# [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors

```Thanks, Ed! Very useful--I have been studying the Hawaiian language
immersion programme which I just missed (I went to elementary school in
Hawaii while the use of Hawaiian in school was still banned). The Hawaiian
immersion programme was modeled on the successful work in New Zealand
transforming Maori into a language of school instruction, but one of the
biggest problems they had at first was creating an instructional register
for mathematics.

Say, for example, you are teaching kids to calculate the volume of a
container by multiplying its three dimensions. You need a word for a
container. Not a calabash or a basket or a pot, which have very distinct
realizations in Hawaiian, but a generalized container of any kind. The
general, abstract notion of a container is actually a very important part
of your instructional register, and that for two reasons.

First of all,  in order to see how the calculation works, you really need a
container that doesn't really exist: an idealized container with nice,
straight sides that will lend themselves perfectly to measuring and
multiplication. Imagine trying to teach this lesson with a calabash, that
is, the kind of hollow gourd that you see used as a percussion instrument
in this song from the Disney movie "Lilo and Stitch":

(See 0.58--the calabash is only there for about a second).

Secondly, in order to understand how to use the calculation, you really
need the idea that it with work, more or less, with any container--and that
the calabash, the basket and the pot are all as if imperfect realizations
of some Platonic ideal container. This is, of course, totally false: things
are quite the other way around, as the fact of languages like Hawaiian that
have words for different containers but no hyperconcept for all containers
will demonstrate. We have the actual artifacts before we have the ideal
object. But, like grammatical metaphor, the Platonic ideal container is a
highly productive fiction.

Derrida, who is the other uber-structuralist of language besides
Chomsky, claimed that writing preceded speaking, and so he might have
agreed with Francine that a non-alphabetic writing system is going to have
profound effects on the "thinginess" of the semantics (whereas for the rest
of us a language tends to get, at least in the long run, the kind of
writing system that its speaking system requires, as soon as the vagaries
introduced by zealous missionaries and tone-deaf colonial officials have
been ironed out).

Chinese was not written alphabetically until the introduction of Hanyu
Pinyin at the end of the 1950s (an intervention that was designed to
standardize pronunciation and which largely failed). But Chinese has nouns,
verbs and expressions that function in ways that are essentially identical
to our prepositions (they are somewhat more verby than preps, in Chinese
you say that a teacup is "being on" the table). But Francine is certainly
right to say that the non-alphabetic writing system has affected the
way Chinese think about language and made our way of thinking about
language quite different from yours. Chinese doesn't really have the
phoneme as a layer of sound analysis and doesn't need it (but then, neither
do you)!

David Kellogg
Hankuk University of Foreign Studies

On 20 December 2014 at 14:24, Ed Wall <ewall@umich.edu> wrote:

> David
>
>       Possibly of interest would be the efforts in the 80s to develop a
> mathematical register for the Maori language. I seem to remember that it
> had to be developed from the early grades on.
>
> Ed
>
> On Dec 19, 2014, at  9:46 PM, David H Kirshner wrote:
>
> > The topic of how grammatical form relates to meaning calls to mind the
> groundbreaking work of Eleanor Orr--whom you've probably never heard of on
> account of the fact that her work was condemned by a politically-correct
> faction of race-conscious sociolinguists who decided her analysis of Black
> English Vernacular could too easily be appropriated into racist discourses
> about language deficiency.
> >
> > Orr was a Washington DC area teacher and principal in the 1970s and
> 1980s, who traced math difficulties of her African American students to
> subtle grammatical differences between Black English dialect and standard
> English. Her 1987 book goes into compelling detail to support the thesis
> that the meaning structure of basic mathematical terms is embedded in the
> grammatical setting in which those terms are expressed. For instance, the
> meaning of “distance” is embedded in the grammatical structure “distance
> from _________ to __________” where the place-holders hold locations; if
> you don’t have that grammatical structure, and you're in a linguistic
> environment in which that structure is assumed, you're likely not going to
> be able to gain full access to the concept.
> >
> > The attached excerpts from her book--ignore the Forward, unless you'd
> like some context--reveal some of her students' bizarre conceptions of
> distance (and other basic mathematical concepts) as revealed in their
> diagrams. Her approach involves linguistic analysis of sentences produced
> by her African American students that she reads as collapsed versions of
> standard English sentences, with differences in prepositional structure
> being highlighted (but other grammatical elements also are indicated).
