to prove that there could be a fuzzy
boundary between , say , thought and body , why should we
not accept his argument ? As you say , the implication
goes so far as to say thought is stuffy , consciousness is
stuffy , word is stuffy , (established here time and
again) and body is stuffy . I also say these are just
relational ; they don't have their independent BEING#NOT
BEING . But when you say 'stuffy' = existants and add the
above are 'materials' , what remains to be discussed ? I
see contradictions . The way I posed the question does not
reify 'ideas' ; for me ideas and all such things emanate
from a BEING in a societal context . I stress this was a
thing I attributed to you . I just can apologize for the
attribution . YOU say : " In the
psychological sense, ideas are internal, psychological
entities and it is absurd to think of blurring a 'boundary'
between consciousness and matter. I have no doubt that
Marx by saying "Behind consciousness is BEING" did by no
means mean that these are two different things and there
might be a probability of creating something in between
them ; in the context , he meant the beginnings or
precedence of one over the other (the word and the act and
other stories you remember) . And I do remember the
"highest property of matter" also . BTW , I've not heard
you oppose those who believe in the 'materiaity' of
thought and consciousness . How is it , then , that here
you , maybe unknowingly , put an equal sign between 'idea'
and 'consciousness' ? In a bright shining day , you say by
definition , ideas do not exist though here you say of
psychological ENTITIES which inevitably then, have to not
exist and though whatever man has at his disposal as books
, huge encys and dics , on computers , etc. SEEM to be
just hallucinations and phantoms . I know where the
problem lies . The first test you gave me was with the
word 'exist' . Now It's time to replace it with some other
term . Terminologically speaking , ideas exist but are not
BEINGS . And , No , in my point of view , too , thoughts
and behaviours are interactional or dialectical .]]
the movement of neurons is not thought, but merely the
material substratum of thinking. Thinking is a function of
the entire person. If I consider the activity of a person
before me, there is both material behaviour (physical
movements) and consciousness lying "behind" the behaviour.
Thinking and behaving are united in activity, but they are
not two different substances which are mixed or blurred,
because you can (as an observer) make no distinction between
them if you going to speak scientifically. Look at "Thinking
and Speech." Does Vygotsky make a distinction between
concepts and forms of action? I think not. These are just
forms of abstraction from one integral, irreducible
Please see if the following satisfies you with ontology
and epistemology :
There were many exchanges of thought among the audience .
But one man's thought shone like a piece of diamond /
We have transgressed the one / two page/s norm in each
post . I personally give my apologies . If you agree , we
continue offlist .
Larry ! I'm indebted to you from time immemorial , I
really like to talk with you as it were . I'll try !!
On 6/09/2015 2:06 AM, Haydi Zulfei wrote:
> Dear Andy,
> The reason I came to you was Peg's authority and
> personality and brilliance of research . Now again I put
> my problem clearly : I have some supposition to the effect
> that "All true concepts are both concrete and universal"
> according to my previous explanation . If I'm mistaken ,
> someone might be kind to justify the point . This is where
> I was led to during discussions .
> P.S. What I wrote you as Marx's evaluation of Feuerbach
> not being "revolutionary" is at hand but I have some more
> important thing to say as to clarify what I meant by
> "fuzzy boundaries" .
> I said of ontology as tending towards "external
> transformable/s [entities] . And you said of plurality of
> both terms . Now I give more explanation .
> By that , I wouldn't have meant just rocks and stones . In
> this regard , in my personal correspondence I referred you
> to the wrestling and involvement and therefrom to "man and
> his world" . That is , man , the world , actions ,
> interactions , processes , relations , relationships , so
> on so forth . That is , to the extent where man still
> remains "man" and "his world" remains "his world" . As I
> understand it , this is the dimension and limits of
> "ontology" .
> But you're talking in a way that one might figure out that
> it's possible to blend some "matter" with some "idea" and
> some idea with some matter . This is what I meant by
> "fuzzy bordering" .
> If , as you say , the being of thought (spatially
> temporally) is something and the knowing of thought
> something else , the former ontological , the latter ,
> epistemological , then what are the neuronal processes
> taking place in the brain ? Wouldn't you agree that this
> latter case might be closer to "ontology" . I say we are
> either dealing with thought or with the thinking man ;
> that is they related but distinctive . And it's when we
> are dealing with the thinking man as "social being" that
> the problem of being "revolutionary" or
> "non-revolutionary" or "counter-revolutionary" occurs .
