It is assumed by some that the idea and concept of hermeneutical logic go back to G. Misch (see Wiehl 1974: 413-414) who in turn got his inspiration from Dilthey. This hermeneutical logic was envisioned as a philosophical theory of knowledge which relies on the description of the hermeneutical dimension of logical phenomena. I have pointed out elsewhere (Freiberger 1983b, 1984a) that the term "hermeneutical logic" had been introduced earlier, independently, by the Russian philosopher Gustav G. Shpet in 1918. Shpet is not widely known in the West. He deserves to be better known. He was the leader of the formal-philosophical school in Moscow in the 1920's which gathered around GAKhN (State Academy for the Study of the Arts) (see Freiberger 1981, 1983a). Shpet, a student of Husserl, together with R. Jakobson, to whom he acted as a mentor (see Holenstein 1976: 14), transmitted Husserl's phenomenology into Russia. In this paper, I shall attempt to summarize Shpet's contribution to hermeneutical logic and philosophical semiotics and to indicate his place within modern hermeneutics and semiotics. I shall limit myself to Shpet's critique of four pioneers of hermeneutics and semiotics; namely Aristotle, Augustine, Schleiermacher, and Dilthey.

Shpet's mature work spans the years from 1914 to 1927 when he was forbidden to do any more work in philosophy. I shall address myself mainly to his still unpublished work Germenevtika i ee problemy (Hermeneutics and Its Problems), written in 1918. [1] This work accomplishes more completely what Dilthey (1900) had set out to do earlier. Shpet reinterprets the history of hermeneutics in view of the history of semiotics, frequently combining joint problems under one mantle, the "theory of
understanding"; this theory in turn is inseparable from the theory of knowledge. The logical side of understanding constitutes the core of Shpet's concept of "hermeneutical logic."

Shpet perceived modern hermeneutics as the foundation not only of the human sciences but possibly all sciences in that it must confront the problem of interpreting and understanding the whole "text" of reality which is given to us through the "word" (slovo). The hermeneutic process of interpreting and understanding is a "verbal" or "linguistic" one in its communicative aspect. Man's reality is, for Shpet, as well as for W. v. Humboldt, firstly a linguistic reality which contains man's history and culture. He set forth these views also in his work on inner form (1927) which was inspired by W. v. Humboldt. Shpet perceived inner forms as logical forms.

It is not a simple task to determine Shpet's position in the history of hermeneutics and semiotics. Should one rank him among the group of philosophers (like Heidegger and Gadamer) of the twentieth century who according to Ricoeur (1965: 1) tried to "graft" the hermeneutical problem on to phenomenology? Shpet does share their common inspiration, which includes among other philosophers, Aristotle and Augustine; but he views these philosophers differently in light of his own critical-logical theory of understanding.

Shpet (1918) sees Aristotle's work *Peri Hermeneias* (On Interpretation) related to Plato's ideas, insofar as the question about words, thoughts and things are a "single connected question." Shpet points out that Aristotle's work is "quite properly seen as a part of logic, since in Aristotle it is only a question of the forms of expression of thought, i.e., of the logical forms of judgment from the standpoint of their truth or falsity, and not of interpretation or understanding. "He points to the Stoics for whom questions of logic and grammar were inseparably linked" and although they did not yet address themselves to the "art of interpretation," they saw the beginning (with Crates) of the Anomalist movement "which later played such a large role in the interpretation of texts." Shpet agrees with Dilthey (1900: 192) in his assessment of the two different hermeneutical tendencies--the Analogists and the Anomalists--which were of "world-historical significance."

The first problem which Shpet encountered in his historical investigation, was that of the univocity and equivocity of senses; he is critical of the arbitrai-
ness which he encountered in the interpretation of these terms. In his discussion of the evolvement of multiple senses, mostly in the so-called allegorical interpretation (Origen, Augustine, the Scholastics), Shpet suggests to replace the traditional designation "allegorical tendency in hermeneutics" with a "characterization which stresses the recognition that words and expressions have several meanings, in contrast to the tendency which assumes a single definite meaning." He sees such an opposition as being of fundamental importance, and as the first problem he encountered in his examination of hermeneutics in a historical context. He points to the various hidden presuppositions which lie at the basis of this difference: "namely the very concept of meaning is assumed to be either something objective or something psychological and subjective." He gives a semiotic explanation:

In the first case, a word, as a sign which is subject to interpretation, indicates some 'thing,' the same object, together with the objective relations among things, which are disclosed by means of interpretation, and these objective relations themselves obviously link together the one who communicates something about them; in the second case, the word indicates only the intentions, wishes and ideas of the communicator, the interpretation is as free and even arbitrary as the communicator's wish to put any given meaning, or many meanings, into his words, insofar as that corresponds to his intentions.

