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[Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception



On 15 Sep 2014 7:08 AM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" <pmocombe@mocombeian.com>
wrote:

> Carol,
>
> It would appear, to me at least, that the unmediated sensations you are
> referring to parallels kant ' s forms of sensibilities and understandings,
> which belong to the body and schopenhauer 's will.  I would agree that
> culture enframes them in a variety of ways.  However, do they not, as
> sensations, tie us down to the material world irrespective of the mediated
> ways we encounter them?
>

Yes, I think so,and but I am not sure why that is a problem. Please
explain.

However, surely we can also remember these sensations.  Today some of our
suburbs had their water cut off for about 21 hours.  I am sure I wasn't the
only who could imagine how lovely it would be to have a shower (or bath or
wash, depending on your culture); and we know what water tastes like.


Carol


>
> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe
> President
> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc.
> www.mocombeian.com
> www.readingroomcurriculum.com
> www.paulcmocombe.info
>
> <div>-------- Original message --------</div><div>From: Carol Macdonald <
> carolmacdon@gmail.com> </div><div>Date:09/15/2014  8:39 AM  (GMT-05:00)
> </div><div>To: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>, "eXtended Mind, Culture,
> Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> </div><div>Subject: [Xmca-l] Re:
> mediate perception and direct perception </div><div>
> </div>Hi Andy,
>
> This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but at the
> same time purports to account for "everything".  But are there really only
> universal artefacts? There must be at least the possibility of
> - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this;
> - as yet potential understanding
> - a total lack of understanding.
> And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - so if we
> are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated.  We need to take in
> fluid, but everything apart from water also seems to be mediated. (And of
> course we serve water in culturally mediated ways.)
> I am sure I have too simplistic a view which misunderstands your schema
> Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns.
>
> Carol
>
> On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>
> > Ah! I see!
> > As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in
> > mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and
> > mediation." I have no great problem with anyone saying that anything is
> > mediated by anything else, where it is appropriate. My problem is that
> the
> > specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions provides
> > an especially productive unit of analysis for science is lost if
> mediation
> > in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with artefact-mediation
> > to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. Still, I would prefer that
> if
> > you were to make the point you were referring to you used some expression
> > other than "mediation."
> >
> > Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do what I
> > like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or thoughts) I have to
> use
> > some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a tool, a
> word,
> > a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, without
> > exception, are products of the history and culture into which I was
> born. I
> > can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them.
> So
> > every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well as
> personal.
> > Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical form is the
> > same for everyone, it is universal. So communication as much as
> > miscommunication takes place through everyone interpreting the same
> > material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my actions. How can they
> do
> > that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set of
> universal
> > artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and historical
> > analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science.
> Wonderful,
> > eh?
> >
> > Andy
> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > *Andy Blunden*
> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> >
> >
> > Huw Lloyd wrote:
> >
> >> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the
> >> history and production of the action.  Under such circumstances,
> assertions
> >> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become more
> >> obviously false.  If one has simplified, through "clarity", the action
> away
> >> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a concept
> >> cannot mediate an action.
> >>
> >> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant way
> >> to demonstrate this.
> >>
> >> Best,
> >> Huw
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:
> >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
> >>
> >>     he, he, Huw!
> >>     For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very
> >>     problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really
> >>     don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to
> >>     obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to
> >>     separation.
> >>     I really don't know what you are referring to with product and
> >>     history. Perhaps you could explain?
> >>     Andy
> >>     ------------------------------------------------------------
> >> ------------
> >>     *Andy Blunden*
> >>     http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> >>     <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> >>
> >>
> >>     Huw Lloyd wrote:
> >>
> >>         I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity".
> >>    Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the
> >>         need for simplicity.  Simplicity usually entails typologies or
> >>         other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and
> >>         perception of genetic relations.  Actually in cases such as
> >>         these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements
> >>         between artefacts and mind.  I think It would be equally
> >>         appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to
> >>         obfuscate (see darkly) too.
> >>
> >>         I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to
> >>         disagree with the 2nd paragraph.  For example, why separate
> >>         the act from its production and history?         Of course, if
> >> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from
> >>         modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem.
> >>
> >>         Best,
> >>         Huw
> >>
> >>         On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
> >>         <mailto:ablunden@mira.net> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
> >>
> >>         <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> wrote:
> >>
> >>             My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT
> >>         tradition
> >>             specifically, as opposed to the English language in general,
> >>             mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every
> >>         action
> >>             is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive
> >>         contexts,
> >>             "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite
> >>         legitimately,
> >>             but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In
> social
> >>             theory, for example, mediation of activities by other
> >>         activities
> >>             or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by
> >>             artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic
> is
> >>             psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I
> >>             prefer to spell it out and use the term
> >>         "artefact-mediated" rather
> >>             than the vague term "mediated".
> >>
> >>             I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a
> >>             concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to
> >>         mean what
> >>             you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context
> of
> >>             CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of
> >>         "mediation" in
> >>             the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact
> that a
> >>             concept is not immediately present in any act of
> >>         communication or
> >>             any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*.
> >>         Artefacts,
> >>             such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can
> of
> >>             course mediate an act of communication. But the point is
> >>         that a
> >>             word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for
> >>         any one
> >>             concept. It means different things to different people.
> >>         Concepts
> >>             are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their
> >>         materiality,
> >>             but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept
> >>         in mind
> >>             when we use a word in communication, the communication is
> >>         mediated
> >>             by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be
> >>         aware
> >>             of that.
> >>
> >>             So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in
> >>         qualified
> >>             way so that its specific meaning is made clear.
> >>
> >>             Andy
> >>             PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too.
> >>                    ------------------------------
> >> ------------------------------------------
> >>             *Andy Blunden*
> >>             http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> >>         <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> >>             <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>             Greg Thompson wrote:
> >>
> >>                 Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture?
> >>
> >>                 Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we
> >>         would need
> >>                 to include
> >>                 reflexes)
> >>
> >>                 And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in
> >>                 Bateson's man with
> >>                 the stick? (in which case, we would need to include
> >>         newborns).
> >>
> >>                 Just wonderin'.
> >>
> >>                 -greg
> >>
> >>
> >>                 On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner
> >>                 <dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>
> >>         <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>>> wrote:
> >>
> >>                                      Thanks for replies.
> >>                     I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided
> >>         to stop
> >>                     talking about
> >>                     situated cognition because the pragmatics of
> >>         adjectival
> >>                     use implies there
> >>                     has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He
> now
> >>                     speaks of
> >>                     situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of
> >>                     physical reflexes (and
> >>                     perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human
> >>         action
> >>                     is mediated (and
> >>                     perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So,
> it's
> >>                     worth noting that
> >>                     "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of
> >>         action, but
> >>                     rather a
> >>                     theoretical assumption about all human action;
> though
> >>                     there seems to be
> >>                     some variation in interpretation of what that
> >>         assumption
> >>                     entails.
> >>                     David
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >
>
>
> --
> Carol A  Macdonald Ph D (Edin)
> Developmental psycholinguist
> Academic, Researcher,  and Editor
> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa
>
>