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[Xmca-l] Re: Phenomenology as lived experience



Got it - thanks.
Carol

On 2 October 2014 19:35, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> wrote:

> Try this:
> http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/hau4.1.021
> You should be able to get the pdf from here.
> -greg
>
> On Thu, Oct 2, 2014 at 11:21 AM, Carol Macdonald <carolmacdon@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> > Hi Greg
> >
> > Please could you send me the reference details?  I'd love to have a look.
> >
> > Thanks
> > Carol
> >
> > On 2 October 2014 19:05, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > > Larry,
> > > and here is a recent articulation of the problematic of splitting
> reason
> > > from lived activity. It is from Tim Ingold's paper "That's enough about
> > > Ethnography" in the open source journal Hau:
> > >
> > > "These questions, however, are founded upon a certain understanding of
> > > immanence and transcendence, deeply rooted in the protocols of normal
> > > science,
> > > according to which human existence is constitutionally split between
> > being
> > > in the
> > > world and knowing about it. The alleged contradiction between
> > participation
> > > and
> > > observation is no more than a corollary of this split. As human beings,
> > it
> > > seems, we
> > > can aspire to truth about the world only by way of an emancipation that
> > > takes us
> > > from it and leaves us strangers to ourselves (Ingold 2013: 5).
> > > Anthropology, surely, cannot passively acquiesce to this excision of
> > > knowing
> > > from being. More than any other discipline in the human sciences, it
> has
> > > the means
> > > and the determination to show how knowledge grows from the crucible of
> > > lives
> > > lived with others. "
> > >
> > > On Wed, Oct 1, 2014 at 7:01 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> > wrote:
> > >
> > > > Greg,
> > > > Your inquiry of the *gap* forming when perception requires separating
> > > from
> > > > and re-composing or the perceptual field disappears from awareness
> has
> > be
> > > > reflecting on *lived experience*, Peirce's firstness, and
> *mediation*.
> > > >
> > > > Imagine a musical score played as a living experience.
> > > > Now imagine a musician playing each single note as notated on the
> > musical
> > > > score and re-cording each *individual* note.
> > > > After playing each note and re-cording the individual notes the
> > musician
> > > > re-assembles and plays back the notes in a series.
> > > > How do you imagine the experience of listening to this reassembled
> > > > individual notes which had been composed as singularities. Would
> > anything
> > > > be *missing* .Would we be orienting to go BEYOND the singular notes.
> Is
> > > > there *something* in EXCESS of the individual notes played in a
> series?
> > > Can
> > > > this *something extra* be indicated through the concept of *lived
> > > > experience* as phenomenological??
> > > > Is this lived experience *intersubjective* [or intrasubjective if you
> > are
> > > > trying to imagine that there are not two discrete individualities who
> > > > exist first as subjects and then meet and conjoin].
> > > >
> > > > Intersubjective as I use the term is phenomenological in a similar
> way
> > > that
> > > > music is internotational AS living [not lived] experience.
> > > >
> > > > In language use, John Shotter's saying as lived experience in
> contrast
> > > with
> > > > the said.
> > > >
> > > > Peirce tried to re-configure *reasoning* as a practice [I would say a
> > > lived
> > > > experience] as distinct from the *theory* of reasoning or
> metareasoning
> > > > [reasoning about reasoning].
> > > >
> > > > I have a sense [and Peirce would include BOTH perception AND
> inference
> > in
> > > > sense] that music that is played as individual notes is an
> abstracting
> > > > secondary derived practice extracted from the lived experience. When
> > the
> > > > individual notes are reassembled in a series, and the gaps filled in
> > > > between each note *something* will still be missing [and deadened] in
> > the
> > > > re-playing [the said]. What I think [or infer or sense] is missing is
> > the
> > > > actual lived experience between I and Thou [the phenomenological
> > > > experience]] that is always in EXCESS of our abstracting and
> analyzing
> > > > and reassembling of the individualities as notations.
> > > > Larry
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > --
> > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > > Assistant Professor
> > > Department of Anthropology
> > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> > > Brigham Young University
> > > Provo, UT 84602
> > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> > >
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > Carol A  Macdonald Ph D (Edin)
> > Developmental psycholinguist
> > Academic, Researcher,  and Editor
> > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa
> >
>
>
>
> --
> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> Assistant Professor
> Department of Anthropology
> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> Brigham Young University
> Provo, UT 84602
> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>



-- 
Carol A  Macdonald Ph D (Edin)
Developmental psycholinguist
Academic, Researcher,  and Editor
Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa