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[Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?



I’m game. I tried to find your article with Engstrom and got nowhere. I would like to read it. I need an affordance here to see if I’m using the right word.
Henry

> On Dec 2, 2014, at 9:44 AM, Glassman, Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu> wrote:
> 
> I'd be interested in anybody else is.
> 
> Michael
> ________________________________________
> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu]
> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
> 
> Interloper, Michael?
> 
> The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and cognitive
> artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom on
> "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are
> interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be gathered
> up.
> 
> mike
> 
> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu>
> wrote:
> 
>> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea).  He
>> actually cops to both of them.  The first was not to distinguish between
>> affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which are
>> designed.  I think this is related to the issue of artifacts.  Meaning are
>> artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to be
>> discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong word, if
>> anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances.  It is a complex
>> question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes based on
>> context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one context may
>> result in organic affordances in another context.
>> 
>> The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that he was
>> not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and constraints.
>> Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances or are
>> they designed to create constraints.
>> 
>> Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the mention
>> just spurred me to throw this up.  Hope I'm not being too much of an
>> interloper.
>> 
>> Michael
>> ________________________________________
>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu]
>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu]
>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM
>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
>> 
>> Annalisa-
>> 
>> I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation not
>> discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of
>> affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set against
>> Gibson's ideas.  The change of views coincided with the advent of the d-cog
>> idea which also has deep roots in chat.
>> 
>> No hidden  history i know of, but interesting connections among the notion
>> of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion  of these
>> connections can be found, among other places, in
>> 
>> Cole, M. & Engeström, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach to
>> distributed*
>> *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: Psychological and
>> educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press.
>> 
>> mike
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu> wrote:
>> 
>>> 
>>> Hi Mike,
>>> 
>>> It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied that
>> wish!
>>> 
>>> Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important connections. I was
>>> not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I learned about
>>> Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science (1985).
>>> 
>>> Is there some history that is not part of the common story?
>>> 
>>> I looked here for clarity:
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance
>>> 
>>> Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to cognitive
>>> artifacts?
>>> 
>>> There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in play, and
>>> even joy!
>>> 
>>> When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however until then
>>> I will remain with the ineffable.
>>> 
>>> Kind regards,
>>> 
>>> Annalisa
>>> ________________________________________
>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>> on behalf of mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM
>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
>>> 
>>> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And,
>>> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive artifacts
>>> right about that time at UCSD.  If it were possible to find a source that
>>> makes these connections visible and available to read about it might be a
>>> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of intro
>> for
>>> newcomers to the discussion.
>>> 
>>> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a newcomer's
>>> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking to
>> sort
>>> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am
>> insuficiently
>>> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted!
>>> 
>>> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many rocks, so
>>> little time"!
>>> 
>>> Mike
>>> 
>>> A
>>> 
>>> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> Martin!
>>>> 
>>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental representation" is
>>>> coming closer!
>>>> 
>>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's theory of
>>>> affordances.
>>>> 
>>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. But
>> I
>>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is
>> important
>>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article.
>>>> 
>>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a grenade
>>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. If
>>> you
>>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward to
>>> your
>>>> reply, Martin.
>>>> 
>>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being at
>> UCSD
>>>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that influences
>> your
>>>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find
>> community
>>> in
>>>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary
>> phrased
>>>> that way).
>>>> 
>>>> Kind regards,
>>>> 
>>>> Annalisa
>>>> ________________________________________
>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;> <
>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;>> on behalf of Martin
>> John
>>>> Packer <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co <javascript:;>>
>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM
>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
>>>> 
>>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, to
>> me
>>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, even
>>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in the
>>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to define the
>>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place.
>>>> 
>>>> Martin
>>>> 
>>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>>> <javascript:;>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> Larry, Annalisa:
>>>>> 
>>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when we
>>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of
>> anything
>>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available
>>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember
>>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the
>>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a
>>>>> non-image based mental representation.
>>>>> 
>>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are
>>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In
>>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against
>> Titchener
>>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples,
>>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that
>>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically anterior
>>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not have
>>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time.
>>>>> 
>>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are
>>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more reading
>>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am
>>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like
>>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT read
>>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11.
>>>>> 
>>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/
>>>>> 
>>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of
>>>>> Michelangelo’s painting to suggest images without using any actual
>>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural
>> experience
>>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings.  Pepperell then deliberately
>>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any
>>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus.
>>>>> 
>>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo’s Sistine Chapel fresco
>>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or she
>>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and
>>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice
>>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it.
>>>>> 
>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>>> 
>>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu
>>>> <javascript:;>> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Hi Larry and David,
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in!
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at the
>>>> root of all thinking.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based upon
>>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in
>>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase I
>>> like
>>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by
>> the
>>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as
>> Hackett
>>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you
>>> already
>>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing
>> to
>>>> take a look.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is
>> controversial.
>>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone says
>>> "this
>>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble
>> observation.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever that
>>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand?
>>> Just a
>>>> thought.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity?
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!)
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Kind regards,
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Annalisa
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> ________________________________________
>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;> <
>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;>> on behalf of Larry
>>> Purss <
>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com <javascript:;>>
>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM
>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity
>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l]  How *basic* are images?
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> David K
>>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My
>> reason
>>>> for
>>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a
>>> basic
>>>>>> question.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking?
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic guiding
>>>> images
>>>>>> upon which thinking rests"
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances
>> and
>>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological
>>> path
>>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this
>>>> process
>>>>>> *metaphoricity*.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible image-character
>>> of
>>>> the
>>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he
>>> brackets -
>>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> AND
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds the
>>>>>> meaning of its very self.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this
>>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of
>>> metaphor
>>>> can
>>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in
>>>>>> *objectivity*
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself
>>> *in*
>>>> the
>>>>>> mode [path] of the concept
>>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images
>> has
>>>> been
>>>>>> established.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of
>>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived from
>>> the
>>>>>> image-character of the guiding image.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this
>> topic
>>>> may
>>>>>> become [again]
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this basic
>>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images as
>>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge
>>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental]
>> and
>>>> is
>>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It
>> seems
>>> to
>>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's
>>>> writings
>>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I
>>>>>> personally am following this path for now.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Larry
>>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> 
>>> --
>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> --
>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> --
> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>