[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

[Xmca-l] Phenomenology as lived experience



Greg,
Your inquiry of the *gap* forming when perception requires separating from
and re-composing or the perceptual field disappears from awareness has be
reflecting on *lived experience*, Peirce's firstness, and *mediation*.

Imagine a musical score played as a living experience.
Now imagine a musician playing each single note as notated on the musical
score and re-cording each *individual* note.
After playing each note and re-cording the individual notes the musician
re-assembles and plays back the notes in a series.
How do you imagine the experience of listening to this reassembled
individual notes which had been composed as singularities. Would anything
be *missing* .Would we be orienting to go BEYOND the singular notes. Is
there *something* in EXCESS of the individual notes played in a series? Can
this *something extra* be indicated through the concept of *lived
experience* as phenomenological??
Is this lived experience *intersubjective* [or intrasubjective if you are
trying to imagine that there are not two discrete individualities who
exist first as subjects and then meet and conjoin].

Intersubjective as I use the term is phenomenological in a similar way that
music is internotational AS living [not lived] experience.

In language use, John Shotter's saying as lived experience in contrast with
the said.

Peirce tried to re-configure *reasoning* as a practice [I would say a lived
experience] as distinct from the *theory* of reasoning or metareasoning
[reasoning about reasoning].

I have a sense [and Peirce would include BOTH perception AND inference in
sense] that music that is played as individual notes is an abstracting
secondary derived practice extracted from the lived experience. When the
individual notes are reassembled in a series, and the gaps filled in
between each note *something* will still be missing [and deadened] in the
re-playing [the said]. What I think [or infer or sense] is missing is the
actual lived experience between I and Thou [the phenomenological
experience]] that is always in EXCESS of our abstracting and analyzing
and reassembling of the individualities as notations.
Larry