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[Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors / Speaking of AAE



​David Ki,
No worries. No offense taken. But thanks for the just-in-case note.
And yes, I agree to disagree.
Respectfully,
greg​

On Mon, Dec 22, 2014 at 6:24 AM, David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu> wrote:
>
> Greg,
>
> I disagree with you that Orr could/should have taken a more culturally
> sensitive approach to her studies of AAE speakers' difficulties in
> classrooms dominated by standard English instruction. But I in no wise
> intended to imply your wishing she had done so places you among those who
> consider her work as racist. I'm very sorry if my words suggested otherwise.
>
> David
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
> xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson
> Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 9:36 AM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors
>
> In the interests of following the recently suggested injunction not to
> directly address specific interlocutors, I'll talk in generalities (This
> makes it a bit more challenging to have a conversation but it also makes
> one think about the extractable and generalizable point that is beyond the
> immediate context).
>
> In my previous post (apologies for drawing on prior context), I neither
> suggested nor intended to imply that Orr's work is racist (do intentions
> matter when it comes to meaning?). This speaks to some of the difficulties
> of talking about issues of race. And in this connection let's not forget
> the fact that this list-serve is dominated by white men - that doesn't mean
> that we are necessarily racist but it does mean that we are likely to be
> ignorant of many aspects of these issues.
>
> Nonetheless, I believe that we can overcome our ignorance through
> education, by learning more about the issues - even when it comes to trying
> to understand cultures and languages that we did not grow up with. And
> while I think that there is good evidence for the linguistic relativity
> hypothesis, I do not believe that language is a determining influence in
> ALL thinking (Whorf uses the term "habitual" to describe the type of
> thinking that is most susceptible to the influence of language). That means
> that even if you don't speak AAE, you can still study it and even come to
> understand how the grammatical forms lend themselves to particular ways of
> understanding the world (this is what linguistic anthropology is all
> about!).
>
> And this is my concern with Orr's work. With all academic work, I think it
> is worth considering questions like "How would racists take up our
> research?" In the case of Orr's work, my sense is that racists could easily
> take up her research to argue (perhaps even by using the linguistic
> relativity hypothesis) that AAE speakers are unable to do complex
> mathematical thinking. This is why I would think that it is important to
> give a positive articulation of what AAE does as a language. It is
> certainly important to understand what it CAN'T do (e.g., help one learn
> math in a particular way), but it is equally important to understand what
> it CAN do.
>
> As Paul points out, Labov has done some of the work addressing this. But
> note that Labov's work was done 40 years ago and no one has sought to
> replicate or do any kind of similar work. What gives?
>
> -greg
>
>
>
>
> -greg
>
> On Sat, Dec 20, 2014 at 11:37 PM, David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu> wrote:
>
> > Greg,
> >
> > I'm delighted that you're familiar with and appreciative of Orr's work.
> >
> > Cleary she didn't provide "serious consideration of how AAE speakers
> > actually use prepositions"--she couldn't have, as she was not a native
> > speaker of Black English dialect, and she was not a linguist. But I'm not
> > sure how paying serious attention to technical nuances of Black English
> > grammar would have helped, as her analyses show that the African American
> > students in her classes were not speaking either standard English or
> Black
> > English Vernacular, but rather a hybrid that arises from their efforts to
> > emulate standard English.
> >
> > Now, it's true her work didn't parallel the approach Gay and Cole took to
> > understanding what other psychologists were classifying as linguistic and
> > cognitive deficits by carefully studying the native language and culture.
> > On the other hand, she did something Gay and Cole didn't do, namely
> > micro-analyze the linguistic miscues operating in the classroom, and the
> > resultant dilemmas of comprehension this created for her African American
> > students.
> >
> > As the excerpt copied below illustrates, Orr was scrupulously attentive
> to
> > understanding her students' experience of distance and location given the
> > different linguistic setting. And her analyses consistently point to the
> > mismatch between the native dialect and the language of instruction as
> the
> > source of the problems, not the native dialect, itself. To label this
> work
> > as implicitly racist, I think cedes too much to those who mistrust
> science
> > as a tool of the oppressor, and whose only locus of attention is the
> > history and legacy of social injustice. Even now, in this discussion, we
> > are missing the point. The major significance of Orr's work is not that
> > differences in grammatical structure have semantic implications. This is
> > merely a window to the dramatic realization that semantics are written
> into
> > grammatical form.