> >
> > This work cuts against the grain of anything going on in mathematics
> education. The Piagetian view that dominates that field holds that basic
> concepts come about from reflection on our actions in our engagement with
> the material world. When language enters the conversation, it's with
> respect to semantic structure; to my knowledge, nobody's ever implicated
> syntax directly in basic quantitative understanding.
> >
> > This work is particularly interesting to me in connection with my
> 21-year-old son who is autistic, and whose grammatical function is severely
> impaired. He has a decent vocabulary, but unless the setting for the
> conversation provides contextual clues, he can't piece together how the
> semantic elements are linked to one another. It is only recently that it
> occurred to me his lack of a secure sense of basic quantitative terms like
> “more” and “less” may be rooted in his grammatical incapacities.
> >
> > The XMCA discussion, thus far, has touched on grammar with respect to
> lexical items such as prepositions. But we've not yet tied that to the
> grammatical forms that embed those lexical items. I'm very curious as to
> whether that further connection can be made.
> >
> > David Kirshner
> >
> > Orr, E., W. (1987). Twice as less: Black English and the performance of
> black students in mathematics and science. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg
> > Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 3:06 PM
> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors
> >
> > Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that
> brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is
> essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now
> rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that
> communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is
> > thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major
> onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language there
> has to be some change in the nature of communication.
> >
> > So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi
> applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific writings of
> Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like
> "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like "bounce
> off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions,
> Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make scientific
> English possible?
> >
> > Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the laws
> of gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he
> really discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation".
> Gravity is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but
> rather a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps,
> again!). So how and above all why does it become an entity?
> >
> > It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's
> on the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize almost
> instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark
> room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did this;
> then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in
> mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's lectures
> on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble
> determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to
> write his conclusion in the form of a law).
> >
> > In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make
> sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens yields
> a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from the
> glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The
> curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the
> eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be
> realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, creating
> an imaginary entity.
> >
> > That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized by
> a verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or something
> that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden"). We
> even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the rules.
> > So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through ignorance",
> all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that
> Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental function is
> realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical
> metaphor.
> >
> > One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness
> hypothesis is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do their
> homework do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know which
> "do" to move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is
> essentially innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see that
> "Do students who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up through
> a process of what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses stand
> for
> > exchanges:
> >
> > Mother: You did your homework, didn't you?
> > Child: No.
> > Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well?
> > Child: No.
> > Mother: You didn't do well?
> > Child: No.
> > Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other
> students do well?
> > Child: Some of them.
> > Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do well?
> >
> > And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two
> functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental function
> > (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental
> function (discourse).
> >
> > I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract
> and unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical kind.
> > But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful and
> far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical metaphor
> that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while the
> grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I must
> stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!)
> >
> > David Kellogg
> > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> >
> >
> >
> > , or "the
> >
> > . He
> >
> > On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
> > wrote:
> >
> >> Helena and David,
> >> I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the so-called
> >> authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition
> >> to
> >> Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion
> >> of "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English)
> >> notion of "time" and how each of these languages offers different
> >> affordances of meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual
> >> understanding, English has a much more reified/objectified/entified
> >> sense of time. (btw, I think the first paragraph is easier to follow
> >> than the second - and in that first paragraph you'll find our old
> friend "imagination").
> >> David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to?
> >> -greg
> >>
> >> Taken from:
> >>
> >> http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Second
> >> ary/Whorfframe2.html
> >>
> >> " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" are
> >> with us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other
> nouns.
> >> They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in winter"
> >> just as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized
> >> and numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our
> >> thought about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified.
> >> Without objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real
> >> time, i.e. of the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply
> >> a cyclic phase similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming
> >> duration. Only by imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside
> >> another and another in the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually
> >> perceived) configuration. "But such is the power of linguistic analogy
> that we do so objectify cyclic phasing.
> >> We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g.,
> "phasing."
> >> And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting
> >> binomial formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is
> >> implicit for all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items
> >> like "substance, matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an
> >> enormously wide range of nouns. But even these are not quite
> >> generalized enough to take in our phase nouns. So for the phase nouns
> we have made a formless item, "time."
