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[Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors / Speaking of AAE



Apologies for the code,
LRH = Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis,
AAE = African-American English.

-greg

On Fri, Dec 26, 2014 at 7:43 PM, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
wrote:
>
> One last post - this one is about the larger question of AAE and
> linguistic relativity and was provoked by a recent conversation I had with
> John Lucy (a key proponent of the LRH -
> http://home.uchicago.edu/~johnlucy/ ). He is has been having a
> conversation about AAE and the LRH with John McWhorter, one of the top
> scholars of AAE (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_McWhorter), and
> McWhorter is not a fan of the LRH. At least part of this seems to be b.c.
> of the fact that it far too easily leads down the road of deficit thinking
> about AAE speakers. The argument goes: if language affects thought then
> speaking AAE will have an effect on how one is able to think. From there it
> is a short jump to the assumption that AAE leads to ways of thinking that
> are not conducive to learning complex intellectual concepts.
>
> Hopefully that provides some background to my comment about potential
> concerns with Orr's work. The concerns are not with her work per se. My
> concerns are rather with the body of scholarship on AAE and the LRH and the
> fact that, other than Labov's early work, there are no positive
> articulations of what the linguistic forms that define AAE actually do for
> those who speak this English dialect (as compared to another dialect). (I
> should add that I've since recalled that Geneva Smitherman's work is shot
> through with positive articulations of what AAE linguistic forms can do -
> her book Talkin and Testifyin' is a classic in this regard, but I wonder if
> the demonstrative style may be too difficult for speakers of mainstream
> English and/or academic-ese to understand!).
>
> Orr's work, in the wrong hands, can lead us down the path that McWhorter
> is concerned about - right to the conclusion that AAE is an intellectually
> problematic language because it interferes with a student's ability to
> understand mathematics.
>
> Hopefully that pulls some of the context of the larger conversation of
> which my post was only a small part.
>
> Cheers to all,
> greg
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, Dec 26, 2014 at 7:25 PM, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>>
>> A second response to the paper that Mike forwarded (and to Paul's post on
>> the previous thread).
>>
>> There is a sticky problem here that has not yet been dealt with
>> adequately, namely, if language forms do affect habitual thinking, then
>> what are the effects of the linguistic forms that come with AAE? I'm
>> thinking not just about pragmatics, but also about grammar (and perhaps
>> semantics as well).
>>
>> One thing that many have noted about AAE is that passive voice and
>> nominalizations are dispreferred by AAE speakers. The result is a way of
>> speaking that encourages the naming of actors and agents. Thus, in AAE, it
>> is difficult to carry on agent-less talk like:
>> 1. "Our neighborhood has been negatively affected in the past few years."
>> or, with nominalizations:
>> 2. "Negative affectings have happened in our neighborhood in the past few
>> years."
>>
>> Now these are perhaps terrible examples because although the first seems
>> a reasonable locution, I think most of us would disprefer the second.
>> Nonetheless, the second takes a form that is not uncommon in legal-ese and
>> academic-ese (!!) as a way of obfuscating potentially responsible agents
>> (one of the main tasks of the lawyer) and making processes into things (one
>> of the tasks of the scientific academic...).
>>
>> Instead the preference in AAE is for active sentences like:
>> "Somebody('s) been negatively affecting our neighborhood in the past few
>> years."
>>
>> With this locution (as with any form), you win some and you lose some.
>> On the one hand, the frequent use of active voice is a mark of good
>> writing (notwithstanding the various other AAE grammatical inflections that
>> are often understood as "bad grammar" by mainstream speakers - and I'll
>> admit that the example offered here is not a good one either...). On the
>> other hand, using predominately active voice can be marginalizing in
>> "high-theoretical" academic writing and in legal writing.
>>
>> That's the way that I tend to think of relativity effects - with any
>> language, you win some, you lose some. But I think attention to both sides,
>> winning and losing, is important. What I've sketched here in a somewhat
>> pathetic fashion is one answer to the question: "what do you "win" with
>> AAE?"
>>
>> -greg
>>
>> p.s., that seems like too many screens (I just adjusted my font size
>> bigger so maybe I can blame it on that...).
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Dec 22, 2014 at 9:33 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>>
>>> I am not in general following this thread, being waaaaaaaaaaaaaay behind
>>> on
>>> the imagination thread, but I tripped over the exchange regarding Orr and
>>> AAE. To keep it short, I attach two documents.
>>>
>>> The first is a draft segment from Cultural Psychology (1996) and the
>>> other
>>> an empirical report of even greater activity. For those who do not know
>>> the
>>> Labov work, the Word file might prove useful. for those of you for whom
>>> this topic is of continuing interest, perhaps the published paper is of
>>> more value.
>>>
>>> It is not true that no one followed up on Labov. It is probably true that
>>> no one followed up on the followup.
>>> mike
>>>
>>> On Mon, Dec 22, 2014 at 8:00 AM, Greg Thompson <
>>> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> > ​David Ki,
>>> > No worries. No offense taken. But thanks for the just-in-case note.
>>> > And yes, I agree to disagree.
>>> > Respectfully,
>>> > greg​
>>> >
>>> > On Mon, Dec 22, 2014 at 6:24 AM, David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu>
>>> wrote:
>>> > >
>>> > > Greg,
>>> > >
>>> > > I disagree with you that Orr could/should have taken a more
>>> culturally
>>> > > sensitive approach to her studies of AAE speakers' difficulties in
>>> > > classrooms dominated by standard English instruction. But I in no
>>> wise
>>> > > intended to imply your wishing she had done so places you among
>>> those who
>>> > > consider her work as racist. I'm very sorry if my words suggested
>>> > otherwise.
>>> > >
>>> > > David
>>> > >
>>> > >
>>> > > -----Original Message-----
>>> > > From: xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
>>> > > xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg
>>> > Thompson
>>> > > Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 9:36 AM
>>> > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>> > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors
>>> > >
>>> > > In the interests of following the recently suggested injunction not
>>> to
>>> > > directly address specific interlocutors, I'll talk in generalities
>>> (This
>>> > > makes it a bit more challenging to have a conversation but it also
>>> makes
>>> > > one think about the extractable and generalizable point that is
>>> beyond
>>> > the
>>> > > immediate context).
>>> > >
>>> > > In my previous post (apologies for drawing on prior context), I
>>> neither
>>> > > suggested nor intended to imply that Orr's work is racist (do
>>> intentions
>>> > > matter when it comes to meaning?). This speaks to some of the
>>> > difficulties
>>> > > of talking about issues of race. And in this connection let's not
>>> forget
>>> > > the fact that this list-serve is dominated by white men - that
>>> doesn't
>>> > mean
>>> > > that we are necessarily racist but it does mean that we are likely
>>> to be
>>> > > ignorant of many aspects of these issues.
>>> > >
>>> > > Nonetheless, I believe that we can overcome our ignorance through
>>> > > education, by learning more about the issues - even when it comes to
>>> > trying
>>> > > to understand cultures and languages that we did not grow up with.
