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[Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors



Message from Francine:

This is a a good way of simplifying what has been discussed.
And it is also a way to enter into a discussion of how a phenomenon
like winter might be referred to as a thing (noun), as a process (verb like wintering in 
Aspen, or winterize your car), and even as a relational prepositional phrase, 
perhaps adverb  (In the bleak mid-winter). Also, gerunds are verbs that can
function as nouns - I can't use wintering as a noun in an intelligent sentence-
but let's use 'singing can lift your spirits.'

> From: hshonerd@gmail.com
> Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 08:39:19 -0700
> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors
> 
> I am late to this, but I wonder if things, processes and relations capture pretty much everything about language and thinking. So nouns, as things, verbs, as processes and prepositions, as relations. 
> Henry
> 
> > On Dec 19, 2014, at 4:48 PM, larry smolucha <lsmolucha@hotmail.com> wrote:
> > 
> > Message from Francine:
> > 
> > Just a thought - Is the use of nouns, verbs, prepositions a result
> > of developing a written language based on an alphabet?
> > 
> > Language use in a culture with no written language would surely differ
> > significantly. 
> > 
> > And written languages based on hieroglyphs, pictograms, cuneiform, 
> > Norse Runes, Celtic oghams, etc. surely divide and frame experience
> > differently.
> > 
> > 
> >> From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu
> >> Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 16:43:24 -0500
> >> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors
> >> 
> >> Hi Everyone,
> >> I appreciate this thread's emphasis on  the relativistic character of
> >> metaphoric language and find think that it supports Vygotsky's notion of
> >> the fluid nature of language as it emerges from socio-cultural and
> >> socio-historical contexts in meaning making (in contrast to biological
> >> determinism). Because each culture makes meaning in widely diverse ways,
> >> language forms and usage might have complex intricacies and shades of
> >> meaning on one concept alone. Along with the example  of early 20th century
> >> Hopi's view of time, there are other more recent examples from the present
> >> day that suggest ways that language can shape thought .
> >> 
> >> Consider the Australian aboriginal language, Guugu Yimithirr, from north
> >> Queensland who have no words for right or left, in front of, or behind to
> >> describe location. Instead they use the points of the compass even when
> >> requesting that someone move over to make room. They will say “move a bit
> >> to the east.” To tell you where exactly they left something in your house,
> >> they’ll say, “I left it on the southern edge of the western table.” (Deutscher,
> >> 2010, p. MM 42)
> >> 
> >> The effect on the thinking of this group is phenomenal in orienting the
> >> speakers to their directional spatial environment to such a degree that
> >> roughly 1 out of every 10 words in conversational Guugu Yimithirr  includes
> >> either north, south, east or west and is accompanied with precise  hand
> >> gestures (ibid). Consequently in this culture, language acquisition
> >> involves constant awareness of spaces relative to the points of the
> >> compass.  Deutscher relays a fascinating story about the ways that memory
> >> is stored for the speakers of this language.  The story also serves as a
> >> clear example of Vygotsky’s notion of language as a mediating tool as a
> >> means of creating higher levels of consciousness through spatial
> >> kinesthetic approaches to meaning creation.
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> One Guugu Yimithirr speaker was filmed telling his friends the story of how
> >> in his youth, he capsized in shark-infested waters. He and an older person
> >> were caught in a storm, and their boat tipped over. They both jumped into
> >> the water and managed to swim nearly three miles to the shore, only to
> >> discover that the missionary for whom they worked was far more concerned at
> >> the loss of the boat than relieved at their miraculous escape. Apart from
> >> the dramatic content, the remarkable thing about the story was that it was
> >> remembered throughout in cardinal directions: the speaker jumped into the
> >> water on the western side of the boat, his companion to the east of the
> >> boat, they saw a giant shark swimming north and so on. Perhaps the cardinal
> >> directions were just made up for the occasion? Well, quite by chance, the
> >> same person was filmed some years later telling the same story. The
> >> cardinal directions matched exactly in the two tellings. Even more
> >> remarkable were the spontaneous hand gestures that accompanied the story.
> >> For instance, the direction in which the boat rolled over was gestured in
> >> the correct geographic orientation, regardless of the direction the speaker
> >> was facing in the two films (ibid).
> >> 
> >> 
> >> *Robert*
> >> 
> >> 
> >> Deutscher, G. (2010, August 29) Does your language shape how you think? *The
> >> New York Times* *Sunday Magazine, *p. MM 42.