He points out that the criterion of truthfulness for communications of the first kind is obvious; whereas for those of the second kind, there is strictly no criterion, "or it must necessarily be assumed to consist in certain peculiarities of the subjectively-psychological experience itself." The fundamental problem raised by all this, is, in Shpet's view, the following: if we agree with an arbitrary construal of senses and meanings, "how can we understand not just the bifurcation but even the fragmentation of the very act or 'faculty' of understanding these various meanings?" And if there is only one "faculty" of understanding, "how do we explain the fact that, while encountering various aspects of the object and its different contents, we nevertheless come to an understanding of the object as one?"
The real complexity of hermeneutical problems which lies concealed behind the apparent simplicity of the unequivocal interpretation, and similarly, the complexity of the equivocal interpretation requires, in Shpet's view, from the beginning, a justification and grounding. He sees such first attempts at theoretical justification of the methods of hermeneutics among the representatives of the equivocal interpretation (Origen). Shpet finds Origen's principles of interpretation unimportant for the essence of the question and notes the inconsistency of the equivocal interpretation.

Shpet praises Augustine for having seen "clearly" and having "thought through a significant number of questions connected with the problem of sign, meaning, sense, understanding, and interpretation." But he regrets that "the same strong interest in the practical role of interpretation which hindered the Alexandrians, did not permit Augustine to elucidate the purely theoretical meaning of these questions." With Origen, as well as with Augustine, the problem of understanding was eliminated "without even having been properly formulated": understanding is reached through an acceptance of Church dogmatics, on the one hand, or, according to Augustine, the divine inspiration of Scripture calls for divine inspiration on the part of the reader as well. Shpet notes that:

Augustine's definition obliges one to acknowledge the uniqueness of the meaning behind the sign, since the apparent multiplicity of meanings, according to his definition, springs only from the assumption that the meaning of the sign can function in turn as a sign.

He points out that it does not follow from this that the reverse is also true. The multiplicity of the modes of expression should not be taken for a multiplicity of meanings; the multiplicity of expressions is "a question of syntax, poetics, rhetoric, and logic." Shpet stresses that hermeneutics "should begin with the assumption that every given sign has a single meaning."

Shpet sees the basic falsehood of Biblical hermeneutics in that it admits the duality of meaning--human and divine--in given expressions. The divine meaning must then in Shpet's view, always remain outside of scientific theory. Augustine contradicts his own definitions in regard to the theory of understanding and interpretation of other people's words by choosing the psycholog-
ical way of explaining the role and meaning of signs. (The reader then has the ability to "fantasize in regard to what is objectively there.") This leads to a theory that the meaning of signs and words is "the idea of the communicator." Shpet notes that such a theory is not true in general "since it requires an understanding of objective relation;" but it may be true in a particular case "where it is a question of understanding the person who is communicating something about objective relations."

But here we must distinguish two cases: understanding a person "through his words (signs) about himself" or "understanding him through other signs which accompany his speech (mimicry, tone of voice, emotional expressions, etc.) for which we also set up requirements as to uniqueness of meaning." Shpet thinks that a more thorough analysis will probably reveal that "what we take for one sign with two meanings actually consists for us of two different signs."

Another difficulty is the question of the truthfulness of what is understood. This Augustine did not bypass; he "drew the appropriate sceptical conclusion (cf. De Magistro, Ch. XIII) but was not able to resolve this scepticism satisfactorily." Augustine appeals to mystical experience, i.e., to the beginning of the theory of "recollection"--which, according to Shpet, "means moving in a circle." Augustine is not yet really aware of the study of signs, "as that which has meaning" and the study of the meanings themselves. Nevertheless, Shpet credits him with having widened the content of hermeneutics, "adding to the problem of whether the word is univocal or equivocal the further problem of the sign in general and the problem of understanding as a transition from sign to meaning."

Shpet does not claim a place for hermeneutics as an independent science but only as an auxiliary discipline used in scientific work. He was concerned with disclosing its place in the system of knowledge which "means first of all to indicate the cycle of scientific questions in relation to which hermeneutics plays its auxiliary role." The theoretical value of the subject matter of hermeneutics must be formulated in order to gain an awareness of the place of hermeneutics. The logic of hermeneutical techniques has to be specified. Shpet examines the evolvement of such a logic historically. He notes that the break with grammar (and rhetoric), observed initially in Flacius, led hermeneutics to logic. Medieval logic (especially the Nominalists and William of Ockham) analyzed the logical theory of signs deeply
and from many aspects. Protestantism placed the medieval tradition, and perhaps especially logic, under suspicion and slandered it. A change in the general conception of philosophy was necessary to bring about a turning point for the grounding of hermeneutics. Locke moved the medieval dispute concerning the word and concept formation to psychological ground, and thus awakened a renewed interest in it. With Locke, the word becomes also a theme of communication, as a social thing.