>>> And
>>> > > while I think that there is good evidence for the linguistic
>>> relativity
>>> > > hypothesis, I do not believe that language is a determining
>>> influence in
>>> > > ALL thinking (Whorf uses the term "habitual" to describe the type of
>>> > > thinking that is most susceptible to the influence of language). That
>>> > means
>>> > > that even if you don't speak AAE, you can still study it and even
>>> come to
>>> > > understand how the grammatical forms lend themselves to particular
>>> ways
>>> > of
>>> > > understanding the world (this is what linguistic anthropology is all
>>> > > about!).
>>> > >
>>> > > And this is my concern with Orr's work. With all academic work, I
>>> think
>>> > it
>>> > > is worth considering questions like "How would racists take up our
>>> > > research?" In the case of Orr's work, my sense is that racists could
>>> > easily
>>> > > take up her research to argue (perhaps even by using the linguistic
>>> > > relativity hypothesis) that AAE speakers are unable to do complex
>>> > > mathematical thinking. This is why I would think that it is
>>> important to
>>> > > give a positive articulation of what AAE does as a language. It is
>>> > > certainly important to understand what it CAN'T do (e.g., help one
>>> learn
>>> > > math in a particular way), but it is equally important to understand
>>> what
>>> > > it CAN do.
>>> > >
>>> > > As Paul points out, Labov has done some of the work addressing this.
>>> But
>>> > > note that Labov's work was done 40 years ago and no one has sought to
>>> > > replicate or do any kind of similar work. What gives?
>>> > >
>>> > > -greg
>>> > >
>>> > >
>>> > >
>>> > >
>>> > > -greg
>>> > >
>>> > > On Sat, Dec 20, 2014 at 11:37 PM, David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu>
>>> > wrote:
>>> > >
>>> > > > Greg,
>>> > > >
>>> > > > I'm delighted that you're familiar with and appreciative of Orr's
>>> work.
>>> > > >
>>> > > > Cleary she didn't provide "serious consideration of how AAE
>>> speakers
>>> > > > actually use prepositions"--she couldn't have, as she was not a
>>> native
>>> > > > speaker of Black English dialect, and she was not a linguist. But
>>> I'm
>>> > not
>>> > > > sure how paying serious attention to technical nuances of Black
>>> English
>>> > > > grammar would have helped, as her analyses show that the African
>>> > American
>>> > > > students in her classes were not speaking either standard English
>>> or
>>> > > Black
>>> > > > English Vernacular, but rather a hybrid that arises from their
>>> efforts
>>> > to
>>> > > > emulate standard English.
>>> > > >
>>> > > > Now, it's true her work didn't parallel the approach Gay and Cole
>>> took
>>> > to
>>> > > > understanding what other psychologists were classifying as
>>> linguistic
>>> > and
>>> > > > cognitive deficits by carefully studying the native language and
>>> > culture.
>>> > > > On the other hand, she did something Gay and Cole didn't do, namely
>>> > > > micro-analyze the linguistic miscues operating in the classroom,
>>> and
>>> > the
>>> > > > resultant dilemmas of comprehension this created for her African
>>> > American
>>> > > > students.
>>> > > >
>>> > > > As the excerpt copied below illustrates, Orr was scrupulously
>>> attentive
>>> > > to
>>> > > > understanding her students' experience of distance and location
>>> given
>>> > the
>>> > > > different linguistic setting. And her analyses consistently point
>>> to
>>> > the
>>> > > > mismatch between the native dialect and the language of
>>> instruction as
>>> > > the
>>> > > > source of the problems, not the native dialect, itself. To label
>>> this
>>> > > work
>>> > > > as implicitly racist, I think cedes too much to those who mistrust
>>> > > science
>>> > > > as a tool of the oppressor, and whose only locus of attention is
>>> the
>>> > > > history and legacy of social injustice. Even now, in this
>>> discussion,
>>> > we
>>> > > > are missing the point. The major significance of Orr's work is not
>>> that
>>> > > > differences in grammatical structure have semantic implications.
>>> This
>>> > is
>>> > > > merely a window to the dramatic realization that semantics are
>>> written
>>> > > into
>>> > > > grammatical form.
>>> > > >
>>> > > > David
>>> > > >
>>> > > > Excerpt from Orr (1987):
>>> > > >
>>> > > > "Jane gives us in these diagrams a glimpse into the kinds of mental
>>> > > images
>>> > > > she constructs when she is using the single symbol length,
>>> representing
>>> > > > both location and distance, as a tool with which to think. Even the
>>> > > > diagrams Jane drew for problems 13 and 14 begin to be less
>>> > > incomprehensible
>>> > > > if one attempts to construct in one's own mind images of the
>>> > information
>>> > > > given in these problems, while adhering to the requirement that
>>> length
>>> > be
>>> > > > used to represent both location and distance. They can be seen as
>>> > > possible
>>> > > > consequents or extensions of the symbol length when it is used to
>>> > > represent
>>> > > > both location and distance. Consider, for instance, the mental
>>> images
>>> > one
>>> > > > might construct in responding to problem 13: Two cities, both
>>> > represented
>>> > > > by line segments, are equal distances (that is, equal line
>>> segments)
>>> > > closer
>>> > > > to a third city (another line segment) than two other cities (line
>>> > > > segments) are. The first two cities must be represented by equal
>>> line
>>> > > > segments because they are equal distances closer to the third city
>>> than
>>> > > the
>>> > > > other two cities are. And these other two cities must also be
>>> > represented
>>> > > > by equal line segments because they are equal distances from the
>>> third
>>> > > > city. One can see that Jane's diagrams are not as lacking in
>>> reason as
>>> > > they
>>> > > > may initially have appeared to be.
>>> > > >
>>> > > > "Jane's diagrams suggest the possibility that when words, or
>>> symbols
>>> > are
>>> > > > used as instruments with which to think, the use in one language
>>> of a
>>> > > > single symbol in contexts where a second language requires two or
>>> more
>>> > > can
>>> > > > lead a speaker of the first language to arrive at a different
>>> mental
>>> > > > construct of some given information from that arrived at by a
>>> speaker
>>> > of
>>> > > > the second language. Or, as in Jane's attempt to handle problem
>>> 14, the
>>> > > > result may be an inability to arrive at a workable mental
>>> construct at
>>> > > > all."  (p. 25)
>>> > > >
>>> > > > [Note, this excerpt is part of a longer segment I emailed on Dec.
>>> 19
>>> > that
>>> > > > shows Jane's diagrams that Orr is referring to.]
>>> > > >
>>> > > >
>>> > > > -----Original Message-----
>>> > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
>>> > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson
>>> > > > Sent: Saturday, December 20, 2014 3:14 PM
>>> > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>> > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors
>>> > > >
>>> > > > The issues that are raised by Orr are indeed important ones. I am
>>> a fan
>>> > > of
>>> > > > her work as it points to important differences in language usage
>>> among
>>> > > AAE
>>> > > > speakers. I agree that she shouldn't have been condemned for
>>> pointing
>>> > out
>>> > > > these differences (particularly considering how important it is for
>>> > > > teachers to understand the consequences of these differences). If
>>> you
>>> > > want
>>> > > > to help AAE speaking students do better on standardized tests,
>>> then you
>>> > > > absolutely need to pay attention to these differences.