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 4:05 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>> 
> >>> Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that
> >>> brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is
> >>> essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now
> >>> rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that
> >>> communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is
> >>> thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major
> >>> onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language there
> >>> has to be some change in the nature of communication.
> >>> 
> >>> So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi
> >>> applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific writings of
> >>> Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like
> >>> "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like "bounce
> >>> off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions,
> >>> Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make scientific
> >>> English possible?
> >>> 
> >>> Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the laws of
> >>> gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he really
> >>> discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". Gravity
> >>> is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but rather
> >>> a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, again!). So
> >>> how and above all why does it become an entity?
> >>> 
> >>> It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's on
> >>> the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize almost
> >>> instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark
> >>> room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did this;
> >>> then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in
> >>> mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's lectures
> >>> on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble
> >>> determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to
> >>> write his conclusion in the form of a law).
> >>> 
> >>> In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make
> >>> sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens yields
> >>> a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from the
> >>> glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The
> >>> curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the
> >>> eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be
> >>> realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, creating
> >>> an imaginary entity.
> >>> 
> >>> That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized by a
> >>> verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or something
> >>> that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden"). We
> >>> even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the rules.
> >>> So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through ignorance",
> >>> all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that
> >>> Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental function is
> >>> realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical
> >>> metaphor.
> >>> 
> >>> One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness hypothesis
> >>> is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do their homework
> >>> do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know which "do" to
> >>> move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is essentially
> >>> innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see that "Do students
> >>> who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up through a process of
> >>> what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses stand for
> >>> exchanges:
> >>> 
> >>> Mother: You did your homework, didn't you?
> >>> Child: No.
> >>> Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well?
> >>> Child: No.
> >>> Mother: You didn't do well?
> >>> Child: No.
> >>> Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other
> >>> students do well?
> >>> Child: Some of them.
> >>> Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do well?
> >>> 
> >>> And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two
> >>> functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental function
> >>> (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental function
> >>> (discourse).
> >>> 
> >>> I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract and
> >>> unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical kind.
> >>> But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful and
> >>> far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical metaphor
> >>> that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while the
> >>> grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I must
> >>> stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!)
> >>> 
> >>> David Kellogg
> >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> >>> 
> >>> 
> >>> 
> >>> , or "the
> >>> 
> >>> . He
> >>> 
> >>> On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
> >>> wrote:
> >>> 
> >>>> Helena and David,
> >>>> I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the so-called
> >>>> authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition to
> >>>> Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion of
> >>>> "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) notion
> >>> of
> >>>> "time" and how each of these languages offers different affordances of
> >>>> meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual understanding, English
> >>> has
> >>>> a much more reified/objectified/entified sense of time. (btw, I think the
> >>>> first paragraph is easier to follow than the second - and in that first
> >>>> paragraph you'll find our old friend "imagination").
> >>>> David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to?
> >>>> -greg
> >>>> 
> >>>> Taken from:
> >>>> 
> >>>> 
> >>> http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Secondary/Whorfframe2.html
> >>>> 
> >>>> " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" are
> >>> with
> >>>> us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other nouns.
> >>>> They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in winter"
> >>> just
> >>>> as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized and
> >>>> numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our thought
> >>>> about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. Without
> >>>> objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real time, i.e.
> >>> of
> >>>> the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply a cyclic phase
> >>>> similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming duration. Only by
> >>>> imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside another and another in
> >>>> the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually perceived) configuration. "But
> >>> such
> >>>> is the power of linguistic analogy that we do so objectify cyclic
> >>> phasing.
> >>>> We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g.,
> >>> "phasing."
> >>>> And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting binomial
> >>>> formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is implicit for
> >>>> all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items like "substance,
> >>>> matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an enormously wide
> >>> range
> >>>> of nouns. But even these are not quite generalized enough to take in our
> >>>> phase nouns. So for the phase nouns we have made a formless item, "time."
> >>>> We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in the
> >>>> pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in the
> >>>> pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say and
> >>> think
> >>>> "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me again point
> >>>> out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" or "a piece of
> >>>> cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a summer" actually
> >>> contains
> >>>> or consists of such-and-such a quantity of "time."
