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[Xmca-l] Re: Understanding "functions" within the "zone" of proximal development





Message from Francine:

Hi Mike,

Good discussion in Luria'sThe Working Brain (1976) pp. -27 - 30.
On page 30, Luria clearly stated his conclusion that brain activity operates as
"complex functional systems." Luria's discussion of brain functions argues
against the model of localized functions that was dominant in American
neurology, at that time. He used some of the same examples (walking as
a functional system) that he mentioned again in the passage from The Making
of Mind (1979) that Mike Cole posted recently on XMCA.

In Higher Cortical Functions (1962 in Russian), Luria refers to Vygotsky
a dozen times, but there is no Vygotsky text in the bibliography -
same thing in the 2013 publication of that same book.

In The Working Brain (1976), there are four Vygotsky publications in the bibliography,
including the 1960 publication of The Development of Higher Psychological
Functions [Mike Cole has Luria's copy of this Vygotsky publication with 
extensive hand written commentary by Luria]



> From: mcole@ucsd.edu
> Date: Sat, 28 Feb 2015 15:28:27 -0800
> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Understanding "functions" within the "zone" of proximal development
> 
> Hi Francine--- I am certain you are correct about the importance of
> contemporary work
> on functional systems. But in so far as we are discussing these ideas in
> light of Vygotsky's,
> I thought the Luria fragment relevant.
> 
> I have Luria's copy of LSV's "Development of higher psychological
> functions" from 1960 and on every page of the article contained therein on
> the study of localization of psychological functions, where a lot of
> discussion of functional systems arises, there are the extensive notes of
> someone who took the ideas very seriously.  Given ARL's dim view of the way
> American neuropsychology went about thinking about such matters, perhaps
> such archania might prove useful.
> 
> Certainly it would be fascinating to see a critical account of these ideas.
> Perhaps in  Elkhonin Goldberg's writings?
> 
> mike
> 
> On Sat, Feb 28, 2015 at 3:01 PM, larry smolucha <lsmolucha@hotmail.com>
> wrote:
> 
> > Message from Francine:
> >
> > Mike,
> >
> > While it would be interesting to read Luria's writings on functional
> > systems, his formulations have been greatly enhanced by contemporary
> > neuroscience's use of the fMRI for brain imaging. I will look for something
> > by a contemporary neurologist, as well.
> >
> > If my memory is correct, the first draft of the chapter that Larry
> > Smolucha and I
> > are writing for the 2nd edition of Vygotsky and Creativity is due March
> > 15th.
> > We will write the section on neuropsychological systems now and I will look
> > for a reference that XMCARs would be able to access now.
> >
> >
> > > From: mcole@ucsd.edu
> > > Date: Sat, 28 Feb 2015 11:48:49 -0800
> > > To: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com; xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Understanding "functions" within the "zone" of
> > proximal development
> > >
> > > I am way behind on this discussion and will not try to join it yet. But
> > my
> > > first step is to go back and read Luria on functional systems. This
> > should
> > > be your specialty, Francine. Do you have a summary chapter of some sort
> > we
> > > might read? Another great entry point is "Man with a Shattered World"
> > that
> > > has, in addition to Luria's own account, a set of mini-lectures by a
> > brain
> > > scientists who worked with Luria.  That is, if this discussion is
> > ongoing.
> > > mike
> > >
> > > On Fri, Feb 27, 2015 at 8:07 AM, Haydi Zulfei <
> > haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>
> > > wrote:
> > >
> > > > Hi Francine !
> > > > This is all brilliant , fantastic but just expressing the dominant
> > > > province of Vygotsky's work the way I think which might be wrong . That
> > > > dominant province is "word' and broader conceptions of "word" .
