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[Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance
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- Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance
- From: Haydi Zulfei <email@example.com>
- Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2014 10:39:06 +0000
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Mike et al
Reading "Crisis" recently again left me no doubt that Vygotsky , of his own will and for good sake , had accepted the "order" of the Day , that is , Marxism . What he did not like was something else .
With the idea of 'ontology' and 'epistemology' again in "Crisis" we have this :
Categories of 'subject' and 'object' as they refer to 'being' , that is , ontologically , are not tied to our content of 'knowledge' while categories of 'matter' and 'mind' do need our content of knowledge to be comprehended .
"One has only to apply the epistemological formula of materialism, given by Lenin (a similar one can be found in Plekhanov) for the psychological subject-object, in order to see what is the matter:the only ‘property’ of matter connected with philosophical materialism is the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside of our consciousness ... Epistemologically the concept of matter means nothing other than objective reality, existing independently from human consciousness and reflected by it. [Lenin,Materialism and Empirio-Criticism]"
Epistemologically , it is in our 'knowing' ; Ontologically , it is in itself according to some especial laws and with some especial properties , subject-matter of a couple of sciences .
" We must not mix up the relation between subject and object with the relation between mind and body, as Høffding  splendidly explains. The distinction between mind [Geist] and matter is a distinction in the content of our knowledge. But the distinction between subject and object manifests itself independently from the content of our knowledge."
He continues :
"Elsewhere Lenin says that this is, essentially, the principle of realism, but that he avoids this word, because it has been captured by inconsistent thinkers.Thus, this formula <seemingly> contradicts our viewpoint: it cannot be true that consciousness exists outside our consciousness. But, as Plekhanov has correctly established, self-consciousness is the consciousness of consciousness. And consciousness can exist without self-consciousness: we become convinced of this by the unconscious and the relatively unconscious. I can see not knowing that I see. That is why Pavlov  is right when he says that we can live according to subjective states, but that we cannot analyse them.Not a single science is possible without separating direct experience from knowledge. It is amazing: only the psychologist-introspectionist thinks that experience and knowledge coincide. If the essence of things and the form of their appearance directly coincided, says Marx , all science would be superfluous. If in psychology appearance and being were the same, then everybody would be a scientist-psychologist and science would be impossible. Only registration would be possible. But, obviously, it is one thing to live, to experience, and another to analyse ."
In this respect , even Spinoza is rejected :
" In this respect we are first of all reminded of Spinoza’s attempt to investigate human vices and stupidities by means of the geometrical method and to examine human actions and drives exactly as if they were lines, surfaces, and bodies. This method is suitable for descriptive psychology and not for any other approach. For it takes from geometry only its verbal style and the outward appearance of irrefutability of its proofs, and all the rest – its core included – is based upon a non-scientific way of thinking."
And one more thing again from "Crisis" :
A is the table ===> material a is its reflection in the mirror ====> just nothing , phantom X is the operation and hitting of the light ====> material
His explanation : two objectives : material mere relationship between them : subjective ====> non-material
We can ask ourselves if attributes of 'matter' are also 'material' , the more so with 'extension' .
There are original 'emphases' if referencing is made .
From: mike cole <email@example.com>
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Sent: Sunday, 23 November 2014, 17:53:50
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fate, Luck and Chance
I am not familiar with the term, "philosophical copout." Could you explain
what it means and how it applies to the notion that language is not
material? Or that part of language, meaning, is not? (Which I take to be
Sperber is a person relatively well versed in matters philosphical but also
anthropological perhaps even psychological. Does the copout influence how I
should think about his idea of the epidemiology of representations (today
we might here them referred to as "memes")?
So far as I can tell from the sampling of opinions on MCA it is safe to say
that we have some serious confusions about matters concerning ontology and
epistemology. Is there a currently prominent thinker we can turn to who can
provide better guidance through that maze?
Superceding the material/ideal dualism is one of the topics of conversation
here for the past 30 years. If someone has the agreed-upon, agreeable-upon
way to solve the problem, lets for goodness sake hear it! The older I get,
the more complicated the whole matter seems to me.
As you have seen, from time to time we pick some common text or texts and
some group of us all read them, and they discuss along with people who have
not read them. Perhaps you could offer a text we could use in that way.
Then we could bounce our different interpretations off of that common
On Sun, Nov 23, 2014 at 4:13 PM, Samuel Paul Louis Veissière, Dr <
> Dan Sperber dismisses the question by saying that "public representations"
> are sound waves and light patterns, and are as such material phenomena.
> That's a philosophical copout. Meaning (what we embed sound waves with) is
> not material, unless one goes full-on neuro-reductionist. If all human
> cultures are dualistic, or have found ways to talk about or try to solve
> the problem of dualism, it may be because, as far as humans are concerned,
> we have a pretty serious ontological problem. No?
> On Nov 23, 2014 7:06 PM, Helena Worthen <email@example.com> wrote:
> Hi, Analisa --
> It they're not material, what are they?
> Helena Worthen
> On Nov 23, 2014, at 3:25 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote:
> > Andy,
> > Please explain how words are material. Do you mean this literally or
> > I am prone to accept that mind is material, but of a different order
> than Grandma's apple pie, mountains or a vinyl record. I can't quite see
> how words are material. Sounds traveling through space are movements of
> material (air), so that to me would be like saying dancing is material, if
> dancing is material, then what is the body who dances? And how is the body
> different from the dance?
> > Kind regards,
> > Annalisa
It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.