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[Xmca-l] Re: Imagination



I am wondering if, despite V’s rejection of Ribot on logical grounds, a more generous reading of Ribot might be possible, especially in the context of the imagination thread. In the same way we can do an expansive reading of James. Both James and Ribot, it seems to me, can add to the dialog. As an associationist, I take it that he is not a “mediationist”. But in his descriptions of all kinds of creativity, he got a lot of things right, didn’t he? In the same way, one might reject Modell for being a Freudian, yet I like that he relates thinking and feeling in discussing trauma and how being locked in the past short circuits the everyday creativity of looking to the future. Can missing the trees for the forest not be counterproductive where imagination and creativity are concerned? Can we mash up pieces of a framework without mashing up the whole thing? Just wondering.
Henry

> On Dec 15, 2014, at 8:42 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
> 
> Makes perfect sense to me concerning Ribot, David. Where does LSV write
> about Ribot on imagination? I lost the forest for the trees and am lost
> back in memory land!
> 
> And who do we turn to for the evidence that animals other than humans
> engage in volitional attention? I was under the impression that it is
> through subordinating oneself to a external/cultural mediator one learned
> to control oneself from the outside.
> 
> These seem like important issues to be straight about, even if one
> disagrees about their implications/interpretation (if that is possible!)
> mike
> 
> 
> On Mon, Dec 15, 2014 at 4:19 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
>> 
>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division between
>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because Ribot is an
>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of attention.
>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from forest to
>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between the two
>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical world of the
>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses in life
>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" (that
>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the farm,where
>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter months are
>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter talking
>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has to be
>> more voluntary.
>> 
>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear
>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins Ribot
>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out the
>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices  really are
>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, there
>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and animal
>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of volitional
>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a theory
>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's
>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all.
>> 
>> David Kellogg
>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>> 
>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks to
>> all
>>> for the food for thought.
>>> 
>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around the
>> time
>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen work
>> on
>>> memory before, but not imagination.
>>> 
>>> Robert-  Does generative = productive and reflective equal reproductive?
>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of development of
>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a relative
>>> newcomer to the topic.
>>> mike
>>> 
>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. This
>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some weeks
>> in
>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that segmented the
>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as “met aphorizing”. Puns,
>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :)
>>>> Henry
>>>> 
>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are
>> doing
>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers as
>> an
>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its of
>>>> course
>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge.
>>>>> 
>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation,
>> seems
>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in this
>>>> passage,
>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction to
>>>>> "memory."
>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary discourse
>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues have
>>>>> illustrated.
>>>>> 
>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists who
>>>> clearly
>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still
>> possible
>>> to
>>>>> include culture in it.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, interestingly
>>> links
>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" act.
>>> Parts
>>>> of
>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that was
>>> also
>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of creativity
>> and
>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that the
>>> two
>>>>> concepts are linked.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself
>> writing.
>>>>> mike
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old
>>>> approaches
>>>>> to a pesum
>>>>> 
>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
>>> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may be
>>> worth
>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to
>>>> Imagination
>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between Recollection and
>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive Imagination,
>> (2)
>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he says
>>> leads
>>>> to
>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other words,
>> the
>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished
>>> through
>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>> 
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> mike cole wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am
>>> trying
>>>> to
>>>>>>> mine for empirical
>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive
>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination
>> develops.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there
>> must
>>>> be a
>>>>>>> kind of ​imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned
>>>> that
>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked
>>> to
>>>>>>> memory.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of
>> anticipation
>>>> and
>>>>>>> memory.
>>>>>>> Imagine that!
>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
>> hshonerd@gmail.com>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination
>> (starting
>>>> with
>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and
>> provides a
>>>>>>>> space
>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This,
>>>>>>>> coupled
>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to
>> take
>>>> part
>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with
>>> preconceptions:
>>>>>>>> Vera
>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker
>> on
>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains,
>> particularly
>>>> the
>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of
>> imagination
>>>> and
>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of
>> temporality:
>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure),
>> which
>>> I
>>>>>>>> think
>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both
>> individual
>>>> and
>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling.
>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and
>> the
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> analogy
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling*
>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet.
>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> "structures
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored
>> under
>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities
>>>> that
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> hang
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> together.  This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that
>> is
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> forming
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we
>> think
>>>>>>>>> imaginatively.  Raymond explores the imaginal as *style*
>>>>>>>>> Larry
>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD <
>> hshonerd@gmail.com
>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry,
>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed
>> up
>>> I
>>>> am
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> now
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> construes
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads,
>>>> finally
>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the
>>>> mind, as
>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I’ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa’
>>> fuera.
>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours,
>>>>>>>>>> Henry
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are
>> two
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> articles
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in
>> a
>>>>>>>>>>> manner
>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of
>>>> doing
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> so.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> texts.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came
>>> upon
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at
>>>> several
>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and
>> I
>>>>>>>>>>> argued
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of
>> access
>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover,
>>>> such
>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the
>>>> perception/imagination
>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to
>>> Kris's
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> paper
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns
>> about
>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they
>>> will
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> prove
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested.
>>>>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science
>>>> with an
>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>>>>>>>>> <Imagination and Perception by P.F. Strawson.pdf>
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> --
>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with
>> an
>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> 
>>> --
>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.