> > > > Think of this please :
> > > > "The experiment with the pictures indicates that a child of three sees
> > > > separate objects and an older child thinks of the world as a system of
> > > > effects. It develops that if one and the same picture (let us say, the
> > > > prisoner in jail) is  shown to  a three-year-old, he will say, "a man,
> > > > another man, a window, a mug, a bench," but for a preschool child it
> > would
> > > > be: '~ man is  sitting, another is  looking out the window and a mug
> > is  on
> > > > the bench," We know that the opposite is  true: both the
> > three-year-old and
> > > > the very young child resolve all the separate objects according to
> > their
> > > > functions, that is, they determine them through [actions]. For the
> > child,
> > > > it is [actions] that are primary. When we try to find the first,
> > primary
> > > > word, then we find that this is the name of an [action] and not an
> > object;
> > > > the child names a word that signifies an [action], then a word that
> > > > signifies an object."
> > > >
> > > > "Summarizing the data, we come to this conclusion: a fatal
> > contradiction
> > > > has arisen between the development of thinking as presented by the
> > story
> > > > with the picture and everything that we know about the development of
> > > > thinking from life. In both cases, the relations seem to be inverted.
> > It is
> > > > curious that all of these notions can be confirmed by experiments and
> > > > facts. We can take a thousand children and show yet again that this is
> > the
> > > > case  with the picture. It is an incontrovertible fact, but it must be
> > > > interpreted differently."
> > > >
> > > > "Let us conduct an experiment because only experiments can give a
> > > > definitive answer. There are several simple ways to do this that seem
> > to me
> > > > to be extremely clever. We will try to exclude the child's speech and
> > we
> > > > will try to get responses to the picture by some other means and not
> > > > through words. If the proposition is true that the child does not
> > think of
> > > > the world as separate things but can say only separate words and cannot
> > > > form their connections, then we will try to get along without words. We
> > > > will ask two  children not to tell a story, but to perform what the
> > picture
> > > > shows. It develops that the children's play about the picture
> > > > sometimes lasts 20 or 30 minutes, and primarily and most of all in  the
> > > > play, those relations are captured that are in the picture. To put it
> > more
> > > > simply, if the child is  asked to dramatize the picture and not to
> > tell its
> > > > story, then, according to the experiments of Stern, the four- or
> > > > five-year-old child dramatizes the prison picture the way a
> > twelve-year-old
> > > > tells it. The child understands very well that the people are in jail:
> > here
> > > > the complex narration about how the people were caught, how they
> > > > were taken, that one looks out the window, and that he wants to be
> > free is
> > > > added. Here a very complex narration is  added about how the nanny was
> > > > fined for not having a ticket on the trolley. In a word, we get a
> > typical
> > > > portrayal of what we see in the story of the twelve-year-old."
> > > >
> > > > The one screen rule has been breaking down many times by the initiators
> > > > themselves . However , I end this portion here .
> > > >       From: larry smolucha <lsmolucha@hotmail.com>
> > > >  To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> > > >  Sent: Wednesday, 25 February 2015, 10:27:05
> > > >  Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Understanding "functions" within the "zone" of
> > > > proximal development
> > > >
> > > > Message from Francine"
> > > >
> > > >  Hi Larry,
> > > >
> > > > Yes, I agree there is an way in which my perspective and Chaiklin's can
> > > > be intertwined. First, my reading of Vygotsky is that higher functions
> > are
> > > > consciously directed, unlike elementary functions which are
> > spontaneous.
> > > > For Vygotsky all functions first exist (in animals, and in infants and
> > > > preschoolers)
> > > > as spontaneous processes of attention, perception, emotion,
> > imagination,
> > > > and
> > > > realistic thinking. Through the process of the internalization of the
> > > > verbal guidance
> > > > of a more knowledgeable person, these functions become consciously
> > directed
> > > > attention, perception, emotions, imagination, and realistic thinking
> > > > (i.e., become
> > > > higher functions).
