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[Xmca-l] Re: Phenomenology as lived experience



Greg,
Peirce explored the relation of reason and logic.
He suggests that acts or practices of reasoning are not following RULES of
logic. Logic [as rules] is the realm of *theory of reasoning* AFTER the
fact and imposed [derived secondary] from the acts of reasoning. This
parallels Merleau-Ponty's critiques of sense *data* or Shotter's
distinction between the saying [lived experience] and the said.

the KEY term for Peirce is *abduction* which explores the *supposed* aspect
of reasoning  as interpretive *musings* .  The imaginal aspect of reasoning
that goes BEYOND the *data* THIS imaginal aspect is phenomenological lived
experience.
Kathleen Hull in her article "Why Hanker After Logic? Mathematical,
Imagination, and Creativity in Peirce's Systematic Philosophy" gives a
clear explanation of interpretive musing and abduction.

I will summarize a few of her interpretive musings in her *reading* OF
Peirce's notion of abduction.
Peirce says abduction is hampered by logical *rules* but abduction IS
logical inference [and perception] and does have a definite logical form.
Abduction is a continuous process IN TIME and as a process is not liable to
being CUT UP in distinct arguments. Abductions AS *supposings* or wagers or
guesses or hypothetical reasonings are NOT the result of a SELF-CONTROLLED
and critical logic. This is not to say they are *illogical* but only that
their logic can ONLY be re-constructed AFTER THE FACTS. [re-presented in
comparison to presented]
Abduction as a living movement of thinking is to be contrasted with
reaching a conclusion BASED on syllogisms.
Peirce makes it clear there is a *conceptual inquiry* in the process of
populating or dwelling within this abductive horizon but it is NOT TO BE
REDUCED TO facts of psychology, not be reduced to facts of sociology, not
be reduced to facts of science.
The conceptual inquiry *in which* the hypothesis is INITIALLY PROPOSED is
not a reductive logical system in the sense of CONSCIOUSLY AND AGENTIVELY
following *a* set of rules. [syllogism]
Peirce does claim that abduction follows logical operations that do not
occur by chance, he emphasizes
"That NO reason whatsoever can be given for it, as far as I can discover,
AND IT NEEDS NO REASON, since it merely offers suggestions".
In other words that discovery is logical AND that no reason can be given
for discovery is Peirce's interpretive musing. This musing questions the
assumption that IF a new hypothesis is logical we must be able to give
reasons for this discovery IN THE FIRST PLACE.
To understand Peirce's musement we must enter his metaphysics. Peirce says
that for those who believe in a reality INDEPENDENT of how we may think it,
there ARE HARD FACTS which intrude in a compulsory way. He mentions these
HARD FACTS:
1. PERCEPTS - having an entirely irrational INSISTENCY
2. PERCEPTUAL JUDGEMENTS - the onlwy way we can know ABOUT percepts; AND
they likewise COMPEL ACCEPTANCE without ANY ASSIGNABLE REASON.
3. MATHEMATICAL DEMONSTRATIONS - constituted by "indefensible
compulsiveness"

These three "unreasonable compulsory FACTS" are similar in that they ALL
DISPLAY THE ASPECT OF SECONDNESS.

SECONDNESS DISPLAYS itself in our VERY IMAGININGS suggests that AS WE
DEMONSTRATE we are SURPRISED by the outcomes UNFOLDING within our
abductions, and musings and diagrammatic experiments. [showings] For Peirce
what is central is this *secondness* this COMPULSIVENESS that we are in the
*grip of* and that has us. This notion challenges the notion of *a
self-controlled thinker following a rule*

Greg, I hope this opens a horizon for exploring reasoning as living
experience phenomenologically
Larry



On Wed, Oct 1, 2014 at 6:01 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:

> Greg,
> Your inquiry of the *gap* forming when perception requires separating from
> and re-composing or the perceptual field disappears from awareness has be
> reflecting on *lived experience*, Peirce's firstness, and *mediation*.
>
> Imagine a musical score played as a living experience.
> Now imagine a musician playing each single note as notated on the musical
> score and re-cording each *individual* note.
> After playing each note and re-cording the individual notes the musician
> re-assembles and plays back the notes in a series.
> How do you imagine the experience of listening to this reassembled
> individual notes which had been composed as singularities. Would anything
> be *missing* .Would we be orienting to go BEYOND the singular notes. Is
> there *something* in EXCESS of the individual notes played in a series? Can
> this *something extra* be indicated through the concept of *lived
> experience* as phenomenological??
> Is this lived experience *intersubjective* [or intrasubjective if you are
> trying to imagine that there are not two discrete individualities who
> exist first as subjects and then meet and conjoin].
>
> Intersubjective as I use the term is phenomenological in a similar way
> that music is internotational AS living [not lived] experience.
>
> In language use, John Shotter's saying as lived experience in contrast
> with the said.
>
> Peirce tried to re-configure *reasoning* as a practice [I would say a
> lived experience] as distinct from the *theory* of reasoning or
> metareasoning [reasoning about reasoning].
>
> I have a sense [and Peirce would include BOTH perception AND inference in
> sense] that music that is played as individual notes is an abstracting
> secondary derived practice extracted from the lived experience. When the
> individual notes are reassembled in a series, and the gaps filled in
> between each note *something* will still be missing [and deadened] in the
> re-playing [the said]. What I think [or infer or sense] is missing is the
> actual lived experience between I and Thou [the phenomenological
> experience]] that is always in EXCESS of our abstracting and analyzing
> and reassembling of the individualities as notations.
> Larry
>
>
>
>
>