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[Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?

> On Dec 1, 2014, at 10:39 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And,
> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive artifacts
> right about that time at UCSD.  If it were possible to find a source that
> makes these connections visible and available to read about it might be a
> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of intro for
> newcomers to the discussion.
> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a newcomer's
> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking to sort
> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am insuficiently
> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted!
> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many rocks, so
> little time"!
> Mike
> A
> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu> wrote:
>> Martin!
>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental representation" is
>> coming closer!
>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's theory of
>> affordances.
>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. But I
>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is important
>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article.
>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a grenade
>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. If you
>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward to your
>> reply, Martin.
>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being at UCSD
>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that influences your
>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find community in
>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary phrased
>> that way).
>> Kind regards,
>> Annalisa
>> ________________________________________
>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;> <
>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;>> on behalf of Martin John
>> Packer <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co <javascript:;>>
>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM
>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, to me
>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, even
>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in the
>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to define the
>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place.
>> Martin
>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com
>> <javascript:;>> wrote:
>>> Larry, Annalisa:
>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when we
>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of anything
>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available
>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember
>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the
>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a
>>> non-image based mental representation.
>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are
>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In
>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against Titchener
>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples,
>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that
>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically anterior
>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not have
>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time.
>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are
>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more reading
>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am
>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like
>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT read
>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11.
>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/
>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of
>>> Michelangelo’s painting to suggest images without using any actual
>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural experience
>>> associates with Renaissance paintings.  Pepperell then deliberately
>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any
>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus.
>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo’s Sistine Chapel fresco
>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or she
>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and
>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice
>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it.
>>> David Kellogg
>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu
>> <javascript:;>> wrote:
>>>> Hi Larry and David,
>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in!
>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at the
>> root of all thinking.
>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based upon
>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in
>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase I like
>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by the
>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it.
>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as Hackett
>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you already
>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing to
>> take a look.
>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is controversial.
>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone says "this
>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble observation.
>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever that
>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand? Just a
>> thought.
>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity?
>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!)
>>>> Kind regards,
>>>> Annalisa
>>>> ________________________________________
>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;> <
>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;>> on behalf of Larry Purss <
>> lpscholar2@gmail.com <javascript:;>>
>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM
>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity
>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l]  How *basic* are images?
>>>> David K
>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My reason
>> for
>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a basic
>>>> question.
>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking?
>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic guiding
>> images
>>>> upon which thinking rests"
>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances and
>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme.
>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological path
>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this
>> process
>>>> *metaphoricity*.
>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible image-character of
>> the
>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning.
>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he brackets -
>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image.
>>>> AND
>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds the
>>>> meaning of its very self.
>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this
>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of metaphor
>> can
>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in
>>>> *objectivity*
>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking.
>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself *in*
>> the
>>>> mode [path] of the concept
>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images has
>> been
>>>> established.
>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of
>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived from the
>>>> image-character of the guiding image.
>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this topic
>> may
>>>> become [again]
>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this basic
>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images as
>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge
>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness.
>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental] and
>> is
>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It seems to
>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings.
>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's
>> writings
>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I
>>>> personally am following this path for now.
>>>> Larry
> -- 
> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.