> > > >
> > > > But, there is also a training in cultural traditions of thinking (what
> > > > Chaiklin calls
> > > > functions) - in particular, realistic thinking can develop into several
> > > > disciplines
> > > > of logical/ analytical thinking such as Aristotelian logic, dialectical
> > > > thinking,
> > > > mathematics, and thinking in scientific concepts. An interesting
> > question
> > > > arises:
> > > > Can someone think in scientific concepts but not be able to consciously
> > > > direct
> > > > their own thinking in scientific concepts? Such a person would have
> > > > acquired
> > > > higher level thinking in Chaiklin's use of the term but not in
> > Vygotsky's
> > > > use of
> > > > the term 'higher functions'. Such a person would lack metacogntive
> > > > awareness
> > > > of how their own thought processes proceed. This would be a high level
> > > > practitioner in a form of disciplinary thinking, who just robotically
> > > > follows a
> > > > procedural way of thinking. I think there are people like that.
> > > >
> > > > A second point to keep in mind, is that Vygotsky used the term higher
> > > > psychological
> > > > functions rather than higher mental functions. For the most part, the
> > > > terms can be
> > > > used inter-changeably. Higher psychological function is more
> > appropriate
> > > > when
> > > > discussing consciously directed emotions. Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy
> > is
> > > > a practical application of Vygotsky and Luria's writings (by Donald
> > > > Meichenbaum), that uses
> > > > the verbal guidance of the therapist as a model for the client's
> > self-talk
> > > > to help the
> > > > client control their own emotions and moods. Also, Vygotsky did say
> > that
> > > > different
> > > > higher psychological functions can function together as psychological
> > > > systems.
> > > >
> > > > I will look more closely at Gadamer's writings. If reciprocal
> > interaction
> > > > means
> > > > that the cultural traditions are both internalized and changed by the
> > > > individual -
> > > > I agree. The latter part is the central point in my understanding of
> > > > Vygotsky's theory of creativity. Through both internal dialogues
> > > > (dialectics) and external conversations
> > > > new ideas, art forms, inventions,emerge.
> > > >
> > > > Oh, one more point my understanding of the research on collaborative
> > > > learning is that
> > > > it is most effective when someone in the peer group knows something
> > more
> > > > than
> > > > the others. That something more moves the group into the zone of
> > proximal
> > > > development. Peers might be at the same level in many areas, but as
> > > > individuals
> > > > they might have higher level skills that they can help the others
> > acquire.
> > > > For, example
> > > > if a group is working on an original story, someone might be good at
> > > > metaphorical
> > > > thinking but not the best in grammar and spelling. Other people might
> > be
> > > > very good at grammar and/or spelling.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > > Date: Wed, 25 Feb 2015 07:54:25 -0800
> > > > > From: lpscholar2@gmail.com
> > > > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Understanding "functions" within the "zone" of
> > > > proximal development
> > > > >
> > > > > Francine,
> > > > > Your answer to my question moves me to return to the notion of
> > > > "reciprocal
> > > > > interaction" and my interest in Gadamer's philosophical
> > hermeneutics.  Is
> > > > > it possible that Chaiklin's understanding of "functions" [as
> > expressing
> > > > > "traditions"] and your elaboration of Vygotsky's "functions" such as
> > > > > "imagination and analytic thinking" are intertwined and that we can
> > > > imagine
> > > > > the person " a if" a weaver of tapesties that INCLUDE both
> > understandings
> > > > > of "functions" [crystallized and open-ended]  The term "reciprocal
> > > > > interaction" I am approaching as Simmel used this term.  Francine,
> > your
> > > > > statement:
> > > > >
> > > > >  "Vygotsky introduced something very different. The dynamics of
> > > > consciously
> > > > > directing
> > > > > one's own thoughts, emotions, perceptions, and behaviors  allows for
> > > > > creativity.
> > > > > Vygotsky also said that consciously directed higher mental functions
> > > > (such
> > > > > as imagination
> > > > > and analytic thinking) can be used in collaboration as psychological
> > > > > systems"
> > > > >
> > > > > I am asking if there is "space" or the possibility of opening a
> > "zone"
> > > > > where yours and Chaiklin's notions of "function" can mutually and
> > > > > reciprocally enrich each "other" ?