>>> > > >
>>> > > > My one concern here is that I do feel like there is a problem of
>>> > deficit
>>> > > > thinking that is at least implied in her work (and maybe "implied"
>>> is
>>> > too
>>> > > > strong a term - maybe it's just that she doesn't provide evidence
>>> to
>>> > > > discourage us from this view). What we don't see in this book is
>>> any
>>> > > > serious consideration of how AAE speakers actually use
>>> prepositions -
>>> > > e.g.,
>>> > > > the ways of using language that exist in the community of AAE
>>> speakers.
>>> > > > This gives Orr's work a feel somewhat like the studies of math
>>> among
>>> > the
>>> > > > Kpelle studied by Gay and Cole in the pre-early days of LCHC (see
>>> wiki
>>> > > for
>>> > > > more:  http://lchcfestschrift.wikispaces.com/Chapter+1). Before
>>> they
>>> > > > showed
>>> > > > up on the scene, everyone had assumed that the Kpelle (Liberia)
>>> > couldn't
>>> > > > comprehend basic math concepts b.c. they weren't learning it in the
>>> > ways
>>> > > > that it was being taught (and perhaps there were even linguistic
>>> > > relativity
>>> > > > arguments that pointed to this). Rather then continuing to pluck
>>> these
>>> > > > folks out of context and run them through various types of
>>> experiments,
>>> > > Gay
>>> > > > and Cole "explicitly began with the assumption that “we must know
>>> more
>>> > > > about the indigenous mathematics so that we can build effective
>>> bridges
>>> > > to
>>> > > > the new mathematics that we are trying to introduce”"
>>> > > > >From their research, they found that the Kpelle actually had high
>>> > > > competence with complex mathematical problems (e.g., estimating
>>> > volumes).
>>> > > > As they write:
>>> > > > "Overall, the data suggested that no generalized lack of
>>> mathematical,
>>> > > > perceptual, or problem solving abilities stood in the way of
>>> > mathematics
>>> > > > education. When the materials and procedures used in assessment
>>> tasks
>>> > > were
>>> > > > designed to match closely valued local practices, lack of ability
>>> could
>>> > > be
>>> > > > replaced by apparent special ability. At the same time, schooling
>>> did
>>> > > > appear to influence performance in tasks that were routinely used
>>> to
>>> > > > measure cognitive development."
>>> > > > So I think I would be more comfortable with Orr's work if she were
>>> to
>>> > > have
>>> > > > included this kind of rich understanding of usage in context and
>>> how
>>> > > > prepositions actually are used among AAE speakers.
>>> > > >
>>> > > > This points to a larger question that might be irksome to some
>>> folks,
>>> > but
>>> > > > the question regards the extent to which mathematical language is
>>> > > > predicated upon a particular form of what Whorf called "Standard
>>> > Average
>>> > > > European." In short, the idea here is that Math has a history and a
>>> > > > culture. This doesn't mean that it is useless or a waste of time,
>>> just
>>> > > that
>>> > > > it is a particular way of encountering the world that is good for
>>> > > > particular things and not for others.
>>> > > >
>>> > > > I think we've gone round this mulberry bush before, but that was
>>> just
>>> > > more
>>> > > > grist for the mill (I prefer my metaphors mixed!).
>>> > > >
>>> > > > -greg
>>> > > >
>>> > > >
>>> > > >
>>> > > >
>>> > > >
>>> > > > On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 8:46 PM, David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu
>>> > > <mailto:
>>> > > > dkirsh@lsu.edu>> wrote:
>>> > > > >
>>> > > > > The topic of how grammatical form relates to meaning calls to
>>> mind
>>> > the
>>> > > > > groundbreaking work of Eleanor Orr--whom you've probably never
>>> heard
>>> > of
>>> > > > on
>>> > > > > account of the fact that her work was condemned by a
>>> > > politically-correct
>>> > > > > faction of race-conscious sociolinguists who decided her
>>> analysis of
>>> > > > Black
>>> > > > > English Vernacular could too easily be appropriated into racist
>>> > > > discourses
>>> > > > > about language deficiency.
>>> > > > >
>>> > > > > Orr was a Washington DC area teacher and principal in the 1970s
>>> and
>>> > > > 1980s,
>>> > > > > who traced math difficulties of her African American students to
>>> > subtle
>>> > > > > grammatical differences between Black English dialect and
>>> standard
>>> > > > English.
>>> > > > > Her 1987 book goes into compelling detail to support the thesis
>>> that
>>> > > the
>>> > > > > meaning structure of basic mathematical terms is embedded in the
>>> > > > > grammatical setting in which those terms are expressed. For
>>> instance,
>>> > > the
>>> > > > > meaning of “distance” is embedded in the grammatical structure
>>> > > “distance
>>> > > > > from _________ to __________” where the place-holders hold
>>> locations;
>>> > > if
>>> > > > > you don’t have that grammatical structure, and you're in a
>>> linguistic
>>> > > > > environment in which that structure is assumed, you're likely not
>>> > going
>>> > > > to
>>> > > > > be able to gain full access to the concept.
>>> > > > >
>>> > > > > The attached excerpts from her book--ignore the Forward, unless
>>> you'd
>>> > > > like
>>> > > > > some context--reveal some of her students' bizarre conceptions of
>>> > > > distance
>>> > > > > (and other basic mathematical concepts) as revealed in their
>>> > diagrams.
>>> > > > Her
>>> > > > > approach involves linguistic analysis of sentences produced by
>>> her
>>> > > > African
>>> > > > > American students that she reads as collapsed versions of
>>> standard
>>> > > > English
>>> > > > > sentences, with differences in prepositional structure being
>>> > > highlighted
>>> > > > > (but other grammatical elements also are indicated).
>>> > > > >
>>> > > > > This work cuts against the grain of anything going on in
>>> mathematics
>>> > > > > education. The Piagetian view that dominates that field holds
>>> that
>>> > > basic
>>> > > > > concepts come about from reflection on our actions in our
>>> engagement
>>> > > with
>>> > > > > the material world. When language enters the conversation, it's
>>> with
>>> > > > > respect to semantic structure; to my knowledge, nobody's ever
>>> > > implicated
>>> > > > > syntax directly in basic quantitative understanding.
>>> > > > >
>>> > > > > This work is particularly interesting to me in connection with my
>>> > > > > 21-year-old son who is autistic, and whose grammatical function
>>> is
>>> > > > severely
>>> > > > > impaired. He has a decent vocabulary, but unless the setting for
>>> the
>>> > > > > conversation provides contextual clues, he can't piece together
>>> how
>>> > the
>>> > > > > semantic elements are linked to one another. It is only recently
>>> that
>>> > > it
>>> > > > > occurred to me his lack of a secure sense of basic quantitative
>>> terms
>>> > > > like
>>> > > > > “more” and “less” may be rooted in his grammatical incapacities.
>>> > > > >
>>> > > > > The XMCA discussion, thus far, has touched on grammar with
>>> respect to
>>> > > > > lexical items such as prepositions. But we've not yet tied that
>>> to
>>> > the
>>> > > > > grammatical forms that embed those lexical items. I'm very
>>> curious as
>>> > > to
>>> > > > > whether that further connection can be made.
