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[Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?



How interesting:
techno

word-forming element meaning "art, craft, skill," later "technical,
technology," from Latinized form of Greek tekhno-, combining form of
tekhne "art,
skill, craft in work; method, system, an art, a system or method of making
or doing," from PIE *teks-na- "craft" (of weaving or fabricating), from
suffixed form of root *teks- "to weave, fabricate, make" (cognates:
Sanskrit taksan "carpenter," Greek tekton "carpenter," Latin texere "to
weave;" see texture
<http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=texture&allowed_in_frame=0>(n.)).

*And contextere traces its roots back to the same morpheme. *
*Context as weaving together*
*mike*


On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 11:52 AM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
wrote:

> On 2 December 2014 at 17:43, Glassman, Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu>
> wrote:
>
> > Hi Huw,
> >
> > Perceived in Norman's description, not sure I'd be comfortable changing
> it
> > at this point.  Could you explain what you mean by technical?
> >
>
> Yes.  In this sense pertaining to the etymological origins:
>
> http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=techno-&allowed_in_frame=0
>
> techno-
> <http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=techno-&allowed_in_frame=0>
> [image:
> Look up techno- at Dictionary.com]
> <http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=techno->word-forming element
> meaning "art, craft, skill," later "technical, technology," from Latinized
> form of Greek tekhno-, combining form of tekhne "art, skill, craft in work;
> method, system, an art, a system or method of making or doing," from PIE
> *teks-na- "craft" (of weaving or fabricating), from suffixed form of root
> *teks- "to weave, fabricate, make" (cognates: Sanskrit taksan "carpenter,"
> Greek tekton "carpenter," Latin texere "to weave;" see texture
> <http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=texture&allowed_in_frame=0>
> (n.)).
>
> Huw
>
>
> > Michael
> > ________________________________________
> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu]
> > on behalf of Huw Lloyd [huw.softdesigns@gmail.com]
> > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 12:35 PM
> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
> >
> > I'd take a look.
> >
> > Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit.  My equivalent of
> your
> > perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically
> > manifest.
> >
> > Huw
> >
> >
> > On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu>
> > wrote:
> >
> > > I'd be interested in anybody else is.
> > >
> > > Michael
> > > ________________________________________
> > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> ]
> > > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu]
> > > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM
> > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
> > >
> > > Interloper, Michael?
> > >
> > > The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and
> cognitive
> > > artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom
> on
> > > "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are
> > > interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be
> gathered
> > > up.
> > >
> > > mike
> > >
> > > On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu
> >
> > > wrote:
> > >
> > > > But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea).  He
> > > > actually cops to both of them.  The first was not to distinguish
> > between
> > > > affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which are
> > > > designed.  I think this is related to the issue of artifacts.
> Meaning
> > > are
> > > > artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to be
> > > > discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong word,
> if
> > > > anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances.  It is a
> > > complex
> > > > question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes based
> on
> > > > context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one
> context
> > > may
> > > > result in organic affordances in another context.
> > > >
> > > > The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that
> he
> > > was
> > > > not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and
> > > constraints.
> > > > Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances or
> > are
> > > > they designed to create constraints.
> > > >
> > > > Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the
> > mention
> > > > just spurred me to throw this up.  Hope I'm not being too much of an
> > > > interloper.
> > > >
> > > > Michael
> > > > ________________________________________
> > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [
> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> > ]
> > > > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu]
> > > > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM
> > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
> > > >
> > > > Annalisa-
> > > >
> > > > I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation
> not
> > > > discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of
> > > > affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set against
> > > > Gibson's ideas.  The change of views coincided with the advent of the
> > > d-cog
> > > > idea which also has deep roots in chat.
> > > >
> > > > No hidden  history i know of, but interesting connections among the
> > > notion
> > > > of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion  of
> > these
> > > > connections can be found, among other places, in
> > > >
> > > >  Cole, M. & Engeström, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach to
> > > > distributed*
> > > > *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition:
> Psychological
> > > and
> > > > educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press.
> > > >
> > > > mike
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu>
> > > wrote:
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Hi Mike,
> > > > >
> > > > > It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied
> that
> > > > wish!
> > > > >
> > > > > Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important connections.
> I
> > > was
> > > > > not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I learned
> > > about
> > > > > Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science
> (1985).
> > > > >
> > > > > Is there some history that is not part of the common story?
> > > > >
> > > > > I looked here for clarity:
> > > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance
> > > > >
> > > > > Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to
> > > cognitive
> > > > > artifacts?
> > > > >
> > > > > There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in
> play,
> > > and
> > > > > even joy!
> > > > >
> > > > > When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however
> until
> > > then
> > > > > I will remain with the ineffable.
> > > > >
> > > > > Kind regards,
> > > > >
> > > > > Annalisa
> > > > > ________________________________________
> > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <
> > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> > > >
> > > > > on behalf of mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
> > > > > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM
> > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
> > > > >
> > > > > The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And,
> > > > > co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive
> > > artifacts
> > > > > right about that time at UCSD.  If it were possible to find a
> source
> > > that
> > > > > makes these connections visible and available to read about it
> might
> > > be a
> > > > > step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of
> > intro
> > > > for
> > > > > newcomers to the discussion.
> > > > >
> > > > > I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a
> > > newcomer's
> > > > > introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking
> > to
> > > > sort
> > > > > out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am
> > > > insuficiently
> > > > > read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted!
> > > > >
> > > > > A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many
> > rocks,
> > > so
> > > > > little time"!
> > > > >
> > > > > Mike
> > > > >
> > > > > A
> > > > >
> > > > > On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu>
> > > wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > > Martin!
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental
> > representation"
> > > is
> > > > > > coming closer!
> > > > > >
> > > > > > For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's
> > theory
> > > of
> > > > > > affordances.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed
> article.
> > > But
> > > > I
> > > > > > wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is
> > > > important
> > > > > > not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a
> > > grenade
> > > > > > pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the
> list.
> > > If
> > > > > you
> > > > > > can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look
> forward
> > to
> > > > > your
> > > > > > reply, Martin.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being
> > at
> > > > UCSD
> > > > > > and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that
> > influences
> > > > your
> > > > > > position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find
> > > > community
> > > > > in
> > > > > > it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary
> > > > phrased
> > > > > > that way).
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Kind regards,
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Annalisa
> > > > > > ________________________________________
> > > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;> <
> > > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;>> on behalf of
> > Martin
> > > > John
> > > > > > Packer <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co <javascript:;>>
> > > > > > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM
> > > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
> > > > > >
> > > > > > An interesting article, David. One way in which it is
> interesting,
> > to
> > > > me
> > > > > > at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used,
> > > even
> > > > > > once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images
> in
> > > the
> > > > > > world around us - material representations - and he tries to
> define
> > > the
> > > > > > "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Martin
> > > > > >
> > > > > > On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com
> > > > > > <javascript:;>> wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > Larry, Annalisa:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight"
> when
> > > we
> > > > > > > met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of
> > > > anything
> > > > > > > except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe
> > available
> > > > > > > for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember
> > > > > > > whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the
> > > > > > > beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a
> > > > > > > non-image based mental representation.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations
> > are
> > > > > > > images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century.
> > In
> > > > > > > fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against
> > > > Titchener
> > > > > > > and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples,
> > > > > > > everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated
> that
> > > > > > > many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically
> > > anterior
> > > > > > > to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would
> not
> > > have
> > > > > > > time or ability to process complex problems in real time.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are
> > > > > > > genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more
> > > reading
> > > > > > > to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than
> I
> > am
> > > > > > > (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels
> like
> > > > > > > she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do
> NOT
> > > read
> > > > > > > this article--instead, look at Figure 11.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure
> of
> > > > > > > Michelangelo’s painting to suggest images without using any
> > actual
> > > > > > > images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural
> > > > experience
> > > > > > > associates with Renaissance paintings.  Pepperell then
> > deliberately
> > > > > > > frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any
> > > > > > > recognizable figures upon which to focus.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > However, the child staring up at Michelangelo’s Sistine Chapel
> > > fresco
> > > > > > > for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He
> or
> > > she
> > > > > > > can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting
> > and
> > > > > > > wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not
> > notice
> > > > > > > the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in
> > it.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > David Kellogg
> > > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar <
> annalisa@unm.edu
> > > > > > <javascript:;>> wrote:
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> Hi Larry and David,
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in!
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are
> at
> > > the
> > > > > > root of all thinking.
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently,
> based
> > > upon
> > > > > > previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in
> > > > > > combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a
> > phrase
> > > I
> > > > > like
> > > > > > a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it
> > by
> > > > the
> > > > > > same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it.
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as
> > > > Hackett
> > > > > > describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have
> you
> > > > > already
> > > > > > given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be
> > willing
> > > > to
> > > > > > take a look.
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is
> > > > controversial.
> > > > > > It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone
> > says
> > > > > "this
> > > > > > is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble
> > > > observation.
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever
> > > that
> > > > > > process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at
> > hand?
> > > > > Just a
> > > > > > thought.
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> What is it that appeals to you about this model,
> metaphoricity?
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!)
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> Kind regards,
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> Annalisa
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> ________________________________________
> > > > > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;> <
> > > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <javascript:;>> on behalf of
> Larry
> > > > > Purss <
> > > > > > lpscholar2@gmail.com <javascript:;>>
> > > > > > >> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM
> > > > > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity
> > > > > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l]  How *basic* are images?
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> David K
> > > > > > >> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce.
> My
> > > > reason
> > > > > > for
> > > > > > >> exploring these authors is I have been following a path
> > pursuing a
> > > > > basic
> > > > > > >> question.
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking?
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic
> > > guiding
> > > > > > images
> > > > > > >> upon which thinking rests"
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring
> > appearances
> > > > and
> > > > > > >> illusions was also exploring this theme.
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new
> > phenomenological
> > > > > path
> > > > > > >> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names
> > this
> > > > > > process
> > > > > > >> *metaphoricity*.
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible
> > > image-character
> > > > > of
> > > > > > the
> > > > > > >> *spontaneous event* of meaning.
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he
> > > > > brackets -
> > > > > > >> finds itself implicated in this guiding image.
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> AND
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject*
> finds
> > > the
> > > > > > >> meaning of its very self.
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this
> > > > > > >> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of
> > > > > metaphor
> > > > > > can
> > > > > > >> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated
> > in
> > > > > > >> *objectivity*
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking.
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of
> > itself
> > > > > *in*
> > > > > > the
> > > > > > >> mode [path] of the concept
> > > > > > >> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding
> > images
> > > > has
> > > > > > been
> > > > > > >> established.
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the
> path
> > of
> > > > > > >> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived
> > > from
> > > > > the
> > > > > > >> image-character of the guiding image.
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial
> this
> > > > topic
> > > > > > may
> > > > > > >> become [again]
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this
> > > basic
> > > > > > >> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these
> > images
> > > as
> > > > > > >> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images
> emerge
> > > > > > >> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness.
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is
> > transcendental]
> > > > and
> > > > > > is
> > > > > > >> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical].
> It
> > > > seems
> > > > > to
> > > > > > >> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings.
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> I also realize this question may already be answered in
> > Vygotsky's
> > > > > > writings
> > > > > > >> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of
> > XMCA. I
> > > > > > >> personally am following this path for now.
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> Larry
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > --
> > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with
> > an
> > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > --
> > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with
> an
> > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> > > >
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> > > --
> > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
> > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> > >
> > >
> >
> >
>



-- 
It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.