> > > > >
> > > > > I look forward to reading your chapter [and book]
> > > > >
> > > > > Larry
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > On Tue, Feb 24, 2015 at 11:24 PM, larry smolucha <
> > lsmolucha@hotmail.com>
> > > > > wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > > Message from Francine Smolucha:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Larry,
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Seth Chaiklin in redefining Vygotsky's terminology (functions and
> > zone
> > > > of
> > > > > > proximal
> > > > > > development), creates a developmental model that is very static.
> > > > Vygotsky,
> > > > > > however,
> > > > > > is very clear in describing a dynamic model of how elementary
> > > > > > psychological functions
> > > > > > develop into consciously directed higher psychological functions
> > > > through
> > > > > > the internalization
> > > > > > of speech. This is very different from Chaiklin defining higher
> > > > > > psychological (or mental)
> > > > > > functions as higher level concepts involving more abstract
> > thinking,
> > > > such
> > > > > > as scientific
> > > > > > concepts - this is more like an cultural model of Piagetian
> > concrete
> > > > and
> > > > > > formal operational
> > > > > > thinking.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I think you hit the mark when you said that Chaiklin's
> > developmental
> > > > model
> > > > > > produces
> > > > > > crystallized and sedimented psychological functions that are
> > > > preordained
> > > > > > by a particular
> > > > > > culture. [This is different from Piaget's structuralist theory in
> > which
> > > > > > reasoning with scientific concepts naturally emerges at certain
> > ages].
> > > > By
> > > > > > making the term 'higher' simply refer to
> > > > > > the higher skill level designated by a particular culture - it all
> > > > becomes
> > > > > > culturally relative.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Vygotsky introduced something very different. The dynamics of
> > > > consciously
> > > > > > directing
> > > > > > one's own thoughts, emotions, perceptions, and behaviors  allows
> > for
> > > > > > creativity.
> > > > > > Vygotsky also said that consciously directed higher mental
> > functions
> > > > (such
> > > > > > as imagination
> > > > > > and analytic thinking) can be used in collaboration as
> > psychological
> > > > > > systems.
> > > > > > This is exactly what contemporary neuroscience has found in its
> > > > > > brain-imaging
> > > > > > studies (fMRI) of the prefrontal neocortex.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > My husband (Larry Smolucha) and I are writing a chapter titled
> > > > > > "Neuropsychological
> > > > > > Systems of Cultural Creativity" for the 2nd edition of Vygotsky and
> > > > > > Creativity.
> > > > > > Cathrene, Vera, and Ana suggested to their acquisitions editor that
> > > > Larry
> > > > > > and I expand
> > > > > > that chapter into a book. (So yes indeed, I can cite my sources
> > > > including
> > > > > > Vygotsky's
> > > > > > works in Russian or contemporary neuroscience.)
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > Date: Tue, 24 Feb 2015 21:08:35 -0800
> > > > > > > From: lpscholar2@gmail.com
> > > > > > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> > > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Understanding "functions" within the "zone" of
> > > > > > proximal    development
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Seth Chaiklin's article has me reflecting on the meaning of
> > > > "functions".
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > The article's concluding comment is:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > According to the analysis presented here, the zone of proximal
> > > > > > development
> > > > > > > refers to the maturing functions that are relevant to the next
> > age
> > > > period
> > > > > > > and that enable performance in collaborative situations that
> > could
> > > > not be
> > > > > > > achieved independently.  These *functions* are not created in
> > > > > > interaction,
> > > > > > > rather interaction provides conditions for identifying their
> > > > existence
> > > > > > and
> > > > > > > the extent to which they have developed."
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > I read this as indicating that the functions analyzed are
> > > > "crystallized"
> > > > > > or
> > > > > > > "sedimented" forms that "objectively" exist as "generalized"
> > > > structures.