> >>>> 
> >>>> In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are not
> >>>> nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are a
> >>>> formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and even
> >>>> other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a locative
> >>> pattern,
> >>>> like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains no morpheme like one
> >>> of
> >>>> "in the house" or "at the tree." It means "when it is morning" or "while
> >>>> morning-phase is occurring." These "temporal s" are not used as subjects
> >>> or
> >>>> objects, or at all like nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or
> >>>> "summer is hot"; summer is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are
> >>> hot,
> >>>> WHEN heat occurs. One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or
> >>>> "summer recently." There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a
> >>>> quantity, of the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about
> >>>> time except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis
> >>>> here for a formless item answering to our "time." "
> >>>> 
> >>>> 
> >>>> 
> >>>> On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen <helenaworthen@gmail.com
> >>>> 
> >>>> wrote:
> >>>>> 
> >>>>> David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this:
> >>>>> 
> >>>>> "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton
> >>>>> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create
> >>>>> sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly productive,
> >>>>> which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and
> >>> thinking
> >>>>> today."
> >>>>> 
> >>>>> Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you when
> >>>> you
> >>>>> say "created to talk about gravity as an entity".
> >>>>> 
> >>>>> Thank you,
> >>>>> 
> >>>>> Helena
> >>>>> 
> >>>>> 
> >>>>> Helena Worthen
> >>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com
> >>>>> 
> >>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote:
> >>>>> 
> >>>>>> As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end of
> >>>> what
> >>>>>> Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what Halliday
> >>>> calls
> >>>>>> "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have
> >>> three
> >>>>>> properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have:
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>> a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can,
> >>>>> actually,
> >>>>>> but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new
> >>> name
> >>>>> or a
> >>>>>> new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can).
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>> b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic
> >>> field
> >>>>> (the
> >>>>>> way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of
> >>>> linguistics)
> >>>>>> but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used.
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>> c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same
> >>>> effect,
> >>>>>> which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the "in"
> >>>> has
> >>>>>> more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly in
> >>>> your
> >>>>>> tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's hands,
> >>>>> refer
> >>>>>> to a book or even a footnote.
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>> Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty
> >>> much
> >>>>>> define the difference between learning and development, at least as I
> >>>>>> understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on functions
> >>>>>> indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the closed set
> >>> of
> >>>>>> functions you already have into new systems. Learning is skill
> >>> specific
> >>>>>> and local, while development is quite global in its implications.
> >>>>> Learning
> >>>>>> is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems,
> >>> while
> >>>>>> development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and forget it
> >>>> just
> >>>>>> as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away.
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>> For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue that
> >>>>> people
> >>>>>> call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end of
> >>> the
> >>>>>> lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, concrete,
> >>> and
> >>>>>> vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that
> >>>> Newton
> >>>>>> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create
> >>>>>> sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly
> >>> productive,
> >>>>>> which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and
> >>>> thinking
> >>>>>> today.  For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is the
> >>>> third
> >>>>>> great moment in child development (after the break into mother tongue
> >>>> and
> >>>>>> the break into disciplinary language in school work).
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>> Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies
> >>> zero
> >>>>>> dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a line', 'on
> >>> a
> >>>>>> plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they are
> >>>>>> grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with time:
> >>> 'at
> >>>> a
> >>>>>> point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at
> >>>>>> Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and "in
> >>>>>> Christmas' (season).
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>> David Kellogg
> >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>> On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen <
> >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com>
> >>>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial
> >>>>>>> relationships from the concrete material world into the conceptual
> >>>>>>> imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common ones, and
> >>>>> between 70
> >>>>>>> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" --
> >>>>> this
> >>>>>>> is according to
> >>> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm
> >>>> ).
> >>>>>>> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, in
> >>>>>>> English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections in
> >>>> parent
> >>>>>>> languages, examples being cases and tenses.
> >>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection like
> >>> the
> >>>>>>> dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial relationships
> >>>>> suggested
> >>>>>>> by contemporary prepositions.
> >>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this.
> >>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>> Helena Worthen
> >>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com
> >>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote:
> >>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>> I’m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly
> >>>> embodied,
> >>>>>>> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to
> >>> linguistics
> >>>>> (For
> >>>>>>> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on
> >>>> “lexicon”:
> >>>>>>> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions,
> >>> being
> >>>>> part
> >>>>>>> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and Halliday
> >>>>> see no
> >>>>>>> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence,
> >>> lexico-grammar.
