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[Xmca-l] Re: Fw: Re: Imagination



Haydi,
Sorry, I realized after I sent my email to you that it wasn’t all that coherent, and certainly not meant to imply there was anything wrong with anything you quoted. I was attracted by your image: “reaction of an explosive type”, which reminded me of crisis in ZPD. I am operating at a very low level of understanding of psychology in general, not just Vygotskian takes. I want to learn!
Henry

> On Dec 16, 2014, at 11:35 PM, Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> wrote:
> 
> Henry,
> 
> The quote should connect to the other thread , my fault . But aside from that , is there anything wrong with me , with the quote . If so , please say it direct and clear to me . Thanks !
> Haydi
> 
>    ----- Forwarded Message -----
>  From: HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com>
> To: Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> 
> Sent: Wednesday, 17 December 2014, 0:28:03
> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
> 
> I was wondering if Vygotsky on crisis in ZPD and Peirce’s triadic categories are of help. David K. has tutored me on ZPD, and turned me on to Seth Chaiklin’s article on ZPD. Natalia Gajdamaschko actually alerted me to the complexities of the ZPD earlier on, but I needed two tutorials. Who is the Peircian out there to smack me down?
> Henry
> 
>> On Dec 16, 2014, at 12:50 PM, Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> wrote:
>> 
>> Dear all ,
>> 
>> Maybe worth reading , History of Higher Mental Functions , Volume 3 , page 127 English Version :
>> 
>> How does the third stage differ from the second? Very briefly we might say that the essential difference is, on the one hand, in the method by which the reactions arise, and on the other hand, in the character of the function, that is, the biological function of the reaction, in contrast to habit, that arises as a result of trial and error or as a result of stimuli acting in Olle direction. In intellectual reactions, a response arises as an expression of a certain image obtained, obviously, as a result of a kind of short circuit, that is, of a complex internal process formed on the basis of excitation of a series of cooperating centers, which creates a new path. Consequently, we are speaking of a reaction of an explosive type, exceptionally complex in the nature of its arising, the mechanisms of which are thus far unknown since our knowledge of brain processes is still at the beginning stage of development. If the function of the instinctive reaction differs from the function of habit, then the latter differs  from the intellectual function. Of course, if the biological function of habit is  adaptation to individual conditions of existence that are more or less clear and simple, then the function of intellectual behavior is adaptation to changing conditions of the environment and to changing circumstances under new conditions. An argument has developed among psychologists specifically on this ground: authors who reject the consideration of intellect as a special level in nature say that it is  only a special subclass within the same class as acquisition of habit. It seems to me that it is the responsibility of scientific caution that we speak here actually of only two classes of development in child behavior: inherited and acquired through experience, and within the latter-that acquired through experience·-we will be able to establish not just two stages, but perhaps even more as our knowledge increases. Consequently, it would be proper, it seems to us at the contemporary state of knowledge, to adopt the point of view of Thorndike, the American psychologist, who differentiates two  stages: inherited and individual, or internal and acquired, and in behavior, he differentiates two stages or two groups of reaction: on the one hand, habits inherited for adaptation to more or less long-term conditions of mdividual existence, and on the other hand, a whole hierarchy of habits directed toward solving new problems that confront the organism, in  other words, that order of reactions of which we have spoken. In order to understand the connection between the levels of development that are of interest to us in child psychology, we must briefly take into account the kind of relation that exists among them. The relations are of a dialectical character.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Just thinking : Even acquired habits are considered "cultural" and it remains for the "intellectual" , as knowledge increases , to be classified as "higher" . 
>> 
>> Regards
>> 
>> Haydi
>>       From: mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> 
>> Sent: Tuesday, 16 December 2014, 9:10:47
>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
>> 
>> Colleagues-- The Vygotsky text that contains the material on Ribot and an
>> introduction to the set of public lectures it was part of are attached in
>> order to further this educational disussion.
>> 
>> A number of ideas that were perplexing me and I was stumbling around
>> thinking about are laid out very well in these two documents. They may
>> perhaps help to ground this part of the discussion of imagination.
