the largest triad, the universe as a whole, forms a circle of three terms (the logical idea, nature and spirit), each of which in turn serves as bare immediacy, as mediating the other two terms, and as mediated immediacy.

Hegel constantly attacks the doctrine that we have immediate access to the truth, whether by knowledge, feeling or faith: (a) All knowledge, like anything else, is mediated, as well as immediate, at least by education, etc. (b) Relatively immediate knowledge, etc., such as sensory certainty (Ps, I) or Jacobi’s immediate knowledge (Enc. I §§61ff) is defective: it leads to the impoverishment of the object of knowledge (since determinacy and complexity require mediation) and it implicitly contradicts itself, since its access to objects is intrinsically mediated by, e.g., universal terms such as ‘this’. (c) The supposed defects of mediated cognition are dispelled by the sublation of mediation into immediacy.

Hegel’s arguments are often obscured by the different levels of mediation and immediacy that come into play: e.g. absolute, wholly unmediated, immediacy (which never occurs), relatively bare immediacy, and mediated immediacy, in which mediation is internalized by the mediated entity. They also seem vitiated by his conflation of apparently distinct types of mediation and immediacy: e.g. physical or causal, epistemic and logical. (The fact that knowledge of my own existence presupposes various biological and educational mediations may not be thought to impair its status as immediate knowledge.) But the coincidence of physical, cognitive and logical processes is essential to Hegel’s idealism: absolute knowledge must accurately mirror the structure of the object known.

**memory, recollection and imagination** German has several words for ‘memory’ and ‘remember’. The most important in Hegel are Erinnerung and Gedächtnis:

1. The verb erinnern is related to the preposition in (‘in’) and originally meant ‘to make (someone) get inside, i.e. become aware of, (something)’. Hence now, as in Hegel’s day, it means ‘to be reminiscent of, to remind (someone) of (something)’). (It also means ‘to criticize adversely, draw unfavourable attention to’.) The reflexive form, sich erinnern, thus means ‘to remind oneself of, recall, remember (something)’. Like the Greek anamnēskesthai (‘to recollect’), it suggests the successful outcome, rather than the process, of an attempt to recall or recollect something one knows or has previously encountered. The noun Erinnerung means a ‘reminder’, but also ‘memory, recollection’. Plato’s doctrine that all learning is the recollection (anamnēsis) of things previously known but later forgotten casts a shadow over the idealists’ uses of Erinnerung: Schelling wrote that the ‘Platonic idea that all philosophy is recollection is true in this sense: all philosophy consists in a recollecting of the state in which we were one with nature’ (Universal Deduction of the Dynamic Process or of the Categories of Physics, 1800).

2. The verb gedanken is related to denken (‘to think’) and means ‘to think of, bear in mind; to remember, recollect; to mention’, etc. It is less active than sich erinnern, and does not suggest an intentional attempt to recall. The noun
Gedächtnis originally meant ‘thinking of something, Erinnerung’, but now means:

(a) Like the Greek mnémē, the whole stock of experiences, etc., that can be recalled, but need not be recalled at the moment.

(b) The ability to retrieve or recall knowledge and past experiences, and to recognize them as encountered before. (Gedächtnis is here close to Erinnerung.)

(c) The ability to remember or memorize things, in the sense of adding them to one’s stock of memories, i.e. to one’s Gedächtnis in sense (a).

There are also two words for imagination:

3. The verb einbilden, from Bild (’picture, image’, etc.) and bilden (’to shape, form, educate’, etc.), originally meant ‘to stamp, impress (something) into (the soul)’. Hegel sometimes uses it to mean ‘to impress (something) into (something else)’, when imagination is not explicitly in play. (Schelling often uses einbilden to mean ‘inform’, and associates imagination with the artist’s ability to inform the real or particular with the ideal or universal.) But in his day, as now, it usually occurred in the reflexive form, sich einbilden, and meant ‘to imagine’. Einbildung is ‘imagination’, and Einbildungskraft is ‘the (power of) imagination’. Kant distinguished the productive from the reproductive Einbildung: The reproductive imagination forms images (Bilde) of perceived objects and combines them according to laws of association. The productive imagination has two functions: (a) It forms a bridge between sensibility and understanding; it unifies the ‘manifold of intuition’ and thus makes experience possible. (b) It creatively transforms the material of nature into works of art.

4. Phantasie (’fancy, imagination’), from the Greek phantasia (’imagination, the ability to perceive appearances’), is the usual word for, e.g., a ‘lively imagination’. Philosophers (e.g. Schiller) often use it interchangeably with Einbildungskraft. If a distinction is drawn, Phantasie is usually the higher, more creative faculty. Jean Paul, e.g., saw Einbildungskraft as simply reproductive and associative (even animals have it, since they dream and fear things), while Phantasie ‘makes all parts into a whole . . . it totalizes everything, brings the absolute and the infinite of reason closer and more vividly before mortal men’ (PA, §§6, 7). Hegel too distinguishes between the passive (i.e. reproductive and mechanically associative) Einbildungskraft and the creative, artistic Phantasie, but he often uses the words interchangeably. Translators sometimes distinguish them as ‘imagination’ (Einbildungskraft) and ‘fancy’ or ‘creative/productive imagination’ (Phantasie).

In Enc. III §§451–64 Hegel treats Erinnerung, Einbildungskraft and Gedächtnis as successively higher phases of Vorstellung. (Vorstellung is at first used in the wider sense of ‘internal representation’, but it acquires the sense of ‘conception’ as the account proceeds.) He stresses what he takes to be the root meanings of the words. Most notably, he takes erinnern to mean, not ‘remind’ or ‘be reminiscent (of)’, but ‘to internalize’, while sich erinnern is less ‘to recall’ than ‘to internalize, withdraw into, (re)collect, oneself’. The word is often contrasted with (sich) entäußern, ‘to externalize (one-, itself)’. It is
often used even when memory is not explicitly in play, especially for an entity’s sublation of its conditions or of its mediation. Essence, e.g., withdraws into itself from the complexity of quality, etc.; scepticism involves a complete self-internalization. Self-internalization and self-externalization, in accordance with Hegel’s view of the inner and outer, are often complementary rather than opposed: a person deepens his inner life, thoughts, etc., to the extent that he externalizes himself in speech, writing, etc. (Often, as in the case of essence, the introduction of Erinnerung generates a reference to the past.) Conversely, Hegel continues to use Erinnerung for ‘recollection’, but usually with a suggestion of internalization. He agrees with Plato that learning involves Erinnerung ((self)-internalization), but not that it involves Erinnerung (recollection). (Anamnesis has no similar suggestion of internalization.)

The recollection of a past event is, in a sense, an internalization of the event: the event is, as it were, in me, rather than at some distance from me in space and time. But to recollect an event, I must at the time of the event have internalized it and acquired a memory of it that can later be recalled; this memory is not so much internalized by my recollection as externalized, dredged up from my memory. Thus Hegel takes Erinnerung to be, not primarily recollection, but the internalization of a sensory intuition as an image (Bild); the image is abstracted from the concrete spatio-temporal position of the intuition, and given a place in the intelligence (which has its own subjective space and time). But the image is fleeting, and passes out of consciousness. The imagination is thus needed to revive or reproduce the image. The imagination is successively reproductive, associative and productive or creative (Phantasie).

However creative the imagination may be, its images are still images of intuited objects. Liberation from intuition and image is provided by Gedächtnis. Hegel associates this with thought: the past participle of denken (‘to think’) is gedacht (‘having been thought’), so that Gedächtnis has the flavour of ‘having-been-thoughtness’. Hence Gedächtnis, though it precedes thought itself (En. III §§465–8) in Hegel’s account, is thought-memory, and, since thinking, on Hegel’s view, involves language, verbal memory. Gedächtnis has three phases: (1) retentive memory, which retains words and their meanings, enabling us to recognize and understand words when we encounter them; (2) reproductive memory, which enables us to utter words on our own account; and (3) mechanical memory, the memorizing of words without regard for their meaning, which Hegel regards as an essential preliminary to thinking. The notion of Erinnerung, as the ‘internalization’ of a word and its meaning, continues to dominate Hegel’s account of Gedächtnis.

Erinnerung is crucial throughout Hegel’s thought. Gedächtnis is less so; elsewhere it is not usually restricted to verbal memory. Imagination, as Phantasie, plays an important role in Hegel’s philosophy of art, as it did in other aesthetic theories of the time, especially Kant’s and Schelling’s. Hegel also regarded it as crucial for philosophy, and in his review of Schulze (in CJP) rebukes him for suggesting that the philosopher can dispense with it.
mind and soul  No single German word covers all the uses of the noun ‘mind’, but several overlap it. The most notable are Gemüüt, Seele and Geist.

1. Gemüüt originally means the ‘totality of one’s feelings, sensations and thoughts’, and then the ‘seat of one’s feelings, etc.’. Eckhart, Paracelsus and Böhme used it for the mind or spirit in general, and also for inner withdrawal or spiritual inwardness (Innerlichkeit). For Leibniz and his followers, Gemüüt includes both the capacity for thought, or the understanding, and the will. Kant (and Schiller) use it in a similarly wide sense, to embrace feelings, sensations and thought: he defines it as the capacity to sense (empfinden) and think, and says that the forms of intuition (space and time) lie in the Gemüüt.

At this stage Gemüüt was a wider term than the more intellectual Geist, but under pressure from Geist (and also from the romantics) the connotation of inner, emotional depth implicit in the mystics’ uses of Gemüüt, but suppressed by the enlightenment, came to predominate. Thus Fichte claimed that while the French have Geist (‘esprit, wit’), the Germans have Gemüüt (‘soul, heart, (the seat of) large-scale, warm emotions’). Romantics such as Novalis saw Gemüüt as the source of poetry: ‘Poetry is the portrayal of the Gemüüt, of the inner world in its totality’ and ‘in the end everything becomes poetry. Does not the world in the end become Gemüüt?’ Hegel uses Gemüüt in the narrower sense of ‘seat of emotion’, and associates it especially with aesthetics.

2. Seele corresponds to the Greek psuchē, the Latin anima and the English ‘soul’. Hegel uses it in several ways:

(a) Occasionally, he refers to the Weltseele (‘world-soul’), referring to the doctrine (initiated by the Pythagoreans and by Plato’s Timaeus, and endorsed by the stoics, Plotinus, Giordano Bruno and Schelling) that the world as a whole is an organism animated by a single soul. But Hegel does not endorse this view, at least in his later works (Enc. III §391).

(b) In Greek thought, especially Plato and Aristotle, the soul is the principle of life. Thus anything alive, animals and men (Plato) and even plants (Aristotle), has a soul. Psuchē covers all psychic activities: nutrition and reproduction (Aristotle), perception, emotion, reason (Plato and Aristotle). When the creature dies it loses its soul. (Whether the soul, or some part of it, persists after death was a controversial question.) Hegel endorses this use of Seele, and thus ascribes a soul to whatever has life: plants, animals and men. But Seele does not, like psuchē, cover all psychic activities, only those that men share with plants and with animals: bodily qualities and alterations, sensation, feeling and habit (Enc. III §§388–412). It contrasts with consciousness and spirit (Geist). The Seele in this sense is not a thing; it is not a separable constituent of the organism; and, like Aristotle, Hegel has no inclination to ascribe immortality to it. It is the middle term between body and spirit (Enc. I §34A.).

(c) Seele is often used metaphorically for the ‘essential, inner side’ of an entity that is not literally alive.