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[Xmca-l] Re: Imagination



I’m not voting on this, but I would love a copy of the Suvorov paper. 
Henry

> On Dec 18, 2014, at 11:43 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
> 
> Dear Colleagues.  Might it be appropriate to start another thread on
> metaphor?
> 
> My basic starting point is the idea that basic perceptual processes
> ineluctably require imagination...... measured in milliseconds. Metaphor
> and linguistic mediation is for sure
> an essential topic here. I want to hold on to the Suvorov metaphor of
> imagination as lifting off from the world and returning to it again. (If
> the Suvorov reference is not familiar I will post relevant paper).
> 
> A thought:  Might it be possible to parse Francine's last message into
> subtopics while not discouraging cross subtopic conversations?
> 
> Trying to hold all the threads in my hand.
> Slow in So Cal.
> mike
> 
> 
> On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com> wrote:
>> 
>> I’m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly embodied,
>> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to linguistics (For
>> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on “lexicon”:
>> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, being part
>> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and Halliday see no
>> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, lexico-grammar. (Lo
>> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, adding the
>> “n”. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are great
>> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of that? In
>> translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced?
>> Henry
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>>> 
>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the metaphorical
>> use of prepositions like:
>>> - "there is some value IN your argument"
>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again"
>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking"
>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again"
>>> 
>>> and so on.
>>> Andy
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>> 
>>> 
>>> larry smolucha wrote:
>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha:
>>>> 
>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself -
>>>> 
>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities:
>>>> 
>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in Thought
>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English
>> 1962]
>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value
>> of the
>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization).
>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are
>> flammable
>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas.
>>>> 
>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European
>> Developmental
>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence the
>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's
>> Genetic
>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology.
>>>> 
>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis based
>> on
>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's
>> example of H2O.
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com
>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600
>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
>>>>> 
>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha:
>>>>> 
>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic
>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts.
>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the
>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be
>> imagined"
>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.)
>>>>> 
>>>>> A couple things to consider:
>>>>> 
>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the
>> brain has
>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level
>> of the Gestalt
>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images).
>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic.
>>>>> 
>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to
>> accurately reproduce
>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the goal
>> of combinatory
>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams,
>> musings, and even
>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects
>> and symbols.
>>>>> 
>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that
>> things and concepts can be
>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour.
>>>>>                                          I can add water and it
>> dissolves a bit
>>>>>                                          But adding heat changes the
>> combination into a pancake.
>>>>>                       [Is this synergistic?]
>>>>> 
>>>>>             Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples
>> to put the discussion
>>>>>             in the metaphysical realm.
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900
>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for
>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's
>> not
>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are
>> associationists who
>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism
>> exists and
>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation.
>> Vygotsky
>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain
>> the
>>>>>> uniqueness of our species?
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its
>> own
>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian
>>>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a
>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it than
>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and
>> our
>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in
>> order
>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same
>> way as
>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for
>> language is
>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human
>> exceptionalism.
>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the
>> vanguard role
>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging
>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick
>> and the
>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs
>> (tools) and
>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our
>> species, it
>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these
>> "circuitous,
>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our
>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been short
>> on
>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material
>> culture
>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: verily,
>> here
>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is
>> simply the
>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are
>> only two
>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So imagination
>> is
>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and
>> nothing
>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear
>> the
>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be
>> able to
>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word
>> meaning.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given a
>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with
>> silver
>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold.
>> Well, we
>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to
>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The
>> method
>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of
>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a
>> velum on
>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because
>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over
>> every
>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the
>> pressure
>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the
>> old
>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known
>> Greek
>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies".
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their
>> relationship
>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are
>> related to
>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar
>> to the
>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?)
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist,
>> “sees
>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention”?
>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division
>> between
>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because
>> Ribot is
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> an
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of
>> attention.
>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from
>> forest
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between
>> the two
>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical
>> world of
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses
>> in life
>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative"
>> (that
>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> farm,where
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter
>> months are
>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter
>> talking
>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has
>> to be
>>>>>>>> more voluntary.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear
>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Ribot
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out
>> the
>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices
>> really
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination,
>> there
>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and
>> animal
>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> volitional
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> theory
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's
>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination,
>> thanks to
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> all
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around
>> the
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> time
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen
>> work
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> on
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Robert-  Does generative = productive and reflective equal
>> reproductive?
>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of
>> development
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a
>> relative
>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic.
>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
>> hshonerd@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list.
>> This
>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some
>> weeks
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that
>> segmented the
>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as “met aphorizing”. Puns,
>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :)
>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> doing
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers
>> as an
>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its
>> of
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> course
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation,
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> seems
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in
>> this
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> passage,
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction
>> to
>>>>>>>>>>> "memory."
>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary
>> discourse
>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues
>> have
>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists
>> who
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> clearly
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still
>> possible
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which,
>> interestingly
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> links
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary"
>> act.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Parts
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that
>> was
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> also
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of
>> creativity
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that
>> the
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> two
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself
>> writing.
>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> approaches
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may
>> be
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> worth
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Imagination
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between
>> Recollection and
>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive
>> Imagination,
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> (2)
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he
>> says
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> leads
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other
>> words,
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> through
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and
>> Williams.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> trying
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical
>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive
>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> develops.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that
>> there
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> must
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ​imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I
>> learned
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is
>> linked
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of
>> anticipation
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that!
>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
>> hshonerd@gmail.com
>>>>>>>>>>>>>                   wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination
>> (starting
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and
>> provides
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed.
>> This,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground
>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> take
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> part
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> preconceptions:
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian
>> Langacker on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> particularly
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> imagination
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of
>> temporality:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure),
>> which
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> I
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both
>> individual
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss <
>> lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space*
>> and the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion
>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored
>> under
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of
>> modalities
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together.  This notion suggests there is a form of knowing
>> that is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> think
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively.  Raymond explores the imaginal as *style*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how
>> jazzed up
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> I
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> am
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as
>> Larry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various
>> triads,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> finally
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of
>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> mind, as
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I’ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa’
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> fuera.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached
>> are two
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists
>> like
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of
>> imagination in a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of
>> productive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no
>> intention of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> doing
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the
>> attached
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I
>> came
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> upon
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked
>> at
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> several
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne
>> and I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> access
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov.
>> Moreover,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> such
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance
>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Kris's
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> about
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps
>> they
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> will
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural
>> science
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> with an
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <Imagination and Perception by P.F. Strawson.pdf>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science
>> with an
>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science
>> with an
>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> 
> 
> -- 
> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.