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[Xmca-l] Re: Intellect and consciousness



Well, myself I am following Larry's lead and reading Alex's book on
Vygotsky so that i can understand the context in which he brought this
topic up, and in the context of his general interpretation of core
Vygotskian concepts.

I would prefer 2 or three potential paradigmatic exemplars of consciousness
before I decided that one was THE paradigmatic exemplar, especially when
that examplar is intellect. Also at the end of T&L is Spinoza and emotion.

mike



On Tue, May 20, 2014 at 7:21 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:

> David, there is terminology, categorical distinctions, and the content of
> the science.
> Almost self-evidently, Thinking and Speech broke off at the threshold of
> the content of the science, and regretably, being a pioneer meant that his
> terminology was also unstable and rudimentary. My claim was that T&S was
> decisive in relaiton to the categorical distinctions underlying the
> science, despite the terminological mess.
>
> I read Vygotsky as a Marxist, rather than as a linguist or a
> Phenomenologist or a teacher, all of which are I am sure legitimate
> standpoints for reading Vygotsky. But I think there is some basis for
> taking it that Vygotsky is using "consciousness" in line with Marxist
> terminology at the time indicating the entire class of phenomena
> encompassed by a general psychology, perhaps similar to what you mean by
> "general consciousness"?
> As to the distinction between "dialogical consciousness" and "intellect",
> if we are restricting "dialogic consciousnes" typologically to language
> use, then I think that that is too unstable and problematic for a
> categorical distinction. If on the other than we were to widen the meaning
> of "dialogical" to sign-use, then I would identify it with intellect. The
> spoken word is the *archetype* of sign-use, but not the only instance of
> sign-use.
>
> I remain of the view that T&S, and in particular thes closing lines,
> specify that he has devoted the book to a study of the *intellect* (the
> special) as a paradigmatic exemplar for psychological research into human
> *consciousness* (as a whole).
>
>
>
> Andy
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.mira.net/~andy/
>
>
> David Kellogg wrote:
>
>> I certainly don't think we can say, surely or otherwise, that the last
>> words of "Thinking and Speech" put an end to the matter. After all, what
>> Vygotsky himself said, in the first words of the book, was that the
>> investigation was broken off at the threshold.
>>
>> Mike's question is about where and when Vygotsky made a clear distinction
>> between consciousness and intellect. Even if we agree that what is meant
>> by
>> "consciousness" is not dialogic consciousness but merely consciousness of
>> sensation, we still need a term for dialogic consciousness. I also think
>> that using the term "consciousness" to refer to consciousness of
>> sensation leaves a gap--we no longer have a clear, unambiguous term for
>> general consciousness of which consciousness of sensation, dialogic
>> consciousness and intellect are all parts.
>>
>> David Kellogg
>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>
>>
>>
>> On 21 May 2014 00:14, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>> Andy, David
>>>
>>> Mike's question is generating answers.
>>> Andy, you quoted:
>>>
>>>  "In consciousness, the word is what - in Feuerbach's words - is
>>> absolutely
>>> impossible for one person but possible for two. The word is the most
>>> direct
>>> manifestation of the historical nature of human
>>> consciousness. Consciousness is reflected in the word like the sun is
>>> reflected in a droplet of water. The word is a microcosm of
>>> consciousness"
>>>
>>> The key seems to be the word is absolutely IMPOSSIBLE for one person but
>>> possible for two. [dialectical. AND dialogical]
>>>
>>> Volosinov wrote: "Language lives and historically evolves IN CONCRETE
>>> verbal communication/Intercourse, neither in the abstract/linquistic
>>> forms
>>> of language NOR in the individual psyche of the speakers."
>>>
>>> Bahktin wrote:  "Actual act-performing thinking is an
>>> emotional-volitional
>>> thinking, a thinking that INTONATES and THIS intonation permeates in an
>>> ESSENTIAL manner in moments of a thought's content."
>>>
>>> Vygotsky wrote:  "The one who begins by separating thinking from affect
>>> forever CLOSES the way to an explication of the causes of thinking ....
>>> and
>>> makes conversely also impossible the investigation of the reverse action
>>> of
>>> thought on the affective-volitive side of psychological life."
>>>
>>> Wolff-Miichael Roth wrote: "In a section of *Thought and Language* where
>>> the scholar focuses on the changes of signification IN THE LIVING PROCESS
>>> of verbal thinking, he provides a description of a continuous coming and
>>> going that relates two processes, thinking and speaking, themselves
>>> manifestations of a higher process, WORD-SIGNIFICATION. Vygotsky does NOT
>>> say that one of the processes constitutes a dialectical inversion of the
>>> other; instead he emphasizes the back and forth BETWEEN the processes.
>>> The
>>> back and forth IS a DEVELOPING [rather than] constant process As a result
>>> of the of THIS coming and going, a thought, which BEGINS as something
>>> VAGUE
>>> develops into a fully articulated idea. The word, for Vygotsky, is NOT an
>>> expression of thought; rather thought BECOMES fully itself ONLY IN
>>> SPEAKING, the voice NEVER is cut off from the idea."
>>>
>>> Wolf-Michael uses the metaphor [internal engine] in this statement:
>>> A speaker "is not just dumping the contents of his mind into the public
>>> forum, but that he [the speaker] is taking up and thefefore evaluating,
>>> the
>>> preceding locution(Bahktin 1978) which is in FACT the internal engine
>>> that
>>> DRIVES the development of speech activity generally AND its moments, the
>>> individual utterances (understood as an irreducuible social phenomenon
>>> specifically (Volosinov, 1930; Vygotskij, 2005) "
>>>
>>> I hope these quotes gesture to *the engine that drives* intonation and
>>> prosody [hearing and seeing as material processes] WITHIN dialectical and
>>> dialogical INTERNAL RELATIONS.
>>>
>>>
>>> larry
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Mon, May 19, 2014 at 5:12 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> The last words of Thinking and Speech surely put an end to the matter
>>>>
>>>>    http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/words/Chapter7.pdf
>>>>
>>>>    "The /consciousness of sensation/ and /thinking/ are characterized
>>>>    by different modes of reflecting reality. They aredifferent types of
>>>>    consciousness."
>>>>
>>>> Immediate sensuous awareness and intellect are *different types of
>>>> consciousness*.
>>>>
>>>>    "Therefore, thinking and speech are the key to understanding the
>>>>    nature of human consciousness."
>>>>
>>>> Intellect is the *key* to understanding consciousness, because by
>>>> understanding just the one, the most developed type of consciousness in
>>>>
>>>>
>>> its
>>>
>>>
>>>> special formation, we unlock the whole ("the hand of man is the key to
>>>> anatomy of the ape")
>>>>
>>>> But if you equate the highest with the lowest and the microcosm with the
>>>> unit, then you may not read this the same way,
>>>>
>>>>    "If language is as ancient as consciousness itself, if language is
>>>>    consciousness that exists in practice for other people and therefore
>>>>    for myself, then it is not only the development of thought but the
>>>>    development of consciousness as a whole that is connected with the
>>>>    development of the word. Studies consistently demonstrate that the
>>>>    word plays a central role not in the isolated functions but the
>>>>    whole of consciousness. In consciousness, the word is what - in
>>>>    Feuerbach's words - is absolutely impossible for one person but
>>>>    possible for two. The word is the most direct manifestation of the
>>>>    historical nature of human consciousness.
>>>>    Consciousness is reflected in the word like the sun is reflected in
>>>>    a droplet of water. The word is a microcosm of consciousness,
>>>>    related to consciousness like a living cell is related to an
>>>>    organism, like an atom is related to the cosmos. The meaningful word
>>>>    is a microcosm of human consciousness."
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Andy
>>>>
>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> ------------
>>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy/
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> David Kellogg wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> But I think Mike's specific question is a good one, and it cries out
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> for a
>>>
>>>
>>>> specific answer. Where exactly does Vygotsky speak of "consciousness" as
>>>>> distinct from "intellect"? He certainly discusses consciousness a lot;
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> it
>>>
>>>
>>>> is the "topic that will not speak its name" throughout the whole of
>>>>> "Thinking and Speech", and one can easily understand why Zavershneva
>>>>> thinks
>>>>> that "Thinking and Speech" is only the prologue of a much longer
>>>>> trilogy
>>>>> on
>>>>> consciousness. He also discusses intellect alot; it is the explicit
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> topic
>>>
>>>
>>>> of most of HDHMF, and part of his outrage over "intelligence" testing in
>>>>> Chapter Fourteen and "accelerated development" in his Lectures on
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> Pedology
>>>
>>>
>>>> is his anger that intellect could be reduced to a kind of ontogenetic
>>>>> speeding. But where does Vygotsky distinguish the one from the other?