>>> > > > >
>>> > > > > David Kirshner
>>> > > > >
>>> > > > > Orr, E., W. (1987). Twice as less: Black English and the
>>> performance
>>> > of
>>> > > > > black students in mathematics and science. New York: W. W.
>>> Norton &
>>> > > > Company.
>>> > > > >
>>> > > > > -----Original Message-----
>>> > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
>>> > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg
>>> > > > > Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 3:06 PM
>>> > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>> > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors
>>> > > > >
>>> > > > > Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things
>>> that
>>> > > > > brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky,
>>> who is
>>> > > > > essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and
>>> who
>>> > now
>>> > > > > rejects the leading role played by social communication and says
>>> that
>>> > > > > communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original
>>> purpose is
>>> > > > > thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every
>>> major
>>> > > > > onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in
>>> language
>>> > > > there
>>> > > > > has to be some change in the nature of communication.
>>> > > > >
>>> > > > > So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science
>>> in
>>> > Hopi
>>> > > > > applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific
>>> > writings
>>> > > > of
>>> > > > > Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like
>>> > > > > "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words
>>> like
>>> > > > "bounce
>>> > > > > off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of
>>> prepositions,
>>> > > > > Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make
>>> > > > scientific
>>> > > > > English possible?
>>> > > > >
>>> > > > > Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered
>>> the
>>> > laws
>>> > > > of
>>> > > > > gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that
>>> what he
>>> > > > really
>>> > > > > discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation".
>>> > > Gravity
>>> > > > > is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity,
>>> but
>>> > > > rather
>>> > > > > a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps,
>>> > again!).
>>> > > So
>>> > > > > how and above all why does it become an entity?
>>> > > > >
>>> > > > > It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with
>>> > Chaucer's
>>> > > on
>>> > > > > the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize
>>> > > almost
>>> > > > > instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and
>>> the
>>> > dark
>>> > > > > room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First,
>>> I did
>>> > > > this;
>>> > > > > then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then
>>> formulates in
>>> > > > > mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's
>>> > > lectures
>>> > > > > on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some
>>> > trouble
>>> > > > > determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the
>>> blackboard
>>> > to
>>> > > > > write his conclusion in the form of a law).
>>> > > > >
>>> > > > > In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to
>>> make
>>> > > > > sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the
>>> lens
>>> > > > yields
>>> > > > > a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light
>>> from
>>> > > the
>>> > > > > glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass"
>>> "The
>>> > > > > curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness
>>> of
>>> > the
>>> > > > > eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would
>>> normally
>>> > be
>>> > > > > realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a
>>> noun,
>>> > > > creating
>>> > > > > an imaginary entity.
>>> > > > >
>>> > > > > That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically"
>>> realized
>>> > > by
>>> > > > a
>>> > > > > verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or
>>> > > something
>>> > > > > that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally
>>> > ("redden").
>>> > > We
>>> > > > > even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know
>>> the
>>> > > rules.
>>> > > > > So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through
>>> > > ignorance",
>>> > > > > all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law
>>> that
>>> > > > > Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental
>>> > function
>>> > > > is
>>> > > > > realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of
>>> > grammatical
>>> > > > > metaphor.
>>> > > > >
>>> > > > > One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness
>>> > > > > hypothesis is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do
>>> not do
>>> > > > their
>>> > > > > homework do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I
>>> know
>>> > > > which
>>> > > > > "do" to move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is
>>> > > > > essentially innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can
>>> see
>>> > > that
>>> > > > > "Do students who do not do their homework do well?" can be built
>>> up
>>> > > > through
>>> > > > > a process of what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby
>>> clauses
>>> > > > stand
>>> > > > > for
>>> > > > > exchanges:
>>> > > > >
>>> > > > > Mother: You did your homework, didn't you?
>>> > > > > Child: No.
>>> > > > > Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well?
>>> > > > > Child: No.
>>> > > > > Mother: You didn't do well?
>>> > > > > Child: No.
>>> > > > > Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the
>>> > other
>>> > > > > students do well?
>>> > > > > Child: Some of them.
>>> > > > > Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework
>>> do
>>> > > well?
>>> > > > >
>>> > > > > And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why"
>>> have
>>> > two
>>> > > > > functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an
>>> intra-mental
>>> > > > function
>>> > > > > (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental
>>> > > > function
>>> > > > > (discourse).
>>> > > > >
>>> > > > > I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and
>>> abstract
>>> > > and
>>> > > > > unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the
>>> lexical
>>> > > kind.
>>> > > > > But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more
>>> powerful
>>> > > and
>>> > > > > far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the
>>> lexical
>>> > > > metaphor
>>> > > > > that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world,
>>> > while
>>> > > > the
>>> > > > > grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm
>>> afraid, I
>>> > > must
>>> > > > > stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used
>>> up!)
>>> > > > >
>>> > > > > David Kellogg
>>> > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>> > > > >
>>> > > > >
>>> > > > >
>>> > > > > , or "the
>>> > > > >
>>> > > > > . He
>>> > > > >
>>> > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson <
>>> > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
>>> > > > <mailto:greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>>
>>> > > > > wrote:
>>> > > > >
>>> > > > > > Helena and David,
>>> > > > > > I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the
>>> > > so-called
>>> > > > > > authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred
>>> > tradition
>>> > > > > > to
>>> > > > > > Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi
>>> > notion
>>> > > > > > of "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including
>>> > English)
>>> > > > > > notion of "time" and how each of these languages offers
>>> different
>>> > > > > > affordances of meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual
>>> > > > > > understanding, English has a much more
>>> reified/objectified/entified
>>> > > > > > sense of time. (btw, I think the first paragraph is easier to
>>> > follow
>>> > > > > > than the second - and in that first paragraph you'll find our
>>> old
>>> > > > friend
>>> > > > > "imagination").
>>> > > > > > David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to?
>>> > > > > > -greg
>>> > > > > >
>>> > > > > > Taken from:
>>> > > > > >
>>> > > > > >
>>> > >
>>> http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Second
>>> > > > > > ary/Whorfframe2.html
>>> > > > > >
>>> > > > > > " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon,
>>> sunset"
>>> > > are
>>> > > > > > with us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference
>>> from
>>> > > other
>>> > > > > nouns.
>>> > > > > > They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in
>>> > > winter"
>>> > > > > > just as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are
>>> > pluralized
>>> > > > > > and numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen.
>>> Our
>>> > > > > > thought about the referents of such words hence becomes
>>> > objectified.
>>> > > > > > Without objectification, it would be a subjective experience of
>>> > real
>>> > > > > > time, i.e. of the consciousness of "becoming later and
>>> > later"--simply
>>> > > > > > a cyclic phase similar to an earlier phase in that
>>> > > ever-later-becoming
>>> > > > > > duration. Only by imagination can such a cyclic phase be set
>>> beside
>>> > > > > > another and another in the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually
>>> > > > > > perceived) configuration. "But such is the power of linguistic
>>> > > analogy
>>> > > > > that we do so objectify cyclic phasing.
>>> > > > > > We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g.,
>>> > > > > "phasing."