> >>>>> (Lo
> >>>>>>> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar,
> >>> adding
> >>>>> the
> >>>>>>> “n”. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are
> >>>> great
> >>>>>>> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of that?
> >>> In
> >>>>>>> translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced?
> >>>>>>>> Henry
> >>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> >>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the
> >>>> metaphorical
> >>>>>>> use of prepositions like:
> >>>>>>>>> - "there is some value IN your argument"
> >>>>>>>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again"
> >>>>>>>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking"
> >>>>>>>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again"
> >>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>> and so on.
> >>>>>>>>> Andy
> >>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>> 
> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
> >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> >>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>> larry smolucha wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha:
> >>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself -
> >>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic
> >>>>> possibilities:
> >>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in
> >>>>> Thought
> >>>>>>>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into
> >>>> English
> >>>>>>> 1962]
> >>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive'
> >>>> value
> >>>>>>> of the
> >>>>>>>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech
> >>>>> vocalization).
> >>>>>>>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that
> >>> are
> >>>>>>> flammable
> >>>>>>>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a
> >>>> gas.
> >>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European
> >>>>>>> Developmental
> >>>>>>>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental'
> >>> hence
> >>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of
> >>>> Piaget's
> >>>>>>> Genetic
> >>>>>>>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology.
> >>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis
> >>>>>>> based on
> >>>>>>>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's
> >>>>>>> example of H2O.
> >>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com
> >>>>>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> >>>>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600
> >>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
> >>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha:
> >>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic
> >>>>>>>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the
> >>> parts.
> >>>>>>>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than
> >>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever
> >>>> be
> >>>>>>> imagined"
> >>>>>>>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.)
> >>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>> A couple things to consider:
> >>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as
> >>> the
> >>>>>>> brain has
> >>>>>>>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest
> >>>> level
> >>>>>>> of the Gestalt
> >>>>>>>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images).
> >>>>>>>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just
> >>>> photographic.
> >>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to
> >>>>>>> accurately reproduce
> >>>>>>>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas,
> >>> the
> >>>>>>> goal of combinatory
> >>>>>>>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams,
> >>>>>>> musings, and even
> >>>>>>>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of
> >>>> objects
> >>>>>>> and symbols.
> >>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways
> >>> that
> >>>>>>> things and concepts can be
> >>>>>>>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and
> >>>>> flour.
> >>>>>>>>>>>                                        I can add water and it
> >>>>>>> dissolves a bit
> >>>>>>>>>>>                                        But adding heat changes
> >>>> the
> >>>>>>> combination into a pancake.
> >>>>>>>>>>>                     [Is this synergistic?]
> >>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>           Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more
> >>> examples
> >>>>>>> to put the discussion
> >>>>>>>>>>>           in the metaphysical realm.
> >>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900
> >>>>>>>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com
> >>>>>>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
> >>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the
> >>> case
> >>>>> for
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think
> >>>> it's
> >>>>>>> not
> >>>>>>>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are
> >>>>>>> associationists who
> >>>>>>>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary
> >>> associationism
> >>>>>>> exists and
> >>>>>>>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation.
> >>>>>>> Vygotsky
> >>>>>>>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion,
> >>>> explain
> >>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>>> uniqueness of our species?
> >>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for
> >>>> its
> >>>>>>> own
> >>>>>>>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a
> >>> Piagetian
> >>>>>>>>>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true
> >>> maturity
> >>>>> as a
> >>>>>>>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to
> >>> it
> >>>>>>> than
> >>>>>>>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of
> >>> primate,
> >>>>> and
> >>>>>>> our
> >>>>>>>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon
> >>> rocks
> >>>>> in
> >>>>>>> order
> >>>>>>>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the
> >>>> same
> >>>>>>> way as
> >>>>>>>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value.
> >>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for
> >>>>>>> language is
> >>>>>>>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human
> >>>>>>> exceptionalism.
> >>>>>>>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the
> >>>>>>> vanguard role
> >>>>>>>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species,
> >>>>> prolonging
> >>>>>>>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the
> >>>> sick
> >>>>>>> and the
> >>>>>>>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs
> >>>>>>> (tools) and
> >>>>>>>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our
> >>>>>>> species, it
> >>>>>>>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these
> >>>>>>> "circuitous,
> >>>>>>>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead
> >>>> our
> >>>>>>>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been
> >>>>>>> short on
> >>>>>>>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material
> >>>>>>> culture
> >>>>>>>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter:
> >>>>>>> verily, here
> >>>>>>>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first.