Shpet praises Schleiermacher's depth of understanding of the tasks of hermeneutics, the subtlety and elegance of the analysis of its content. His works on hermeneutics stand on a level "which has not been surpassed up to the present time." Dilthey (1900:198) pointed out that hermeneutics arrived in Schleiermacher at a consciousness of the rules and moreover, turned to an analysis of understanding. Shpet disagrees with Dilthey's assessment of Schleiermacher. In his view, Schleiermacher did not yet provide an analysis of understanding as such. Shpet feels also that Schleiermacher "obscured the question in its very formulation by not sufficiently differentiating between understanding in the strict sense and interpretation." Shpet explains that Schleiermacher ignored the circumstance "that interpretation begins precisely at the moment when understanding ends, where immediate understanding is insufficient." Shpet points out that Schleiermacher was quite right in his view that hermeneutics was more than just a supplement to logic (as Wolff had argued); that, according to Schleiermacher (1838: 8-9), "hermeneutics should be placed in relation to thinking as the inner aspect of speech and thus should be philosophical." Shpet found Schleiermacher's explanation of the place of hermeneutics too general and not entirely satisfactory. Schleiermacher had at least clarified the relation between hermeneutics and rhetoric, which he perceived to be parallel, as speech and understanding are parallel. The philosophical and logical grounding of hermeneutics, in Shpet's view, remained unclarified.

Hermeneutics lies at the base of every artful interpretation--as Schleiermacher would say--it "is not a mere resonance chamber for logic and grammar . . ." Shpet speaks about the independence of hermeneutics and stresses that hermeneutics is not mediated by logic. Logical and grammatical analysis, however, can serve a hermeneutical purpose. He notes two canons of hermeneutics in Schleiermacher (1838: 41, 69):
(1) Everything in a given speech which still needs closer definition can be defined only on the basis of the language of the author and his original circle of readers; (2) The sense of every word in a given passage is to be defined in terms of its connection with the sense in the context.

Shpet asks in what will the grounding in principle of these ideas consist? Although logic, grammar, history, or philology may formulate them "as a certain kind of empirical observation," none of these disciples can answer the question. According to Shpet, only an analysis of understanding can locate their ultimate philosophical ground. These questions indicate to logic where it should turn its attention to "in order to satisfy the demands of those who are beginning to look to logic for the elucidation of the nature of those sciences which have a need of hermeneutics." Shpet explains:

Only on this condition does logic itself become the ground for the mathematical and natural sciences—as a logic of analysis and prediction—and for the philological and historical sciences—as a logic of interpretation or hermeneutical logic.

Shpet notes a circle: "in order to understand one must be able to read (or to hear) the logical (as well as the grammatical and, in general the formal) structure, but in order to give a logical exposition one must be able to understand." Shpet proposes a solution to the circle via a simple sequence of questions which eliminates the circle itself. The outer and inner forms of the thing being expounded, do not consist of two different contents but of one and the same content. This content has its own forms: "namely, the ontological forms which are present in every content and are also universal, from the side of understanding as well as from that of exposition." Forms of exposition are forms of "external impression," whereas forms of understanding remain internal and constitute inner logical forms (cf. Shpet 1927).

Shpet assails the psychological interpretation which one encounters in Schleiermacher and his followers, which had only hindered historical interpretation in the strict sense. According to Droysen (1863) an individual person realizes himself only in communication; he is an expression of communion or community. Then, Shpet argues, the individual "ceases to be a psychological
subject and becomes instead a social and historical object." Shpet implies that, in fact, man and the cultural objects which he creates, are a sign which produce other signs, and asks whether we must not speak of a new type of understanding and a new type of interpretation.

Shpet praises Dilthey for having focused on the fundamental significance of hermeneutic problems and "for having seriously propagated hermeneutics as the methodological basis for the humanities in general and for history in particular." Dilthey sees the importance of hermeneutics as "all-embracing" but Shpet chides him for his one-sided approach which limits his whole exposition. Dilthey (1900: 187) poses the question of the knowledge of the individual person, to which Schleiermacher and Droysen had also turned, asking about the possibility of such knowledge and how it can be acquired. Shpet assails the one-sidedness of this question since the philological and the historical sciences "have not only the individual person as their object... but also what it is that is communicated." On the other hand, if the individual person becomes an "objectively-social object" we must know what constitutes such an object and how we can interpret it. Shpet regrets that with Dilthey the object of historical investigation and understanding is reduced to something "purely psychological." Shpet stresses that the problem of the problem of the knowledge of the individual person is "not reducible to the methods of introspective psychology," that it is a problem of understanding which must be raised in a fundamental methodological way. Hermeneutics links philosophy and the historical sciences methodologically. Schleiermacher had already raised this question. Shpet regrets that the logical-semiotic problem, which is correlated with hermeneutic investigation, escaped Dilthey's attention. However, he notes that Dilthey later on did free himself from his earlier psychologism. [2]

