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[Xmca-l] Re: Imagination



Message from Francine:

More bibliography entries that should be added to our list.

Historical note: I am familiar with Lakoff and Johnson's work.
And, the last time I spoke to George Lakoff in 1989, he said he
found my work interesting (SRCD Biennial Convention Kansas City).

> From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co
> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 16:59:41 +0000
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
> 
> Lakoff and Johnson have lots about this, Andy.
> 
> Martin
> 
> Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
> 
> Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). The metaphorical structure of the human conceptual system. Cognitive Science, 4(2), 195-208.
> 
> 
> On Dec 18, 2014, at 4:54 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> 
> > the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the metaphorical use of prepositions like:
> > - "there is some value IN your argument"
> > - "I'd like to go OVER that again"
> > - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking"
> > - "Let's go THROUGH that again"
> > 
> > and so on.
> > Andy
> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > *Andy Blunden*
> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> > 
> > 
> > larry smolucha wrote:
> >> Message from Francine Smolucha:
> >> 
> >> Forgive me for replying to myself -
> >> 
> >> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities:
> >> 
> >> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in Thought
> >> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English 1962]
> >> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value of the
> >> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization).
> >> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are flammable
> >> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas.
> >> 
> >> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European Developmental
> >> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence the
> >> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's Genetic
> >> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology.
> >> 
> >> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis based on
> >> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's example of H2O.
> >> 
> >>  
> >>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com
> >>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> >>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600
> >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
> >>> 
> >>> Message from Francine Smolucha:
> >>> 
> >>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic
> >>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts.
> >>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the
> >>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be imagined"
> >>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.)
> >>> 
> >>> A couple things to consider:
> >>> 
> >>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the brain has
> >>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level of the Gestalt
> >>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). 
> >>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic.
> >>> 
> >>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to accurately reproduce
> >>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the goal of combinatory
> >>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, musings, and even
> >>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects and symbols.
> >>> 
> >>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that things and concepts can be
> >>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour.
> >>>                                           I can add water and it dissolves a bit
> >>>                                           But adding heat changes the combination into a pancake.
> >>>                        [Is this synergistic?]
> >>> 
> >>>              Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples to put the discussion
> >>>              in the metaphysical realm.
> >>>                                           
> >>>    
> >>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900
> >>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com
> >>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
> >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
> >>>> 
> >>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for
> >>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's not
> >>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are associationists who
> >>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism exists and
> >>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. Vygotsky
> >>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain the
> >>>> uniqueness of our species?
> >>>> 
> >>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its own
> >>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian
> >>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a
> >>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it than
> >>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and our
> >>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in order
> >>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same way as
> >>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value.
> >>>> 
> >>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for language is
> >>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human exceptionalism.
> >>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the vanguard role
> >>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging
> >>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick and the
> >>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs (tools) and
> >>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our species, it
> >>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these "circuitous,
> >>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our
> >>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been short on
> >>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material culture
> >>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: verily, here
> >>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first.
> >>>> 
> >>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is simply the
> >>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are only two
> >>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So imagination is
> >>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and nothing
> >>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear the
> >>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be able to
> >>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word meaning.
> >>>> 
> >>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given a
> >>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with silver
> >>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. Well, we
> >>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to
> >>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The method
> >>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of
> >>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about.
> >>>> 
> >>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a velum on
> >>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because
> >>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over every
> >>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the pressure
> >>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the old
> >>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known Greek
> >>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies".
> >>>> 
> >>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their relationship
> >>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are related to
> >>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar to the
> >>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew.
> >>>> 
> >>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?)
> >>>> 
> >>>> David Kellogg
> >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> >>>> 
> >>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>>>      
> >>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, “sees
> >>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention”?
> >>>>> Henry
> >>>>> 
> >>>>>        
> >>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division between
> >>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because Ribot is
> >>>>>>          
> >>>>> an
> >>>>>        
> >>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of attention.
> >>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from forest
> >>>>>>          
> >>>>> to
> >>>>>        
> >>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between the two
> >>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical world of
> >>>>>>          
> >>>>> the
> >>>>>        
> >>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses in life
> >>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" (that
> >>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the
> >>>>>>          
> >>>>> farm,where
> >>>>>        
> >>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter months are
> >>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter talking
> >>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has to be
> >>>>>> more voluntary.
