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[Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion



Paul, I really don't care if Willard Quine has problems.
My reply was in the tradition of Hegel, Marx and Vygotsky, not American analytical philosophy. Quine's difficulties shed no light on A N Leontyev's criticisms of Vygotsky.
Andy
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/


Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote:
But Andy, the genetic argument, the unity of consciousness and behavior, sounds like Willard van Orman quine ' s behaviorism and structurationism in sociology, neither adequately resolve the old conundrum of behaviorism? Watch quine as he struggles to resolve the conundrum....

Watch "On the Ideas of Quine: Section 1" on YouTube
On the Ideas of Quine: Section 1: http://youtu.be/1iZvycU3I9w
Dr. Paul C. Mocombe
President
The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc.
www.mocombeian.com www.readingroomcurriculum.com www.paulcmocombe.info

-------- Original message --------
From: Andy Blunden
Date:10/11/2014 8:22 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion

Mike, in my view, your observations below, that your "private"
reflections were connected to a future action is exactly the sense in
which CHAT bases itself on *action* as the unity of consciousness and
behaviour, i.e., genetically. When we simply confront the product
(private thoughts) insoluble conundrums are presented. CHAT understands
the relation of thinking and acting genetically.
Andy
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/


mike cole wrote:
> ...
> I might characterize what I was doing in the car as preparing for, and
> simulating a next turn in an ongoing discussion with a number of
> colleagues, unsure of what my own conclusions regarding the issue of
> thought/action/semiosis are. In light of the discussion, I began to wonder
> about that term, articulation, in Martin's note. I take articulation to
> mean roughly "to say out loud to another as part of a conversation (text?). > But, I have been asking myself, and ask you all for your thoughts, when I
> am engaged in verbal thinking aren't I engaged in a conversation with
> another, with an audience or my sense of an audience, as part of the
> process that generates what I say? It is often said that one does not stop
> being a sociocultural organism simply by virtue of being physically
> separate from others. Is there, in such "conversations with oneself" a form
> of articulation?
>
> And/or, might the fact that these thoughts were incorporated in my next
> communication as part of this conversation, not be considered a form of
> asychronous, semiotic, action?
>
> Thanks again for your concise answer. Sorry I cannot follow adequately some
> of the points you are making.
> mike
> >