>>>>>
>>>>> The best answer I can come up with is Chapter Six of "Thinking and
>>>>> Speech",
>>>>> where Vygotsky places inner speech at the extreme dialogic end of a
>>>>> continuum which has oral speech in the middle and written speech at the
>>>>> far
>>>>> monologic end. Of course, this assumes that "inner speech" is a
>>>>> realization
>>>>> of consciousness and that "written speech" is a realization of
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> intellect,
>>>
>>>
>>>> and that seems a leap too far for Kozulin: both are both. So perhaps the
>>>>> solution is to consider some mediating layer--some form of meaning
>>>>> potential which realizes consciousness and is realized as inner speech,
>>>>> and
>>>>> some other form of meaning potential that realizes intellect and is
>>>>> realized as writing. That's where, I think, Larry is going when he
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> brings
>>>
>>>
>>>> in Bakhtin and genre: dialogues at the end of consciousness and
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> narratives
>>>
>>>
>>>> at the end of intellect: the two modes of consciousness/intellect--the
>>>>> episodic and the narrativistic--discussed by Strawson in a paper
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> discussed
>>>
>>>
>>>> by xmca a few years ago.
>>>>>
>>>>> My graduate students are trying to write a version of Shakespeare's
>>>>> "The
>>>>> Tempest" for children. This morning one of them condensed the whole of
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> Act
>>>
>>>
>>>> One (except the actual tempest) into the following dialogue:
>>>>>
>>>>> Miranda: Father--soften the storm. Where is my lover?
>>>>> Prospero: Don't worry. No one died. Your lover's coming.
>>>>>
>>>>> (Miranda sleeps)
>>>>>
>>>>> Ariel: Great Master! I did what you asked.
>>>>> Prospero: Where are the king's ship and the passengers?
>>>>> Ariel: They are all safe. The king's ship is in the harbor.
>>>>>
>>>>> (Prospero goes to look.)
>>>>>
>>>>> Ariel: Come unto these yellow sands....!
>>>>> Ferdinand: Where does the music come from? It softens my fury....
>>>>>
>>>>> (Ferdinand finds the sleeping Miranda.)
>>>>>
>>>>> You can see--from the parenthetic stage directions, but above all from
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> the
>>>
>>>
>>>> missing intellectations--that dialogue cannot do it all. We need some
>>>>> narrative here as well! And when we go back to Shakespeare's original
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> text
>>>
>>>
>>>> we do find that most of Act One consists of Prospero's narrative to the
>>>>> distracted Miranda.
>>>>>
>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 19 May 2014 22:42, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> Mike, Peter
>>>>>> Thanks for keeping this thread moving.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Mike, your reflection on models of schooling *expanding beyond* the
>>>>>> ethnocentrism of Bibler's model seems to be an underlying *value*
>>>>>> built
>>>>>> into the model.
>>>>>> The model seems to  presume multiple logics and rationalities
>>>>>> [cultural
>>>>>> historical formations or schemas] and therefore Eurocentric formations
>>>>>> within this model must also be transfigured through dialogue.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Bibler's approach focuses on learning multiple particular schemas
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> through
>>>
>>>
>>>> an *immersion* experience at each grade level. The intent is to live
>>>>>> through the experience of *knowing* within each sociocultural schema
>>>>>> by the approach of reading the *primary documents* and developing the
>>>>>> unique *logic/value* of that particular schema. [various grades in
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> school
>>>
>>>
>>>> offer immersion experiences in different logic formations]
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This approach would hopefully develop within each person a polylogical
>>>>>> sensibility that would situate the scientific logic of our current
>>>>>> sociocultural schema as only one particular formation which could be
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> put
>>>
>>>
>>>> into dialogue with previous formations which are seen as equally valid
>>>>>> formations that continue to enter interplay with our scientific
>>>>>> biases.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> To *extend* and *go beyond* the ethnocentrism of Bibler's model which
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> is
>>>
>>>
>>>> biased toward *Eurocentric presuppositions* seems to be a natural
>>>>>> extension
>>>>>> of the model.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Mike,
>>>>>> I read Alex Kozulin writings on Bibler's approach as an example of
>>>>>> Vygotsky's writings on *inner speech* being put into dialogue with
>>>>>> Bahktin's writings on *readings and genres* as formations of
>>>>>> consciousness.
