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[Xmca-l] Re: Intellect and consciousness



David, there is terminology, categorical distinctions, and the content of the science. Almost self-evidently, Thinking and Speech broke off at the threshold of the content of the science, and regretably, being a pioneer meant that his terminology was also unstable and rudimentary. My claim was that T&S was decisive in relaiton to the categorical distinctions underlying the science, despite the terminological mess.

I read Vygotsky as a Marxist, rather than as a linguist or a Phenomenologist or a teacher, all of which are I am sure legitimate standpoints for reading Vygotsky. But I think there is some basis for taking it that Vygotsky is using "consciousness" in line with Marxist terminology at the time indicating the entire class of phenomena encompassed by a general psychology, perhaps similar to what you mean by "general consciousness"? As to the distinction between "dialogical consciousness" and "intellect", if we are restricting "dialogic consciousnes" typologically to language use, then I think that that is too unstable and problematic for a categorical distinction. If on the other than we were to widen the meaning of "dialogical" to sign-use, then I would identify it with intellect. The spoken word is the *archetype* of sign-use, but not the only instance of sign-use.

I remain of the view that T&S, and in particular thes closing lines, specify that he has devoted the book to a study of the *intellect* (the special) as a paradigmatic exemplar for psychological research into human *consciousness* (as a whole).


Andy
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
http://home.mira.net/~andy/


David Kellogg wrote:
I certainly don't think we can say, surely or otherwise, that the last
words of "Thinking and Speech" put an end to the matter. After all, what
Vygotsky himself said, in the first words of the book, was that the
investigation was broken off at the threshold.

Mike's question is about where and when Vygotsky made a clear distinction
between consciousness and intellect. Even if we agree that what is meant by
"consciousness" is not dialogic consciousness but merely consciousness of
sensation, we still need a term for dialogic consciousness. I also think
that using the term "consciousness" to refer to consciousness of
sensation leaves a gap--we no longer have a clear, unambiguous term for
general consciousness of which consciousness of sensation, dialogic
consciousness and intellect are all parts.

David Kellogg
Hankuk University of Foreign Studies



On 21 May 2014 00:14, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:

Andy, David

Mike's question is generating answers.
Andy, you quoted:

 "In consciousness, the word is what - in Feuerbach's words - is absolutely
impossible for one person but possible for two. The word is the most direct
manifestation of the historical nature of human
consciousness. Consciousness is reflected in the word like the sun is
reflected in a droplet of water. The word is a microcosm of consciousness"

The key seems to be the word is absolutely IMPOSSIBLE for one person but
possible for two. [dialectical. AND dialogical]

Volosinov wrote: "Language lives and historically evolves IN CONCRETE
verbal communication/Intercourse, neither in the abstract/linquistic forms
of language NOR in the individual psyche of the speakers."

Bahktin wrote:  "Actual act-performing thinking is an emotional-volitional
thinking, a thinking that INTONATES and THIS intonation permeates in an
ESSENTIAL manner in moments of a thought's content."

Vygotsky wrote:  "The one who begins by separating thinking from affect
forever CLOSES the way to an explication of the causes of thinking .... and
makes conversely also impossible the investigation of the reverse action of
thought on the affective-volitive side of psychological life."

Wolff-Miichael Roth wrote: "In a section of *Thought and Language* where
the scholar focuses on the changes of signification IN THE LIVING PROCESS
of verbal thinking, he provides a description of a continuous coming and
going that relates two processes, thinking and speaking, themselves
manifestations of a higher process, WORD-SIGNIFICATION. Vygotsky does NOT
say that one of the processes constitutes a dialectical inversion of the
other; instead he emphasizes the back and forth BETWEEN the processes. The
back and forth IS a DEVELOPING [rather than] constant process As a result
of the of THIS coming and going, a thought, which BEGINS as something VAGUE
develops into a fully articulated idea. The word, for Vygotsky, is NOT an
expression of thought; rather thought BECOMES fully itself ONLY IN
SPEAKING, the voice NEVER is cut off from the idea."

