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[Xmca-l] Re: Phenomenology as lived experience



​Larry,
and here is a recent articulation of the problematic of splitting reason
from lived activity. It is from Tim Ingold's paper "That's enough about
Ethnography" in the open source journal Hau:

"These questions, however, are founded upon a certain understanding of
immanence and transcendence, deeply rooted in the protocols of normal
science,
according to which human existence is constitutionally split between being
in the
world and knowing about it. The alleged contradiction between participation
and
observation is no more than a corollary of this split. As human beings, it
seems, we
can aspire to truth about the world only by way of an emancipation that
takes us
from it and leaves us strangers to ourselves (Ingold 2013: 5).
Anthropology, surely, cannot passively acquiesce to this excision of
knowing
from being. More than any other discipline in the human sciences, it has
the means
and the determination to show how knowledge grows from the crucible of
lives
lived with others. "​

On Wed, Oct 1, 2014 at 7:01 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:

> Greg,
> Your inquiry of the *gap* forming when perception requires separating from
> and re-composing or the perceptual field disappears from awareness has be
> reflecting on *lived experience*, Peirce's firstness, and *mediation*.
>
> Imagine a musical score played as a living experience.
> Now imagine a musician playing each single note as notated on the musical
> score and re-cording each *individual* note.
> After playing each note and re-cording the individual notes the musician
> re-assembles and plays back the notes in a series.
> How do you imagine the experience of listening to this reassembled
> individual notes which had been composed as singularities. Would anything
> be *missing* .Would we be orienting to go BEYOND the singular notes. Is
> there *something* in EXCESS of the individual notes played in a series? Can
> this *something extra* be indicated through the concept of *lived
> experience* as phenomenological??
> Is this lived experience *intersubjective* [or intrasubjective if you are
> trying to imagine that there are not two discrete individualities who
> exist first as subjects and then meet and conjoin].
>
> Intersubjective as I use the term is phenomenological in a similar way that
> music is internotational AS living [not lived] experience.
>
> In language use, John Shotter's saying as lived experience in contrast with
> the said.
>
> Peirce tried to re-configure *reasoning* as a practice [I would say a lived
> experience] as distinct from the *theory* of reasoning or metareasoning
> [reasoning about reasoning].
>
> I have a sense [and Peirce would include BOTH perception AND inference in
> sense] that music that is played as individual notes is an abstracting
> secondary derived practice extracted from the lived experience. When the
> individual notes are reassembled in a series, and the gaps filled in
> between each note *something* will still be missing [and deadened] in the
> re-playing [the said]. What I think [or infer or sense] is missing is the
> actual lived experience between I and Thou [the phenomenological
> experience]] that is always in EXCESS of our abstracting and analyzing
> and reassembling of the individualities as notations.
> Larry
>



-- 
Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
Department of Anthropology
882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
Brigham Young University
Provo, UT 84602
http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson