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[Xmca-l] Re: The mirror has two candles



Martin [and others] exploring this theme.

I was raising questions of the phenomena of *seeing as* that I noticed
being explored within Pierce's notion of *abduction* which is a phenomenon
of *seeing as* which Pierce viewed as outside the logical processes of
*analysis* This phenomena of *seeing as* which Pierce viewed as an existant
developed through imaginative musings.  Analysis then was *derived* from
this earlier abductive process.
I sensed Anna Sfard exploring this SAME realm in her notion of more than
one approach to *seeing as* mathematical concepts and the transformations
between *figurative* gestalt developmental *knowings* AND speech developed
sequential TYPE *knowings*.

Martin's pointing us towards *modal simulations* as central to *seeing as*
deepens my understanding of this phenomena of *seeing as* that moves
between *potential* and concrete actual existants.

I believe this is a KEY topic.
Larry

On Mon, Oct 20, 2014 at 12:27 PM, Martin John Packer <
mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote:

> Larry, David, Greg:
>
> I think this "seeing as" is central to understanding the psychological
> process of imagination that Plump Materialist Karl Marx described, as David
> Ke pointed out.
>
> I have in the past thought a lot about this passage from Kapital,
> precisely because it seems to imply a "doubling": there is the real world,
> plus there is the world in the mind of the archiect. In short, it sounds
> like the standard cognitivist model of mental representation.
>
> But I think in fact not. I think there is a three-part analysis of the
> *imagination* that Marx was describing.
>
> First, the structure that the architect "raises in imagination" is often
> raised in the form of sketches, drawings, plans, and blueprints. That is,
> using *material* representations of the to-be-constructed building, not
> mental representations. We don't need to invoke "mind" to explain this.
>
> Second, the architect has developed a specific skill of "seeing as" (cf,
> Wittgenstein for an analysis). He walks around the site, seeing it *as* it
> will be once the construction is completed. In addition, he can see the
> plans *as* the building. Ed Hutchins has said, “When humans engage in
> symbolic processes, they are engaging in cultural practices for seeing
> as.”  No need to invoke "mind" to explain this.
>
> Third, we develop brains capable of forming "simulations" of past and
> future events and objects (cf. Larry Barsalou's work). These simulations
> are "modal," that is to say, they have sensory qualities, of sound, sight,
> and touch. And, of course, we are conscious of them. They are*not* the
> unconscious, syntactic, and amodal representations of a computer.  The
> architect *imagines* the building by creating a simulation of it.
>
> Does that sound odd? On xmca we have often discussed one kind of
> simulation: inner speech. The silent kind. When I hear myself talking, that
> is my brain's simulation of a sensory experience. Where does it take place?
> In the brain, of course, not in the mind! Inner speech is a material
> phenomenon.
>
> Barselou says this: "Grounded cognition rejects traditional views that
> cognition is computation on amodal symbols in a modular system, independent
> of the brain’s modal systems for perception, action, and introspection.
> Instead, grounded cognition proposes that modal simulations, bodily states,
> and situated action underlie cognition."
>
> In short, a Plump Materialist can give a detailed account of imagination
> without locating it "inside a mind."
>
> Martin
>
> p.s., Greg, to be a Plump Materialist is to *avoid* doubles, at least of
> the ontological kind
>
>
>
> On Oct 20, 2014, at 8:44 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > I want to respond to this theme by bringing in the notion of *mediated
> > action* AS the best *unit of analysis*. Wertsch weaved together Vygotsky
> > and Bakhtin and showed utterances AS *mediated actions*
> > The place of the *ideal* in relation to *objects* is the theme.
> >
> > Now I want to weave in Anna Sfard's exploration of mathematical
> *entities*
> > AS having a dual *nature*. This extension is from an article she just
> > posted on the web [On the Dual Nature of Mathematical Conceptions]
> >
> > Page 4 is her elaborating this dual nature as follows.
> >
> > [is] Treating mathematical conceptions AS IF they referred to some
> abstract
> > OBJECTS the only possibility of relating to mathematical concepts? THIS
> > KIND of conception [interpretation] Anna labels *structural*. THIS TYPE
> of
> > utterance [mediated action] prevails in mathematical discourse situations
> > as mediational means
> > However, there ARE different KINDS of mathematical definitions that
> > *reveal* quite a different approach to these same concepts.
> > Functions can be defined not only AS *a set of ordered pairs* BUT ALSO
> AS a
> > process of *getting from one system to another* [skemp referenced]
> >
> > Symmetry can BE conceived [interpreted] AS a static property of geometric
> > forms BUT ALSO AS a *kind* of transformation.  This latter TYPE of
> > description [genre] SPEAKS AS IF the mathematical notion is about
> > processes, algorithms, ACTIONS, [rather than speaking of these
> mathematical
> > notions AS IF they ARE *objects*
> > THIS TYPE OF GENRE *reflects* an Operational interpretation [rather than
> > structural interpretation] of mathematical conceptions.
> >
> > Seeing a mathematical *entity* AS *an object* *means* being capable of
> > gesturing [referring] to the mathematical concept  AS IF the mathematical
> > concept were A REAL THING [a static structure actually existing somewhere
> > in time and space but timeless] It also *means* being able to *recognize*
> > the *idea* at a glance AND to manipulate this mathematical conception AS
> IF
> > the structure existed AS A WHOLE [without going into details or analysis]
> > AS AN EXISTING OBJECT.
> >
> > Using Hadamard's *metaphor* we can SAY that *structural genres* endows a
> > concept with a KIND of *physiognomy* which ALLOWS a person to think of
> this
> > concept AS a unique, THING [entity] however complicated this concept may
> BE.
> >
> > JUST AS WE SEE A FACE OF A MAN.
> >
> > In contrast, interpreting A concept AS A PROCESS implies regarding THIS
> > PARTICULAR mathematical concept AS A POTENTIAL [existant] rather than an
> > ACTUAL EXISTING ENTITY. In operational kinds of genres the *entity* COMES
> > INTO EXISTENCE upon request in a sequence of actions.
> > THUS
> > whereas the structural genre IS timeless [static] instantaneous, and
> > integrative, the operational genre is dynamic, sequential, and detailed.
> In
> > other words different mediational means within *mediated action* produce
> > radically different notions of the place of concepts as interpretants
> that
> > exist [in actuality or in potential]
> >
> > THEREFORE the play involves different TYPES of *seeing* and different
> TYPES
> > of *saying*.
> >
> > BOTH are equally *true*
> >
> > I have been exploring *objects of activity* *units of analysis* and
> > *mediated action* through Anna Sfard's exploration of mathematical
> > conceptions which do not appear through the 5 senses but DO EXIST.
> >
> > Larry
> >
> > On Sun, Oct 19, 2014 at 4:00 PM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> > wrote:
> >
> >> Hi David,
> >>
> >> I don't think anyone is going to argue against the paper's defamatory
> >> quality.  Everything he says against LSV can be taken with a pinch of
> salt
> >> if we assume he was trying to protect his colleagues.
> >>
> >> What remains is therefore what is countered and proposed with respect to
> >> the subject of the environment.
> >>
> >> Best,
> >> Huw
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On 19 October 2014 23:38, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>
> >>> First of all, a word of appreciation to Martin for his candle in the
> >>> mirror and his delightful formulation of "Plump Materialism", and also
> >>> to Michael for recognizing the beauty of the image and using it to
> >>> revitalize a thread that was growing somewhat tiresome to me: no fault
> >>> of the participants; it was my own inability to see past "fatalistic
> >>> determinism", "captive to bourgeois theories", and ANL's other fatuous
> >>> formulae. As Mike points out, this is not just name calling: these are
> >>> blood libels.
> >>>
> >>> Secondly, let me put in a word for Andy's counter-blast. For those of
> >>> you who have not read it; it is available on Andy's academia.edu page,
> >>> and it's well worth a look:
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>
> http://www.academia.edu/7511935/The_Problem_of_the_Environment._A_Defence_of_Vygotsky
> >>>
> >>> Thirdly--can I draw attention to the top of page fourteen of ANL's
> >>> dishonest and dishonorable hatchet job? Here he rounds on Basov for
> >>> non-Marxist, idealist notion that humans in some way "double" the
> >>> natural environment. ANL returns to this theme at the bottom of the
> >>> page where he says:
> >>>
> >>> "To the animal, however, any “artificial” object created by humans is
> >>> simply
> >>> a natural object, it is nature because the animal’s relation toward it
> >>> will always
> >>> be an instinctive relation. Thus, of course, in reality there is no
> >>> doubling of the
> >>> environment. The environment as a whole is transformed into a human
> >>> environment,
> >>> that is, for the human being, into a social environment, based on the
> >>> fact that humans themselves relate to it in human terms, that is, as
> >>> social humans."
> >>>
> >>> Note the use of "Thus"; it marks a shameless non sequitur. First of
> >>> all, it is a non sequitur to say that because animals and very small
> >>> children treat i-phones as natural objects, THEREFORE there is no
> >>> doubling of the environment Secondly, it is a non sequitur to say that
> >>> the environment "as a whole" becomes a human environment (because
> >>> animals and infants do NOT see it that way??) without any trace of the
> >>> natural environment. But the biggest non-sequitur is the least
> >>> explicit: it is the insinuation that the process of social
> >>> idealization of nature that we call enculturation is prima facie
> >>> subversive of Marxism.
> >>>
> >>> Consider the following, from a great subversive of Marxism and primal
> >>> plump materialist:
> >>>
> >>> "We pre-suppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human.
> >>> A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a
> >>> bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells.
> >>> But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is
> >>> this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he
> >>> erects it in reality. At the end of every labour-process, we get a
> >>> result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its
> >>> commencement." (Capital, Vol 1, Chapter III, Part 7)
> >>>
> >>> What is THIS if not a doubling of reality--a mirror with two candles?
> >>>
> >>> David Kellogg
> >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> have a look:
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> On 20 October 2014 00:15, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>>> Here's an example memory paper abstract by Sereda (2011), titled "A
> >>>> Theoretical Model of Memory
> >>>> as a Mechanism for Systematically Organizing Individual Experience"
> >>>>
> >>>> "In order to improve the explanatory potential of activity theory,
> this
> >>>> article
> >>>> proposes a theoretical model of human memory as a mechanism for
> >>>> the systematic organization of individual experience, organization
> that
> >>>> is an essential condition for performing future activity. The model
> >> rests
> >>>> on the idea that the main factor in human memory is the motivational
> >>>> and semantic sets of personality and thus orientation toward the
> future
> >>>> (prospective orientation)."
> >>>>
> >>>> The storehouse metaphor as used in psychology merely reflects a rather
> >>> poor
> >>>> approach.
> >>>>
> >>>> Best,
> >>>> Huw
> >>>>
> >>>> On 19 October 2014 15:20, Glassman, Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu>
> >> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>> Hi Larry,
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I renamed this thread because it seems to be taking a tangent from
> the
> >>>>> very rich discussion on LSV and ANL, but perhaps it might circle
> back.
> >>>>> Anyway, I thought Martin's very interesting illustration deserves a
> >>> moment
> >>>>> of fame.  I wonder if memory is the right word in current
> >>> circumstance.  In
> >>>>> U.S. psychology memory is very often viewed as a storehouse of
> >>> information
> >>>>> where you send your messages back to retrieve information when needed
> >> to
> >>>>> apply to the current situation.  Do you think Pierce would see the
> >>> overall
> >>>>> process this way (did he actually talk about memory?)  For him it
> >> seems
> >>> it
> >>>>> would be part of a more active process of establishing relationships
> >> of
> >>>>> that which came before with that which is currently being explored.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Michael
> >>>>> ________________________________________
> >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [
> >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu]
> >>>>> on behalf of lpscholar2@gmail.com [lpscholar2@gmail.com]
> >>>>> Sent: Sunday, October 19, 2014 6:40 AM
> >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Michael Glassman and Martin and How
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I want to ex-tend the exploration of *models* and *memories* and
> >>>>> *contextualism* as linked in Michael’s rejoinder to Martin.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Michael wrote “if ALL you can *see* [perceive] is what is IN the
> >> mirror
> >>>>> [metaphor of reflection AS mirroring] how do you “know” there IS a
> >>> mirror
> >>>>>
> >>>>> The IF IMPLIED is the ‘ALL’ .
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> However, is that “all there IS” in *seeing*?
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> IS “memory* also existent as an existent IN seeing?
> >>>>>
> >>>>> In other words, do *interpretants* ACTUALLY exist IN FACT? [as such]
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Umberto Eco suggests there is both ORPHIC knowing/seeing [when
> Picasso
> >>>>> paints THAT PARTICULAR yellow shoe in a painting the SINGULARITY of
> >> THAT
> >>>>> experience IS “orphic”
> >>>>>
> >>>>> POETS and artists are “biased” to privilege THIS WAY of knowing
> >>> [Peirce's
> >>>>> secondness as orphic and possibly orphaned]
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> HOWEVER, Umberto Eco suggests that this orphic “knowing* is also
> >>>>> *indicative* [indexical] of further *interpreting* AND THIS TYPE of
> >>>>> *knowing* EX-TENDS Orphic knowing. [Peirce's tiredness]
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Now in Peirce's metaphysics THIS interpreting creating interpretants
> >>> also
> >>>>> is EXISTING as facts.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Is this transforming orphic [what IS present] TO forming
> >> *interpretants*
> >>>>> AS *something* that actually exists {through the interpreting
> process}
> >>>>> INCLUDE memory but that IS NOT ALL.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> IS creative imagining potentially existent?  that goes BEYOND memory?
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I believe Umberto Eco’s question of a deeper knowing than
> >> orphic/orphan
> >>>>> knowing *things-in-themselves* EX-tending BEYOND the orphic
> >>> [secondness] to
> >>>>> INCLUDE interpreting and forming actual *interpretants* [tiredness]
> >>> must be
> >>>>> considered within the memory process.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> This returns to *models* that are necessary but NOT ALL there *is*.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> The *relation* between *orphic* knowing and *interpreting* knowing
> >>> seems a
> >>>>> KEY question [and may ex-tend back into metaphysics?
