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[Xmca-l] Re: Thought and language as oscillating and pulsing [or not]



Now THAT I think I understood, Larry. Thanks.

*Meaning *is not just a property of thinking. Meaning penetrates [infuses]
the structure of motor and perceptual activities.

So we are talking, so to speak, about "zhivanie" followed by "perezhivanie
(living and living through, System 1 and System 2 in current cog sci
jargon?

The two are distinguished not only temporally, but through different
modalities, different "systems of mediation." One embodied in the moving
body, the flesh, the other emobided in movement and sound.

If that interpretation is even close to the right way to think about the
matter, how do I describe the walk I took this morning that was (more or
less) simultaneously, being in a marsh at dawn, incredible sunrise, grey
heron in the gloom by the lagoon and a hawk mewing. The dog stopping the
procession to do her own sniffing. And thinking about the discussion on
xmca.
Is there less living in my writing this note than in feeding the birds in
the garden?
I think I vote for both/and.  :-)

That summary should go into the newcomer's guide!
mike

On Sun, Jan 25, 2015 at 10:01 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:

> Mike,
> I chose that metaphor in relation to Zinchenko proposing two types of
> "embodiment" the primary [lived through] embodiment such as motor and
> perceptual movement and ways of  orientation [which is enacted at the level
> of intonation, affect regulation, rhythmicity etc] AND
> secondary embodiment.
>
> Yesterday WAS first experienced as primarily embodied as lived through
> being-in-the-world. The question Zinchenko asks is "What sort of flesh
> [material form] this *initial meaning takes.*
> *Meaning *is not just a property of thinking. Meaning penetrates [infuses]
> the structure of motor and perceptual activities.
> Zinchenko argues we do not "know" intellectually what the *initial primary
> original* meaning or conception was embodied in.
> To "know" intellectually requires *second embodiment*.  [objectification,
> or if you wish signification] of the initial embodiment witnin perceptual,
> operational, motor, and verbal meanings. THIS second embodiment I imagine
> as an alternative "level" [metaphors of surface and deep]
> Zinchenko suggests it is within this second embodiment [the level of
> images] that the initial original meaning *reveals *itself to the person
> for the *first *time and in this second embodiment "yesterday" is "born"
> [for the first time]
>
> This second embodiment in which the primary embodiment is revealed for the
> first time may turn *out to BE embodied as* an image, an action, or a
> thought. If this primary embodiment is expressed as a thought it will *be*
> expressed in a word [as a second embodiment or objectification or
> signification.
> The original embodiment becomes a "yesterday" as a second embodiment
> Zinchenko is questioning making a discrete "boundary" between meaning and
> sense. He imagines the relation  [images or figural]  through the metaphor
> of the Mobius strip. More like meaning infusing sense and sense infusing
> meaning.
>
> I find Zinchenko's approach clarifying where different traditions overlap
> Larry
>
> On Sun, Jan 25, 2015 at 8:51 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>
> > I found the mobius strip metaphor a lot more understandable than the
> > "yesterday has not
> > yet been born" metaphor, Larry. From the former I kept look for the
> > sense/meaning distinction because it seemed as if needed to be there.
> Still
> > mulling that idea over.
> > mike
> >
> > On Sun, Jan 25, 2015 at 8:35 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > > I have imaginally been walking with Zinchenko who is telling me about
> his
> > > chats with Schpet and Vygotsky.
> > > Zinchenko is engaged in rehabilitating the centrality of the meaning
> > > of "meaning" to processes of phenomenological historical understanding,
> > and
> > > interpretation.  His conversation is in the form  of a rejoinder [or
> > > joining back] with Vygotsky and Schpet with who he wants to bring out
> > their
> > > mutually shared thesis on the relation of thought and word.
> > > Zinchenko uses metaphors to poetically embody his attempt to have
> > > "meanings" more modest place with Vygotsky take on a more prominent and
> > > central quality.
> > >
> > > Zinchenko wrote:
> > > "A good image for the mutual relationships of meaning and sense is a
> > Mobius
> > > strip.  In the process of understanding or thinking, we encounter
> > > oppositely encountered *acts of making sense of meanings and sense
> giving
> > > meaningful signs to senses *[authors emphasis], which are transformed
> > into
> > > each other. In Russian, 'meaning' ['znachenie'] and 'sign' ['znak']
> have
> > a
> > > common root and, hence, the untranslated italicized phrase sounds like
> a
> > > Russian pun. On the outer side of the strip may be meaning, which is
> > > transformed into sense as a result of the act of making sense, and this
> > > *becomes* the internal side of the *same* strip. Assigning a meaningful
> > > sign to sense  makes an *analogous *transformation. Anyway, it was