> > > > > > > Within "socially situated" settings individual persons will
> > > > subjectively
> > > > > > > move through a sequence of predictable "periods".  Within modern
> > > > social
> > > > > > > situations "school" is a predictable social situation and it is
> > the
> > > > goal
> > > > > > or
> > > > > > > desire to develop "scientific concepts" in school settings.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Therefore functions described as "higher mental functions" exist
> > in
> > > > > > > particular historical social situations of development, not
> > > > universally
> > > > > > > applicable situations. To be more specific "scientific concepts
> > > > function
> > > > > > > within school situations of development. As  Chaiklin writes:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > "It is important to recognize that these periods are not
> > reflecting a
> > > > > > > biological necessity (because of genetic or other organic
> > sources),
> > > > even
> > > > > > > though the development of higher psychological functions (e.g. ,
> > > > > > > perception, voluntary memory, speech, thinking) are dependent on
> > > > these
> > > > > > > natural conditions. .... Similarly, none of the psychological
> > > > functions
> > > > > > are
> > > > > > > 'pure' in the sense of a biologically given module or faculty."
> > > > [page 7]
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > In other words there exists an "objective" zone [a general zone]
> > > > which
> > > > > > > Chaiklin clarifies as a tripartite constellation of "present
> > age",
> > > > > > > "maturing function", and "next age"  AS "the objective zone of
> > > > proximal
> > > > > > > development" [page 7] This zone is objective in the sense that it
> > > > does
> > > > > > not
> > > > > > > refer to any individual child, but reflects [mirrors] the
> > > > psychological
> > > > > > > functions that need to be formed during a given age period of
> > > > development
> > > > > > > [and in particular the higher scientific or school concepts
> > > > developed in
> > > > > > > school situations.]  In order to approach the more abstract
> > concepts
> > > > > > [which
> > > > > > > are going "higher"]  psychological functions need to develop
> > first in
> > > > > > order
> > > > > > > to move to the next "period" or situation of concept development
> > > > [verbal
> > > > > > > thought].
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Chaiklin then makes a clear statement of the characteristic of
> > this
> > > > > > > objective zone:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > "The 'objective' zone is not defined a priori, but reflects the
> > > > > > structural
> > > > > > > relationships that are *historically-constructed and objectively
> > > > > > > constituted* in the historical period in which the child lives.
> > One
> > > > can
> > > > > > say
> > > > > > > that the zone for a given age period is normative, in that it
> > > > > > > *reflects *[LP-mirrors]
> > > > > > > the institutionalized demands and expectations that developed
> > > > > > historically
> > > > > > > in a particular societal *tradition of practice*.  For example
> > > > school age
> > > > > > > children are expected to develop capabilities to reason with
> > academic
> > > > > > > (i.e., scientific) concepts. Individuals who do not develop this
> > > > > > > *capability* can be said to *have* [LP - possess] a different
> > > > > > intellectual
> > > > > > > structure.... Reasoning with concepts is a specific
> > manifestation of
> > > > the
> > > > > > > new-formations for this age ... " [page7]
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > In other words functions which develop are "new" formations
> > which are
> > > > > > > normative [ "crystallized" or "sedimented"].
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > The question that I am left with is the relation of these
> > normative
> > > > > > > functions existing within particular social situations of
> > development
> > > > > > when
> > > > > > > the social situations that now exist become the object of deep
> > > > > > questioning?
> > > > > > > This type of reflection and speculation is entering the realm of
> > > > "what
> > > > > > > if".  What if the "objective" zone of proximal development and
> > its
> > > > "new"
> > > > > > > formations [crystallized, sedimented] itself becomes the
> > "object" of
> > > > > > > inquiry?
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > I hope my train of thought is coherent? Chaiklin's article
> > brought
> > > > > > clarity
> > > > > > > to my understanding of "functions" as key concepts for
> > understanding
> > > > the
> > > > > > > meaning and sense of ZPD.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Larry
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> > > --
> > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an
> > object
> > > that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> >
> >
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object
> that creates history. Ernst Boesch.