Wolf-Michael uses the metaphor [internal engine] in this statement:
A speaker "is not just dumping the contents of his mind into the public
forum, but that he [the speaker] is taking up and thefefore evaluating, the
preceding locution(Bahktin 1978) which is in FACT the internal engine that
DRIVES the development of speech activity generally AND its moments, the
individual utterances (understood as an irreducuible social phenomenon
specifically (Volosinov, 1930; Vygotskij, 2005) "

I hope these quotes gesture to *the engine that drives* intonation and
prosody [hearing and seeing as material processes] WITHIN dialectical and
dialogical INTERNAL RELATIONS.


larry







On Mon, May 19, 2014 at 5:12 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:

The last words of Thinking and Speech surely put an end to the matter

   http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/words/Chapter7.pdf

   "The /consciousness of sensation/ and /thinking/ are characterized
   by different modes of reflecting reality. They aredifferent types of
   consciousness."

Immediate sensuous awareness and intellect are *different types of
consciousness*.

   "Therefore, thinking and speech are the key to understanding the
   nature of human consciousness."

Intellect is the *key* to understanding consciousness, because by
understanding just the one, the most developed type of consciousness in
its
special formation, we unlock the whole ("the hand of man is the key to
anatomy of the ape")

But if you equate the highest with the lowest and the microcosm with the
unit, then you may not read this the same way,

   "If language is as ancient as consciousness itself, if language is
   consciousness that exists in practice for other people and therefore
   for myself, then it is not only the development of thought but the
   development of consciousness as a whole that is connected with the
   development of the word. Studies consistently demonstrate that the
   word plays a central role not in the isolated functions but the
   whole of consciousness. In consciousness, the word is what - in
   Feuerbach's words - is absolutely impossible for one person but
   possible for two. The word is the most direct manifestation of the
   historical nature of human consciousness.
   Consciousness is reflected in the word like the sun is reflected in
   a droplet of water. The word is a microcosm of consciousness,
   related to consciousness like a living cell is related to an
   organism, like an atom is related to the cosmos. The meaningful word
   is a microcosm of human consciousness."


Andy

------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
http://home.mira.net/~andy/


David Kellogg wrote:

But I think Mike's specific question is a good one, and it cries out
for a
specific answer. Where exactly does Vygotsky speak of "consciousness" as
distinct from "intellect"? He certainly discusses consciousness a lot;
it
is the "topic that will not speak its name" throughout the whole of
"Thinking and Speech", and one can easily understand why Zavershneva
thinks
that "Thinking and Speech" is only the prologue of a much longer trilogy
on
consciousness. He also discusses intellect alot; it is the explicit
topic
of most of HDHMF, and part of his outrage over "intelligence" testing in
Chapter Fourteen and "accelerated development" in his Lectures on
Pedology
is his anger that intellect could be reduced to a kind of ontogenetic
speeding. But where does Vygotsky distinguish the one from the other?

The best answer I can come up with is Chapter Six of "Thinking and
Speech",
where Vygotsky places inner speech at the extreme dialogic end of a
continuum which has oral speech in the middle and written speech at the
far
monologic end. Of course, this assumes that "inner speech" is a
realization
of consciousness and that "written speech" is a realization of
intellect,
and that seems a leap too far for Kozulin: both are both. So perhaps the
solution is to consider some mediating layer--some form of meaning
potential which realizes consciousness and is realized as inner speech,
and
some other form of meaning potential that realizes intellect and is
realized as writing. That's where, I think, Larry is going when he
brings
in Bakhtin and genre: dialogues at the end of consciousness and
narratives
at the end of intellect: the two modes of consciousness/intellect--the
episodic and the narrativistic--discussed by Strawson in a paper
discussed
by xmca a few years ago.

My graduate students are trying to write a version of Shakespeare's "The
Tempest" for children. This morning one of them condensed the whole of
Act
One (except the actual tempest) into the following dialogue:

Miranda: Father--soften the storm. Where is my lover?
Prospero: Don't worry. No one died. Your lover's coming.

(Miranda sleeps)

Ariel: Great Master! I did what you asked.
Prospero: Where are the king's ship and the passengers?
Ariel: They are all safe. The king's ship is in the harbor.

(Prospero goes to look.)

Ariel: Come unto these yellow sands....!
Ferdinand: Where does the music come from? It softens my fury....

(Ferdinand finds the sleeping Miranda.)