>>>>>> The reciprocal movements of orientation moving towards *internal*
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> speech*
>>>
>>>
>>>> AND the interplay with the movements of orientation moving towards
>>>>>> cultural
>>>>>> historical schemas. How these movements of orientation are linked
>>>>>> *hinges*
>>>>>> or *pivots* on this reciprocal interplay.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This seems to offer a model of schooling AS reciprocal conversations
>>>>>> developing *thinking*, *speech*, and *readings* as mutually reciprocal
>>>>>> intersubjective experiences.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The underlying movement of answerability as responding to emerging
>>>>>> questions that is moving *beyond* received knowledge formations/logics
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> by
>>>
>>>
>>>> the process of *living through* and exploring the concealed logics
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> within
>>>
>>>
>>>> each schema.
>>>>>> The centrality of *gaps* and *openings* emerging within all received
>>>>>> *knowings* which then *call us* into dialogue and re-search and
>>>>>> experiments
>>>>>> [as dialogical ways of orienting] which develop through dialogue and
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> the
>>>
>>>
>>>> reciprocal engagement of self-reflection AND intersubjective
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> reflection.
>>>
>>>
>>>> The question Alex Kozulin leaves open is the notion of *higher forms*
>>>>>> *sublating* earlier formations OR if these earlier formations are
>>>>>> continually in dialogue with later formations.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The concept *sociocultural schemas* is the notion Alex Kozulin
>>>>>> explored
>>>>>> in
>>>>>> his book inviting us to re-engage this concept within a revitalized
>>>>>> *humanism*. Bibler's approach to schooling is one particular answer to
>>>>>> Kozulin's general question of how do we engage with *sociocultural
>>>>>> schemas*
>>>>>> as dialogically developing formations.
>>>>>> I read Kozulin's question as a movement of going beyond received
>>>>>> traditions
>>>>>> while honouring these traditions. Moving through *Eurocentrism* to go
>>>>>> *beyond* and embrace other sociocultural schemas in dialogue with
>>>>>> *Eurocentric* models is an approach of deepening our conversations
>>>>>> AS questions and answers. Conversations as gestures within genres.
>>>>>> This
>>>>>> approach has the potential to develop polylogical ways of orienting as
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> we
>>>
>>>
>>>> move forward within a new expanding humanism of communicative action.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Alex may have more to contribute on this theme of sharing mutual
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> dialogue
>>>
>>>
>>>> towards finding *common ground* within a new commons
>>>>>> Larry
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 6:34 PM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Thank you for sending your overview of the papers based Bibler's
>>>>>>> ideas
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> and
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> their pedagogical implications, Peter. And thanks for the succinct
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> summary
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> from Alex Kozulin, Larry.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> To me it seems that the only way to overcome the ethnocentricism in
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> the
>>>
>>>
>>>>  model is to make the conversation a global polylogue, Peter. Creating
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> conditions for such a polylogue within the structures of state or
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> business
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> scientific structure of power seems a real challenge, even for the
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> wealthy.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> What source(s) does one take as the purpose of education, as a social
>>>>>>> category and its related social institutions of implementation?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> Constantly
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> posing the questions seems one source. Creating alternatives seems
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> another.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> One hopes that where there is a way there will also be a will!
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We'll see.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Meantime, I had a question about the quotation from Alex's work, so I
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> will
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> include him the discussion, the contents of which he knows far better
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> than
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I. The statement that caught my eye was this:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> At this moment it seems relevant to recall Vygotsky's distinction
>>>>>>> between
>>>>>>> consciousness and intellect. Intellect, and its OBJECTIVIZED FORM,
>>>>>>> scientific reasoning, are MONOLOGOUS and object-oriented, while
>>>>>>> consciousness, which is ORGANIZED by the system of *senses* is
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> NECESSARILY
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> dialogical.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ​Here is my question: Where is this well known distinction between
>>>>>>> consciousness and intellect best represented in Vygotsky's writings?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ((It seems important to suggest that a consciously organized system
>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>> senses
>>>>>>> (as in sense/meaning) would be polylogical, that is, ideally, global.
>>>>>>> Binary systems, in particular, seem to be unstable in ways that are
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> not
>>>
>>>
>>>>  condusive to human develpment.))
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ​
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Thu, May 15, 2014 at 4:10 AM, Peter Smagorinsky <smago@uga.edu>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Here's my contribution.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Smagorinsky, P. (2011). A distant perspective on the School of the
>>>>>>>> Dialogue of Cultures pedagogical movement in Ukraine and Russia.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Journal
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Russian and East European Psychology, 49(2), 29-35. Available at
>>>>>>>> http://www.petersmagorinsky.net/About/PDF/JREEP/JREEP2011.pdf
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Peter Smagorinsky
>>>>>>>> Distinguished Research Professor of English Education
>>>>>>>> Department of Language and Literacy Education
>>>>>>>> The University of Georgia
>>>>>>>> 315 Aderhold Hall
>>>>>>>> Athens, GA 30602
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss
>>>>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, May 14, 2014 10:14 PM
>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bibler's concept of "formations of Reasoning"
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Thanks, Peter
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> What year was volume 49 (2) ??
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Has the XMCA community discussed Bibler's way of orienting to
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> education
>>>
>>>
>>>>  and its purpose as *humanistic*.  Seeing *reason* as developing
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> distinct
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> formations historically and these various formations continuing to be
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *dialogue* within contemporary ways of understanding.  The current
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> scientific mode/genre of reasoning as a particular formation
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> expressing
>>>
>>>
>>>>  particular assumptions which can be put in dialogue with earlier
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> formations
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> that CONTINUE to inform contemporary reasoning processes.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I will elaborate by referring to chapter 7 [The Life of Ideas] in
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Alex
>>>
>>>
>>>>  Kozulin's book *Vygotsky's Psychology*. Onn page 254 is an outline of
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> how
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Kozulin views Vygotsky's legacy developing in the 1970's & 1980's.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>  Kozulin wrote:
>>>>>>>> "To give some idea of how Vygotsky's theoretical legacy was
>>>>>>>> developed
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> the 1970's and 1980's  I will concentrate on three directions. The
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> first
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> direction  included a constructive critique of Vygotsky's notion of
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> *scientific* concepts and the development of  a new program for the
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> study
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> of theoretical concept formation in schoolchildren. The second
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> direction
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> research was associated with the fundamental epistemological
>>>>>>>> critique
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>  of
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> psychology based on the natural-scientific model and the proposals
>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> NEW HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY and psychotherapy.  The third direction
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> explored
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> the philosophical importance of Vygotsky's work together with the
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> work
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Bahktin.. The problem of the dialogical nature of human consciousness
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> came
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> to the forefront and proposals were made for a new logic based on a
>>>>>>>> dialogue between different *cultures of thinking*"
>>>>>>>> Kozulin in chapter 7 then expands his understanding of each of these
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> three
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> directions.
>>>>>>>> The second direction [a new humanistic psychology] references
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Vasilyk's
>>>
>>>
>>>>  book *The Psychology of Experiencing* as an example of this new
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> direction.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Vasilyk contrasts *defense mechanisms* with the notion of
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *overcoming*
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> by
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *living through* crisis. The individual *lives through* a crisis ONLY
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> by
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> plugging into the *sociocultural schemas* that are supra-individual.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> At
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> same time *plugging into* the sociocultural schemas does NOT lift
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> requirement of *authoring* [overcoming] but rather emphasizes
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *authoring*.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Overcoming/authoring is impossible without sociocultural schemas but
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> can
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> be accomplished only in a highly individual way. In Vasilyk's book
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> idea
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> of *psychological tools* was EXTENDED to include the sociocultural
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> schemas
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> of religious character AND the critical issue of the issue of
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> MEDIATION
>>>
>>>
>>>>  THROUGH THE  SIGNIFICANT OTHER is explored. Kozulin suggests Vasilyk
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> is
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> an
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> example of this second new direction Vygotsky's legacy extended
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> within
>>>
>>>
>>>>  humanistic psychology.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The third direction opened up by Vygotsky's legacy in the 1970's and
>>>>>>>> 1980's is the theme of *dialogical* human nature.
>>>>>>>> Vladimir Bibler is exploring one particular type or genre within
>>>>>>>> dialogical notions of human nature. [the dialogue between different
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> SYSTEMS
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> OF LOGIC].
>>>>>>>> Bibler suggests the represented object is different in different
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *systems
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> of thought*.   Kozulin writes:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> "The dialogue of these systems would REVEAL the object as
>>>>>>>> *encircled*
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> by
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> different forms of cognitive representation, no one of which is
>>>>>>> either
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> final or *encompassing*. Such a dialogue, however, is impossible as
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> long
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> the scientific inquiry is taken as the prototype of THE logic of
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> human
>>>
>>>
>>>>  thought. Scientific epistemology, as it was formulated in the
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> seventeenth
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> through the nineteenth centuries PRESUPPOSES a continuous progression
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> thought and the SUBLATION of the achievements of the past into new,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> HIGHER
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> forms of theorizing. Such a prototype would not allow for a truly
>>>>>>>> dialogical relationship between DIFFERENT SYSTEMS, because one of
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> them
>>>
>>>
>>>>  should necessarily appear as a special case of the MORE DEVELOPED
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> one."