>>> > > > > > And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the
>>> resulting
>>> > > > > > binomial formula of formless item plus form, is so general
>>> that it
>>> > is
>>> > > > > > implicit for all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless
>>> > items
>>> > > > > > like "substance, matter," by which we can fill out the
>>> binomial for
>>> > > an
>>> > > > > > enormously wide range of nouns. But even these are not quite
>>> > > > > > generalized enough to take in our phase nouns. So for the phase
>>> > nouns
>>> > > > we
>>> > > > > have made a formless item, "time."
>>> > > > > > We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a
>>> phase, in
>>> > > the
>>> > > > > > pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make
>>> "summer" in
>>> > > > > > the pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we
>>> can
>>> > say
>>> > > > > > and think "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of
>>> time." Let
>>> > > me
>>> > > > > > again point out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of
>>> > milk"
>>> > > > > > or "a piece of cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a
>>> > > > > > summer" actually contains or consists of such-and-such a
>>> quantity
>>> > of
>>> > > > > "time."
>>> > > > > >
>>> > > > > > In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc.,
>>> are
>>> > > not
>>> > > > > > nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy.
>>> They
>>> > are
>>> > > a
>>> > > > > > formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns,
>>> verbs,
>>> > and
>>> > > > > > even other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a
>>> > > > > > locative pattern, like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It
>>> > contains
>>> > > > > > no morpheme like one of "in the house" or "at the tree." It
>>> means
>>> > > > > > "when it is morning" or "while morning-phase is occurring."
>>> These
>>> > > > > > "temporal s" are not used as subjects or objects, or at all
>>> like
>>> > > > > > nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or "summer is hot";
>>> > > summer
>>> > > > > > is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat
>>> > occurs.
>>> > > > > > One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or "summer
>>> > > recently."
>>> > > > > > There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a
>>> quantity, of
>>> > > > > > the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about
>>> time
>>> > > > > > except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no
>>> > basis
>>> > > > > here for a formless item answering to our "time." "
>>> > > > > >
>>> > > > > >
>>> > > > > >
>>> > > > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen
>>> > > > > > <helenaworthen@gmail.com<mailto:helenaworthen@gmail.com>>
>>> > > > > > wrote:
>>> > > > > > >
>>> > > > > > > David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to
>>> this:
>>> > > > > > >
>>> > > > > > > "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that
>>> > Newton
>>> > > > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to
>>> > > create
>>> > > > > > > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly
>>> > > > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of
>>> scientific
>>> > > > > > > writing and thinking today."
>>> > > > > > >
>>> > > > > > > Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I
>>> lose you
>>> > > > > > > when
>>> > > > > > you
>>> > > > > > > say "created to talk about gravity as an entity".
>>> > > > > > >
>>> > > > > > > Thank you,
>>> > > > > > >
>>> > > > > > > Helena
>>> > > > > > >
>>> > > > > > >
>>> > > > > > > Helena Worthen
>>> > > > > > > helenaworthen@gmail.com<mailto:helenaworthen@gmail.com>
>>> > > > > > >
>>> > > > > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote:
>>> > > > > > >
>>> > > > > > > > As Helena points out, prepositions are from the
>>> "grammatical"
>>> > end
>>> > > > > > > > of
>>> > > > > > what
>>> > > > > > > > Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what
>>> > > > > > > > Halliday
>>> > > > > > calls
>>> > > > > > > > "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they
>>> > have
>>> > > > > > > > three properties that words from the more "lexical" end do
>>> not
>>> > > > have:
>>> > > > > > > >
>>> > > > > > > > a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You
>>> > can,
>>> > > > > > > actually,
>>> > > > > > > > but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you
>>> invent a
>>> > new
>>> > > > > > > > name
>>> > > > > > > or a
>>> > > > > > > > new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can).
>>> > > > > > > >
>>> > > > > > > > b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific
>>> > semantic
>>> > > > > > > > field
>>> > > > > > > (the
>>> > > > > > > > way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of
>>> > > > > > linguistics)
>>> > > > > > > > but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are
>>> used.
>>> > > > > > > >
>>> > > > > > > > c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the
>>> > same
>>> > > > > > effect,
>>> > > > > > > > which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your
>>> argument" the
>>> > > > "in"
>>> > > > > > has
>>> > > > > > > > more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in
>>> "there's a
>>> > fly
>>> > > > > > > > in
>>> > > > > > your
>>> > > > > > > > tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in
>>> Henry's
>>> > > > > > > > hands,
>>> > > > > > > refer
>>> > > > > > > > to a book or even a footnote.
>>> > > > > > > >
>>> > > > > > > > Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties
>>> > pretty
>>> > > > > > > > much define the difference between learning and
>>> development, at
>>> > > > > > > > least as I understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on
>>> > > > > > > > functions indefinitely while development works by
>>> reorganizing
>>> > > the
>>> > > > > > > > closed set of functions you already have into new systems.
>>> > > > > > > > Learning is skill specific and local, while development is
>>> > quite
>>> > > > > global in its implications.
>>> > > > > > > Learning
>>> > > > > > > > is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new
>>> > systems,
>>> > > > > > > > while development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary
>>> > (and
>>> > > > > > > > forget it
>>> > > > > > just
>>> > > > > > > > as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes
>>> > away.
>>> > > > > > > >
>>> > > > > > > > For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of
>>> blue
>>> > > > > > > > that
>>> > > > > > > people
>>> > > > > > > > call the sky") are simply metaphors from the
>>> non-productive end
>>> > > of
>>> > > > > > > > the lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are
>>> crisp,
>>> > > > > > > > concrete, and vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the
>>> > > > > > > > nominalizations that
>>> > > > > > Newton
>>> > > > > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and
>>> to
>>> > > > > > > > create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are
>>> > > highly
>>> > > > > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of
>>> > scientific
>>> > > > > > > > writing and
>>> > > > > > thinking
>>> > > > > > > > today.  For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical
>>> metaphor is
>>> > > the
>>> > > > > > third
>>> > > > > > > > great moment in child development (after the break into
>>> mother
>>> > > > > > > > tongue
>>> > > > > > and
>>> > > > > > > > the break into disciplinary language in school work).
>>> > > > > > > >
>>> > > > > > > > Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at"
>>> > implies
>>> > > > > > > > zero dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two
>>> ("on a
>>> > > > > > > > line', 'on a
>>> > > > > > > > plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because
>>> they
>>> > > are
>>> > > > > > > > grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them
>>> with
>>> > > time:
>>> > > > > > > > 'at
>>> > > > > > a
>>> > > > > > > > point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'.
>>> Compare:
>>> > "at
>>> > > > > > > > Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very
>>> day),
>>> > and
>>> > > > > > > > "in Christmas' (season).
>>> > > > > > > >
>>> > > > > > > > David Kellogg
>>> > > > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>> > > > > > > >
>>> > > > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen
>>> > > > > > > > <helenaworthen@gmail.com<mailto:helenaworthen@gmail.com>>
>>> > > > > > > > wrote:
>>> > > > > > > >>
>>> > > > > > > >> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across"
>>> spatial
>>> > > > > > > >> relationships from the concrete material world into the
>>> > > > > > > >> conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50
>>> > > common
>>> > > > > > > >> ones, and
>>> > > > > > > between 70
>>> > > > > > > >> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as
>>> far
>>> > > as"
>>> > > > > > > >> --
>>> > > > > > > this
>>> > > > > > > >> is according to
>>> > > > > > > >> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm
>>> > > > > > ).