> >>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention
> >>> is
> >>>>>>> simply the
> >>>>>>>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there
> >>> are
> >>>>>>> only two
> >>>>>>>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So
> >>>>>>> imagination is
> >>>>>>>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences,
> >>> and
> >>>>>>> nothing
> >>>>>>>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you
> >>>>> hear
> >>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to
> >>> be
> >>>>>>> able to
> >>>>>>>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in
> >>>> word
> >>>>>>> meaning.
> >>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was
> >>>>> given
> >>>>>>> a
> >>>>>>>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed
> >>>> with
> >>>>>>> silver
> >>>>>>>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of
> >>> gold.
> >>>>>>> Well, we
> >>>>>>>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not
> >>>> possible
> >>>>> to
> >>>>>>>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely.
> >>> The
> >>>>>>> method
> >>>>>>>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal
> >>>> of
> >>>>>>>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about.
> >>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest,
> >>> a
> >>>>>>> velum on
> >>>>>>>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other.
> >>>>> Because
> >>>>>>>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written
> >>>> over
> >>>>>>> every
> >>>>>>>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft,
> >>> the
> >>>>>>> pressure
> >>>>>>>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones
> >>> when
> >>>>> the
> >>>>>>> old
> >>>>>>>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only
> >>>> known
> >>>>>>> Greek
> >>>>>>>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies".
> >>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their
> >>>>>>> relationship
> >>>>>>>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are
> >>>>>>> related to
> >>>>>>>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite
> >>>>> similar
> >>>>>>> to the
> >>>>>>>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew.
> >>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?)
> >>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> >>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD <
> >>> hshonerd@gmail.com>
> >>>>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an
> >>>>> associationist,
> >>>>>>> “sees
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention”?
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg <
> >>>> dkellogg60@gmail.com
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division
> >>>>>>> between
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other,
> >>> because
> >>>>>>> Ribot is
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> an
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form
> >>> of
> >>>>>>> attention.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition
> >>>> from
> >>>>>>> forest
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> to
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division
> >>>> between
> >>>>>>> the two
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and
> >>> commonsensical
> >>>>>>> world of
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic
> >>>> uses
> >>>>>>> in life
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more
> >>>>> "imaginative"
> >>>>>>> (that
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of
> >>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> farm,where
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter
> >>>>>>> months are
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to
> >>>> encounter
> >>>>>>> talking
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here
> >>> attention
> >>>>> has
> >>>>>>> to be
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> more voluntary.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very
> >>>> clear
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that
> >>>>>>> underpins
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky
> >>> points
> >>>>> out
> >>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive
> >>> practices
> >>>>>>> really
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> are
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of
> >>>> imagination,
> >>>>>>> there
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between
> >>> human
> >>>>> and
> >>>>>>> animal
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable
> >>> of
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> volitional
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans).
> >>>>> Without
> >>>>>>> a
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> theory
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for
> >>>>> Ribot's
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions
> >>> at
> >>>>>>> all.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
> >>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination,
> >>>>>>> thanks to
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> all
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential
> >>>>>>> around the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> time
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I
> >>> had
> >>>>>>> seen work
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> on
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Robert-  Does generative = productive and reflective equal
> >>>>>>> reproductive?
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of
> >>>>>>> development
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> of
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of
> >>> being
> >>>> a
> >>>>>>> relative
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
> >>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket
> >>>> list.
> >>>>>>> This
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from
> >>>> some
> >>>>>>> weeks
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> in
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that
> >>>>>>> segmented the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as “met
> >>> aphorizing”.
> >>>>>>> Puns,
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :)
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
> >>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and
> >>>> they
> >>>>>>> are
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> doing
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his
> >>>>>>> followers as an
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel,
> >>> so
> >>>>>>> its of
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> course
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in
> >>>>>>> translation,
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> seems
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection"
> >>>> in
> >>>>>>> this
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> passage,
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter
> >>>>>>> distinction to
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "memory."