>> 
>> I am certainly benefiting from reading them. My last reading was very
>> narrowly focused and I was totally ignorant of the links between what LSV
>> was writing about imagination and Kant or Hegel. And most amazingly, I
>> ignored the discussion of Ribot. And, naturally, I have the attached pdf
>> in my file on imagination (!).
>> 
>> There must be some lesson here about the social, culturally mediated nature
>> of individual memory out there somewhere.  :-))
>> 
>> mike
>> 
>> On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 7:49 AM, larry smolucha <lsmolucha@hotmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Message from Francine Smolucha:
>>> 
>>> To the old-timers on XMCA I have to say HELLO!!!!!!
>>> To the Newcomers read on.
>>> 
>>> In Vygotsky's three papers on the development of imagination and
>>> creativity in childhood and adolescence, Vygotsky specifically defined
>>> memory as
>>> reproductive imagination  and creativity as combinatory imagination
>>> (1930 paper published in 1990 in Soviet Psychology
>>> p. 85 - F. Smolucha translator). All three of Vygotsky's papers on the
>>> development
>>> of imagination and creativity cited Ribot's book Essay on the Creative
>>> Imagination (1900).
>>> In these three papers and in his writings on play, Vygotsky also mentioned
>>> that
>>> imagination and creativity emerge from children's pretend play involving
>>> analogical/metaphorical/figurative thinking in which one object is
>>> substituted for another
>>> (using a stick as a horse).
>>>         Newcomers to XMCA will forgive me if I seem a bit short tempered
>>> when dealing with
>>> the veteram XMCAR's on these topics - but Michael Cole and others are
>>> certainly
>>> familiar with my pioneering work in this area. I even emailed Michael a
>>> copy
>>> of my 2012 publication on these topics to post for discussion on XMCA -
>>> that paper not
>>> only reviews these topics but provides the formal bibliography including
>>> the
>>> reference to Ribot's book Essay on Creative Imagination that was first
>>> published in
>>> English in 2006 (I discovered the 2006 translation while writing my 2012
>>> publication).
>>>         For a review of all of this, and the past 25 years of research on
>>> these topics,
>>> read my 2012 publication "Vygotsky's Theory of Creative Imagination:
>>> Figurative thinking Allied with Literal Thinking" (authors: Larry and
>>> Francine Smolucha) published in Contemporary
>>> Readings on Research in Creativity in Early Childhood (O. Saracho editor)
>>> Information Age Publishing 2012 pp. 63 - 85.
>>>         I applaud those interested in pursuing these ideas in new
>>> directions, and an important
>>> part of that effort requires a understanding of where these ideas came
>>> from so you are not
>>> just reinventing the wheel.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> From: mcole@ucsd.edu
>>>> Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 19:42:05 -0800
>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination
>>>> 
>>>> Makes perfect sense to me concerning Ribot, David. Where does LSV write
>>>> about Ribot on imagination? I lost the forest for the trees and am lost
>>>> back in memory land!
>>>> 
>>>> And who do we turn to for the evidence that animals other than humans
>>>> engage in volitional attention? I was under the impression that it is
>>>> through subordinating oneself to a external/cultural mediator one learned
>>>> to control oneself from the outside.
>>>> 
>>>> These seem like important issues to be straight about, even if one
>>>> disagrees about their implications/interpretation (if that is possible!)
>>>> mike
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On Mon, Dec 15, 2014 at 4:19 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division between
>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because Ribot
>>> is an
>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of
>>> attention.
>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from
>>> forest to
>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between the
>>> two
>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical world
>>> of the
>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses in
>>> life
>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative"
>>> (that
>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the
>>> farm,where
>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter months
>>> are
>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter
>>> talking
>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has to
>>> be
>>>>> more voluntary.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear
>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins
>>> Ribot
>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out the
>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices
>>> really are
>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, there
>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and
>>> animal
>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of
>>> volitional
>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a
>>> theory
>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's
>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all.
