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[Xmca-l] Method as Disposition



I wonder how central to "reading and writing the world" is the notion of
"disposition".
At the risk of falling back into the vortex of intensity or of becoming too
"distanced" in my conversational style, I want to share an extended
reflection by Chris Hacket on a Hediggerian quote.
First the quote:

""implicit in the essential nature of all genuine method as a path towards
the disclosure of objects is the tendency to order to order itself always
toward that which it itself discloses."

How Chris Hacket expands and explores how he reads and interprets this
Heideggerian quote is fascinating.

Three things stand out for Chris in this quote:

1] Method is a "tendency" - one could even say "disposition", or better a
"habit" and "habituating toward" something
2] Method is as a result a "path".  A metaphor that "guides" these
reflections.
3] Method is "marked" by paradox.  Genuine method, though not "equated"
with disclosure of objects is a critical mark of the path to the disclosure
of objects AND at the same time and precisely because the object is present
there, method is most essentially understood to be a tendency, a
disposition, perhaps even a habit - to be "ordered" to that which method
itself discloses, - to disclosure itself.
In other words - method for Heidegger is that which emerges "out of" an
ordered disposition toward the disclosure of its object.
More RADICALLY [going to its root or its founding], method traces its own
emergence in the "event" of intelligable disclosure: just as
intelligibility is, "through questioning" TIED to the questioning - where
we "found" the disclosure of the presence of method - so also for the
"path" of method which is now the TYING itself.

The paradox, BOTH "toward" AND "from" [approach to disclosure AND emergence
from disclosure]. Method is only "calculated approach" as it is
simultaneously wholly "incalculable emergence".
This conception of the "nature" of method - as a sort of formal name we
give to A MORE FUNDAMENTAL "disposition" that defines material
phenomenology  - "indicates" [points to] that method does not define
phenomenology. Material phenomenology, it seems, is not a method although
it surely requires that which method formally "signifies".

Thus, for Heidegger at least, the particulars of a method do not make
material phenomenology what it is, in the FIRST place. Rather, the "genuine
question" that arises from experience defines material phenomenology. Here,
method is the thoughtful "approach" [path, tendency. disposition] to
phenomena of "the questioning" - itself.

In other words the paradox of questioning and answer as a method, a path, a
disposition, and a habit BOTH "calculated" and "incalculable emergence"

I found Chris Hackett's expansion and elaboration evocative. Others may
read it as constipated word/play. The notion of "disposition" tied to
questions & answers as a method or path.
Larry