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in
> >>> contemporary
> >>>>>>> discourse
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian
> >>>>>>> colleagues have
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from
> >>>> theorists
> >>>>>>> who
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clearly
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was
> >>>> still
> >>>>>>> possible
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which,
> >>>>>>> interestingly
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> links
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a
> >>>> "voluntary"
> >>>>>>> act.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Parts
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff
> >>>>> that
> >>>>>>> was
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of
> >>>>>>> creativity
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> and
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to
> >>> see
> >>>>>>> that the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> two
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found
> >>>> himself
> >>>>>>> writing.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which
> >>> pretty
> >>>>> old
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> approaches
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden <
> >>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but
> >>> it
> >>>>>>> may be
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> worth
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent
> >>> place
> >>>> to
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagination
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between
> >>>>>>> Recollection and
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive
> >>>>>>> Imagination,
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> (2)
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which
> >>>> he
> >>>>>>> says
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> leads
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In
> >>> other
> >>>>>>> words,
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is
> >>>>>>> accomplished
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> through
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>> 
> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson
> >>> and
> >>>>>>> Williams.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose
> >>>> work i
> >>>>>>> am
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> trying
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of
> >>>>>>> productive
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive
> >>>> imagination
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> develops.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies
> >>> that
> >>>>>>> there
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> must
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ​imagination called UNproductive imagination.
> >>> But
> >>>> I
> >>>>>>> learned
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears
> >>> and
> >>>> is
> >>>>>>> linked
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of
> >>>>>>> anticipation
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that!
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
> >>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>                 wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on
> >>> imagination
> >>>>>>> (starting
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look,
> >>> and
> >>>>>>> provides
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> a
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as
> >>>>> fixed.
> >>>>>>> This,
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a
> >>>>> ground
> >>>>>>> to
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> take
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> part
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preconceptions:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian
> >>>>>>> Langacker on
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains,
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full
> >>> of
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of
> >>>>>>> temporality:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic
> >>>>>>> structure), which
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for
> >>> both
> >>>>>>> individual
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss <
> >>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third
> >>>> *space*
> >>>>>>> and the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling*
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his
> >>>>>>> notion of
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is
> >>>>>>> explored under
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of
> >>>>>>> modalities
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together.  This notion suggests there is a form of
> >>>> knowing
> >>>>>>> that is
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt"
> >>> [perceived??]
> >>>> if
> >>>>>>> we
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> think
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively.  Raymond explores the imaginal as
> >>> *style*
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry,
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say
> >>> how
> >>>>>>> jazzed up
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the
> >>> mind
> >>>>> as
> >>>>>>> Larry
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various
> >>>>>>> triads,
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> finally
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my
> >>> notebooks
> >>>>> of
> >>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind, as
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I’ll be back! Gap adentro,
> >>>> luega
> >>>>>>> pa’
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fuera.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours,
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole <
> >>>> mcole@ucsd.edu>
> >>>>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread,
> >>>> attached
> >>>>>>> are two
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT
> >>>>> theorists
> >>>>>>> like
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of
> >>>>>>> imagination in a
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of
> >>>>>>> productive
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no
> >>>>>>> intention of
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doing
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in
> >>> the
> >>>>>>> attached
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these
> >>>> philosophers,
> >>>>> I
> >>>>>>> came
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> upon
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely
> >>>>>>> linked at
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> several
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete,
> >>>>>>> Ettienne and I
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a
> >>>> means
> >>>>> of
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> access
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander
> >>> Suvorov.
> >>>>>>> Moreover,
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> such
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct
> >>>>> relevance
> >>>>>>> to
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kris's
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to
> >>>>>>> concerns
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> about
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in
> >>>> development.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread.
> >>>>> Perhaps
> >>>>>>> they
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> will
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a
> >>> natural
> >>>>>>> science
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with an
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <Imagination and Perception by P.F. Strawson.pdf>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural
> >>>> science
> >>>>>>> with an
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural
> >>> science
> >>>>>>> with an
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>> 
> >>>>> 
> >>>>> 
> >>>>> 
> >>>> 
> >>>> --
> >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> >>>> Assistant Professor
> >>>> Department of Anthropology
> >>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> >>>> Brigham Young University
> >>>> Provo, UT 84602
> >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> >>>> 
> >>> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> -- 
> >> 
> >> *Robert Lake  Ed.D.*Associate Professor
> >> Social Foundations of Education
> >> Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading
> >> Georgia Southern University
> >> Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group
> >> P. O. Box 8144
> >> Phone: (912) 478-0355
> >> Fax: (912) 478-5382
> >> Statesboro, GA  30460
> > 		 	   		  
> 
>