> And it's O.K. for us to think over the well-known saying
> that "behind consciousness is BEING" . Does not this BEING
> , first of all , mean the Being who is born , who grows ,
> lives , works , uses tools , acts , interacts , wrestles
> with , involves , gets engaged , enters processes , joins
> , communicates , socializes , fails , succeeds , dies ,
> Please first go to the first parag in full . Others are
> deletable .
> *From:* Andy Blunden <firstname.lastname@example.org
> *To:* Haydi Zulfei <email@example.com
> "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
> *Sent:* Saturday, 5 September 2015, 16:47:41
> *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Oliver Sacks/Romantic Science
> But Haydi, those "fuzzy foggy boundaries" are
> revolutionary practice! Now you see it now you don't!
> *Andy Blunden*
> On 5/09/2015 9:15 PM, Haydi Zulfei wrote:
>> Thanks for the explanation !
>> A large part of my personal debate was about the theses ,
>> the first one in particular and you admitted that you'd
>> seen nothing richer than them . Then , it was not a
>> matter of recent decades , revisions , innovations or the
>> other Marx or Marxes . To put it simply even today : The
>> table exists and the idea of the table exists . Does
>> creating fuzzy foggy boundaries in between help resolve
>> our problems ? Now , that's not our main point of
>> What you're talking about was my Post-Script , an
>> addendum to a major point . Shortly , within our bounds
>> (Vygotsky Marxist School of the Time and beyond) , could
>> we say : "All true concepts are both universal and
>> concrete" ?
>> I would not provide support for this because , I think ,
>> David Kellog or Mike is able to locate if such a saying
>> exists within Vygotsky's Collected works or some other
>> Vygotskian's . My mind triggers blazingly though it's too
>> old .
>> Larry ! I'll read your post again and try to provide an
>> answer . Many thanks !
>> *From:* Andy Blunden <firstname.lastname@example.org
>> <mailto:email@example.com <mailto:firstname.lastname@example.org>>
>> *To:* "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
>> *Sent:* Saturday, 5 September 2015, 4:58:38
>> *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: Oliver Sacks/Romantic Science
>> Haydi, on the question of ontology and epistemology ...
>> Ontology is the study of being. That does not mean that it
>> is concerned only with independently existing entities. It
>> is the study of what forms of being there are, such as
>> "thoughts". In recent decades this has come to mean a
>> or a culture's belief in the array of different entities
>> that may be talked of, e.g. gods, classes or
>> it is an aspect of cultural difference.
>> Epistemology is the study of knowing, in particular the
>> limits and validity of knowledge. It is not necessarily a
>> study of reflection. In recent decades it has comes to mean
>> a person or a culture's beliefs about the legitimate
>> of knowledge, e.g. priests, books or experience, etc.
>> It was Hegel who first proposed that these sciences were
>> bankrupt and should be transcended, because every social
>> formation had its own integral "epistemology" and
>> and there was no final answer to the question these
>> proposed, so Hegel's view leads us to the modern way of
>> talking about epistemologies and ontologies in the plural
>> and aspects of a way of thinking and acting in the world.
>> Hegel's Ontology is the first Book of the Logic, and I can
>> see a sense in which you could say that the Second Book is
>> about epistemology, but I don't think this is accurate.
>> *Andy Blunden*
>> On 5/09/2015 7:08 AM, Haydi Zulfei wrote:
>> > P.S. Many a time I've made efforts , asked others , to
>> differentiate between ONTOLOGY and EPISTEMOLOGY ; yet
>> I've stayed on the same spot . First thesis of Feuerbach
>> tells us if it's the case that we imagine / conceive the
>> objects there to themselves without any wrestling on our
>> part to get involved with them , then science / genuine
>> materialism would not present any meaning to us . All
>> things arise from the wrestling and the involvement . On
>> this point , too , in either case , our work and thinking
>> power are involved except that with ontology , we try to
>> conceive things as existent and trace them as external
>> transformables in themselves while with epistemology we
>> deal with the pertaining ideas as reflexions . Then , in
>> the natural and physical sciences , by concrete we mean
>> "of matter" , corporeal , while in philosophy and
>> gnoseology which is the province of the second of our
>> division , knowledge , concrete , of necessity , would
>> mean conceptual , the highest and most valued categorial
>> philosophical term .
>> > In what ways am I completely mistaken ?
>> > Best
>> > Haydi