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[Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL

If one is going to attend to the notion of consciousness as attentiveness,
an "inner eye" etc, then it is germane to distinguish the genetic source
from the derived means.  The means for reflexivity is memory.  It so
happens that most of our memory is located in our heads, which is how we're
able to imagine doing something without concurrently doing it  -- or, what
might be more accurate, only partially doing it.


On 19 October 2014 01:49, Martin John Packer <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co>

> Hi Greg,
> I'm certainly not suggesting we stop using the terms inside and outside.
> Material entities - including complex systems - can be inside other
> entities, including other systems. But "mind" can't be inside anything,
> because it occupies no space. At least that how the classical enlightenment
> philosophers defined mental entities - they have no extension, no spatial
> dimensions. Remember how Descartes tried to link mind to the pineal gland,
> because that was the smallest structure he could find in the brain?
> One of the indications that psychology is not, in fact, a study of the
> mind is that we are completely inconsistent in how we talk about it. I ask
> my students where their mind is. Most of them point at their heads. So I
> ask them what I asked Andy - "you mean if I look inside you skull I'll see
> your thoughts?" They tell me no. So I ask them again where their mind is,
> and they can't answer. I ask them how we can study something when we don't
> even know where it is.
> Your right, important stuff is inside the head. I have no trouble at all
> with the proposal that we study what is inside the  head. I used to be a
> computer programmer, so I know something about the important stuff inside
> the machine. I think it's important to understand the human brain; I would
> not like to try to think without mine. But we won't find the mind by
> looking at the brain; in both cases there are material processes going on
> in material entities - physical in one case, biological in the other. In
> the case of a human being, the brain is a necessary basis for psychological
> processes to occur. But also necessary are the rest of the body, and a
> culture to live in. Just because the brain is inside the skull doesn't mean
> that the mind is inside the brain. There are now many powerful arguments
> against the assumption central to Cog Sci, that psychological processes are
> like computational processes, which operate on non-semantic formal
> representations (look at Clark, Barsalou, Glenberg, Ingold). And what sense
> would it make to say that consciousness is *in* the brain? Consciousness is
> a process; it is an aspect of our ongoing involvement in the material
> world. Where is it? It is where that involvement is.
> Martin
> On Oct 18, 2014, at 6:18 PM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote:
> > Martin, I wonder whether you think the notions of "inside" and "outside
> run into similar trouble of mental/material dualism?
> > I was thinking in particular of the notion of the "inside" of a system
> (this was how Jay Lemke once described the notion of "stance" as the
> insides if the system).
> > I can see trouble if we think of "Inside" solely in terms of "inside my
> head" as you mention. But I wonder if there isn't some possibility of
> working with this way of speaking that doesn't necessarily call in a
> mental/physical dualism? (I mean, "inside" and "outside are both ways of
> describing physical spaces, so it seems like as long as they aren't applied
> to a pre existing dualist if concept, then this shouldn't be a problem.)
> > And though I'm not fond of the brain-as-computer metaphor, it might be
> instructive as a way to think about this inside/outside distinction as the
> difference between watching the processor at work (outside) and watching
> the screens as a program runs (inside).
> > In principle the one can be reduced to the other, but in practice it
> can't anymore (I assume this is true with today's computers).
> > The degree of complexity can make it seem like the program running is an
> autonomous explanatory level of its own, but that doesn't mean that it is.
> Just that it is the "inside" of the system.
> > What do you think?
> > -Greg
> > Ps, apologies for not making more direct ties to lsv vs anl discussion.
> If this is too much of a sidetrack, I'm happy to take this up offline. But
> Martin, I find your position to be a very provocative one and would like to
> hear more about how it makes sense for you. It is a way of thinking that is
> very difficult to wrap one's Western language/mind/brain around!
> >
> >
> > Sent from my iPhone
> >
> >> On Oct 18, 2014, at 3:38 PM, Martin John Packer <
> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote:
> >>
> >> Hi Michael,
> >>
> >> LSV points out that no proper science sets out to study appearances.
> Every science studies entities that exist, in order to *explain*
> appearance. One of his examples is from the science of optics. When we
> place a burning candle in front of a mirror there *appears* to be a second
> candle burning behind the mirror, or 'in' the mirror. The scientist doesn't
> study that second candle. What he or she studies is the first candle, and
> the mirror, in order to discover principles by which to explain why an
> 'image' of a second candle appears, apparently located 'in' the mirror.
> >>
> >> It's the same with the mind. It *appears* to us (at least to those of
> us raised in western, scientific cultures) that our thoughts and feelings
> exist in a special, internal, subjective, hidden place that we call "the
> mind."  A scientific psychology, says LSV, needs to try to explain how that
> appearance is possible. It's not too difficult, in fact: our verbal
> thoughts, our private subvocal speech, is possible, first, because we can
> use vocal speech to direct our own actions and second, because a fibre
> bundle called the arcuate fasciculus forms between Broca's area and
> Wernicke's area (to considerably simply the neuroanatomy and
> neurofunctioning).  The appearance of a "mind in the head" is a *folk*
> psychology: it is simply one way, among several, in which people try to
> make sense of an experience that they have; it is the way our own
> psychological processes *appear* to us. Scientific psychology cannot study
> the mind, any more than it can study the second candle. It can, however,
> set out to *explain* the mind, and that is part of what LSV did.
> >>
> >> Martin
> >>
> >>> On Oct 18, 2014, at 8:11 AM, Glassman, Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu>
> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> I sort of feel like (at this point) Vygotsky did open himself up for
> being critiqued for going inside the head.  It was a choice, I don't think
> he was willing to give up the idea of individual development (which I think
> you have to do if you are going to escape dualism - because what develops
> if you can't say there is something inside the head that develops (remember
> I am suggesting individual development here).
> >>
> >>
> >