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[Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds



Mike,
I love that you use the term "grok" and in this context!  This is a topic where grokking is essential - not atomizing nor synthesizing but taking new stuff on board as we evolve and new forms emerge.
Vandy 
(Valerie Wilkinson)

-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole
Sent: Friday, September 26, 2014 14:01
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds

We were only trying to whisper Greg, that the physiologically requisite conditions for sensing the world require that we separate from the world and recombine with it as an ongoing process or our sensory field framents and eventually d  s  pp ears.

With Tim Ingold due here next week, this and related topics will not go away.

I am still going back and forth between the two videos and considering David's erudite and thought provoking comments on them, or provoked by them. So far I have only gotten to the part where I am given a choice between Chez Panise and Applebees and wondering why class is not part of the discussion, but instead innate individual differences explain one's preferences as well as the preferences of the people in the audience.

Way more in these messages than I can properly grok!

mike

On Thu, Sep 25, 2014 at 8:51 AM, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Larry, I really appreciate your descriptions of Peirce's 3 categories 
> of experience. From my reading of Peirce, this seems as close to the 
> text as I have seen.
> But I wonder, now what? (or, perhaps a bit more bluntly "so what?").
> What do you make of this way of introducing differences that are 
> purported to make a difference?
> What can we do with these categories? Particularly as they related to 
> the imaginal, the imaginated, and the imagination.
>
> And lurking somewhere in the back of my head is Mike's voice shouting 
> that even the ontology of naturalism involves imagination (i.e. 
> mediation or "into image-making" - see Etienne Pelaprat and Mike's 
> paper on Minding the
> Gap) - and perhaps this is where there is much less of a difference 
> between the individual subscribing to a naturalist ontology and one 
> who lives in a world inhabited by spirits of dead ancestors and such - 
> both require a kind of meconnaissance, a mis-recognizing of the 
> mediated nature of the world and both FEEL that they know the world in 
> its immediacy (or perhaps just in a "more immediate, less mediated" 
> way than the other). Just as I feel that I am grasping a more 
> immediate and unmediated truth by making this very statement. We all 
> imagine our hold on the world to be immediate. And perhaps it is best 
> that this is so since it is difficult to imagine knowing how to go on 
> if we really were immediately in the world - as in a kind of perpetual Peircean firstness.
>
> Imagining that is to imagine the unimaginable.
>
> -greg
>
> On Thu, Sep 25, 2014 at 8:57 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > This topic of types of ontologies was engaged with by Peirce who 
> > proposed his 3 categories of experience.
> >
> > Firstness: Is the category of bare immediacy. *is* Pure 
> > undiscriminated presence. Epistemologically firstness is immediate 
> > and VIVID BUT INDESCRIBABLE experience. Metaphysically firstness is 
> > *possibility* that could *become* qualities that are general. 
> > [redness, pain] Firstness is unorganized, unreflected, and 
> > uncognized. Yet general qualities can
> > *emerge* in metaphysical firstness.
> >
> > SECONDNESS: Secondness is characterized by its RESISTANCE TO OUR
> INTENTIONS
> > or expectations. Epistemolgically secondness is experienced as a 
> > shock to habitual patterns of awareness. Secondness is particular and disruptive.
> > Metaphysically secondness is characterized as NONEGO [what is other] 
> > That is it cannot be associated with the *self* since it actively 
> > contradicts the VOLITIONS of the self.
> >
> > THIRDNESS depends upon both firstness and secondness and functions 
> > as
> THEIR
> > MEDIATION. Thirdness is conceptual and conscious. It is the realm of 
> > general repeatable habitual experiences AND [in general] thirdness 
> > is cognitive. All uniformities [in knowledge OR REALITY] are *modes* 
> > of thirdness insofar as they are general.
> > Human ACTION is GOVERNED by the thirdness that IS cognitively present.
> > Without thirdness we are left with the confusing and uncognizable 
> > world
> of