> >
> > David
> >
> > Excerpt from Orr (1987):
> >
> > "Jane gives us in these diagrams a glimpse into the kinds of mental
> images
> > she constructs when she is using the single symbol length, representing
> > both location and distance, as a tool with which to think. Even the
> > diagrams Jane drew for problems 13 and 14 begin to be less
> incomprehensible
> > if one attempts to construct in one's own mind images of the information
> > given in these problems, while adhering to the requirement that length be
> > used to represent both location and distance. They can be seen as
> possible
> > consequents or extensions of the symbol length when it is used to
> represent
> > both location and distance. Consider, for instance, the mental images one
> > might construct in responding to problem 13: Two cities, both represented
> > by line segments, are equal distances (that is, equal line segments)
> closer
> > to a third city (another line segment) than two other cities (line
> > segments) are. The first two cities must be represented by equal line
> > segments because they are equal distances closer to the third city than
> the
> > other two cities are. And these other two cities must also be represented
> > by equal line segments because they are equal distances from the third
> > city. One can see that Jane's diagrams are not as lacking in reason as
> they
> > may initially have appeared to be.
> >
> > "Jane's diagrams suggest the possibility that when words, or symbols are
> > used as instruments with which to think, the use in one language of a
> > single symbol in contexts where a second language requires two or more
> can
> > lead a speaker of the first language to arrive at a different mental
> > construct of some given information from that arrived at by a speaker of
> > the second language. Or, as in Jane's attempt to handle problem 14, the
> > result may be an inability to arrive at a workable mental construct at
> > all."  (p. 25)
> >
> > [Note, this excerpt is part of a longer segment I emailed on Dec. 19 that
> > shows Jane's diagrams that Orr is referring to.]
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
> > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson
> > Sent: Saturday, December 20, 2014 3:14 PM
> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors
> >
> > The issues that are raised by Orr are indeed important ones. I am a fan
> of
> > her work as it points to important differences in language usage among
> AAE
> > speakers. I agree that she shouldn't have been condemned for pointing out
> > these differences (particularly considering how important it is for
> > teachers to understand the consequences of these differences). If you
> want
> > to help AAE speaking students do better on standardized tests, then you
> > absolutely need to pay attention to these differences.
> >
> > My one concern here is that I do feel like there is a problem of deficit
> > thinking that is at least implied in her work (and maybe "implied" is too
> > strong a term - maybe it's just that she doesn't provide evidence to
> > discourage us from this view). What we don't see in this book is any
> > serious consideration of how AAE speakers actually use prepositions -
> e.g.,
> > the ways of using language that exist in the community of AAE speakers.
> > This gives Orr's work a feel somewhat like the studies of math among the
> > Kpelle studied by Gay and Cole in the pre-early days of LCHC (see wiki
> for
> > more:  http://lchcfestschrift.wikispaces.com/Chapter+1). Before they
> > showed
> > up on the scene, everyone had assumed that the Kpelle (Liberia) couldn't
> > comprehend basic math concepts b.c. they weren't learning it in the ways
> > that it was being taught (and perhaps there were even linguistic
> relativity
> > arguments that pointed to this). Rather then continuing to pluck these
> > folks out of context and run them through various types of experiments,
> Gay
> > and Cole "explicitly began with the assumption that “we must know more
> > about the indigenous mathematics so that we can build effective bridges
> to
> > the new mathematics that we are trying to introduce”"
> > >From their research, they found that the Kpelle actually had high
> > competence with complex mathematical problems (e.g., estimating volumes).
> > As they write:
> > "Overall, the data suggested that no generalized lack of mathematical,
> > perceptual, or problem solving abilities stood in the way of mathematics
> > education. When the materials and procedures used in assessment tasks
> were
> > designed to match closely valued local practices, lack of ability could
> be
> > replaced by apparent special ability. At the same time, schooling did
> > appear to influence performance in tasks that were routinely used to
> > measure cognitive development."
> > So I think I would be more comfortable with Orr's work if she were to
> have
> > included this kind of rich understanding of usage in context and how
> > prepositions actually are used among AAE speakers.
> >
> > This points to a larger question that might be irksome to some folks, but
> > the question regards the extent to which mathematical language is
> > predicated upon a particular form of what Whorf called "Standard Average
> > European." In short, the idea here is that Math has a history and a
> > culture. This doesn't mean that it is useless or a waste of time, just
> that
> > it is a particular way of encountering the world that is good for
> > particular things and not for others.
> >
> > I think we've gone round this mulberry bush before, but that was just
> more
> > grist for the mill (I prefer my metaphors mixed!).
