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[Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?



I do not have a copy of the distributed cognition article with Engestrom,
either, Henry.
Maybe someone on the list does, or I can get one made.

Here is a copy of a paper by Ed Hutchins originally given as a talk at a
Sylvia Scribner
memorial meeting at (I think) the anthro meetings. I think lots of
affinities between perspectives are on display here.
mike
for the "this thread" library :-)



On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 4:23 PM, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com> wrote:

> I’m game. I tried to find your article with Engstrom and got nowhere. I
> would like to read it. I need an affordance here to see if I’m using the
> right word.
> Henry
>
> > On Dec 2, 2014, at 9:44 AM, Glassman, Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu>
> wrote:
> >
> > I'd be interested in anybody else is.
> >
> > Michael
> > ________________________________________
> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu]
> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu]
> > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM
> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
> >
> > Interloper, Michael?
> >
> > The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and cognitive
> > artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom on
> > "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are
> > interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be gathered
> > up.
> >
> > mike
> >
> > On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu>
> > wrote:
> >
> >> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea).  He
> >> actually cops to both of them.  The first was not to distinguish between
> >> affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which are
> >> designed.  I think this is related to the issue of artifacts.  Meaning
> are
> >> artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to be
> >> discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong word, if
> >> anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances.  It is a
> complex
> >> question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes based on
> >> context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one context
> may
> >> result in organic affordances in another context.
> >>
> >> The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that he
> was
> >> not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and
> constraints.
> >> Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances or
> are
> >> they designed to create constraints.
> >>
> >> Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the
> mention
> >> just spurred me to throw this up.  Hope I'm not being too much of an
> >> interloper.
> >>
> >> Michael
> >> ________________________________________
> >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu]
> >> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu]
> >> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM
> >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
> >>
> >> Annalisa-
> >>
> >> I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation not
> >> discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of
> >> affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set against
> >> Gibson's ideas.  The change of views coincided with the advent of the
> d-cog
> >> idea which also has deep roots in chat.
> >>
> >> No hidden  history i know of, but interesting connections among the
> notion
> >> of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion  of
> these
> >> connections can be found, among other places, in
> >>
> >> Cole, M. & Engeström, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach to
> >> distributed*
> >> *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: Psychological
> and
> >> educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press.
> >>
> >> mike
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu>
> wrote:
> >>
> >>>
> >>> Hi Mike,
> >>>
> >>> It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied that
> >> wish!
> >>>
> >>> Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important connections. I
> was
> >>> not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I learned
> about
> >>> Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science (1985).
> >>>
> >>> Is there some history that is not part of the common story?
> >>>
> >>> I looked here for clarity:
> >>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance
> >>>
> >>> Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to
> cognitive
> >>> artifacts?
> >>>
> >>> There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in play,
> and
> >>> even joy!
> >>>
> >>> When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however until
> then
> >>> I will remain with the ineffable.
> >>>
> >>> Kind regards,
> >>>
> >>> Annalisa
> >>> ________________________________________
> >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> >
> >>> on behalf of mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
> >>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM
> >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
> >>>
> >>> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And,
> >>> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive
> artifacts
> >>> right about that time at UCSD.  If it were possible to find a source
> that
> >>> makes these connections visible and available to read about it might
> be a
> >>> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of intro
> >> for
> >>> newcomers to the discussion.
> >>>
> >>> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a
> newcomer's
> >>> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking to
> >> sort
> >>> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am
> >> insuficiently
> >>> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted!
> >>>
> >>> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many rocks,
> so
> >>> little time"!
> >>>
> >>> Mike
> >>>
> >>> A
> >>>
> >>> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu>
> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>> Martin!
> >>>>
> >>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental representation"
> is
> >>>> coming closer!
> >>>>
> >>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's theory
> of
> >>>> affordances.
> >>>>
> >>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. But
> >> I
> >>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is
> >> important
> >>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article.
> >>>>
> >>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a grenade
> >>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. If
> >>> you
> >>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward to
> >>> your
> >>>> reply, Martin.
> >>>>
> >>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being at
> >> UCSD
> >>>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that influences
> >> your
> >>>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find
> >> community
> >>> in
> >>>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary
> >> phrased
> >>>> that way).
> >>>>
> >>>> Kind regards,
> >>>>
> >>>> Annalisa
> >>>> ________________________________________
> >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;> <
> >>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;>> on behalf of Martin
> >> John
> >>>> Packer <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co <javascript:;>>
> >>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM
> >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
> >>>>
> >>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, to
> >> me
> >>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, even
> >>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in
> the
> >>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to define
> the
> >>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place.
> >>>>
> >>>> Martin
> >>>>
> >>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com
> >>>> <javascript:;>> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>> Larry, Annalisa:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when we
> >>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of
> >> anything
> >>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available
> >>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember
> >>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the
> >>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a
> >>>>> non-image based mental representation.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are
> >>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In
> >>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against
> >> Titchener
> >>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples,
> >>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that
> >>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically anterior
> >>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not have
> >>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are
> >>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more reading
> >>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am
> >>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like
> >>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT read
> >>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/
> >>>>>
> >>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of
> >>>>> Michelangelo’s painting to suggest images without using any actual
> >>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural
> >> experience
> >>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings.  Pepperell then deliberately
> >>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any
> >>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo’s Sistine Chapel fresco
> >>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or she
> >>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and
> >>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice
> >>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> David Kellogg
> >>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> >>>>>
> >>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu
> >>>> <javascript:;>> wrote:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Hi Larry and David,
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in!
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at the
> >>>> root of all thinking.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based upon
> >>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in
> >>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase I
> >>> like
> >>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by
> >> the
> >>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as
> >> Hackett
> >>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you
> >>> already
> >>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing
> >> to
> >>>> take a look.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is
> >> controversial.
> >>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone says
> >>> "this
> >>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble
> >> observation.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever that
> >>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand?
> >>> Just a
> >>>> thought.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity?
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!)
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Kind regards,
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Annalisa
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> ________________________________________
> >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;> <
> >>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;>> on behalf of Larry
> >>> Purss <
> >>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com <javascript:;>>
> >>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM
> >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity
> >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l]  How *basic* are images?
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> David K
> >>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My
> >> reason
> >>>> for
> >>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a
> >>> basic
> >>>>>> question.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking?
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic guiding
> >>>> images
> >>>>>> upon which thinking rests"
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances
> >> and
> >>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological
> >>> path
> >>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this
> >>>> process
> >>>>>> *metaphoricity*.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible image-character
> >>> of
> >>>> the
> >>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he
> >>> brackets -
> >>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> AND
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds the
> >>>>>> meaning of its very self.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this
> >>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of
> >>> metaphor
> >>>> can
> >>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in
> >>>>>> *objectivity*
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself
> >>> *in*
> >>>> the
> >>>>>> mode [path] of the concept
> >>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images
> >> has
> >>>> been
> >>>>>> established.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of
> >>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived from
> >>> the
> >>>>>> image-character of the guiding image.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this
> >> topic
> >>>> may
> >>>>>> become [again]
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this basic
> >>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images as
> >>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge
> >>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental]
> >> and
> >>>> is
> >>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It
> >> seems
> >>> to
> >>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's
> >>>> writings
> >>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I
> >>>>>> personally am following this path for now.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Larry
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>> --
> >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
> >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>
> >>
> >> --
> >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
> >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> >>
> >>
> >
> >
> > --
> > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
> > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> >
>
>
>


-- 
It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.

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