> > immediacy [firstness] and resistance [secondness]
> >
> > Peirce seems to be playing in this realm of reality and imaginal 
> > Larry
> >
> > On Thu, Sep 25, 2014 at 6:56 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > > Greg, and David
> > >
> > > The questions generated by reflections considering  types of the
> imaginal
> > > such as:
> > >
> > > # natural ontology that says something exists because the world 
> > > just
> *is*
> > > [nothing more, nothing less] in all its base materiality.
> > >
> > > # the imaginal *as* reality opening up an enchanted world of myth,
> belief
> > > and religion.
> > >
> > > # the *intentionally* constructed [made] imaginal that brings into
> *form*
> > > [structure] that are rational
> > >
> > > # the gestalt perception of multiple poly arrangements of the real 
> > > AND imaginal [*and* NOT as addition but as chiasm or binocular 
> > > depth perceiving/conceiving]
> > >
> > >  Greg SAYS he *feels* [intuits, speculates?] :
> > >
> > > "At the same time I can't help but feel like there is something
> different
> > > about these two TYPES of imagined worlds, with the other 
> > > (rationalist)
> > type
> > > of imagined worlds that, as you note, are perhaps more contrived, 
> > > more intentionally made."
> > >
> > > Then Greg makes a value observation that he notes is a difference 
> > > that makes a difference:
> > > :
> > > "But to say that there is a difference here worth noting is not to 
> > > say that  the latter is superior to the former. Rather, it seems 
> > > that this points to  differences in ontology."
> > >
> > > These various "types" when privileged are possibly "reductions" or 
> > > "abstractions" from the EXCESS which Merleau Ponty explores 
> > > through *expressive cognition* The notions of reversals, and 
> > > transversals, and
> > the
> > > personification of THIS movement of orientations [orientations in
> sense]
> > > can be personified in the person of Hermes [the trickster].
> > >
> > > Hillman, who plays within the ontology suggesting the imaginal is
> reality
> > > suggests the *I* [ego] is that personification [as imaginal] that
> *takes*
> > > itself literally, not metaphorically. If we see *through*  the 
> > > myth of
> > the
> > > *I* as a literalization of the social actor [as intentional maker 
> > > or constructor] then we possibly open up the EXCESS [of *is*] to 
> > > explore relations between *is* [material, being, becoming] with 
> > > the imaginal
> *as
> > > if* to create a *chiasm* or binocular vision in *depth* [which is 
> > > NOT a summation of the *is* and *and is*] but is a gestalt *type*
> historically
> > > constituted through *expressive cognition* [Merleau Ponty's term]
> > >
> > > Greg, this *feeling* as a way of orienting to make *sense* through
> > *types*
> > > seems like *interpretive musings* [Peirce]
> > >
> > > Just wondering
> > > Larry
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On Wed, Sep 24, 2014 at 11:45 PM, Greg Thompson <
> > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
> > > > wrote:
> > >
> > >> David,
> > >> Thanks for this wonderfully thoughtful note.
> > >> As I posted my note to the video, I was reading Max Gluckman's 
> > >> Rituals
> > of
> > >> Rebellion. In that book, Gluckman describes rituals in which 
> > >> people
> > invert
> > >> the norms of society for a period of time. This is clearly living 
> > >> in
> an
> > >> imagined world (perhaps as much as living in the world full of 
> > >> upright norms), but this wouldn't make it onto Saler's radar. So 
> > >> I agree with
> > your
> > >> concern about ethnocentrism.
> > >> At the same time I can't help but feel like there is something
> different
> > >> about these two types of imagined worlds, with the other 
> > >> (rationalist) type of imagined worlds that, as you note, are 
> > >> perhaps more contrived, more intentionally made.
> > >> But to say that there is a difference here worth noting is not to 
> > >> say
> > that
> > >> the latter is superior to the former. Rather, it seems that this
> points
> > to
> > >> differences in ontology. The intentionally made imaginary is a 
> > >> result
> > of a
> > >> naturalist ontology (here you see I am buying some of Saler's 
> > >> argument about a Weberian disenchantment with modernity). In a 
> > >> naturalist
> > ontology,
> > >> the world is just there in "all its base materiality." Nothing 
> > >> more, nothing less. There is no space for the rich imagined world 
> > >> of myth, belief, and religion (or so it is believed). In other 
> > >> worlds, there is space for something more.
> > >> Anyway, I think there was too much for me to chew on in your post.
> > >> Still thinking about it...
> > >> -greg
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 10:22 PM, David Kellogg 
> > >> <dkellogg60@gmail.com
> >
> > >> wrote:
> > >>
> > >> > Yes, I was impressed. But mostly I was impressed by how 
> > >> > cramped, ethnocentric and also present-centric Saler's view of 
> > >> > imaginary
> worlds
> > >> > is.
> > >> >
> > >> > The argument, as I understand it, is that the colonization of 
> > >> > imaginary worlds only begins with Sherlock Holmes, because it 
> > >> > is
> only
> > >> > with Sherlock Holmes that people began to deliberately 
> > >> > "believe" in
> a
> > >> > fictional creation and "disbelieve" in the actual creator. That 
> > >> > is, adult play only begins with people who were the peers of my 
> > >> > grandparents. Hoaxes, myths, and religions may also be 
> > >> > imaginary worlds that are inhabited by large numbers of people, 
> > >> > but they do
> not
> > >> > signify, because the effort of believing in them in order to 
> > >> > inhabit them is not differentiated from believing in them 
> > >> > because you think they are true.
> > >> >
> > >> > Of course, the distinction between the conscious, volitional 
> > >> > "suspension of disbelief" and non-conscious, non-volitional 
> > >> > delusion is very much older than this. At the end of Don 
> > >> > Quixote, the old
> man's
> > >> > neighbors try their very best to convince Don Quixote to go on 
> > >> > inhabiting the novelistic world he has created for them, and 
> > >> > fail; there is no suggestion that they do this because they 
> > >> > believe the
> old
> > >> > man's world is real. There was a spate of similar novels in 
> > >> > English
> in
> > >> > eighteenth century (e.g. Charlotte Lennox's "the Female 
> > >> > Quixote"),
> and
> > >> > Jane Austen's first novel, Northanger Abbey, is a romance about 
> > >> > a woman whose whole attraction is that she actually assumes 
> > >> > only the very best motives in real people, and reserves her 
> > >> > fascination with ill will for the reading of Gothic novels; 
> > >> > when she meets with a genuinely nasty character (General 
> > >> > Tilney) for the first time, she imputes Gothic motives to him 
> > >> > where there are only mundane and mercenary ones, and the novel 
> > >> > ends with the half disenchantment of
> the
> > >> > heroine and half enchantment of the General's son, both quite 
> > >> > deliberately acts of metacognition.
> > >> >
> > >> > But as with so many things, the Chinese thought of it much earlier.
> > >> > "Journey to the West" started out as "fan fiction" of a 
> > >> > particular kind of Buddhist adventure novel, and became 
> > >> > parodistsic. "Dream of the Red Chamber" is about a stone left 
> > >> > over from when the world was made, which is reincarnated by a 
> > >> > sensitive young man who falls in
> with
> > >> > one cousin and marries another. It is also about a garden, 
> > >> > built
> for a
> > >> > one day visit to her family by one of the Emperor's concubines,
> which
> > >> > eventually bankrupts the family. But the children of the family 
> > >> > are allowed to run wild there, and they indulge a wide variety 
> > >> > of
> fancies:
> > >> > at various places we are told that various parts of the novel, 
> > >> > and even whole families, are simply willful fictions in the 
> > >> > minds of others. Actually, in the days before mass printing, 
> > >> > almost every fiction manuscript was passed around in a 
> > >> > community (rather as Jane Austen's manuscripts were shared in 
> > >> > her family) and "Dream of the
> Red
> > >> > Chamber" was probably finished by someone else (the last third 
> > >> > of it was written well after the death of the author, but 
> > >> > computer
> analysis
> > >> > has not definitively proven that it was written by someone else).
> > >> >
> > >> > I think that the reason we tend to make howlers like Saler's is
> that,
> > >> > like fish, we just can't see the water we swim in, and we keep 
> > >> > thinking that our own age is somehow uniquely modern, and the 
> > >> > preoccupations of our own brands of irrealist and realist 
> > >> > thinking (e.g. between art and science, between rationality and 
> > >> > wonder) are
> the
> > >> > last word and not merely latest one. I spend a great deal of 
> > >> > the
> time
> > >> > that I spend writing half-listening to eighteenth century 
> > >> > operas, which are in very obvious ways imaginary worlds which 
> > >> > we enter only
> by
> > >> > voluntarily checking our linguistic assumptions in the 
> > >> > cloakroom. In less obvious ways, it seems to me, these 
> > >> > imaginary worlds are interested in a clash that we no longer 
> > >> > take very seriously. It's
> the
> > >> > clash between a form of knowledge which is broadly humanist, 
> > >> > because empirical, and one which is narrowly rationalist, 
> > >> > because
> puritanical.
> > >> > The humanist agenda demands that the opera must end in an act 
> > >> > of forgiveness (as the Count is forgiven in the Marriage of Figaro).
> The
> > >> > strictly rationalist agenda forbids this (because forgiveness 
> > >> > by its very nature is a kind of diremption of justice). Don 
> > >> > Giovanni gets around this problem by making repentance a 
> > >> > precondition for forgiveness, and then by arguing that the 
> > >> > truly damnable will never repent, not even as they are actually being damned.
> > >> >
> > >> > We still see traces of this clash between empiricistic humanism 
> > >> > and merciless rationalism in my own field, language teaching. 
> > >> > There is
> the
> > >> > humanist belief in words--empirical, temporary negotiations of
> meaning
> > >> > between human beings--and the rationalist belief in the 
> > >> > inflexible, innate laws of grammar. But elsewhere it seems to 
> > >> > have been subsumed in the general opposition between art and 
> > >> > science that we find in Saler's talk. Part of the point of my 
> > >> > book is really to try to
> revive
> > >> > it--in the form of a humanizing dialogic tendency in story 
> > >> > telling versus a more rationalizing narrativistic one.
> > >> >
> > >> > David Kellogg
> > >> > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> > >> >
> > >> > By the way...the index of the book has at last been fixed, and 
> > >> > everybody and their grandchildren can download the first two
> chapters
> > >> > for free at....
> > >> >
> > >> >
> > >> >
> > >>
> >
> https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/imagination-and-pr
> axis/the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit/
> > >> >
> > >> >
> > >> > (Yes, even xmca postings sometimes carry promotions...think of 
> > >> > it
> not
> > >> > as an interface between the virtual world and the real one, but 
> > >> > only as yet another interface between this virtual world and 
> > >> > the next
> one!)
> > >> >
> > >> > dk
> > >> >
> > >> >
> > >> >
> > >> > On 24 September 2014 12:10, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
> > >> > > Just trying to keep some minimum level of continuity in the
> > >> discussions,
> > >> > > Greg. Maybe its just my problem alone, but I think one or two
> others
> > >> > suffer
> > >> > > from the same difficulties.
> > >> > >
> > >> > > My intention is to watch both and consider them together. If
> that's
> > a
> > >> > > mistake, my loss! I do not watch TED talks as a general rule, 
> > >> > > but
> > when
> > >> > they
> > >> > > are specifically called out by xmca members as relevant, 
> > >> > > seems
> like
> > a
> > >> > > relatively painless way to figure out what other participants 
> > >> > > in
> the
> > >> > > discussion are trying to communicate.
> > >> > >
> > >> > > Easier than reading, for example, *Who's Asking*?  !! :-)))
> > >> > >
> > >> > > Rockin chair mike
> > >> > >
> > >> > > Thanks
> > >> > >
> > >> > > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:38 PM, Greg Thompson <
> > >> > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
> > >> > > wrote:
> > >> > >
> > >> > >> I thought the other tread was beginning to descend into "reality"
> > >> more
> > >> > than
> > >> > >> I care to (or perhaps worse, spiraling downward into the 
> > >> > >> abyss of
> > an
> > >> > >> epistemologically-minded social constructionism - is there a
> there
> > >> > there?).
> > >> > >>
> > >> > >> Seemed like good reason to soar in the imagination (yes, 
> > >> > >> Mike, I
> > know
> > >> > that
> > >> > >> you prefer to invert that metaphor and "ascend to the 
> > >> > >> concrete" -
> > >> which
> > >> > >> makes me wonder what you mean by "the concrete"? Reality? Or
> > >> something
> > >> > >> else? A "made real"?).
> > >> > >>
> > >> > >> But I'd agree that it is on point with a "making"-oriented 
> > >> > >> social constructionism (trying to avoid using that awful 
> > >> > >> word
> > >> "ontological"?).
> > >> > >>
> > >> > >> Anyway, I think this is the Haidt talk that John Cummins was
