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[Xmca-l] How *basic* are images?

David K
I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My reason for
exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a basic

Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking?

Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic guiding images
upon which thinking rests"

The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances and
illusions was also exploring this theme.

Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological path
that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this process

Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible image-character of the
*spontaneous event* of meaning.

He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he brackets -
finds itself implicated in this guiding image.


it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds the
meaning of its very self.

Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this
image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of metaphor can
invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in

This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking.

Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself *in* the
mode [path] of the concept
occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images has been

In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of
 conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived from the
image-character of the guiding image.

I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this topic may
become [again]

However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this basic
question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images as
occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge
spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness.

This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental] and is
not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It seems to
have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings.

I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's writings
and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I
personally am following this path for now.