> >
> > -greg
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 8:46 PM, David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu
> <mailto:
> > dkirsh@lsu.edu>> wrote:
> > >
> > > The topic of how grammatical form relates to meaning calls to mind the
> > > groundbreaking work of Eleanor Orr--whom you've probably never heard of
> > on
> > > account of the fact that her work was condemned by a
> politically-correct
> > > faction of race-conscious sociolinguists who decided her analysis of
> > Black
> > > English Vernacular could too easily be appropriated into racist
> > discourses
> > > about language deficiency.
> > >
> > > Orr was a Washington DC area teacher and principal in the 1970s and
> > 1980s,
> > > who traced math difficulties of her African American students to subtle
> > > grammatical differences between Black English dialect and standard
> > English.
> > > Her 1987 book goes into compelling detail to support the thesis that
> the
> > > meaning structure of basic mathematical terms is embedded in the
> > > grammatical setting in which those terms are expressed. For instance,
> the
> > > meaning of “distance” is embedded in the grammatical structure
> “distance
> > > from _________ to __________” where the place-holders hold locations;
> if
> > > you don’t have that grammatical structure, and you're in a linguistic
> > > environment in which that structure is assumed, you're likely not going
> > to
> > > be able to gain full access to the concept.
> > >
> > > The attached excerpts from her book--ignore the Forward, unless you'd
> > like
> > > some context--reveal some of her students' bizarre conceptions of
> > distance
> > > (and other basic mathematical concepts) as revealed in their diagrams.
> > Her
> > > approach involves linguistic analysis of sentences produced by her
> > African
> > > American students that she reads as collapsed versions of standard
> > English
> > > sentences, with differences in prepositional structure being
> highlighted
> > > (but other grammatical elements also are indicated).
> > >
> > > This work cuts against the grain of anything going on in mathematics
> > > education. The Piagetian view that dominates that field holds that
> basic
> > > concepts come about from reflection on our actions in our engagement
> with
> > > the material world. When language enters the conversation, it's with
> > > respect to semantic structure; to my knowledge, nobody's ever
> implicated
> > > syntax directly in basic quantitative understanding.
> > >
> > > This work is particularly interesting to me in connection with my
> > > 21-year-old son who is autistic, and whose grammatical function is
> > severely
> > > impaired. He has a decent vocabulary, but unless the setting for the
> > > conversation provides contextual clues, he can't piece together how the
> > > semantic elements are linked to one another. It is only recently that
> it
> > > occurred to me his lack of a secure sense of basic quantitative terms
> > like
> > > “more” and “less” may be rooted in his grammatical incapacities.
> > >
> > > The XMCA discussion, thus far, has touched on grammar with respect to
> > > lexical items such as prepositions. But we've not yet tied that to the
> > > grammatical forms that embed those lexical items. I'm very curious as
> to
> > > whether that further connection can be made.
> > >
> > > David Kirshner
> > >
> > > Orr, E., W. (1987). Twice as less: Black English and the performance of
> > > black students in mathematics and science. New York: W. W. Norton &
> > Company.
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
> > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg
> > > Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 3:06 PM
> > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors
> > >
> > > Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that
> > > brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is
> > > essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now
> > > rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that
> > > communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is
> > > thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major
> > > onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language
> > there
> > > has to be some change in the nature of communication.
> > >
> > > So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi
> > > applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific writings
> > of
> > > Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like
> > > "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like
> > "bounce
> > > off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions,
> > > Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make
> > scientific
> > > English possible?
> > >
> > > Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the laws
> > of
> > > gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he
> > really
> > > discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation".
> Gravity
> > > is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but
> > rather
> > > a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, again!).
> So
> > > how and above all why does it become an entity?
> > >
> > > It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's
> on
> > > the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize
> almost
> > > instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark
> > > room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did
> > this;
> > > then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in
> > > mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's
> lectures
> > > on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble
> > > determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to
> > > write his conclusion in the form of a law).
> > >
> > > In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make
> > > sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens
> > yields
> > > a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from
> the
> > > glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The
> > > curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the
> > > eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be
> > > realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun,
> > creating
> > > an imaginary entity.
> > >
> > > That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized
> by
> > a
> > > verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or
> something
> > > that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden").
> We
> > > even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the
> rules.
> > > So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through
> ignorance",
> > > all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that
> > > Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental function
> > is
> > > realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical
> > > metaphor.
> > >
> > > One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness
> > > hypothesis is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do
> > their
> > > homework do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know
> > which
> > > "do" to move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is
> > > essentially innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see
> that
> > > "Do students who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up
> > through
> > > a process of what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses
> > stand
> > > for
> > > exchanges:
> > >
> > > Mother: You did your homework, didn't you?
> > > Child: No.
> > > Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well?
> > > Child: No.
> > > Mother: You didn't do well?
> > > Child: No.
> > > Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other
> > > students do well?
> > > Child: Some of them.
> > > Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do
> well?
> > >
> > > And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two
> > > functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental
> > function
> > > (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental
> > function
> > > (discourse).
> > >
> > > I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract
> and
> > > unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical
> kind.
> > > But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful
> and
> > > far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical
> > metaphor
> > > that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while
> > the
> > > grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I
> must
> > > stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!)
> > >
> > > David Kellogg
> > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > , or "the
> > >
> > > . He
> > >
> > > On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
> > <mailto:greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>>
> > > wrote:
> > >
> > > > Helena and David,
> > > > I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the
> so-called
> > > > authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition
> > > > to
> > > > Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion
> > > > of "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English)
> > > > notion of "time" and how each of these languages offers different
> > > > affordances of meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual
> > > > understanding, English has a much more reified/objectified/entified
> > > > sense of time. (btw, I think the first paragraph is easier to follow
> > > > than the second - and in that first paragraph you'll find our old
> > friend
> > > "imagination").
> > > > David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to?
> > > > -greg
> > > >
> > > > Taken from:
> > > >
> > > >
> http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Second
> > > > ary/Whorfframe2.html
> > > >
> > > > " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset"
> are
> > > > with us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from
> other
> > > nouns.
> > > > They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in
> winter"
> > > > just as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized
> > > > and numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our
> > > > thought about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified.
> > > > Without objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real
> > > > time, i.e. of the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply
> > > > a cyclic phase similar to an earlier phase in that
> ever-later-becoming
> > > > duration. Only by imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside
> > > > another and another in the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually
> > > > perceived) configuration. "But such is the power of linguistic
> analogy
> > > that we do so objectify cyclic phasing.
> > > > We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g.,
> > > "phasing."
> > > > And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting
> > > > binomial formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is
> > > > implicit for all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items
> > > > like "substance, matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for
> an
> > > > enormously wide range of nouns. But even these are not quite
> > > > generalized enough to take in our phase nouns. So for the phase nouns
> > we
> > > have made a formless item, "time."
> > > > We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in
> the
> > > > pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in
> > > > the pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say
> > > > and think "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let
> me
> > > > again point out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk"
> > > > or "a piece of cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a
> > > > summer" actually contains or consists of such-and-such a quantity of
> > > "time."
> > > >
> > > > In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are
> not
> > > > nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are
> a
> > > > formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and
> > > > even other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a
> > > > locative pattern, like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains
> > > > no morpheme like one of "in the house" or "at the tree." It means
> > > > "when it is morning" or "while morning-phase is occurring." These
> > > > "temporal s" are not used as subjects or objects, or at all like
> > > > nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or "summer is hot";
> summer
> > > > is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat occurs.
> > > > One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or "summer
> recently."
> > > > There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a quantity, of
> > > > the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about time
> > > > except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis
> > > here for a formless item answering to our "time." "
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen
> > > > <helenaworthen@gmail.com<mailto:helenaworthen@gmail.com>>
> > > > wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this:
> > > > >
> > > > > "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton
> > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to
> create
> > > > > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly
> > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific
> > > > > writing and thinking today."
> > > > >
> > > > > Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you
> > > > > when
> > > > you
> > > > > say "created to talk about gravity as an entity".
> > > > >
> > > > > Thank you,
> > > > >
> > > > > Helena
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Helena Worthen
> > > > > helenaworthen@gmail.com<mailto:helenaworthen@gmail.com>
> > > > >
> > > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > > As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end
> > > > > > of
> > > > what
> > > > > > Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what
> > > > > > Halliday
> > > > calls
> > > > > > "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have
> > > > > > three properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not
> > have:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can,
> > > > > actually,
> > > > > > but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new
> > > > > > name
> > > > > or a
> > > > > > new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can).
> > > > > >
> > > > > > b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic
> > > > > > field
> > > > > (the
> > > > > > way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of
> > > > linguistics)
> > > > > > but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same
> > > > effect,
> > > > > > which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the
> > "in"
> > > > has
> > > > > > more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly
> > > > > > in
> > > > your
> > > > > > tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's
> > > > > > hands,
> > > > > refer
> > > > > > to a book or even a footnote.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty
> > > > > > much define the difference between learning and development, at
> > > > > > least as I understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on
> > > > > > functions indefinitely while development works by reorganizing
> the
> > > > > > closed set of functions you already have into new systems.
> > > > > > Learning is skill specific and local, while development is quite
> > > global in its implications.
> > > > > Learning
> > > > > > is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems,
> > > > > > while development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and
> > > > > > forget it
> > > > just
> > > > > > as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue
> > > > > > that
> > > > > people
> > > > > > call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end
> of
> > > > > > the lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp,
> > > > > > concrete, and vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the
> > > > > > nominalizations that
> > > > Newton
> > > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to
> > > > > > create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are
> highly
> > > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific
> > > > > > writing and
> > > > thinking
> > > > > > today.  For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is
> the
> > > > third
> > > > > > great moment in child development (after the break into mother
> > > > > > tongue
> > > > and
> > > > > > the break into disciplinary language in school work).
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies
> > > > > > zero dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a
> > > > > > line', 'on a
> > > > > > plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they
> are
> > > > > > grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with
> time:
> > > > > > 'at
> > > > a
> > > > > > point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at
> > > > > > Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and
> > > > > > "in Christmas' (season).
> > > > > >
> > > > > > David Kellogg
> > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> > > > > >
> > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen
> > > > > > <helenaworthen@gmail.com<mailto:helenaworthen@gmail.com>>
> > > > > > wrote:
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial
> > > > > >> relationships from the concrete material world into the
> > > > > >> conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50
> common
> > > > > >> ones, and
> > > > > between 70
> > > > > >> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far
> as"
> > > > > >> --
> > > > > this
> > > > > >> is according to
> > > > > >> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm
> > > > ).
> > > > > >> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently,
> > > > > >> in English, they evolved from and did the job done by
> inflections
> > > > > >> in
> > > > parent
> > > > > >> languages, examples being cases and tenses.
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection
> > > > > >> like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial
> > > > > >> relationships
> > > > > suggested
> > > > > >> by contemporary prepositions.
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this.
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >> Helena Worthen
> > > > > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com<mailto:helenaworthen@gmail.com>
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote:
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>> I’m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly
> > > > embodied,
> > > > > >> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to
> > > > > >> linguistics
> > > > > (For
> > > > > >> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on
> > > > “lexicon”:
> > > > > >> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions,
> > > > > >> being
> > > > > part
> > > > > >> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and
> > > > > >> Halliday
> > > > > see no
> > > > > >> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence,
> > > lexico-grammar.
> > > > > (Lo
> > > > > >> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar,
> > > > > >> adding
> > > > > the
> > > > > >> “n”. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings
> are
> > > > great
> > > > > >> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of
> > > > > >> that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever
> practiced?
> > > > > >>> Henry
> > > > > >>>
> > > > > >>>
> > > > > >>>
> > > > > >>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
> > <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
> > > > wrote:
> > > > > >>>>
> > > > > >>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the
> > > > metaphorical
> > > > > >> use of prepositions like:
> > > > > >>>> - "there is some value IN your argument"
> > > > > >>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again"
> > > > > >>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking"
> > > > > >>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again"
> > > > > >>>>
> > > > > >>>> and so on.
> > > > > >>>> Andy
> > > > > >>>>
> > > > >
> --------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > > > ----
> > > > > >>>> *Andy Blunden*
> > > > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> > > > > >>>>
> > > > > >>>>
> > > > > >>>> larry smolucha wrote:
> > > > > >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha:
> > > > > >>>>>
> > > > > >>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself -
> > > > > >>>>>
> > > > > >>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic
> > > > > possibilities:
> > > > > >>>>>
> > > > > >>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published
> in
> > > > > Thought
> > > > > >>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into
> > > > English
> > > > > >> 1962]
> > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the
> 'additive'
> > > > value
> > > > > >> of the
> > > > > >>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech
> > > > > vocalization).
> > > > > >>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements
> that
> > > > > >>>>> are
> > > > > >> flammable
> > > > > >>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable
> nor
> > > > > >>>>> a
> > > > gas.
> > > > > >>>>>
> > > > > >>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century
> > > > > >>>>> European
> > > > > >> Developmental
> > > > > >>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental'
> > > > > >>>>> hence
> > > > > the
> > > > > >>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of
> > > > Piaget's
> > > > > >> Genetic
> > > > > >>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology.
> > > > > >>>>>
> > > > > >>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and
> > > > > >>>>> synthesis
> > > > > >> based on
> > > > > >>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in
> > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky's
> > > > > >> example of H2O.
> > > > > >>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com
> > > > > >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> > > > > >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600
> > > > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
> > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha:
> > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be
> synergistic
> > > > > >>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the
> > > parts.