II

Shpet was familiar with Husserl's Logical Investigations (1900) and ideas (1913) and was influenced by these works. Husserl (1913) distinguished between natural and human sciences (history, cultural sciences, sociology), and, furthermore, differentiated sciences of experience or "fact" with sciences of essences. He acknowledged a "principle of all principles" which is a
source of authority for knowledge. Our consciousness is consciousness of something. Internal experiences are consciousness of something to which they are intentionally related. Husserl addresses himself to the "foreign" and "other" in its relation to consciousness. For Husserl (1913:145) a sign is something that points to something that lies beyond it. And he concluded that all reality exists through the dispensing of meaning. For Husserl, all real unities are unities of meaning. All knowledge is descriptive; inferences lead us only towards the facts. Husserl pointed out that the main themes or main types of description must be determined. This leads to his (1913:197) attack on formal logic which was shared by most of his contemporaries and followers (cf. Bollnow 1983: Introduction): formal logic does not give method, but the form of possible method. And this method is essentially dependent on the knowledge of structures. Husserl perceived the phenomenological method to be one which proceeds through the acts of reflexion, as well as certain sceptical doubts, which we must dispose of. He warns that experiences are not epistemologically guaranteed and stresses that complete clearness is the measure of all truth.

In his hermeneutical views, Shpet too, strives towards the attainment of objective meaning in the interpretation of the world as a text, as slovo (word). In classical ontology, logos led to real being. The "word" is a hermeneutical, ontological concept; through it we express our discourse on reality. It is also a semiotic concept as sign or as carrier of a sign or meaning. In Aesthetic Fragments II Shpet (1922/23: 28-29) discussed the discursive nature of speech. He differentiated between logos (sound with meaning) and lexis (articulated sound), and distinguished two kinds of meanings: nominative and interpretative meaning (see Freiberger-Sheikholeslami 1984a). Shpet (1922/23, II:44) also believed that word and thought belong together. The word has an ontological basis.

One may view Shpet's contribution as the link between Husserl and Dilthey, to G. Misch, H. Lipps [3], Heidegger [4], and later, Gadamer [5]. Shpet's prime concern is the understanding of man as historical being as expressed in his language, whose existence is meaningful in as far as language which describes man's being and existence is meaningful. When hermeneutical logic reached a peak in Germany in the late 1920's and 1930's (see Bollnow 1983: 19), to be silenced by the Nazis, Shpet was already severely attacked in the Soviet Union. We do not know whether Shpet knew Heidegger's Sein
und Zeit (Time and Being) (1927), and it is unlikely that he was aware of the arguments which ensued between Misch (1930) and Heidegger. We find already many thoughts which we encounter in Misch, in Shpet: the conviction that all consciousness is consciousness of something; the concept of intentionality; the concept of significative thinking which goes back to Husserl; the construction of the objective world in language (including the connection of meaning and naming); the problem of what is universal; speech as discourse; the relation of sentence to word; the relation of part and whole (which goes back to Husserl also); the circular structure of knowledge; and finally, the hermeneutical feature of philosophical logic (cf. Bollnow 1983). It is regrettable that Shpet was not given the chance to further develop his thought.

We would like to stress Shpet's indebtedness to Schleiermacher, W. v. Humboldt, and Husserl. For all of them language is the key for understanding the world.

NOTES

[1] I would like to thank Shpet's heirs who gave me access to this unpublished manuscript. I have translated it into English and German. It is part of Shpet's Hermeneutical Investigations: the first two parts of which are contained in his dissertation (1916); the third part has the tentative title Istoricheskiy ocherk ucheniyu o ponimanii (Historical Investigation of the Theory of Understanding, 1918). The research for this paper was made possible through an IREX-Fulbright Young Faculty Exchange grant to the Soviet Union in 1979/80 and a DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service) Research grant to Germany in the summer of 1983.

[2] Poeggeler (1972: 15) notes that Dilthey, like Husserl, turned away from the psychologistic approach which sought recourse to the author of a work in order to achieve understanding.

[3] Lipps was also a student of Husserl. He developed a hermeneutical logic in the 1930's. He was primarily concerned with how understanding expresses itself. He (1938: 11) understood logos as a responsibility which is given to man.

[4] For Heidegger (1927: 87), interpretation constitutes the formation of understanding. Where there is under-
standing, there is meaning (sense).