You can see--from the parenthetic stage directions, but above all from
the
missing intellectations--that dialogue cannot do it all. We need some
narrative here as well! And when we go back to Shakespeare's original
text
we do find that most of Act One consists of Prospero's narrative to the
distracted Miranda.

David Kellogg
Hankuk University of Foreign Studies





On 19 May 2014 22:42, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:



Mike, Peter
Thanks for keeping this thread moving.

Mike, your reflection on models of schooling *expanding beyond* the
ethnocentrism of Bibler's model seems to be an underlying *value* built
into the model.
The model seems to  presume multiple logics and rationalities [cultural
historical formations or schemas] and therefore Eurocentric formations
within this model must also be transfigured through dialogue.

Bibler's approach focuses on learning multiple particular schemas
through
an *immersion* experience at each grade level. The intent is to live
through the experience of *knowing* within each sociocultural schema
by the approach of reading the *primary documents* and developing the
unique *logic/value* of that particular schema. [various grades in
school
offer immersion experiences in different logic formations]

This approach would hopefully develop within each person a polylogical
sensibility that would situate the scientific logic of our current
sociocultural schema as only one particular formation which could be
put
into dialogue with previous formations which are seen as equally valid
formations that continue to enter interplay with our scientific biases.

To *extend* and *go beyond* the ethnocentrism of Bibler's model which
is
biased toward *Eurocentric presuppositions* seems to be a natural
extension
of the model.

Mike,
I read Alex Kozulin writings on Bibler's approach as an example of
Vygotsky's writings on *inner speech* being put into dialogue with
Bahktin's writings on *readings and genres* as formations of
consciousness.
The reciprocal movements of orientation moving towards *internal*
speech*
AND the interplay with the movements of orientation moving towards
cultural
historical schemas. How these movements of orientation are linked
*hinges*
or *pivots* on this reciprocal interplay.

This seems to offer a model of schooling AS reciprocal conversations
developing *thinking*, *speech*, and *readings* as mutually reciprocal
intersubjective experiences.

The underlying movement of answerability as responding to emerging
questions that is moving *beyond* received knowledge formations/logics
by
the process of *living through* and exploring the concealed logics
within
each schema.
The centrality of *gaps* and *openings* emerging within all received
*knowings* which then *call us* into dialogue and re-search and
experiments
[as dialogical ways of orienting] which develop through dialogue and
the
reciprocal engagement of self-reflection AND intersubjective
reflection.
The question Alex Kozulin leaves open is the notion of *higher forms*
*sublating* earlier formations OR if these earlier formations are
continually in dialogue with later formations.

The concept *sociocultural schemas* is the notion Alex Kozulin explored
in
his book inviting us to re-engage this concept within a revitalized
*humanism*. Bibler's approach to schooling is one particular answer to
Kozulin's general question of how do we engage with *sociocultural
schemas*
as dialogically developing formations.
I read Kozulin's question as a movement of going beyond received
traditions
while honouring these traditions. Moving through *Eurocentrism* to go
*beyond* and embrace other sociocultural schemas in dialogue with
*Eurocentric* models is an approach of deepening our conversations
AS questions and answers. Conversations as gestures within genres. This
approach has the potential to develop polylogical ways of orienting as
we
move forward within a new expanding humanism of communicative action.

Alex may have more to contribute on this theme of sharing mutual
dialogue
towards finding *common ground* within a new commons
Larry






On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 6:34 PM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:



Thank you for sending your overview of the papers based Bibler's ideas


and


their pedagogical implications, Peter. And thanks for the succinct


summary


from Alex Kozulin, Larry.

To me it seems that the only way to overcome the ethnocentricism in
the
model is to make the conversation a global polylogue, Peter. Creating
the
conditions for such a polylogue within the structures of state or


business


scientific structure of power seems a real challenge, even for the


wealthy.


What source(s) does one take as the purpose of education, as a social
category and its related social institutions of implementation?


Constantly


posing the questions seems one source. Creating alternatives seems


another.


One hopes that where there is a way there will also be a will!

We'll see.

Meantime, I had a question about the quotation from Alex's work, so I


will


include him the discussion, the contents of which he knows far better


than


I. The statement that caught my eye was this:

At this moment it seems relevant to recall Vygotsky's distinction
between
consciousness and intellect. Intellect, and its OBJECTIVIZED FORM,
scientific reasoning, are MONOLOGOUS and object-oriented, while
consciousness, which is ORGANIZED by the system of *senses* is


NECESSARILY


dialogical.