> > > > > >>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more
> > > > > >>>>>> than
> > > > the
> > > > > >>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can
> > > > > >>>>>> ever
> > > > be
> > > > > >> imagined"
> > > > > >>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.)
> > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>> A couple things to consider:
> > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination
> > > > > >>>>>> as the
> > > > > >> brain has
> > > > > >>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the
> > > > > >>>>>> simplest
> > > > level
> > > > > >> of the Gestalt
> > > > > >>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images).
> > > > > >>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just
> > > > photographic.
> > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try
> > > > > >>>>>> to
> > > > > >> accurately reproduce
> > > > > >>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event.
> Whereas,
> > > > > >>>>>> the
> > > > > >> goal of combinatory
> > > > > >>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories,
> > > > > >>>>>> dreams,
> > > > > >> musings, and even
> > > > > >>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of
> > > > objects
> > > > > >> and symbols.
> > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different
> ways
> > > > > >>>>>> that
> > > > > >> things and concepts can be
> > > > > >>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar
> > > > > >>>>>> and
> > > > > flour.
> > > > > >>>>>>                                         I can add water and
> > > > > >>>>>> it
> > > > > >> dissolves a bit
> > > > > >>>>>>                                         But adding heat
> > > > > >>>>>> changes
> > > > the
> > > > > >> combination into a pancake.
> > > > > >>>>>>                      [Is this synergistic?]
> > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>            Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more
> > > > > >>>>>> examples
> > > > > >> to put the discussion
> > > > > >>>>>>            in the metaphysical realm.
> > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900
> > > > > >>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com
> > > > > >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> > > > > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
> > > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the
> > > > > >>>>>>> case
> > > > > for
> > > > > >>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I
> > > > > >>>>>>> think
> > > > it's
> > > > > >> not
> > > > > >>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are
> > > > > >> associationists who
> > > > > >>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary
> > > > > >>>>>>> associationism
> > > > > >> exists and
> > > > > >>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as
> > mediation.
> > > > > >> Vygotsky
> > > > > >>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion,
> > > > explain
> > > > > >> the
> > > > > >>>>>>> uniqueness of our species?
> > > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels
> > > > > >>>>>>> for
> > > > its
> > > > > >> own
> > > > > >>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a
> > > > > >>>>>>> Piagetian perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian
> > > > > >>>>>>> one--true maturity
> > > > > as a
> > > > > >>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more
> > > > > >>>>>>> to it
> > > > > >> than
> > > > > >>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of
> > > > > >>>>>>> primate,
> > > > > and
> > > > > >> our
> > > > > >>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon
> > > > > >>>>>>> rocks
> > > > > in
> > > > > >> order
> > > > > >>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged
> > > > > >>>>>>> the
> > > > same
> > > > > >> way as
> > > > > >>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value.
> > > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and
> > > > > >>>>>>> for
> > > > > >> language is
> > > > > >>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human
> > > > > >> exceptionalism.
> > > > > >>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for
> > > > > >>>>>>> the
> > > > > >> vanguard role
> > > > > >>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species,
> > > > > prolonging
> > > > > >>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after
> > > > > >>>>>>> the
> > > > sick
> > > > > >> and the
> > > > > >>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial
> > > > > >>>>>>> organs
> > > > > >> (tools) and
> > > > > >>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for
> > > > > >>>>>>> our
> > > > > >> species, it
> > > > > >>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these
> > > > > >> "circuitous,
> > > > > >>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that
> > > > > >>>>>>> lead
> > > > our
> > > > > >>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always
> > > > > >>>>>>> been
> > > > > >> short on
> > > > > >>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for
> > > > > >>>>>>> material
> > > > > >> culture
> > > > > >>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another
> matter:
> > > > > >> verily, here
> > > > > >>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first.
> > > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of
> > > > > >>>>>>> attention is
> > > > > >> simply the
> > > > > >>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says
> > > > > >>>>>>> there are
> > > > > >> only two
> > > > > >>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So
> > > > > >> imagination is
> > > > > >>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete
> experiences,
> > > > > >>>>>>> and
> > > > > >> nothing
> > > > > >>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when
> > > > > >>>>>>> you
> > > > > hear
> > > > > >> the
> > > > > >>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there
> > > > > >>>>>>> to be
> > > > > >> able to
> > > > > >>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work
> > > > > >>>>>>> in
> > > > word
> > > > > >> meaning.
> > > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who
> > > > > >>>>>>> was
> > > > > given
> > > > > >> a
> > > > > >>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been
> > > > > >>>>>>> mixed
> > > > with
> > > > > >> silver
> > > > > >>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of
> > > gold.
> > > > > >> Well, we
> > > > > >>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not
> > > > possible
> > > > > to
> > > > > >>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that
> > > > > >>>>>>> precisely. The
> > > > > >> method
> > > > > >>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the
> > > > > >>>>>>> "principal
> > > > of
> > > > > >>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about.
> > > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes
> > > > > >>>>>>> palimpsest, a
> > > > > >> velum on
> > > > > >>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each
> other.
> > > > > Because
> > > > > >>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and
> > > > > >>>>>>> written
> > > > over
> > > > > >> every
> > > > > >>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was
> soft,
> > > > > >>>>>>> the
> > > > > >> pressure
> > > > > >>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones
> > > > > >>>>>>> when
> > > > > the
> > > > > >> old
> > > > > >>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the
> only
> > > > known
> > > > > >> Greek
> > > > > >>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies".
> > > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor
> their
> > > > > >> relationship
> > > > > >>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they
> > > > > >>>>>>> are
> > > > > >> related to
> > > > > >>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's
> quite
> > > > > similar
> > > > > >> to the
> > > > > >>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew.
> > > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?)
> > > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>> David Kellogg
> > > > > >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> > > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD
> > > > > >>>>>>> <hshonerd@gmail.com<mailto:hshonerd@gmail.com>>
> > > > > >> wrote:
> > > > > >>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an
> > > > > associationist,
> > > > > >> “sees
> > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention”?
> > > > > >>>>>>>> Henry
> > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg <
> > > > dkellogg60@gmail.com<mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> > > > > >
> > > > > >> wrote:
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> division
> > > > > >> between
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other,
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> because
> > > > > >> Ribot is
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>> an
> > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> form of
> > > > > >> attention.
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> transition
> > > > from
> > > > > >> forest
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>> to
> > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division
> > > > between
> > > > > >> the two
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> commonsensical
> > > > > >> world of
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>> the
> > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> prosaic
> > > > uses
> > > > > >> in life
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more
> > > > > "imaginative"
> > > > > >> (that
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>> farm,where
> > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> winter
> > > > > >> months are
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to
> > > > encounter
> > > > > >> talking
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention
> > > > > has
> > > > > >> to be
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> more voluntary.
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> very
> > > > clear
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism
> that
> > > > > >> underpins
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>> Ribot
> > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> points
> > > > > out
> > > > > >> the
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> practices
> > > > > >> really
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>> are
> > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of
> > > > imagination,
> > > > > >> there
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> human
> > > > > and
> > > > > >> animal
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> capable of
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>> volitional
> > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than
> humans).
> > > > > Without
> > > > > >> a
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>> theory
> > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> for
> > > > > Ribot's
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> functions at
> > > > > >> all.
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu
> > <mailto:mcole@ucsd.edu>>
> > > > wrote:
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination,
> > > > > >> thanks to
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>> all
> > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought.
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> influential
> > > > > >> around the
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>> time
> > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century.
> I
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> had
> > > > > >> seen work
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>> on
> > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination.
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Robert-  Does generative = productive and reflective
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> equal
> > > > > >> reproductive?
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> of
> > > > > >> development
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>> of
> > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> being
> > > > a
> > > > > >> relative
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic.
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> mike
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
> > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com<mailto:hshonerd@gmail.com>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote:
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> bucket
> > > > list.
> > > > > >> This
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> from
> > > > some
> > > > > >> weeks
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>> in
> > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that
> > > > > >> segmented the
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as “met
> > > aphorizing”.
> > > > > >> Puns,
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :)
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Henry
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> <mcole@ucsd.edu<mailto:mcole@ucsd.edu>>
> > > > > wrote:
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> and
> > > > they
> > > > > >> are
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>> doing
> > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his
> > > > > >> followers as an
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel, so
> > > > > >> its of
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> course
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge.
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in
> > > > > >> translation,
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>> seems
> > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word,
> > "recollection"
> > > > in
> > > > > >> this
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> passage,
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter
> > > > > >> distinction to
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "memory."
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary
> > > > > >> discourse
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian
> > > > > >> colleagues have
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated.
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from
> > > > theorists
> > > > > >> who
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> clearly
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it
> was
> > > > still
> > > > > >> possible
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it.
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which,
> > > > > >> interestingly
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> links
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a
> > > > "voluntary"
> > > > > >> act.
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Parts
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> of
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> stuff
> > > > > that
> > > > > >> was
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> also
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> of
> > > > > >> creativity
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>> and
> > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious
> to
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> see
> > > > > >> that the
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> two
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked.
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found
> > > > himself
> > > > > >> writing.
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> mike
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> pretty
> > > > > old
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> approaches
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden <
> > > > > >> ablunden@mira.net<mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote:
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary,
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> but it
> > > > > >> may be
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> worth
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> place
> > > > to
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between
> > > > > >> Recollection and
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive
> > > > > >> Imagination,
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>> (2)
> > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination,
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> which
> > > > he
> > > > > >> says
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> leads
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> other
> > > > > >> words,
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>> the
> > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is
> > > > > >> accomplished
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> through
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination.
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>
> > > >
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > > --
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote:
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading
> Strawson
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
> > > > > >> Williams.
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists
> whose
> > > > work i
> > > > > >> am
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> trying
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of
> > > > > >> productive
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive
> > > > imagination
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>> develops.
> > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive
> implies
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
> > > > > >> there
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>> must
> > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> be a
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ​imagination called UNproductive
> imagination.
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> But
> > > > I
> > > > > >> learned
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination
> appears
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
> > > > is
> > > > > >> linked
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory.
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of
> > > > > >> anticipation
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory.
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that!
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
> > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com<mailto:hshonerd@gmail.com>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>                  wrote:
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination
> > > > > >> (starting
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> look, and
> > > > > >> provides
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>> a
> > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as
> > > > > fixed.
> > > > > >> This,
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a
> > > > > ground
> > > > > >> to
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>> take
> > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> part
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> preconceptions:
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> grammarian
> > > > > >> Langacker on
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> domains,
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>> particularly
> > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> full of
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination
> > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of
> > > > > >> temporality:
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic
> > > > > >> structure), which
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both
> > > > > >> individual
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling.
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss <
> > > > > >> lpscholar2@gmail.com<mailto:lpscholar2@gmail.com>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic.
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third
> > > > *space*
> > > > > >> and the
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling*
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet.
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his
> > > > > >> notion of
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion
> is
> > > > > >> explored under
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a
> *set*
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of
> > > > > >> modalities
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together.  This notion suggests there is a form of
> > > > knowing
> > > > > >> that is
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt"
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [perceived??]
> > > > if
> > > > > >> we
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>> think
> > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively.  Raymond explores the imaginal as
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *style* Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM,
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> HENRY SHONERD <
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com<mailto:hshonerd@gmail.com>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry,
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> say how
> > > > > >> jazzed up
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> am
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild,
> the
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind
> > > > > as
> > > > > >> Larry
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> various
> > > > > >> triads,
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> finally
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notebooks
> > > > > of
> > > > > >> the
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> mind, as
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I’ll be back! Gap
> adentro,
> > > > luega
> > > > > >> pa’
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> fuera.
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours,
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole <
> > > > mcole@ucsd.edu>
> > > > > >> wrote:
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread,
> > > > attached
> > > > > >> are two
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue.
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT
> > > > > theorists
> > > > > >> like
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of
> > > > > >> imagination in a
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion
> of
> > > > > >> productive
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have
> no
> > > > > >> intention of
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> doing
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so.
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the
> > > > > >> attached
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts.
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these
> > > > philosophers,
> > > > > I
> > > > > >> came
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> upon
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> closely
> > > > > >> linked at
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> several
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our
> naivete,
> > > > > >> Ettienne and I
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as
> a
> > > > means
> > > > > of
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>> access
> > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander
> > > Suvorov.
> > > > > >> Moreover,
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> such
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct
> > > > > relevance
> > > > > >> to
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Kris's
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
> > > > > >> concerns
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>> about
> > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in
> > > > development.
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination
> thread.
> > > > > Perhaps
> > > > > >> they
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> will
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested.
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural
> > > > > >> science
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with an
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <Imagination and Perception by P.F.
> Strawson.pdf>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> --
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural
> > > > science
> > > > > >> with an
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> --
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> science
> > > > > >> with an
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>>
> > > > > >>>>>
> > > > > >>>>
> > > > > >>>
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > > --
> > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > > > Assistant Professor
> > > > Department of Anthropology
> > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> > > > Brigham Young University
> > > > Provo, UT 84602
> > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> > > >
> > >
> >
> >
> > --
> > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > Assistant Professor
> > Department of Anthropology
> > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> > Brigham Young University
> > Provo, UT 84602
> > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> >
> >
>
>
> --
> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> Assistant Professor
> Department of Anthropology
> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> Brigham Young University
> Provo, UT 84602
> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>
>
>

-- 
Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
Department of Anthropology
880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
Brigham Young University
Provo, UT 84602
http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson