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[Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion
усваивает? (Mind you, I don't have a Russian text in hand but this is what comes to mind while reading this para).
----- Original Message -----
From: "mike cole" <firstname.lastname@example.org>
To: "Andy Blunden" <email@example.com>, "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Sent: Thursday, October 9, 2014 8:42:11 PM
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion
Assimilate is a very unfortunate word choice. I wonder what the Russian was.
On Thu, Oct 9, 2014 at 6:08 PM, Andy Blunden <email@example.com> wrote:
> Dmitry Leontyev's main speech to ISCAR (at the pre-conference on Monday)
> was all about the dualism between sense and meaning, including the Russian
> terms (was it mysl and znachnie or something?) and the German Sinn and
> Bedeutung, and he preferred in ENglish to use "personal meaning" and
> "public meaning" to clarify the difference, because "sense" is so
> polysemic. A wonderful dualistic world, simply divided between internal,
> psychological sense and non-psychological, material/external meaning. The
> clearest explication of the fallacy of AN Leontyev's approach I have ever
> Anyway, as I understand it, "meaning" is objectively fixed in words by the
> objective relations between words and words, words and things, and between
> things. "Sense" is the internal psychological reflection of this external
> world. So in the "Evolution of the Psyche" I read:
> "Meaning is the reflection of reality irrespective of man’s
> individual, personal relation to it. Man finds an already prepared,
> historically formed system of meanings and assimilates it just as he
> masters a tool, the material prototype of meaning. The psychological
> fact proper, the fact of my life, is this, (a) that I do or do not
> assimilate a given meaning, do or do not master it, and (b) what it
> becomes for me and for my personality in so far as I assimilate it;
> and that depends on what subjective, personal sense it has for me."
> So I guess "primitive consciousness" is sort of like these people who vote
> for George Bush because "he's my kind of guy," and don't reflect on it. :)
> *Andy Blunden*
> mike cole wrote:
>> I, to, have returned to Leontiev's develoment book following David's
>> suggestion. Still reading,
>> but passages such as the following really dicombobulate me.
>> "The coincidences of sense and meanings is the main feature of primitive
>> On Thu, Oct 9, 2014 at 4:21 PM, Andy Blunden <firstname.lastname@example.org <mailto:
>> email@example.com>> wrote:
>> This discussion has sent me back to looking at A N Leontyev's
>> "Development of Mind." For all his faults, ANL expended a lot of
>> energy in tracing the phylogenetic evolution of activity (which
>> for ANL is a broad category, inclusive of unconscious activity).
>> He traces the evolution of behaviour (as in animals without a
>> central nervous system operating on a reflex basis) through
>> conditioned reflexes and habits to operations (scripts which can
>> be moved from one situation to another and adapted to conditions
>> without conscious awareness) to actions (consciously determined by
>> their immediate goal) to activities (where the goal is remote from
>> the immediate actions, and a whole series of actions are required
>> to meet the goal). Then he is able to trace the movement back and
>> forth between behaviour, operational activity, actions and
>> activities in both ontogenesis and microgenesis. I have always
>> been a bit impatient with this kind of move (reifying a theory of
>> human activity into Nature and then importing it back), but I have
>> to say it was a useful exercise. And clarifying.
>> Here is a link to an excerpt from part of this work:
>> *Andy Blunden*
>> David Kellogg wrote:
>> All of which has to be sung with screams of pain (Strauss has, you
>> see, stacked the deck in Rousseau's favor). But maybe both
>> singing and
>> speech are exaptations of something that is functionally
>> neither and
>> not specific to humans at all, which for want of a better name
>> we can
>> call activity WITHOUT thinking.
>> David Kellogg
>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.