> >> We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in the
> >> pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in
> >> the pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say
> >> and think "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me
> >> again point out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk"
> >> or "a piece of cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a
> >> summer" actually contains or consists of such-and-such a quantity of
> "time."
> >>
> >> In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are not
> >> nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are a
> >> formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and
> >> even other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a
> >> locative pattern, like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains
> >> no morpheme like one of "in the house" or "at the tree." It means
> >> "when it is morning" or "while morning-phase is occurring." These
> >> "temporal s" are not used as subjects or objects, or at all like
> >> nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or "summer is hot"; summer
> >> is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat occurs.
> >> One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or "summer recently."
> >> There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a quantity, of
> >> the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about time
> >> except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis
> here for a formless item answering to our "time." "
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen
> >> <helenaworthen@gmail.com>
> >> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this:
> >>>
> >>> "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton
> >>> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create
> >>> sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly
> >>> productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific
> >>> writing and thinking today."
> >>>
> >>> Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you
> >>> when
> >> you
> >>> say "created to talk about gravity as an entity".
> >>>
> >>> Thank you,
> >>>
> >>> Helena
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Helena Worthen
> >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com
> >>>
> >>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote:
> >>>
> >>>> As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end
> >>>> of
> >> what
> >>>> Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what
> >>>> Halliday
> >> calls
> >>>> "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have
> >>>> three properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have:
> >>>>
> >>>> a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can,
> >>> actually,
> >>>> but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new
> >>>> name
> >>> or a
> >>>> new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can).
> >>>>
> >>>> b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic
> >>>> field
> >>> (the
> >>>> way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of
> >> linguistics)
> >>>> but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used.
> >>>>
> >>>> c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same
> >> effect,
> >>>> which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the "in"
> >> has
> >>>> more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly
> >>>> in
> >> your
> >>>> tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's
> >>>> hands,
> >>> refer
> >>>> to a book or even a footnote.
> >>>>
> >>>> Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty
> >>>> much define the difference between learning and development, at
> >>>> least as I understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on
> >>>> functions indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the
> >>>> closed set of functions you already have into new systems.
> >>>> Learning is skill specific and local, while development is quite
> global in its implications.
> >>> Learning
> >>>> is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems,
> >>>> while development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and
> >>>> forget it
> >> just
> >>>> as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away.
> >>>>
> >>>> For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue
> >>>> that
> >>> people
> >>>> call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end of
> >>>> the lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp,
> >>>> concrete, and vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the
> >>>> nominalizations that
> >> Newton
> >>>> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to
> >>>> create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly
> >>>> productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific
> >>>> writing and
> >> thinking
> >>>> today.  For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is the
> >> third
> >>>> great moment in child development (after the break into mother
> >>>> tongue
> >> and
> >>>> the break into disciplinary language in school work).
> >>>>
> >>>> Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies
> >>>> zero dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a
> >>>> line', 'on a
> >>>> plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they are
> >>>> grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with time:
> >>>> 'at
> >> a
> >>>> point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at
> >>>> Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and
> >>>> "in Christmas' (season).
> >>>>
> >>>> David Kellogg
> >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> >>>>
> >>>> On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen
> >>>> <helenaworthen@gmail.com>
> >>>> wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial
> >>>>> relationships from the concrete material world into the
> >>>>> conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common
> >>>>> ones, and
> >>> between 70
> >>>>> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as"
> >>>>> --
> >>> this
> >>>>> is according to
> >>>>> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm
> >> ).
> >>>>> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently,
> >>>>> in English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections
> >>>>> in
> >> parent
> >>>>> languages, examples being cases and tenses.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection
> >>>>> like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial
> >>>>> relationships
> >>> suggested
> >>>>> by contemporary prepositions.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Helena Worthen
> >>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com
> >>>>>
> >>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> I’m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly
> >> embodied,
> >>>>> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to
> >>>>> linguistics
> >>> (For
> >>>>> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on
> >> “lexicon”:
> >>>>> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions,
> >>>>> being
> >>> part
> >>>>> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and
> >>>>> Halliday
> >>> see no
> >>>>> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, lexico-grammar.