​Here is my question: Where is this well known distinction between
consciousness and intellect best represented in Vygotsky's writings?

((It seems important to suggest that a consciously organized system of
senses
(as in sense/meaning) would be polylogical, that is, ideally, global.
Binary systems, in particular, seem to be unstable in ways that are
not
condusive to human develpment.))

mike

​

On Thu, May 15, 2014 at 4:10 AM, Peter Smagorinsky <smago@uga.edu>


wrote:


Here's my contribution.
Smagorinsky, P. (2011). A distant perspective on the School of the
Dialogue of Cultures pedagogical movement in Ukraine and Russia.


Journal
of


Russian and East European Psychology, 49(2), 29-35. Available at
http://www.petersmagorinsky.net/About/PDF/JREEP/JREEP2011.pdf

Peter Smagorinsky
Distinguished Research Professor of English Education
Department of Language and Literacy Education
The University of Georgia
315 Aderhold Hall
Athens, GA 30602

Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education

Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga



-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss
Sent: Wednesday, May 14, 2014 10:14 PM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Bibler's concept of "formations of Reasoning"

Thanks, Peter

What year was volume 49 (2) ??

Has the XMCA community discussed Bibler's way of orienting to
education
and its purpose as *humanistic*.  Seeing *reason* as developing


distinct
formations historically and these various formations continuing to be
in
*dialogue* within contemporary ways of understanding.  The current
scientific mode/genre of reasoning as a particular formation
expressing
particular assumptions which can be put in dialogue with earlier


formations


that CONTINUE to inform contemporary reasoning processes.

I will elaborate by referring to chapter 7 [The Life of Ideas] in
Alex
Kozulin's book *Vygotsky's Psychology*. Onn page 254 is an outline of


how
Kozulin views Vygotsky's legacy developing in the 1970's & 1980's.
 Kozulin wrote:
"To give some idea of how Vygotsky's theoretical legacy was developed


in
the 1970's and 1980's  I will concentrate on three directions. The
first
direction  included a constructive critique of Vygotsky's notion of
*scientific* concepts and the development of  a new program for the


study
of theoretical concept formation in schoolchildren. The second
direction
of


research was associated with the fundamental epistemological critique


 of
psychology based on the natural-scientific model and the proposals for
the


NEW HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY and psychotherapy.  The third direction


explored


the philosophical importance of Vygotsky's work together with the
work
of
Bahktin.. The problem of the dialogical nature of human consciousness
came


to the forefront and proposals were made for a new logic based on a
dialogue between different *cultures of thinking*"
Kozulin in chapter 7 then expands his understanding of each of these


three


directions.
The second direction [a new humanistic psychology] references
Vasilyk's
book *The Psychology of Experiencing* as an example of this new


direction.


Vasilyk contrasts *defense mechanisms* with the notion of
*overcoming*
by
*living through* crisis. The individual *lives through* a crisis ONLY
by
plugging into the *sociocultural schemas* that are supra-individual.
At
the


same time *plugging into* the sociocultural schemas does NOT lift the
requirement of *authoring* [overcoming] but rather emphasizes


*authoring*.


Overcoming/authoring is impossible without sociocultural schemas but


can
be accomplished only in a highly individual way. In Vasilyk's book the
idea


of *psychological tools* was EXTENDED to include the sociocultural


schemas


of religious character AND the critical issue of the issue of
MEDIATION
THROUGH THE  SIGNIFICANT OTHER is explored. Kozulin suggests Vasilyk
is
an


example of this second new direction Vygotsky's legacy extended
within
humanistic psychology.

