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[Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception

Sure Kate, "all action is mediated through culture," but that is not only a very general statement which is kind of bound to be true, but what is culture? Is the concept of culture something clearer and more definite and basic that the concept of "action"? How does it help us to know that "culture" is mediating all our actions?
*Andy Blunden*

Katherine Wester Neal wrote:
I'm still working through all this and trying to keep up with the discussion, so please bear with me if this is simplistic. I am wary of blanket statements, but I think it is possible to say that all action is mediated through culture. Certainly for adults, I think culture is the medium through which everyone lives their lives. (I am not so sure this is true with children of all ages, but that's a different post.) Perhaps not? Carol's examples really have me thinking this morning about what is or isn't mediated. I think even the sensation of being hungry is mediated; scads of advertising dollars are expended to make us think, at least in the U.S., that we are hungry all the time--not just for food, but also for more stuff. And in nearly every locale in the U.S., even the water is mediated: filtered by local authorities and pumped up with fluoride. That's not always true outside of the U.S., so following the "all action is culturally-mediated" statement, I would say the filtering and the fluoride are culturally-based actions that then themselves mediate how people act to fulfill a basic need.

Katie Wester-Neal
Doctoral Candidate
University of Georgia

On Sep 15, 2014, at 9:07 AM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" <pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote:


It would appear, to me at least, that the unmediated sensations you are referring to parallels kant ' s forms of sensibilities and understandings, which belong to the body and schopenhauer 's will.  I would agree that culture enframes them in a variety of ways.  However, do they not, as sensations, tie us down to the material world irrespective of the mediated ways we encounter them?

Dr. Paul C. Mocombe
The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc.
www.readingroomcurriculum.com www.paulcmocombe.info
<div>-------- Original message --------</div><div>From: Carol Macdonald <carolmacdon@gmail.com> </div><div>Date:09/15/2014  8:39 AM  (GMT-05:00) </div><div>To: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>, "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> </div><div>Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception </div><div>
</div>Hi Andy,

This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but at the
same time purports to account for "everything".  But are there really only
universal artefacts? There must be at least the possibility of
- misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this;
- as yet potential understanding
- a total lack of understanding.
And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - so if we
are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated.  We need to take in
fluid, but everything apart from water also seems to be mediated. (And of
course we serve water in culturally mediated ways.)
I am sure I have too simplistic a view which misunderstands your schema
Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns.


On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:

Ah! I see!
As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in
mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and
mediation." I have no great problem with anyone saying that anything is
mediated by anything else, where it is appropriate. My problem is that the
specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions provides
an especially productive unit of analysis for science is lost if mediation
in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with artefact-mediation
to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. Still, I would prefer that if
you were to make the point you were referring to you used some expression
other than "mediation."

Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do what I
like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or thoughts) I have to use
some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a tool, a word,
a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, without
exception, are products of the history and culture into which I was born. I
can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. So
every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well as personal.
Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical form is the
same for everyone, it is universal. So communication as much as
miscommunication takes place through everyone interpreting the same
material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my actions. How can they do
that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set of universal
artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and historical
analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. Wonderful,

*Andy Blunden*

Huw Lloyd wrote:

If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the
history and production of the action.  Under such circumstances, assertions
that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become more
obviously false.  If one has simplified, through "clarity", the action away
from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a concept
cannot mediate an action.

The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant way
to demonstrate this.


On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:
ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:

   he, he, Huw!
   For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very
   problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really
   don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to
   obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to
   I really don't know what you are referring to with product and
   history. Perhaps you could explain?
   *Andy Blunden*

   Huw Lloyd wrote:

       I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity".
  Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the
       need for simplicity.  Simplicity usually entails typologies or
       other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and
       perception of genetic relations.  Actually in cases such as
       these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements
       between artefacts and mind.  I think It would be equally
       appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to
       obfuscate (see darkly) too.

       I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to
       disagree with the 2nd paragraph.  For example, why separate
       the act from its production and history?         Of course, if
one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from
       modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem.


       On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
       <mailto:ablunden@mira.net> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net

       <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> wrote:

           My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT
           specifically, as opposed to the English language in general,
           mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every
           is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive
           "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite
           but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In social
           theory, for example, mediation of activities by other
           or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by
           artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic is
           psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I
           prefer to spell it out and use the term
       "artefact-mediated" rather
           than the vague term "mediated".

           I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a
           concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to
       mean what
           you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context of
           CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of
       "mediation" in
           the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact that a
           concept is not immediately present in any act of
       communication or
           any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*.
           such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can of
           course mediate an act of communication. But the point is
       that a
           word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for
       any one
           concept. It means different things to different people.
           are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their
           but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept
       in mind
           when we use a word in communication, the communication is
           by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be
           of that.

           So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in
           way so that its specific meaning is made clear.

           PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too.
           *Andy Blunden*

           Greg Thompson wrote:

               Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture?

               Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we
       would need
               to include

               And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in
               Bateson's man with
               the stick? (in which case, we would need to include

               Just wonderin'.


               On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner
               <dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>
       <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>>> wrote:

                                    Thanks for replies.
                   I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided
       to stop
                   talking about
                   situated cognition because the pragmatics of
                   use implies there
                   has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He now
                   speaks of
                   situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of
                   physical reflexes (and
                   perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human
                   is mediated (and
                   perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, it's
                   worth noting that
                   "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of
       action, but
                   rather a
                   theoretical assumption about all human action; though
                   there seems to be
                   some variation in interpretation of what that