> >>> (Lo
> >>>>> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar,
> >>> the
> >>>>> “n”. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are
> >> great
> >>>>> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of
> >>>>> that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced?
> >>>>>> Henry
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> >> wrote:
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the
> >> metaphorical
> >>>>> use of prepositions like:
> >>>>>>> - "there is some value IN your argument"
> >>>>>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again"
> >>>>>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking"
> >>>>>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again"
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> and so on.
> >>>>>>> Andy
> >>>>>>>
> >>> --------------------------------------------------------------------
> >>> ----
> >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
> >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> larry smolucha wrote:
> >>>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha:
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself -
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic
> >>> possibilities:
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in
> >>> Thought
> >>>>>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into
> >> English
> >>>>> 1962]
> >>>>>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive'
> >> value
> >>>>> of the
> >>>>>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech
> >>> vocalization).
> >>>>>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that
> >>>>>>>> are
> >>>>> flammable
> >>>>>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor
> >>>>>>>> a
> >> gas.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century
> >>>>>>>> European
> >>>>> Developmental
> >>>>>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental'
> >>>>>>>> hence
> >>> the
> >>>>>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of
> >> Piaget's
> >>>>> Genetic
> >>>>>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and
> >>>>>>>> synthesis
> >>>>> based on
> >>>>>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in
> >>>>>>>> Vygotsky's
> >>>>> example of H2O.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com
> >>>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> >>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600
> >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha:
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic
> >>>>>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts.
> >>>>>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more
> >>>>>>>>> than
> >> the
> >>>>>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can
> >>>>>>>>> ever
> >> be
> >>>>> imagined"
> >>>>>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.)
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> A couple things to consider:
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination
> >>>>>>>>> as the
> >>>>> brain has
> >>>>>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the
> >>>>>>>>> simplest
> >> level
> >>>>> of the Gestalt
> >>>>>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images).
> >>>>>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just
> >> photographic.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try
> >>>>>>>>> to
> >>>>> accurately reproduce
> >>>>>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas,
> >>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>> goal of combinatory
> >>>>>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories,
> >>>>>>>>> dreams,
> >>>>> musings, and even
> >>>>>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of
> >> objects
> >>>>> and symbols.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways
> >>>>>>>>> that
> >>>>> things and concepts can be
> >>>>>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar
> >>>>>>>>> and
> >>> flour.
> >>>>>>>>>                                        I can add water and
> >>>>>>>>> it
> >>>>> dissolves a bit
> >>>>>>>>>                                        But adding heat
> >>>>>>>>> changes
> >> the
> >>>>> combination into a pancake.
> >>>>>>>>>                     [Is this synergistic?]
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>           Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more
> >>>>>>>>> examples
> >>>>> to put the discussion
> >>>>>>>>>           in the metaphysical realm.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900
> >>>>>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com
> >>>>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> >>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the
> >>>>>>>>>> case
> >>> for
> >>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I
> >>>>>>>>>> think
> >> it's
> >>>>> not
> >>>>>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are
> >>>>> associationists who
> >>>>>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary
> >>>>>>>>>> associationism
> >>>>> exists and
> >>>>>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation.
> >>>>> Vygotsky
> >>>>>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion,
> >> explain
> >>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>> uniqueness of our species?
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels
> >>>>>>>>>> for
> >> its
> >>>>> own
> >>>>>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a
> >>>>>>>>>> Piagetian perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian
> >>>>>>>>>> one--true maturity
> >>> as a
> >>>>>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more
> >>>>>>>>>> to it
> >>>>> than
> >>>>>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of
> >>>>>>>>>> primate,
> >>> and
> >>>>> our
> >>>>>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon
> >>>>>>>>>> rocks
> >>> in
> >>>>> order
> >>>>>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged
> >>>>>>>>>> the
> >> same
> >>>>> way as
> >>>>>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and
> >>>>>>>>>> for
> >>>>> language is
> >>>>>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human
> >>>>> exceptionalism.