>>>>> 
>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>>> 
>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks
>>> to
>>>>> all
>>>>>> for the food for thought.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around
>>> the
>>>>> time
>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen
>>> work
>>>>> on
>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Robert-  Does generative = productive and reflective equal
>>> reproductive?
>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of
>>> development of
>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a
>>> relative
>>>>>> newcomer to the topic.
>>>>>> mike
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list.
>>> This
>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some
>>> weeks
>>>>> in
>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that
>>> segmented the
>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as “met aphorizing”. Puns,
>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :)
>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are
>>>>> doing
>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers
>>> as
>>>>> an
>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its
>>> of
>>>>>>> course
>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation,
>>>>> seems
>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in
>>> this
>>>>>>> passage,
>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction
>>> to
>>>>>>>> "memory."
>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary
>>> discourse
>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues
>>> have
>>>>>>>> illustrated.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists
>>> who
>>>>>>> clearly
>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still
>>>>> possible
>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> include culture in it.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which,
>>> interestingly
>>>>>> links
>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary"
>>> act.
>>>>>> Parts
>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that
>>> was
>>>>>> also
>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of
>>> creativity
>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that
>>> the
>>>>>> two
>>>>>>>> concepts are linked.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself
>>>>> writing.
>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old
>>>>>>> approaches
>>>>>>>> to a pesum
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
>>>> 
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may
>>> be
>>>>>> worth
>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to
>>>>>>> Imagination
>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between
>>> Recollection and
>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive
>>> Imagination,
>>>>> (2)
>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he
>>> says
>>>>>> leads
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other
>>> words,
>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished
>>>>>> through
>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote:
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and
>>> Williams.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am
>>>>>> trying
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical
>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive
>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination
>>>>> develops.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that
>>> there
>>>>> must
>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>>> kind of ​imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I
>>> learned
>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is
>>> linked
>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>> memory.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of
>>>>> anticipation
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>> memory.
>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that!
>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination
>>>>> (starting
>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and
>>>>> provides a
>>>>>>>>>>> space
>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed.
>>> This,
>>>>>>>>>>> coupled
>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground
>>> to
>>>>> take
>>>>>>> part
>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with
>>>>>> preconceptions:
>>>>>>>>>>> Vera
>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian
>>> Langacker
>>>>> on
>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains,
>>>>> particularly
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of
>>>>> imagination
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of
>>>>> temporality:
>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure),
>>>>> which
>>>>>> I
>>>>>>>>>>> think
>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both
>>>>> individual
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling.
>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss <
>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space*
>>> and
>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> analogy
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling*
>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet.
>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion
>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> "structures
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored
>>>>> under
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of
>>> modalities
>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> hang
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> together.  This notion suggests there is a form of knowing
>>> that
>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> forming
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we
>>>>> think
>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively.  Raymond explores the imaginal as *style*
>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how
>>> jazzed
>>>>> up
>>>>>> I
>>>>>>> am
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> now
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as
>>> Larry
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> construes
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various
>>> triads,
>>>>>>> finally
>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of
>>> the
>>>>>>> mind, as
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I’ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa’
>>>>>> fuera.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached
>>> are
>>>>> two
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists
>>> like
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of
>>> imagination in
>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of
>>> productive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no
>>> intention of
>>>>>>> doing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> so.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the
>>> attached
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I
>>> came
>>>>>> upon
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked
>>> at
>>>>>>> several
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne
>>> and
>>>>> I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of
>>>>> access
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov.
>>> Moreover,
>>>>>>> such
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the
>>>>>>> perception/imagination
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance
>>> to
>>>>>> Kris's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns
>>>>> about
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps
>>> they
>>>>>> will
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural
>>> science
>>>>>>> with an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <Imagination and Perception by P.F. Strawson.pdf>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science
>>> with
>>>>> an
>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with
>>> an
>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> --
>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> -- 
>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
>