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[Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion



Mike and Paul,
Paul assumes your thinking about the XMCA dialog had nothing to do with your driving. I find that riding my bike to the university in the morning sets loose thinking about what's "on my plate" intellectually. The same thing happens when I am dancing to music with others (I do Nia, very popular in some places). Lakoff's claim that cognition is embodied is typically related to metaphor, but I am interested in how the phonological pole of language is iconic, not just with onomatopoeia, but with all forms of sound symbolism. And I assume that the phonological pole is a subset of the sematic pole. The indexical, iconic, symbolic aspects of language, would it be fair to say they are on a continuum, rather than discontinuous? Temporal aspects of language (including within speech and writing), wouldn't they figure in with the making (including comprehension) of meaning? I am sure David said as much back a while. Am I making sense that relates at all to the on-going dialog?
Henry
 
On Oct 11, 2014, at 12:59 PM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" <pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote:

> Mike,
> 
> My comment was in reference to your process of thinking about the xmca conversation, and not your drive, which I am assuming from the speech act, comment has no relation to the thinking you was doing.  It is simply background information for us the reader (I am not going to reiterate the debate between derrida and Searle over the phenomenological issue of background, which derrida assumes Searle misunderstands...by the way based on you including it in your post it would imply that derrida is correct on the argument).  
> 
> Anyways, your act of thinking in the car is purely psychological and semiotic, and falls outside of austin's locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary categories.  This psychological act of thinking is the element Searle attempts to account for in Austin's thinking.  However, in order to do so he has to deal with three issues, background, intentionality, and the wittgensteinian issue of a private language, for example, was your act of thinking in the car a private speech act? Obviously it was not and Derrida is right their is nothing outside the text.    
> 
> 
> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe
> President
> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc.
> www.mocombeian.com 
> www.readingroomcurriculum.com 
> www.paulcmocombe.info 
> 
> <div>-------- Original message --------</div><div>From: mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> </div><div>Date:10/11/2014  1:10 PM  (GMT-05:00) </div><div>To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> </div><div>Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion </div><div>
> </div>Thanks Paul --
> 
> Could you take me a little further? Others might have the same question:
> How do the Searles and Austin views of semiotic mediation differ, Paul,
> such that Martin's formulation only works for one of them?
> 
> And how do they coincide, or differ, from Halliday's views, David Ke?
> 
> What are the major implications of the differences??
> 
> mike
> 
> On Fri, Oct 10, 2014 at 6:49 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe <
> pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote:
> 
>> Martin,
>> 
>> I would suggest that they are semiotic in John Searles theory of speech
>> act, but not austin's.
>> 
>> 
>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe
>> President
>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc.
>> www.mocombeian.com
>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com
>> www.paulcmocombe.info
>> 
>> <div>-------- Original message --------</div><div>From: mike cole <
>> mcole@ucsd.edu> </div><div>Date:10/10/2014  7:48 PM  (GMT-05:00)
>> </div><div>To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>> </div><div>Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion
>> </div><div>
>> </div>Martin-- When I was driving home by myself and thinking about the
>> conversation on xmca, it seemed like I might be thinking with words, but i
>> was not articulating and someone might even claim that it was all a jumble
>> of sense and meaning anyway. Would this be inconsistent with the belief
>> that both acting and thinking are semiotic in character?
>> mike
>> 
>> On Wed, Oct 8, 2014 at 9:28 AM, Martin John Packer <
>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co>
>> wrote:
>> 
>>> Might some kind of reconciliation be possible here by recognizing that
>>> both acting and thinking are *semiotic* in character?  Acting requires
>>> ongoing interpretation of signs (icons, indices, symbols) in the world.
>>> Thinking ditto, the difference being that verbal thinking (thinking with
>>> words), at least, requires articulating that interpretation in the form
>> of
>>> new signs.
>>> 
>>> ?
>>> 
>>> Martin
>>> 
>>> On Oct 8, 2014, at 9:09 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> I am asking if Andy and David will follow David's *lead* by exploring
>>>> *mind* through what David *indicates* is Vygotsky's KEY INSIGHT that
>> word
>>>> meaning is BEST understood -
>>>> 
>>>> "as MODES  of semantic abstraction and generalization THAN as
>> operations,
>>>> actions, and activities."
>>>> 
>>>> This notion of BEST ways to *indicate* the sense of word meanings.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> --
>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
>