> > highly
> > > productive for Vygotsky to change the *focus* from *'meaning*' to
> sense.
> > > *Such
> > > a change *brings his views closer to those of Shpet. [page 228]
> > >
> > > I will pause here but want to point out how the metaphor of the Mobius
> > > strip has a similar quality to the hermeneutical movement of "fusions
> of
> > > horizons"
> > >
> > > Larry
> > >
> > > On Sun, Jan 25, 2015 at 7:51 AM, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com>
> > wrote:
> > >
> > > > Thank you, Martin!
> > > > Henry
> > > >
> > > > > On Jan 24, 2015, at 1:49 PM, Martin John Packer <
> > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co>
> > > > wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > This is the information I have, Henry.
> > > > >
> > > > > Freiberger-Sheikholeslami, E. (1984). Gustav G. Shpet:
> Hermeneutical
> > > > logic and philosophical semiotics. In J. Deely (Ed.), Semiotics 1984
> > (pp.
> > > > 381-391). Bloomington: Semiotic Society of America.
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Martin
> > > > >
> > > > > On Jan 24, 2015, at 2:37 PM, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com>
> > wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > >> Martin,
> > > > >> Thank you very muchfor the article on Sheet. I think the readings
> > and
> > > > dialog generated will help me understand much better Vygotsky and his
> > > > context by getting a better grip on the long view, through the eyes
> of
> > > > hermeneutics. Do you know when the Freiberger-Sheeikholes article was
> > > > written?
> > > > >> Henry
> > > > >>
> > > > >>> On Jan 24, 2015, at 10:26 AM, Martin John Packer <
> > > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote:
> > > > >>>
> > > > >>> I am sure that there are differences between LSV and Shpet, as
> > Larry
> > > > points out. But there are also striking similarities. Here is a
> little
> > > > background:
> > > > >>>
> > > > >>> Martin
> > > > >>>
> > > > >>> <Freiberger-Sheikholeslami 1985 Gustav G. Shpet He.pdf>
> > > > >>> On Jan 24, 2015, at 11:39 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> > > > wrote:
> > > > >>>
> > > > >>>> Martin will be sending us an article on Shpet.
> > > > >>>> I therefore did some background exploration and discovered that
> > > Shpet
> > > > and
> > > > >>>> Vygotsky differed on the notion of "oscillation".
> > > > >>>> Vygotsky believed thought and language oscillated while Shpet
> > > > disagreed.
> > > > >>>>
> > > > >>>> Zinchenko clarifies Vygotsky's understanding in this paragraph
> > > > >>>> that Zinchenko wrote in his chapter "Thought and Word, the
> > > Approaches
> > > > of L.
> > > > >>>> S. Vygotsky and G. G. Shpet": It uses the metaphor of rain
> [which
> > I
> > > > >>>> associated with the other thread on rain]
> > > > >>>>
> > > > >>>> "Thought and word are no less polyphonic than mind.  Yet, there
> > is a
> > > > >>>> long way to go to arrive at this conclusion.  And it is hard to
> > > > >>>> overestimate the input of Shpet and Vygotsky, along with
> Aleksandr
> > > > Potebnya.
> > > > >>>> Out of all the polyphony of mind and thought, out of all the
> > various
> > > > >>>> possibilities of origins, Shpet and Vygotsky   gave their
> > preference
> > > > to the
> > > > >>>> word, although they understood it differently.  Let us start
> from
> > > > >>>> Vygotsky's metaphorical description: *What is simultaneous in
> > > thought
> > > > is
> > > > >>>> successive in language.*  It would be possible to compare a
> > thought
> > > > with a
> > > > >>>> cloud that showers a rain of words.  This is why the transition
> > from
> > > > >>>> thought to language is a very complicated process of
> > *dismemberment*
> > > > of a
> > > > >>>> thought and its recreation in a word.  On the next page,
> Vygotsky
> > > > wrote,
> > > > >>>> 'continuing this picturesque comparison, we should liken the
> > > > motivation of
> > > > >>>> thought to the wind that sets the clouds in motion.'  If
> something
> > > > can *pour
> > > > >>>> itself, *it means that it already exists.  Therefore we can
> > > > understand the
> > > > >>>> given metaphor as saying that thought, already existing is
> > > *expressed
> > > > *in a
> > > > >>>> word"  [emphasis in the original]
> > > > >>>>
> > > > >>>> This quote draws attention to Vygotsky perceiving *oscillation
> > > > *behind the
> > > > >>>> movement of thought and language. Shpet did not see thought and
> > > > language as
> > > > >>>> oscillating.  Zinchenko's goal in his article is not to place
> the
> > > > >>>> approaches of Shpet and Vygotsky in opposition but to present
> them
> > > as
> > > > >>>> mutually complimentary approaches.
> > > > >>>>
> > > > >>>> I hope to learn from others on the complexity of the notions of
> > > > >>>> oscillating movement of thought and language situated within
> > words.
> > > > >>>> Polyphonic notions
> > > > >>>
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > >
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science as an
> object
> > that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> >
>



-- 
It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science as an object
that creates history. Ernst Boesch.