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[Xmca-l] Re: Phenomenology as lived experience
I like your metaphor for the importance of syntagmatic relations in
experience (see what I did there?).
Seems like a close kin to this phenomena would be computer animated voices.
If you have ever tried to have Adobe read a pdf to you, you'll know what
I'm talking about. Each word is pronounced adequately (usually) but at the
level of the sentence it lacks the coherence of a human speaker. It is just
one word after another (with a pause when it comes to a comma or paragraph).
And when computers are able to give intonation to sentences, then it gets
scary. Check out the WOPR in the 80's classic film Wargames:
I also had a colleague that once was working on getting computers to
produce sentence-level intonation. When they tried it out with students,
the female students in particular said that they thought that the computers
were "creepy" b.c. it sounded like the computers were "coming onto them"
(in the colloquial sense of "hitting on" or making romantic advances).
So, indeed, the flow to experience is essential to human life. But perhaps
we had that already with William James and even Immanuel Kant.
What seems most interesting to me is the Peircean idea that you mentioned
of reasoning as lived experience.*
So, what's up with that?
Can you say more about that? How is reasoning lived experience?
*(and true, that may be nothing new either - consider Hamann or Goethe or
others in the German Romantic tradition, among other traditions).
On Wed, Oct 1, 2014 at 7:01 AM, Larry Purss <email@example.com> wrote:
> Your inquiry of the *gap* forming when perception requires separating from
> and re-composing or the perceptual field disappears from awareness has be
> reflecting on *lived experience*, Peirce's firstness, and *mediation*.
> Imagine a musical score played as a living experience.
> Now imagine a musician playing each single note as notated on the musical
> score and re-cording each *individual* note.
> After playing each note and re-cording the individual notes the musician
> re-assembles and plays back the notes in a series.
> How do you imagine the experience of listening to this reassembled
> individual notes which had been composed as singularities. Would anything
> be *missing* .Would we be orienting to go BEYOND the singular notes. Is
> there *something* in EXCESS of the individual notes played in a series? Can
> this *something extra* be indicated through the concept of *lived
> experience* as phenomenological??
> Is this lived experience *intersubjective* [or intrasubjective if you are
> trying to imagine that there are not two discrete individualities who
> exist first as subjects and then meet and conjoin].
> Intersubjective as I use the term is phenomenological in a similar way that
> music is internotational AS living [not lived] experience.
> In language use, John Shotter's saying as lived experience in contrast with
> the said.
> Peirce tried to re-configure *reasoning* as a practice [I would say a lived
> experience] as distinct from the *theory* of reasoning or metareasoning
> [reasoning about reasoning].
> I have a sense [and Peirce would include BOTH perception AND inference in
> sense] that music that is played as individual notes is an abstracting
> secondary derived practice extracted from the lived experience. When the
> individual notes are reassembled in a series, and the gaps filled in
> between each note *something* will still be missing [and deadened] in the
> re-playing [the said]. What I think [or infer or sense] is missing is the
> actual lived experience between I and Thou [the phenomenological
> experience]] that is always in EXCESS of our abstracting and analyzing
> and reassembling of the individualities as notations.
Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
Department of Anthropology
882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
Brigham Young University
Provo, UT 84602