The third direction opened up by Vygotsky's legacy in the 1970's and
1980's is the theme of *dialogical* human nature.
Vladimir Bibler is exploring one particular type or genre within
dialogical notions of human nature. [the dialogue between different


SYSTEMS


OF LOGIC].
Bibler suggests the represented object is different in different


*systems
of thought*.   Kozulin writes:
"The dialogue of these systems would REVEAL the object as *encircled*


by
different forms of cognitive representation, no one of which is either
final or *encompassing*. Such a dialogue, however, is impossible as


long
as


the scientific inquiry is taken as the prototype of THE logic of
human
thought. Scientific epistemology, as it was formulated in the


seventeenth
through the nineteenth centuries PRESUPPOSES a continuous progression
of
thought and the SUBLATION of the achievements of the past into new,
HIGHER


forms of theorizing. Such a prototype would not allow for a truly
dialogical relationship between DIFFERENT SYSTEMS, because one of
them
should necessarily appear as a special case of the MORE DEVELOPED
one."
[page 270]

Kozulin goes on in referring to Vladimir Bibler's project to say:

" While Vygotsk's study of inner speech suggested to Bibler the
psychological model of the process of thought formation, Bahktin'a


analysis


of the novel armed him with the philosophy of culture BASED on the
idea
of


dialogue.... What is meant by Bahktin is NOT an explicit, overt


dialogue
in


which two voices are engaged, but an INNER dialogic quality of a
text,
EVERY ELEMENT of which is incorporating the overtones of other texts.


This


sometimes hidden dialogic NATURE OF A TEXT is a REFLECTION of the
essentially dialogical nature of human consciousness. At this moment
it
seems relevant to recall Vygotsky's distinction between consciousness


and
intellect. Intellect, and its OBJECTIVIZED FORM, scientific reasoning,
are


MONOLOGOUS and object-oriented, while consciousness, which is
ORGANIZED
by


the system of *senses* is NECESSARILY dialogical.  That is why


language,
according to Vygotsky, is a microcosm of the human consciousness
rather
than that of the intellect." [page 271]

Peter, I have ventriloquated Kozulin's voice [and also other voices


from
Kozulin's *readings*.
The concept *sociocultural schemas* was used by Kozulin to explore
DISTINCT formations of reason within particular epochs. His central


point
is that these formations are NOT sublated but continue to *plug in* to
contempory formations of reason* [as dialogically emergent] Vladimir


Bibler


has attempted within the *School of Cultural Dialogues* to help


students
learn to think and converse in each of these DISTINCT forms of reason.
He
assumes that by learning to *plug in* each type [genre] a student can
also


learn to see the dialogical nature of our current way of scientific
reasoning as one particular type and not a universal capacity.

Then a student can learn to be more playful and flexible with the


multiple


types of reasoning that continue to develop in our ongoing interplay.

I'm curious if the 3 directions Kozulin was *reading* into Vygotsky's
legacy in the 1970's and 1980's are continuing to inform Vygotsky's


legacy


or is Kozulin's *reading* a minor stream of Vygotsky in-search and
re-search?

Peter, thanks for the lead to the JREEP article's on Bibler.

So many varied *readings* Of Vygotsky to try to understand and


interpret
Larry

Kozulin's book on Vygotsky has


On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 12:09 PM, Peter Smagorinsky <smago@uga.edu>


wrote:


Eugene Matusov edited an issue of JREEP dedicated to the School of
the
Dialogue of Cultures. Journal of Russian and East European
Psychology,
49(2), http://www.mesharpe.com/mall/results1.asp?ACR=rpo
Peter Smagorinsky
Distinguished Research Professor of English Education Department of
Language and Literacy Education The University of Georgia
315 Aderhold Hall
Athens, GA 30602

Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education

Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga


-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry
xmca-l-bounces+Purss
Sent: Wednesday, May 14, 2014 10:56 AM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: [Xmca-l] Bibler's concept of "formations of Reasoning"

Valdimir Bibler was recently mentioned on this site. He has
participated in creating the "School of the Dialogue of Cultures"
which uses as its central construct "formations or systems of


reasoning".
Kozulin refers to this construct as "sociocultural schemas"
Binswanger refers to "world designs"
Gadamer refers to "horizons of understanding"

This construct does not see knowledge as *sublated* but each new
*formation* enters into dialogue with previous formations of
consciousness AND knowledge is the process OF REVEALING the


dialogical
nature of this EMERGING encounter between formations of *reasoning*
Bibler has developed a school system where students engage in USING
these various formations of histrorically developed *reasons* as


world-designs.


I'm fascinated with the family resemblance with Gadmer and
Binswanger's ideas as sharing common intersections.
Larry