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear
> >>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins
> >>>>>>          
> >>>>> Ribot
> >>>>>        
> >>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out the
> >>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices  really
> >>>>>>          
> >>>>> are
> >>>>>        
> >>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, there
> >>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and animal
> >>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of
> >>>>>>          
> >>>>> volitional
> >>>>>        
> >>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a
> >>>>>>          
> >>>>> theory
> >>>>>        
> >>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's
> >>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all.
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>> David Kellogg
> >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> >>>>>> 
> >>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
> >>>>>>          
> >>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks to
> >>>>>>>            
> >>>>> all
> >>>>>        
> >>>>>>> for the food for thought.
> >>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around the
> >>>>>>>            
> >>>>> time
> >>>>>        
> >>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen work
> >>>>>>>            
> >>>>> on
> >>>>>        
> >>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination.
> >>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>> Robert-  Does generative = productive and reflective equal reproductive?
> >>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of development
> >>>>>>>            
> >>>>> of
> >>>>>        
> >>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a relative
> >>>>>>> newcomer to the topic.
> >>>>>>> mike
> >>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com>
> >>>>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>            
> >>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. This
> >>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some weeks
> >>>>>>>>              
> >>>>> in
> >>>>>        
> >>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that segmented the
> >>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as “met aphorizing”. Puns,
> >>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :)
> >>>>>>>> Henry
> >>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>              
> >>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are
> >>>>>>>>>                
> >>>>> doing
> >>>>>        
> >>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers as an
> >>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its of
> >>>>>>>>>                
> >>>>>>>> course
> >>>>>>>>              
> >>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge.
> >>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation,
> >>>>>>>>>                
> >>>>> seems
> >>>>>        
> >>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in this
> >>>>>>>>>                
> >>>>>>>> passage,
> >>>>>>>>              
> >>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction to
> >>>>>>>>> "memory."
> >>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary discourse
> >>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues have
> >>>>>>>>> illustrated.
> >>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists who
> >>>>>>>>>                
> >>>>>>>> clearly
> >>>>>>>>              
> >>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still possible
> >>>>>>>>>                
> >>>>>>> to
> >>>>>>>            
> >>>>>>>>> include culture in it.
> >>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, interestingly
> >>>>>>>>>                
> >>>>>>> links
> >>>>>>>            
> >>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" act.
> >>>>>>>>>                
> >>>>>>> Parts
> >>>>>>>            
> >>>>>>>> of
> >>>>>>>>              
> >>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that was
> >>>>>>>>>                
> >>>>>>> also
> >>>>>>>            
> >>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of creativity
> >>>>>>>>>                
> >>>>> and
> >>>>>        
> >>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that the
> >>>>>>>>>                
> >>>>>>> two
> >>>>>>>            
> >>>>>>>>> concepts are linked.
> >>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself writing.
> >>>>>>>>> mike
> >>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old
> >>>>>>>>>                
> >>>>>>>> approaches
> >>>>>>>>              
> >>>>>>>>> to a pesum
> >>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> >>>>>>>>>                
> >>>>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>            
> >>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may be
> >>>>>>>>>>                  
> >>>>>>> worth
> >>>>>>>            
> >>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to
> >>>>>>>>>>                  
> >>>>>>>> Imagination
> >>>>>>>>              
> >>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between Recollection and
> >>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive Imagination,
> >>>>>>>>>>                  
> >>>>> (2)
> >>>>>        
> >>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he says
> >>>>>>>>>>                  
> >>>>>>> leads
> >>>>>>>            
> >>>>>>>> to
> >>>>>>>>              
> >>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other words,
> >>>>>>>>>>                  
> >>>>> the
> >>>>>        
> >>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished
> >>>>>>>>>>                  
> >>>>>>> through
> >>>>>>>            
> >>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination.
> >>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>> Andy
> >>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>                  
> >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >>>>>>>            
> >>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
> >>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> >>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>                  
> >>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams.
> >>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am
> >>>>>>>>>>>                    
> >>>>>>> trying
> >>>>>>>            
> >>>>>>>> to
> >>>>>>>>              
> >>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical
> >>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive
> >>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination
> >>>>>>>>>>>                    
> >>>>> develops.
> >>>>>        
> >>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there
> >>>>>>>>>>>                    
> >>>>> must
> >>>>>        
> >>>>>>>> be a
> >>>>>>>>              
> >>>>>>>>>>> kind of ​imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned
> >>>>>>>>>>>                    
> >>>>>>>> that
> >>>>>>>>              
> >>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked
> >>>>>>>>>>>                    
> >>>>>>> to
> >>>>>>>            
> >>>>>>>>>>> memory.
> >>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation
> >>>>>>>>>>>                    
> >>>>>>>> and
> >>>>>>>>              
> >>>>>>>>>>> memory.
> >>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that!
> >>>>>>>>>>> mike
> >>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com
> >>>>>>>>>>>                    wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>                    
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting
> >>>>>>>>>>>>                      
> >>>>>>>> with
> >>>>>>>>              
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and provides
> >>>>>>>>>>>>                      
> >>>>> a
> >>>>>        
> >>>>>>>>>>>> space
> >>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This,
> >>>>>>>>>>>> coupled
> >>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to
> >>>>>>>>>>>>                      
> >>>>> take
> >>>>>        
> >>>>>>>> part
> >>>>>>>>              
> >>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with
> >>>>>>>>>>>>                      
> >>>>>>> preconceptions:
> >>>>>>>            
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Vera
> >>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on
> >>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains,
> >>>>>>>>>>>>                      
> >>>>> particularly
> >>>>>        
> >>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>              
> >>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of
> >>>>>>>>>>>>                      
> >>>>> imagination
> >>>>>        
> >>>>>>>> and
> >>>>>>>>              
> >>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality:
> >>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which
> >>>>>>>>>>>>                      
> >>>>>>> I
> >>>>>>>            
> >>>>>>>>>>>> think
> >>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both individual
> >>>>>>>>>>>>                      
> >>>>>>>> and
> >>>>>>>>              
> >>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling.
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
> >>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>                      
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>                        
> >>>>>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>              
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>                        
> >>>>>>>>>>>> analogy
> >>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>                      
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling*
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>                        
> >>>>>>>>>>>> "structures
> >>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>                      
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>                        
> >>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>              
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>                        
> >>>>>>>> that
> >>>>>>>>              
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>                        
> >>>>>>>>>>>> hang
> >>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>                      
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> together.  This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>                        
> >>>>>>>>>>>> forming
> >>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>                      
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>                        
> >>>>> think
> >>>>>        
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively.  Raymond explores the imaginal as *style*
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>                        
> >>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com
> >>>>>        
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>                        
> >>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>                      
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry,
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>                        
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>                          
> >>>>>>> I
> >>>>>>>            
> >>>>>>>> am
> >>>>>>>>              
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>                          
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> now
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>                        
> >>>>>>>>>>>>                      
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>                        
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>                          
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> construes
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>                        
> >>>>>>>>>>>>                      
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads,
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>                        
> >>>>>>>> finally
> >>>>>>>>              
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>                          
> >>>>>>>> mind, as
> >>>>>>>>              
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I’ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa’
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>                          
> >>>>>>> fuera.
> >>>>>>>            
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours,
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>                          
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>                            
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>                          
> >>>>>>>>>>>>                      
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>                        
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>                            
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>                          
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in a
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>                            
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>                          
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>                            
> >>>>>>>> doing
> >>>>>>>>              
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>                            
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> so.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>                          
> >>>>>>>>>>>>                      
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>                        
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>                            
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>                          
> >>>>>>>>>>>>                      
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>                        
> >>>>>>> upon
> >>>>>>>            
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>                            
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>                          
> >>>>>>>>>>>>                      
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>                        
> >>>>>>>> several
> >>>>>>>>              
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>                            
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> in
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>                          
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>                            
> >>>>> access
> >>>>>        
> >>>>>>>> to
> >>>>>>>>              
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>                            
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>                          
> >>>>>>>>>>>>                      
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover,
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>                        
> >>>>>>>> such
> >>>>>>>>              
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>                            
> >>>>>>>> perception/imagination
> >>>>>>>>              
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>                            
> >>>>>>> Kris's
> >>>>>>>            
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>                            
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>                          
> >>>>>>>>>>>>                      
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>                        
> >>>>> about
> >>>>>        
> >>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>              
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>                            
> >>>>>>> will
> >>>>>>>            
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>                            
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>                          
> >>>>>>>>>>>>                      
> >>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>                        
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>                            
> >>>>>>>> with an
> >>>>>>>>              
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <Imagination and Perception by P.F. Strawson.pdf>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>                            
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>                          
> >>>>>>>>>>>>                      
> >>>>>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>                    
> >>>>>>>>>>                  
> >>>>>>>>> --
> >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
> >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> >>>>>>>>>                
> >>>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>>              
> >>>>>>> --
> >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
> >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> >>>>>>> 
> >>>>>>>            
> >>>>> 
> >>>>>        
> >>> 		 	   		      
> >> 		 	   		  
> > 
> 
>