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[Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?



Oopps! Send the wrong paper. Sort of interesting but afield.
Here is the Kosslyn paper i meant to send.
mike

On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 11:18 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:

> I think I am with you on re-fraction rather than re-presentation, Henry.
> Although there are circumstances in which representation seems an
> appropriate enough word.
>
> I would like to continue the half of the conversation that continued to
> talk about images (despite their bad rep) and imagination (despite its
> trendiness).
>
> I take the core of the discussion to be about the nature of/existence
> of/signficicance of "mental images" and their relation (or lack thereof) to
> the polysemic concept of imagination.
>
> To go way back in time (not so far as Wundt and Tichner, but all the way
> back to 1978) I attach a paper by Stephen Kosslyn that seems relevant to
> think about images as processes so that the verbiness of imag(ing) is
> brought to the fore.
>
>
> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:49 AM, HENRY SHONERD <hshonerd@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Peeps,
>> I come late to this, but I was thinking this morning at the bus stop
>> about David K’s narrative of kids learning about light. I though maybe a
>> parallel: Representation = Reflection and Procedural = Refraction. I think
>> of both as imagery, just that representation is sort of nouny and
>> procedural is verby. Procedural imagery involves, depending on the angle of
>> incidence, deviation from the the initial vector. But procedural imagery
>> keeps things on the move. An affordance. I have forgotten my physics, but
>> does refraction slow things down in any way?
>> Henry
>>
>> > On Dec 1, 2014, at 8:23 PM, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu> wrote:
>> >
>> > Martin!
>> >
>> > Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental representation" is
>> coming closer!
>> >
>> > For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's theory of
>> affordances.
>> >
>> > This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. But
>> I wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is important
>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article.
>> >
>> > I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a grenade
>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. If you
>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward to your
>> reply, Martin.
>> >
>> > Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being at
>> UCSD and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that influences
>> your position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find
>> community in it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more
>> voluntary phrased that way).
>> >
>> > Kind regards,
>> >
>> > Annalisa
>> > ________________________________________
>> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>> on behalf of Martin John Packer <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co>
>> > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM
>> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images?
>> >
>> > An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, to
>> me at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, even
>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in the
>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to define the
>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place.
>> >
>> > Martin
>> >
>> > On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
>> >
>> >> Larry, Annalisa:
>> >>
>> >> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when we
>> >> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of anything
>> >> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available
>> >> for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember
>> >> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the
>> >> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a
>> >> non-image based mental representation.
>> >>
>> >> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are
>> >> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In
>> >> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against Titchener
>> >> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples,
>> >> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that
>> >> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically anterior
>> >> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not have
>> >> time or ability to process complex problems in real time.
>> >>
>> >> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are
>> >> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more reading
>> >> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am
>> >> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like
>> >> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT read
>> >> this article--instead, look at Figure 11.
>> >>
>> >> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/
>> >>
>> >> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of
>> >> Michelangelo’s painting to suggest images without using any actual
>> >> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural experience
>> >> associates with Renaissance paintings.  Pepperell then deliberately
>> >> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any
>> >> recognizable figures upon which to focus.
>> >>
>> >> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo’s Sistine Chapel fresco
>> >> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or she
>> >> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and
>> >> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice
>> >> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it.
>> >>
>> >> David Kellogg
>> >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>> >>
>> >> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar <annalisa@unm.edu>
>> wrote:
>> >>>
>> >>> Hi Larry and David,
>> >>>
>> >>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in!
>> >>>
>> >>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at the
>> root of all thinking.
>> >>>
>> >>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based upon
>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in
>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase I like
>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by the
>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it.
>> >>>
>> >>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as Hackett
>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you already
>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing to
>> take a look.
>> >>>
>> >>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is
>> controversial. It is likely controversial because no one likes it when
>> someone says "this is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my
>> humble observation.
>> >>>
>> >>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever that
>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand? Just a
>> thought.
>> >>>
>> >>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity?
>> >>>
>> >>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!)
>> >>>
>> >>> Kind regards,
>> >>>
>> >>> Annalisa
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> ________________________________________
>> >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <
>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> on behalf of Larry Purss <
>> lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>> >>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM
>> >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity
>> >>> Subject: [Xmca-l]  How *basic* are images?
>> >>>
>> >>> David K
>> >>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My
>> reason for
>> >>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a
>> basic
>> >>> question.
>> >>>
>> >>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking?
>> >>>
>> >>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic guiding
>> images
>> >>> upon which thinking rests"
>> >>>
>> >>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances and
>> >>> illusions was also exploring this theme.
>> >>>
>> >>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological
>> path
>> >>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this
>> process
>> >>> *metaphoricity*.
>> >>>
>> >>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible image-character
>> of the
>> >>> *spontaneous event* of meaning.
>> >>>
>> >>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he
>> brackets -
>> >>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image.
>> >>>
>> >>> AND
>> >>>
>> >>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds the
>> >>> meaning of its very self.
>> >>>
>> >>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this
>> >>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of
>> metaphor can
>> >>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in
>> >>> *objectivity*
>> >>>
>> >>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking.
>> >>>
>> >>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself
>> *in* the
>> >>> mode [path] of the concept
>> >>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images has
>> been
>> >>> established.
>> >>>
>> >>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of
>> >>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived from
>> the
>> >>> image-character of the guiding image.
>> >>>
>> >>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this
>> topic may
>> >>> become [again]
>> >>>
>> >>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this basic
>> >>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images as
>> >>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge
>> >>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness.
>> >>>
>> >>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental]
>> and is
>> >>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It seems
>> to
>> >>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings.
>> >>>
>> >>> I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's
>> writings
>> >>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I
>> >>> personally am following this path for now.
>> >>>
>> >>> Larry
>> >>>
>> >>
>> >
>> >
>> >
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> --
> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>
>
>


-- 
It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.

Attachment: kosslyn.image2.pdf
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