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[Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects

When I say: "activities made up not of individuals but of actions," I should have said "activities made up not of persons but of actions." It is always persons who act. I referred to concepts being "manifested", not projects. Projects are aggregates of actions, and both projects and actions are manifested in physical movements of things and people. It is not projects which are realised by concepts, but concepts which are realised by projects. And this is the only part of Activity Theory as I see it which is really difficult to get your head around.
*Andy Blunden*
On 24/07/2015 1:38 PM, Lplarry wrote:
This is a very insightful narrative pointing to clear differences.

I find myself wondering about the characteristics of "action" which are NOT individual. Actions "manifest" projects which are "realized" by concepts OF the projects. In other words, projects manifest "by" concepts "upon" these projects.

Andy, as I try to grasp this understanding I reflect on Dewey's "having an experience" in relation to "having knowledges.

Your way of unifying experiences and knowledges though shared actions (undergone and manifested) as historically effected activities coming to be through developing concepts.

I hope I have grasped (slightly) what you want us to perceive (as Dewey uses this concept)

This months topic is something to "savor" (or savour/savoir)
From: Andy Blunden <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
Sent: ‎2015-‎07-‎23 6:48 PM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity <mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Cc: Geoffrey C. Bowker <mailto:gbowker@uci.edu>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Emergence of Boundary Objects

Thank you Lubomir.
Lubomir, it is not a problem of unfamiliarity with diamat. I
was educated in the same diamat school as you were. Diamat
translates very well into English. And nor is it a problem
of translating between German, Russian and English. It is
partly a problem of the departmentalisation of knowledge and
activity, and partly a problem of getting one's head around
genuinely interdisciplinary concepts. Unlike Manfred, you
have ventured beyond the bounds of Psychology, so you give
me the opportunity to illustrate my point.
Let us suppose that there are three characters whom I will
call the Psychologist, the Sociologist and the Social
Theorist for the sake of convenience.

You play the role of *the Psychologist*. Everything in your
explanation is about the individual (a.k.a. subject) on one
side, and society with its unchangeable laws, on the other.
Objective meaning, is *socially agreed*! By whom? Pretty
well any Psychologist will be inclined to see things this
way, whether they were trained in diamat or not and whether
they spoke Russian or English. Yes, the subject, i.e., the
individual person, is an"active social agent" and can go out
in the world and try to change things. They are a very small
agent in the world, but enough of an agent to change what
matters to them. It is the subject, an individual, on one
side, and society with its unchanging, "agreed," "objective"
meanings on the other.

*The Sociologist* on the other hand, does his or her survey
and tells us that men and women think differently, as do
retired people and workers, and blue collar workers have
different opinions from white collar workers and so on. And
these different groups of people interact. The Sociologist
agrees that "objective laws of social reality cannot be
changed" but he/she knows that every proposition you want to
make about the social reality is contested, and there is no
"socially agreed" meaning for anything. Muslims see things
differently from Christians, etc., etc., and if things
change it is because of the changing relations between these
groups, and these changes are beyond the power of any
individual to do anything about them. History sweeps over
the individual like wave over a grain of sand. It is a
matter of formulating the laws governing the interaction
between these groups.

For *the Social Theorist*, the individual is an agent in the
world beyond their immediate sphere of life only insofar as
they can participate in some project, e.g. practising their
profession, building up a firm or a political party, etc.,
and it here, taking actions as part of a collaborative
project, that the the regularities of social life are made
and broken. These projects are motivated by concepts of
themselves which are manifested by their actions in the
world as a whole, embedded in artefacts and signs and active
in the consciousness of individual participants. The concept
of "trade union" enters the consciousness of other people
who are not unionists, thanks to the actions of trade
unions, people learn about science, and have a concept of
science, only because of the activity of scientific
institutions and movements. These projects are not the
Sociologists' social groups, but activities made up not of
individuals but of actions. Projects are not sociological
entities. They are the actions of individuals and are just
as much part of Psychology as Social Theory, but the actions
of individuals as such are mere capriciousness, grains of
dust in the wind, except insofar as they are coordinated by
concepts, that is, are carried out in collaboration with
others. The world is made up not of old and young, male and
female, Muslim and Christian, but feminism, business,
farming, sport, socialism, etc., activities, the unit of
which is a project.