>>>
>>>
>>>>  [page 270]
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Kozulin goes on in referring to Vladimir Bibler's project to say:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> " While Vygotsk's study of inner speech suggested to Bibler the
>>>>>>>> psychological model of the process of thought formation, Bahktin'a
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> analysis
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> of the novel armed him with the philosophy of culture BASED on the
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> idea
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> dialogue.... What is meant by Bahktin is NOT an explicit, overt
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> dialogue
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> which two voices are engaged, but an INNER dialogic quality of a
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> text,
>>>
>>>
>>>>  EVERY ELEMENT of which is incorporating the overtones of other texts.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> sometimes hidden dialogic NATURE OF A TEXT is a REFLECTION of the
>>>>>>>> essentially dialogical nature of human consciousness. At this moment
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> it
>>>
>>>
>>>>  seems relevant to recall Vygotsky's distinction between consciousness
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> intellect. Intellect, and its OBJECTIVIZED FORM, scientific
>>>>>>> reasoning,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> MONOLOGOUS and object-oriented, while consciousness, which is
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ORGANIZED
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> by
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> the system of *senses* is NECESSARILY dialogical.  That is why
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> language,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> according to Vygotsky, is a microcosm of the human consciousness
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> rather
>>>
>>>
>>>>  than that of the intellect." [page 271]
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Peter, I have ventriloquated Kozulin's voice [and also other voices
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> from
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Kozulin's *readings*.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The concept *sociocultural schemas* was used by Kozulin to explore
>>>>>>>> DISTINCT formations of reason within particular epochs. His central
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> point
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> is that these formations are NOT sublated but continue to *plug in*
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> contempory formations of reason* [as dialogically emergent] Vladimir
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Bibler
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> has attempted within the *School of Cultural Dialogues* to help
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> students
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> learn to think and converse in each of these DISTINCT forms of
>>>>>>> reason.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> He
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> assumes that by learning to *plug in* each type [genre] a student can
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> also
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> learn to see the dialogical nature of our current way of scientific
>>>>>>>> reasoning as one particular type and not a universal capacity.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Then a student can learn to be more playful and flexible with the
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> multiple
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> types of reasoning that continue to develop in our ongoing
>>>>>>>> interplay.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I'm curious if the 3 directions Kozulin was *reading* into
>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's
>>>>>>>> legacy in the 1970's and 1980's are continuing to inform Vygotsky's
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> legacy
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> or is Kozulin's *reading* a minor stream of Vygotsky in-search and
>>>>>>>> re-search?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Peter, thanks for the lead to the JREEP article's on Bibler.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> So many varied *readings* Of Vygotsky to try to understand and
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> interpret
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Larry
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Kozulin's book on Vygotsky has
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 12:09 PM, Peter Smagorinsky <smago@uga.edu>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Eugene Matusov edited an issue of JREEP dedicated to the School of
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Dialogue of Cultures. Journal of Russian and East European
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Psychology,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 49(2), http://www.mesharpe.com/mall/results1.asp?ACR=rpo
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Peter Smagorinsky
>>>>>>>>> Distinguished Research Professor of English Education Department of
>>>>>>>>> Language and Literacy Education The University of Georgia
>>>>>>>>> 315 Aderhold Hall
>>>>>>>>> Athens, GA 30602
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
>>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry
>>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces+Purss
>>>>>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, May 14, 2014 10:56 AM
>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Bibler's concept of "formations of Reasoning"
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Valdimir Bibler was recently mentioned on this site. He has
>>>>>>>>> participated in creating the "School of the Dialogue of Cultures"
>>>>>>>>> which uses as its central construct "formations or systems of
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> reasoning".
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Kozulin refers to this construct as "sociocultural schemas"
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Binswanger refers to "world designs"
>>>>>>>>> Gadamer refers to "horizons of understanding"
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> This construct does not see knowledge as *sublated* but each new
>>>>>>>>> *formation* enters into dialogue with previous formations of
>>>>>>>>> consciousness AND knowledge is the process OF REVEALING the
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> dialogical
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> nature of this EMERGING encounter between formations of *reasoning*
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Bibler has developed a school system where students engage in USING
>>>>>>>>> these various formations of histrorically developed *reasons* as
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> world-designs.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I'm fascinated with the family resemblance with Gadmer and
>>>>>>>>> Binswanger's ideas as sharing common intersections.
>>>>>>>>> Larry
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>