>>> > > > > > > >> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms.
>>> > Apparently,
>>> > > > > > > >> in English, they evolved from and did the job done by
>>> > > inflections
>>> > > > > > > >> in
>>> > > > > > parent
>>> > > > > > > >> languages, examples being cases and tenses.
>>> > > > > > > >>
>>> > > > > > > >> But there is real difference in meaning between an
>>> inflection
>>> > > > > > > >> like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the
>>> spatial
>>> > > > > > > >> relationships
>>> > > > > > > suggested
>>> > > > > > > >> by contemporary prepositions.
>>> > > > > > > >>
>>> > > > > > > >> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about
>>> > this.
>>> > > > > > > >>
>>> > > > > > > >> Helena Worthen
>>> > > > > > > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com<mailto:helenaworthen@gmail.com>
>>> > > > > > > >>
>>> > > > > > > >> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote:
>>> > > > > > > >>
>>> > > > > > > >>> I’m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are
>>> clearly
>>> > > > > > embodied,
>>> > > > > > > >> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to
>>> > > > > > > >> linguistics
>>> > > > > > > (For
>>> > > > > > > >> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is
>>> focused on
>>> > > > > > “lexicon”:
>>> > > > > > > >> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of
>>> > prepositions,
>>> > > > > > > >> being
>>> > > > > > > part
>>> > > > > > > >> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker
>>> and
>>> > > > > > > >> Halliday
>>> > > > > > > see no
>>> > > > > > > >> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence,
>>> > > > > lexico-grammar.
>>> > > > > > > (Lo
>>> > > > > > > >> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write
>>> lexicon-grammar,
>>> > > > > > > >> adding
>>> > > > > > > the
>>> > > > > > > >> “n”. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word
>>> coinings
>>> > > are
>>> > > > > > great
>>> > > > > > > >> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much
>>> of
>>> > > > > > > >> that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever
>>> > > practiced?
>>> > > > > > > >>> Henry
>>> > > > > > > >>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden <
>>> > ablunden@mira.net
>>> > > > <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
>>> > > > > > wrote:
>>> > > > > > > >>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is
>>> the
>>> > > > > > metaphorical
>>> > > > > > > >> use of prepositions like:
>>> > > > > > > >>>> - "there is some value IN your argument"
>>> > > > > > > >>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again"
>>> > > > > > > >>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking"
>>> > > > > > > >>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again"
>>> > > > > > > >>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>> and so on.
>>> > > > > > > >>>> Andy
>>> > > > > > > >>>>
>>> > > > > > >
>>> > > --------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> > > > > > > ----
>>> > > > > > > >>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>> > > > > > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>> > > > > > > >>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>> larry smolucha wrote:
>>> > > > > > > >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha:
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself -
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the
>>> synergistic
>>> > > > > > > possibilities:
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929)
>>> published
>>> > > in
>>> > > > > > > Thought
>>> > > > > > > >>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as
>>> translated
>>> > into
>>> > > > > > English
>>> > > > > > > >> 1962]
>>> > > > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the
>>> > > 'additive'
>>> > > > > > value
>>> > > > > > > >> of the
>>> > > > > > > >>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the
>>> speech
>>> > > > > > > vocalization).
>>> > > > > > > >>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical
>>> elements
>>> > > that
>>> > > > > > > >>>>> are
>>> > > > > > > >> flammable
>>> > > > > > > >>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither
>>> flammable
>>> > > nor
>>> > > > > > > >>>>> a
>>> > > > > > gas.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century
>>> > > > > > > >>>>> European
>>> > > > > > > >> Developmental
>>> > > > > > > >>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean
>>> > 'developmental'
>>> > > > > > > >>>>> hence
>>> > > > > > > the
>>> > > > > > > >>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the
>>> case of
>>> > > > > > Piaget's
>>> > > > > > > >> Genetic
>>> > > > > > > >>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and
>>> > > > > > > >>>>> synthesis
>>> > > > > > > >> based on
>>> > > > > > > >>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in
>>> > > > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky's
>>> > > > > > > >> example of H2O.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha:
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be
>>> > > synergistic
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum
>>> of the
>>> > > > > parts.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing
>>> more
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> than
>>> > > > > > the
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really
>>> new
>>> > can
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> ever
>>> > > > > > be
>>> > > > > > > >> imagined"
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.)
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> A couple things to consider:
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of
>>> > imagination
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> as the
>>> > > > > > > >> brain has
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> simplest
>>> > > > > > level
>>> > > > > > > >> of the Gestalt
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images).
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just
>>> > > > > > photographic.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is
>>> to
>>> > try
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> to
>>> > > > > > > >> accurately reproduce
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event.
>>> > > Whereas,
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> the
>>> > > > > > > >> goal of combinatory
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of
>>> memories,
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> dreams,
>>> > > > > > > >> musings, and even
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual
>>> manipulation
>>> > of
>>> > > > > > objects
>>> > > > > > > >> and symbols.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the
>>> different
>>> > > ways
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> that
>>> > > > > > > >> things and concepts can be
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and
>>> sugar
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> and
>>> > > > > > > flour.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>                                         I can add
>>> water
>>> > and
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> it
>>> > > > > > > >> dissolves a bit
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>                                         But adding
>>> heat
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> changes
>>> > > > > > the
>>> > > > > > > >> combination into a pancake.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>                      [Is this synergistic?]
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>            Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of
>>> more
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> examples
>>> > > > > > > >> to put the discussion
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>            in the metaphysical realm.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen
>>> limit--make
>>> > the
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> case
>>> > > > > > > for
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting
>>> associationism. I
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> think
>>> > > > > > it's
>>> > > > > > > >> not
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there
>>> are
>>> > > > > > > >> associationists who
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> associationism
>>> > > > > > > >> exists and
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as
>>> > > > mediation.
>>> > > > > > > >> Vygotsky
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking
>>> > religion,
>>> > > > > > explain
>>> > > > > > > >> the
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> uniqueness of our species?