> > >> proposing:
> > >> > >>
> > >> http://www.ted.com/talks/jonathan_haidt_on_the_moral_mind?languag
> > >> e=en
> > >> > >>
> > >> > >> I'm wondering if people are a bit fed up with the Ted talks 
> > >> > >> since
> > it
> > >> > can be
> > >> > >> tough to find 20 minutes to watch/listen to a Ted talk and 
> > >> > >> they
> can
> > >> be
> > >> > hit
> > >> > >> or miss.
> > >> > >> But I would again strongly recommend the Saler talk I 
> > >> > >> originally
> > >> sent in
> > >> > >> this email. I thought David Ke, in particular, would find it
> > >> interesting
> > >> > >> (or at least point out where it is wrong). David?
> > >> > >> Others?
> > >> > >> -greg
> > >> > >>
> > >> > >>
> > >> > >>
> > >> > >>
> > >> > >>
> > >> > >> On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 6:59 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
> wrote:
> > >> > >>
> > >> > >> > I thought the other tread involved imagination as a 
> > >> > >> > central
> > >> component,
> > >> > >> > Greg.
> > >> > >> > So not clear why this is a distraction. (Or am i in the 
> > >> > >> > wrong
> > >> > >> conversation
> > >> > >> > here?).
> > >> > >> >
> > >> > >> > Can you find the Haight TED talk that was recommended to us?
> > >> Perhaps
> > >> > the
> > >> > >> > two talks will aid the discussion.
> > >> > >> > mike
> > >> > >> >
> > >> > >> > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:37 AM, Greg Thompson <
> > >> > >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
> > >> > >> > wrote:
> > >> > >> >
> > >> > >> > > Apologies for distracting from the "real world" 
> > >> > >> > > discussions
> on
> > >> the
> > >> > >> other
> > >> > >> > > thread, but I came across this Ted talk and thought that
> others
> > >> > might
> > >> > >> be
> > >> > >> > > interested in the history and role of imagined worlds in
> > >> politics:
> > >> > >> > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUtErxgz7Mo
> > >> > >> > >
> > >> > >> > > But perhaps it is worth tracing otherworlds and "the
> otherwise"
> > >> to
> > >> > >> works
> > >> > >> > > such as those of Jonathan Swift, Laurence Sterne, and
> Rabelais.
> > >> > >> > >
> > >> > >> > > Seems like imagining other worlds has always been a 
> > >> > >> > > deeply
> > >> political
> > >> > >> act.
> > >> > >> > >
> > >> > >> > > -greg
> > >> > >> > >
> > >> > >> > > --
> > >> > >> > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > >> > >> > > Assistant Professor
> > >> > >> > > Department of Anthropology
> > >> > >> > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University 
> > >> > >> > > Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> > >> > >> > >
> > >> > >> >
> > >> > >> >
> > >> > >> >
> > >> > >> > --
> > >> > >> >
> > >> > >> > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of
> construction
> > >> and
> > >> > re-
> > >> > >> > construction in which heterogeneous resources are 
> > >> > >> > contingently
> > but
> > >> > more
> > >> > >> or
> > >> > >> > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama,
> > Griffiths,
> > >> and
> > >> > >> > Gray, 2001]
> > >> > >> >
> > >> > >>
> > >> > >>
> > >> > >>
> > >> > >> --
> > >> > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > >> > >> Assistant Professor
> > >> > >> Department of Anthropology
> > >> > >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, 
> > >> > >> UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> > >> > >>
> > >> > >
> > >> > >
> > >> > >
> > >> > > --
> > >> > >
> > >> > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of 
> > >> > > construction
> > and
> > >> re-
> > >> > > construction in which heterogeneous resources are 
> > >> > > contingently but
> > >> more
> > >> > or
> > >> > > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, 
> > >> > > Griffiths,
> > and
> > >> > > Gray, 2001]
> > >> >
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> --
> > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > >> Assistant Professor
> > >> Department of Anthropology
> > >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> > >> Brigham Young University
> > >> Provo, UT 84602
> > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> > >>
> > >
> > >
> >
>
>
>
> --
> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> Assistant Professor
> Department of Anthropology
> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> Brigham Young University
> Provo, UT 84602
> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>



--
It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.