Mike asked what is at stake here? What is at stake if we
insist that there is an objective world, whose laws cannot
be changed, and words/signs have objective meanings which
are "socially agreed"? Where, if you don't accept the
"socially agreed" meaning, you need to see a Psychologist to
find out why. And who is it that is the arbiter of the
"socially agreed" meaning of everything? Surely it speaks
for itself.


*Andy Blunden*
On 24/07/2015 12:49 AM, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote:

Hi Mike and Andy,

Sorry, it takes time to respond, and there are some other business going on.

Both Rubinstein and Leontiev work in a Historical Materialist (Histmat) paradigm. In this respect, there are no substantial differences between them. If we look from outside, the differences are minor. If we go in the details, there are always differences. However, my personal impression is that Rubenstein was more systematic and deep. He was also more of a psychologist rather than activity theorist.

In Historical Materialism, the subject is an active social agent. The subject exists objectively. This is not a paradox in that paradigm. On the other hand, although materialists talk about the objective existence of the world, they conceptualize people as active social agents, while the object of activity is subservient to the social agent/subject of activity. In addition, there is a dialectic between the objective existence of human beings and their*subjective (in the sense of personal*, individual) perception of the world. The subject is in the center of everything. When we talk about "subject", we do not mean subjectivity in the US sense. The Histmat is an objectivist paradigm that professes the objective existence of humans but at the same time acknowledges the perceptions and agency of the individual. It is a bit different to translate/transfer these concepts. In Historical Materialism the subject is not subjective in the Anglo sense, not biased, not partial, but exists objectively according to the laws of social reality. Of course, in a different usage of the term "subjective," the subject can display subjectivity in the Anglo sense, like developing political bias and prejudice in his/her perceptions and actions regarding the social world. So, the subject exists objectively and always in control of the object. The dialectic of the subjective and objective regarding a social individual also means that*each individual has his/her own specific consciousness*, but its content is affected strongly by*objective social laws that the subject cannot disregard*, even if he/she wishes so. By "social laws" we mean social regularities, and actually the Histmat people say -- objectively existing social regularities. This means that*the subjects or individuals can not affect or change these objective social regularities*. Again, there is no paradox when the Histmat people believe that the*objective laws of social reality cannot be changed*, but at the same time subjects have the power to change their lives and the organization of society. Yes, subjects/social agents can make changed, but within the limits of social regularities and using these objective social processes to their advantage, creating synergy.

In Histmat, they talk about subjective meaning (like in the Anglo discourses) and objective meaning (*socially agreed and accepted* in everyday life conventions).

There is also one other topic, about the dialectics of the leader and the masses, and how the leader cannot change the world, only the masses can change the world, but they cannot do that without their leader. Basically, this is a political idea: you need a leader, but if you lose your leader, you can get another one and fight again. That is an example how Histmat was used to idelogize political situations and actions.

In principle, it is very difficult to translate/convert Histmat ideas into Anglo discourses. Most of the staff will be lost in translation. Even German words like Tatigkeit and Activitat are used very differently than in German language where they are synonyms. Marx has used these words to denote two very different concepts: Tatigkeit is activity, whole Aktivitat is used for all kinds of chemical and biological process, denoting some kind of movement and development of the situation or the cell, or whatever. The Histmat people religiously follow and keep this differentiation. It is a big mistake to substitute Tatigkeit (deyatelnost in Russian) for Aktivitat (aktivnost in Russian). Actually, the definition of deyatelnost is that it is goal-directed aktivnost.

Best wishes,