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species
>>> > feels
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> for
>>> > > > > > its
>>> > > > > > > >> own
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from
>>> a
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Piagetian perspective--and even from a strict
>>> Darwinian
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> one--true maturity
>>> > > > > > > as a
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is
>>> nothing
>>> > more
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> to it
>>> > > > > > > >> than
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety
>>> of
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> primate,
>>> > > > > > > and
>>> > > > > > > >> our
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones
>>> piled
>>> > upon
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> rocks
>>> > > > > > > in
>>> > > > > > > >> order
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be
>>> judged
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> the
>>> > > > > > same
>>> > > > > > > >> way as
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological
>>> functions
>>> > and
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> for
>>> > > > > > > >> language is
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case
>>> human
>>> > > > > > > >> exceptionalism.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the
>>> case for
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> the
>>> > > > > > > >> vanguard role
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other
>>> > species,
>>> > > > > > > prolonging
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking
>>> after
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> the
>>> > > > > > sick
>>> > > > > > > >> and the
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because
>>> artificial
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> organs
>>> > > > > > > >> (tools) and
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so
>>> important
>>> > for
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> our
>>> > > > > > > >> species, it
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where
>>> > these
>>> > > > > > > >> "circuitous,
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced
>>> that
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> lead
>>> > > > > > our
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth
>>> > always
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> been
>>> > > > > > > >> short on
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal
>>> for
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> material
>>> > > > > > > >> culture
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another
>>> > > matter:
>>> > > > > > > >> verily, here
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> attention is
>>> > > > > > > >> simply the
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he
>>> says
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> there are
>>> > > > > > > >> only two
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and
>>> recombinative. So
>>> > > > > > > >> imagination is
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete
>>> > > experiences,
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> and
>>> > > > > > > >> nothing
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky
>>> says,
>>> > when
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> you
>>> > > > > > > hear
>>> > > > > > > >> the
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been
>>> > there
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> to be
>>> > > > > > > >> able to
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory
>>> at
>>> > work
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> in
>>> > > > > > word
>>> > > > > > > >> meaning.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about
>>> Archimedes,
>>> > who
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> was
>>> > > > > > > given
>>> > > > > > > >> a
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had
>>> been
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> mixed
>>> > > > > > with
>>> > > > > > > >> silver
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent
>>> quantity
>>> > of
>>> > > > > gold.
>>> > > > > > > >> Well, we
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work:
>>> it's not
>>> > > > > > possible
>>> > > > > > > to
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> precisely. The
>>> > > > > > > >> method
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> "principal
>>> > > > > > of
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> palimpsest, a
>>> > > > > > > >> velum on
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to
>>> each
>>> > > other.
>>> > > > > > > Because
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> written
>>> > > > > > over
>>> > > > > > > >> every
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of
>>> was
>>> > > soft,
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> the
>>> > > > > > > >> pressure
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the
>>> new
>>> > ones
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> when
>>> > > > > > > the
>>> > > > > > > >> old
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is
>>> the
>>> > > only
>>> > > > > > known
>>> > > > > > > >> Greek
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies".
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning
>>> nor
>>> > > their
>>> > > > > > > >> relationship
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact
>>> > they
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> are
>>> > > > > > > >> related to
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But
>>> it's
>>> > > quite
>>> > > > > > > similar
>>> > > > > > > >> to the
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?)
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> <hshonerd@gmail.com<mailto:hshonerd@gmail.com>>
>>> > > > > > > >> wrote:
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an
>>> > > > > > > associationist,
>>> > > > > > > >> “sees
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention”?
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> Henry
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg <
>>> > > > > > dkellogg60@gmail.com<mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>> > > > > > > >
>>> > > > > > > >> wrote:
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for
>>> the
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> division
>>> > > > > > > >> between
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the
>>> other,
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> because
>>> > > > > > > >> Ribot is
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> an
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather
>>> distal
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> form of
>>> > > > > > > >> attention.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> transition
>>> > > > > > from
>>> > > > > > > >> forest
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> to
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the
>>> > division
>>> > > > > > between
>>> > > > > > > >> the two
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> commonsensical
>>> > > > > > > >> world of
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> the
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to
>>> fairly
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> prosaic
>>> > > > > > uses
>>> > > > > > > >> in life
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much
>>> more
>>> > > > > > > "imaginative"
>>> > > > > > > >> (that
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the
>>> > world
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> farm,where
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where
>>> long
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> winter
>>> > > > > > > >> months are
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more
>>> likely to
>>> > > > > > encounter
>>> > > > > > > >> talking
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!).
>>> Here
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention
>>> > > > > > > has
>>> > > > > > > >> to be
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> more voluntary.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he
>>> has a
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> very
>>> > > > > > clear
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian
>>> romanticism
>>> > > that
>>> > > > > > > >> underpins
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> Ribot
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism.
>>> Vygotsky
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> points
>>> > > > > > > out
>>> > > > > > > >> the
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these
>>> productive
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> practices
>>> > > > > > > >> really
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> are
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of
>>> > > > > > imagination,
>>> > > > > > > >> there
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference
>>> > between
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> human
>>> > > > > > > and
>>> > > > > > > >> animal
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are
>>> perfectly
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> capable of
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> volitional
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than
>>> > > humans).
>>> > > > > > > Without
>>> > > > > > > >> a
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> theory
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any
>>> basis
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> for
>>> > > > > > > Ribot's
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> functions at
>>> > > > > > > >> all.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole <
>>> > mcole@ucsd.edu
>>> > > > <mailto:mcole@ucsd.edu>>
>>> > > > > > wrote:
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination,
>>> > > > > > > >> thanks to
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> all
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> influential
>>> > > > > > > >> around the
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> time
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th
>>> > century.
>>> > > I
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> had
>>> > > > > > > >> seen work
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> on
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Robert-  Does generative = productive and
>>> reflective
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> equal
>>> > > > > > > >> reproductive?
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical
>>> > studies
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> of
>>> > > > > > > >> development
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> of
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The
>>> cost
>>> > of
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> being
>>> > > > > > a
>>> > > > > > > >> relative
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> mike
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
>>> > > > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com<mailto:hshonerd@gmail.com>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on
>>> my
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> bucket
>>> > > > > > list.
>>> > > > > > > >> This
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal
>>> musings
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> from
>>> > > > > > some
>>> > > > > > > >> weeks
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> in
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell
>>> correct
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that
>>> > > > > > > >> segmented the
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as “met
>>> > > > > aphorizing”.
>>> > > > > > > >> Puns,
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor.
>>> :)
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> <mcole@ucsd.edu<mailto:mcole@ucsd.edu>>
>>> > > > > > > wrote:
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward
>>> Kant
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>> > > > > > they
>>> > > > > > > >> are
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> doing
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky
>>> and
>>> > his
>>> > > > > > > >> followers as an
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced
>>> by
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel, so
>>> > > > > > > >> its of
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> course
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories
>>> > emerge.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary,
>>> especially in
>>> > > > > > > >> translation,
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> seems
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word,
>>> > > > "recollection"
>>> > > > > > in
>>> > > > > > > >> this
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> passage,
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in
>>> counter
>>> > > > > > > >> distinction to
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "memory."
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary
>>> > > > > > > >> discourse
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out
>>> > Russian
>>> > > > > > > >> colleagues have
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something
>>> from
>>> > > > > > theorists
>>> > > > > > > >> who
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> clearly
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology --
>>> when it
>>> > > was
>>> > > > > > still
>>> > > > > > > >> possible
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination"
>>> > which,
>>> > > > > > > >> interestingly
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> links
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of
>>> a
>>> > > > > > "voluntary"
>>> > > > > > > >> act.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Parts
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> of
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like
>>> children
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> stuff
>>> > > > > > > that
>>> > > > > > > >> was
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> also
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the
>>> > concepts
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>> > > > > > > >> creativity
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> and
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its
>>> curious
>>> > > to
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> see
>>> > > > > > > >> that the
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> two
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he
>>> > found
>>> > > > > > himself
>>> > > > > > > >> writing.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to
>>> > which
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> pretty
>>> > > > > > > old
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> approaches
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden <
>>> > > > > > > >> ablunden@mira.net<mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively
>>> > contemporary,
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> but it
>>> > > > > > > >> may be
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> worth
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a
>>> > prominent
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> place
>>> > > > > > to
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating
>>> between
>>> > > > > > > >> Recollection and
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1)
>>> > Reproductive
>>> > > > > > > >> Imagination,
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> (2)
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive
>>> Imagination,
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> which
>>> > > > > > he
>>> > > > > > > >> says
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> leads
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive
>>> Memory.