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Larry
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Sent from Windows Mail
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> From: Glassman, Michael
> >>>>> Sent: ‎Saturday‎, ‎October‎ ‎18‎, ‎2014 ‎5‎:‎18‎ ‎PM
> >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Hi Martin,
> >>>>>
> >>>>> That's a very interesting metaphor, but let me see if I can take it a
> >>> step
> >>>>> further.  Basically you seem to be saying that Vygotsky is making a
> >>>>> mechanistic argument - I'm not talking about the more colloquial
> >>> expression
> >>>>> of mechanistic but the one that Pepper talks about in World
> >> Hypothesis.
> >>>>> You are looking into the mirror and seeing the reflection of a candle
> >> -
> >>> but
> >>>>> you are making the assumption that there must be a mechanism that is
> >>>>> causing the reflection of the candle.  You cannot know this mechanism
> >>>>> itself - it is too difficult to reach - but you can build models that
> >>> bring
> >>>>> us closer to understanding. This I think is almost exactly how Pepper
> >>>>> discusses this root metaphor.  Our goal as scientists is to find the
> >>>>> mediate description of the underlying mechanism.  This
> >>>>> Pragmatists/Conextualists would say this is dualism - not the dualism
> >>> you
> >>>>> get from Formism where you depend on your mind to bring you closer to
> >> a
> >>>>> known but unreachable ideal, but in the sense that there is this
> >>> mechanism
> >>>>> that exists that is somehow separate from and causing the reflection
> >> in
> >>> the
> >>>>> mirror.  So the Contextualist asks, if all you can see is what is in
> >> the
> >>>>> mirror how do you know there is a mirror.  That is the only
> >> information
> >>> you
> >>>>> have and you have to base all interpretation of the world on that
> >>>>> information - to suggest you are looking at a reflection is an
> >>> assumption
> >>>>> based on a belief system that there must be causing what you are
> >>> seeing.  I
> >>>>> think you are right, Vygotsky wants to assume the mirror, but in the
> >> end
> >>>>> doesn't that suggest a dualism to his thinking.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Michael
> >>>>> ________________________________________
> >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [
> >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu]
> >>>>> on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co]
> >>>>> Sent: Saturday, October 18, 2014 6:38 PM
> >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Hi Michael,
> >>>>>
> >>>>> LSV points out that no proper science sets out to study appearances.
> >>> Every
> >>>>> science studies entities that exist, in order to *explain*
> >> appearance.
> >>> One
> >>>>> of his examples is from the science of optics. When we place a
> burning
> >>>>> candle in front of a mirror there *appears* to be a second candle
> >>> burning
> >>>>> behind the mirror, or 'in' the mirror. The scientist doesn't study
> >> that
> >>>>> second candle. What he or she studies is the first candle, and the
> >>> mirror,
> >>>>> in order to discover principles by which to explain why an 'image' of
> >> a
> >>>>> second candle appears, apparently located 'in' the mirror.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> It's the same with the mind. It *appears* to us (at least to those of
> >> us
> >>>>> raised in western, scientific cultures) that our thoughts and
> feelings
> >>>>> exist in a special, internal, subjective, hidden place that we call
> >> "the
> >>>>> mind."  A scientific psychology, says LSV, needs to try to explain
> how
> >>> that
> >>>>> appearance is possible. It's not too difficult, in fact: our verbal
> >>>>> thoughts, our private subvocal speech, is possible, first, because we
> >>> can
> >>>>> use vocal speech to direct our own actions and second, because a
> fibre
> >>>>> bundle called the arcuate fasciculus forms between Broca's area and
> >>>>> Wernicke's area (to considerably simply the neuroanatomy and
> >>>>> neurofunctioning).  The appearance of a "mind in the head" is a
> *folk*
> >>>>> psychology: it is simply one way, among several, in which people try
> >> to
> >>>>> make sense of an experience that they have; it is the way our own
> >>>>> psychological processes *appear* to us. Scientific psychology cannot
> >>> study
> >>>>> the mind, any more than it can study the second candle. It can,
> >> however,
> >>>>> set out to *explain* the mind, and that is part of what LSV did.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Martin
> >>>>>
> >>>>> On Oct 18, 2014, at 8:11 AM, Glassman, Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu>
> >>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> I sort of feel like (at this point) Vygotsky did open himself up
> >> for
> >>>>> being critiqued for going inside the head.  It was a choice, I don't
> >>> think
> >>>>> he was willing to give up the idea of individual development (which I
> >>> think
> >>>>> you have to do if you are going to escape dualism - because what
> >>> develops
> >>>>> if you can't say there is something inside the head that develops
> >>> (remember
> >>>>> I am suggesting individual development here).
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>
>
>
>