> >>>>>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for
> >>>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>> vanguard role
> >>>>>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species,
> >>> prolonging
> >>>>>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after
> >>>>>>>>>> the
> >> sick
> >>>>> and the
> >>>>>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial
> >>>>>>>>>> organs
> >>>>> (tools) and
> >>>>>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for
> >>>>>>>>>> our
> >>>>> species, it
> >>>>>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these
> >>>>> "circuitous,
> >>>>>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that
> >> our
> >>>>>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always
> >>>>>>>>>> been
> >>>>> short on
> >>>>>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for
> >>>>>>>>>> material
> >>>>> culture
> >>>>>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter:
> >>>>> verily, here
> >>>>>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of
> >>>>>>>>>> attention is
> >>>>> simply the
> >>>>>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says
> >>>>>>>>>> there are
> >>>>> only two
> >>>>>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So
> >>>>> imagination is
> >>>>>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences,
> >>>>>>>>>> and
> >>>>> nothing
> >>>>>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when
> >>>>>>>>>> you
> >>> hear
> >>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there
> >>>>>>>>>> to be
> >>>>> able to
> >>>>>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work
> >>>>>>>>>> in
> >> word
> >>>>> meaning.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who
> >>>>>>>>>> was
> >>> given
> >>>>> a
> >>>>>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been
> >>>>>>>>>> mixed
> >> with
> >>>>> silver
> >>>>>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold.
> >>>>> Well, we
> >>>>>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not
> >> possible
> >>> to
> >>>>>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that
> >>>>>>>>>> precisely. The
> >>>>> method
> >>>>>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the
> >>>>>>>>>> "principal
> >> of
> >>>>>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes
> >>>>>>>>>> palimpsest, a
> >>>>> velum on
> >>>>>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other.
> >>> Because
> >>>>>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and
> >>>>>>>>>> written
> >> over
> >>>>> every
> >>>>>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft,
> >>>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>> pressure
> >>>>>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones
> >>>>>>>>>> when
> >>> the
> >>>>> old
> >>>>>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only
> >> known
> >>>>> Greek
> >>>>>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies".
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their
> >>>>> relationship
> >>>>>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they
> >>>>>>>>>> are
> >>>>> related to
> >>>>>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite
> >>> similar
> >>>>> to the
> >>>>>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?)
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
> >>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD
> >>>>>>>>>> <hshonerd@gmail.com>
> >>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an
> >>> associationist,
> >>>>> “sees
> >>>>>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention”?
> >>>>>>>>>>> Henry
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg <
> >> dkellogg60@gmail.com
> >>>>
> >>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the
> >>>>>>>>>>>> division
> >>>>> between
> >>>>>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other,
> >>>>>>>>>>>> because
> >>>>> Ribot is
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> an
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal
> >>>>>>>>>>>> form of
> >>>>> attention.
> >>>>>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the
> >>>>>>>>>>>> transition
> >> from
> >>>>> forest
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> to
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division
> >> between
> >>>>> the two
> >>>>>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and
> >>>>>>>>>>>> commonsensical
> >>>>> world of
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly
> >>>>>>>>>>>> prosaic
> >> uses
> >>>>> in life
> >>>>>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more
> >>> "imaginative"
> >>>>> (that
> >>>>>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world
> >>>>>>>>>>>> of the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> farm,where
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long
> >>>>>>>>>>>> winter
> >>>>> months are
> >>>>>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to
> >> encounter
> >>>>> talking
> >>>>>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here
> >>>>>>>>>>>> attention
> >>> has
> >>>>> to be
> >>>>>>>>>>>> more voluntary.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a
> >>>>>>>>>>>> very
> >> clear
> >>>>>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that
> >>>>> underpins
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> Ribot
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky
> >>>>>>>>>>>> points
> >>> out
> >>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive
> >>>>>>>>>>>> practices
> >>>>> really
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> are
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of
> >> imagination,
> >>>>> there
> >>>>>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between
> >>>>>>>>>>>> human
> >>> and
> >>>>> animal
> >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly
> >>>>>>>>>>>> capable of
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> volitional
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans).
> >>> Without
> >>>>> a
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> theory
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis
> >>>>>>>>>>>> for
> >>> Ribot's
> >>>>>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological
> >>>>>>>>>>>> functions at
> >>>>> all.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
> >> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination,
> >>>>> thanks to
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> all
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> influential
> >>>>> around the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> time
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I
> >>>>> seen work
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> on
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Robert-  Does generative = productive and reflective
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> equal
> >>>>> reproductive?
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> of
> >>>>> development
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> of
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> being
> >> a
> >>>>> relative
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
> >>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> bucket
> >> list.
> >>>>> This
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> from
> >> some
> >>>>> weeks
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> in
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
> >>>>> segmented the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as “met aphorizing”.
> >>>>> Puns,
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :)
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <mcole@ucsd.edu>
> >>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
> >> they
> >>>>> are
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> doing
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his
> >>>>> followers as an
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel, so
> >>>>> its of
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> course
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in
> >>>>> translation,
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> seems
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection"
> >> in
> >>>>> this
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> passage,
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter
> >>>>> distinction to
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "memory."
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary
> >>>>> discourse
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian
> >>>>> colleagues have
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from
> >> theorists
> >>>>> who
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> clearly
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was
> >> still
> >>>>> possible
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> to
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which,
> >>>>> interestingly
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a
> >> "voluntary"
> >>>>> act.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Parts
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stuff
> >>> that
> >>>>> was
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> also
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of
> >>>>> creativity
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> and
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> see
> >>>>> that the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> two
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found
> >> himself
> >>>>> writing.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> pretty
> >>> old
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> approaches
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden <
> >>>>> ablunden@mira.net>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary,
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but it
> >>>>> may be
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> worth
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> place
> >> to
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagination
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between
> >>>>> Recollection and
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive
> >>>>> Imagination,
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> (2)
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination,
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which
> >> he
> >>>>> says
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> other
> >>>>> words,
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is
> >>>>> accomplished
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> through
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>
> >> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> >> --
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
> >>>>> Williams.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose
> >> work i
> >>>>> am
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> trying
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of
> >>>>> productive
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive
> >> imagination
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> develops.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
> >>>>> there
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> must
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ​imagination called UNproductive imagination.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But
> >> I
> >>>>> learned
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
> >> is
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> to
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of
> >>>>> anticipation
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that!
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
> >>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>                 wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination
> >>>>> (starting
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> look, and
> >>>>> provides
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> a
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as
> >>> fixed.
> >>>>> This,
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a
> >>> ground
> >>>>> to
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> take
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> part
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> preconceptions:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> grammarian
> >>>>> Langacker on
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> domains,
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> particularly
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> full of
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> imagination
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of
> >>>>> temporality:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic
> >>>>> structure), which
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both
> >>>>> individual
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss <
> >>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third
> >> *space*
> >>>>> and the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling*
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his
> >>>>> notion of
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is
> >>>>> explored under
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set*
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of
> >>>>> modalities
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together.  This notion suggests there is a form of
> >> knowing
> >>>>> that is
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt"
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [perceived??]
> >> if
> >>>>> we
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> think
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively.  Raymond explores the imaginal as
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *style* Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM,
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> HENRY SHONERD <
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry,
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> say how
> >>>>> jazzed up
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> am
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind
> >>> as
> >>>>> Larry
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> various
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> finally
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notebooks
> >>> of
> >>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind, as
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I’ll be back! Gap adentro,
> >> luega
> >>>>> pa’
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> fuera.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours,
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole <
> >> mcole@ucsd.edu>
> >>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread,
> >> attached
> >>>>> are two
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT
> >>> theorists
> >>>>> like
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of
> >>>>> imagination in a
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of
> >>>>> productive
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no
> >>>>> intention of
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> doing
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the
> >>>>> attached
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these
> >> philosophers,
> >>> I
> >>>>> came
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> upon
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> closely
> >>>>> linked at
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> several
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete,
> >>>>> Ettienne and I
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a
> >> means
> >>> of
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> access
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov.
> >>>>> Moreover,
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> such
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct
> >>> relevance
> >>>>> to
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Kris's
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
> >>>>> concerns
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in
> >> development.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread.
> >>> Perhaps
> >>>>> they
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> will
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural
> >>>>> science
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with an
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <Imagination and Perception by P.F. Strawson.pdf>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural
> >> science
> >>>>> with an
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> --
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> science
> >>>>> with an
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>
> >> --
> >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> >> Assistant Professor
> >> Department of Anthropology
> >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> >> Brigham Young University
> >> Provo, UT 84602