>>> > In
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> other
>>> > > > > > > >> words,
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> the
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to
>>> Intellect is
>>> > > > > > > >> accomplished
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> through
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>
>>> > > > > >
>>> > >
>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> > > > > > --
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote:
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading
>>> > > Strawson
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>> > > > > > > >> Williams.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian
>>> developmentalists
>>> > > whose
>>> > > > > > work i
>>> > > > > > > >> am
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> trying
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results)
>>> speak
>>> > of
>>> > > > > > > >> productive
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that
>>> productive
>>> > > > > > imagination
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> develops.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive
>>> > > implies
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>> > > > > > > >> there
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> must
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> be a
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ​imagination called UNproductive
>>> > > imagination.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> But
>>> > > > > > I
>>> > > > > > > >> learned
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination
>>> > > appears
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>> > > > > > is
>>> > > > > > > >> linked
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an
>>> ineluctable
>>> > part
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>> > > > > > > >> anticipation
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that!
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY
>>> SHONERD <
>>> > > > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com<mailto:hshonerd@gmail.com>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>                  wrote:
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination
>>> > > > > > > >> (starting
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more
>>> contemporaneous
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> look, and
>>> > > > > > > >> provides
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> a
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the
>>> > socio-cultural
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as
>>> > > > > > > fixed.
>>> > > > > > > >> This,
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination,
>>> gives
>>> > me
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a
>>> > > > > > > ground
>>> > > > > > > >> to
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> take
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> part
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I
>>> start
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> preconceptions:
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> grammarian
>>> > > > > > > >> Langacker on
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and
>>> cognitive
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> domains,
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> particularly
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to
>>> me, is
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> full of
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two
>>> > aspects
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>> > > > > > > >> temporality:
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and
>>> rhythmic
>>> > > > > > > >> structure), which
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and
>>> creativity,
>>> > for
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both
>>> > > > > > > >> individual
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and
>>> feeling.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss <
>>> > > > > > > >> lpscholar2@gmail.com<mailto:lpscholar2@gmail.com>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this
>>> > topic.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the
>>> > third
>>> > > > > > *space*
>>> > > > > > > >> and the
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling*
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to
>>> internet.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond
>>> Williams
>>> > and
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his
>>> > > > > > > >> notion of
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This
>>> notion
>>> > > is
>>> > > > > > > >> explored under
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as
>>> a
>>> > > *set*
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>> > > > > > > >> modalities
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together.  This notion suggests there is a
>>> form
>>> > of
>>> > > > > > knowing
>>> > > > > > > >> that is
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt"
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [perceived??]
>>> > > > > > if
>>> > > > > > > >> we
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> think
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively.  Raymond explores the
>>> imaginal as
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *style* Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38
>>> PM,
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> HENRY SHONERD <
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com<mailto:hshonerd@gmail.com>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry,
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just
>>> want to
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> say how
>>> > > > > > > >> jazzed up
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> am
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going
>>> wild,
>>> > > the
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind
>>> > > > > > > as
>>> > > > > > > >> Larry
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad,
>>> actually
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> various
>>> > > > > > > >> triads,
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> finally
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of
>>> my
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notebooks
>>> > > > > > > of
>>> > > > > > > >> the
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> mind, as
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I’ll be back! Gap
>>> > > adentro,
>>> > > > > > luega
>>> > > > > > > >> pa’
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> fuera.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours,
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole <
>>> > > > > > mcole@ucsd.edu>
>>> > > > > > > >> wrote:
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination
>>> > thread,
>>> > > > > > attached
>>> > > > > > > >> are two
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the
>>> > issue.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of
>>> > CHAT
>>> > > > > > > theorists
>>> > > > > > > >> like
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the
>>> development
>>> > of
>>> > > > > > > >> imagination in a
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's
>>> notion
>>> > > of
>>> > > > > > > >> productive
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and
>>> have
>>> > > no
>>> > > > > > > >> intention of
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> doing
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as
>>> > explicated
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the
>>> > > > > > > >> attached
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these
>>> > > > > > philosophers,
>>> > > > > > > I
>>> > > > > > > >> came
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> upon
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are
>>> very
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> closely
>>> > > > > > > >> linked at
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> several
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our
>>> > > naivete,
>>> > > > > > > >> Ettienne and I
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around
>>> earlier
>>> > as
>>> > > a
>>> > > > > > means
>>> > > > > > > of
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> access
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist,
>>> Alexander
>>> > > > > Suvorov.
>>> > > > > > > >> Moreover,
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> such
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of
>>> the
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have
>>> > direct
>>> > > > > > > relevance
>>> > > > > > > >> to
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Kris's
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also
>>> > speak
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>> > > > > > > >> concerns
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> about
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play
>>> in
>>> > > > > > development.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination
>>> > > thread.
>>> > > > > > > Perhaps
>>> > > > > > > >> they
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> will
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal
>>> with a
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural
>>> > > > > > > >> science
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with an
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <Imagination and Perception by P.F.
>>> > > Strawson.pdf>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a
>>> > natural
>>> > > > > > science
>>> > > > > > > >> with an
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> --
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a
>>> natural
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> science
>>> > > > > > > >> with an
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>>
>>> > > > > > > >>>
>>> > > > > > > >>
>>> > > > > > > >>
>>> > > > > > > >>
>>> > > > > > >
>>> > > > > > >
>>> > > > > > >
>>> > > > > >
>>> > > > > > --
>>> > > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
>>> > > > > > Assistant Professor
>>> > > > > > Department of Anthropology
>>> > > > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
>>> > > > > > Brigham Young University
>>> > > > > > Provo, UT 84602
>>> > > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>>> > > > > >
>>> > > > >
>>> > > >
>>> > > >
>>> > > > --
>>> > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
>>> > > > Assistant Professor
>>> > > > Department of Anthropology
>>> > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
>>> > > > Brigham Young University
>>> > > > Provo, UT 84602
>>> > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>>> > > >
>>> > > >
>>> > >
>>> > >
>>> > > --
>>> > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
>>> > > Assistant Professor
>>> > > Department of Anthropology
>>> > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
>>> > > Brigham Young University
>>> > > Provo, UT 84602
>>> > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>>> > >
>>> > >
>>> > >
>>> >
>>> > --
>>> > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
>>> > Assistant Professor
>>> > Department of Anthropology
>>> > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
>>> > Brigham Young University
>>> > Provo, UT 84602
>>> > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>>> >
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
>> Assistant Professor
>> Department of Anthropology
>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
>> Brigham Young University
>> Provo, UT 84602
>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>>
>
>
> --
> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> Assistant Professor
> Department of Anthropology
> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> Brigham Young University
> Provo, UT 84602
> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>


-- 
Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
Department of Anthropology
880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
Brigham Young University
Provo, UT 84602
http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson